Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, October 8, 2026, are:

Re:                 Cortes, Juan M. vs. Ford Motor Company

Case No.:   VCU323325

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Facts

Defendant Ford moves for summary judgment, or adjudication of the following issues:

Issue No. 1: Ford is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for Breach of Express Warranty, on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot present evidence to prove the essential elements of their claims because Ford had approved the repurchase and was actively processing it before Plaintiffs filed suit.

Issue No. 2: Ford is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ second cause of action for Breach of Implied Warranty, on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot present evidence to prove the essential elements of their claims because Ford had approved the repurchase and was actively processing it before Plaintiffs filed suit.

Issue No. 3: Ford is entitled to summary judgment and/or summary adjudication on Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b), on the grounds that Plaintiffs cannot present evidence to prove the essential elements of that claim because Ford had approved the repurchase and was actively processing it before Plaintiffs filed suit.

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this action on July 2, 2025. The Complaint asserts three causes of action against Ford: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act — Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act — Breach of Implied Warranty; and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act, Section 1793.2(b). (UMF No. 12.)

The vehicle at issue is a 2020 Ford Explorer, VIN 1FMSK7DH5LGB22100 (the “Subject Vehicle”). (UMF No. 1.) Plaintiffs Juan M. Cortes and Maria G. Zarate de Magdaleno purchased the Subject Vehicle on February 8, 2020. (UMF No. 2.)

Ford received Plaintiffs’ prelitigation lemon-law demand letter, dated May 30, 2025, on June 9, 2025. (UMF No. 3.)

Beginning the day after receipt, Ford’s Consumer Affairs Team initiated a Good Faith Review of Plaintiffs’ demand and requested information from Plaintiffs by email dated June 10, 2025, a second email dated June 16, 2025, and a follow-up voicemail on June 19, 2025. (UMF No. 4.)

Plaintiffs did not respond to Ford's requests for information. (UMF No. 5.)

Ford completed its Good Faith Review on June 24, 2025, and approved the repurchase of the Subject Vehicle. (UMF No. 6.)

On June 26, 2025, Ford's Reacquired Vehicle (RAV) team received and accepted the case. (UMF No. 7.)

On June 26, 2025, Ford sent Plaintiffs a written letter (signed by Repurchase Coordinator Carrie Rush) stating that Ford had conducted a good faith evaluation and would like to repurchase the Subject Vehicle, and requesting the documents needed to calculate and process the repurchase refund, including the finance contract or sales agreement, vehicle registration, title (if applicable), an itemized payment history from Plaintiffs’ lender, and a payoff quote from Plaintiffs’ lender. Ford also assigned a Repurchase Coordinator to handle the matter further. (UMF No. 8.)

Also on June 26, 2025, the assigned Repurchase Coordinator also sent Plaintiffs an email confirming that Ford intended to repurchase the Subject Vehicle and asking to arrange a time to discuss the repurchase. (UMF No. 9.)

On July 2, 2025, the Repurchase Coordinator sent Plaintiffs an email, in Spanish, summarizing the repurchase process and the Repurchase (Buyback) and Cash-and-Keep settlement options, and again requesting the documents and information needed to formulate a formal offer, including the vehicle's current registration, the title (front and back) if paid in full, the finance contract, the bill of sale or buyer's order, the driver's licenses of the titled owners, a payoff quote from the lienholder (including per diem interest, the account number, and an overnight payoff address), and an itemized payment history from the lienholder. (UMF No. 10.)

As of July 2, 2025, Ford had approved the repurchase of the Subject Vehicle, had communicated that approval to Plaintiffs in writing, had assigned a Repurchase Coordinator, and was still awaiting the sales contract, the itemized payment history, and the payoff quote requested to calculate and process the repurchase refund. (UMF No. 11.)

Ford filed its Answer to the Complaint on August 13, 2025, asserting, among other defenses, a Fourth Affirmative Defense for waiver, estoppel, and/or laches. (UMF No. 13.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs dispute that there was repurchase offer made that could be accepted in compliance with the Song Beverly requirements. (Plaintiff’s Disputes to UMF Nos. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11.)

Plaintiffs add that Ford’s June 26, 2025 letter contains no numerical repurchase or restitution amount and the June 26 letter requests financial and vehicle documents and invites Plaintiffs to provide other documents that would assist Ford in calculating the repurchase amount. (AUMF Nos. 5, 6.) Further that the June 26 letter states Plaintiffs would have an opportunity later in the process to review the financial terms of Ford’s repurchase and states vehicle turn-in and the refund check would occur only after the requested documents were provided and the numbers confirmed. (AUMF Nos. 7, 8.)

Further that the Declaration of Pannel indicates Ford requested the documents to calculate the repurchase amount and process the refund. (AUMF No. 9.) Additionally, that Ford’s June 26 email from Carrie Rush contains no repurchase amount and asks only to arrange a time to discuss the case. (AUMF No. 10.)

The Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections to the Declaration of Pannell.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

First Cause of Action — Violation of Song-Beverly Act-Breach of Express Warranty

"To succeed on a claim for breach of an express warranty for a vehicle, the buyer plaintiff must prove that (1) the vehicle had a defect or nonconformity covered by a written warranty that substantially impaired the vehicle's use, value, or safety to a reasonable person in plaintiff's shoes (the nonconformity element); (2) the vehicle was presented to an authorized representative of the manufacturer for repair (the presentation element); (3) the manufacturer or its authorized repair facility did not repair the defect after a reasonable number of repair attempts (the failure to repair element); and (4) the manufacturer did not promptly replace or repurchase the vehicle from the plaintiff (the failure to replace or repurchase element). [Citations.]" (Carver v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 864, 879.)

Defendant argues that it provided a valid repurchase offer in accordance with the requirements of Song Beverly and Plaintiffs’ failure to accept the offer precludes recovery in this matter.

In Carver, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's summary adjudication of plaintiff's express warranty claim because plaintiff could not prove that the defendant manufacturer failed to replace or repurchase plaintiff's vehicle where the manufacturer made an act-compliant offer to repurchase the vehicle, one which the plaintiff declined. (Id. at 879.)

The court found a sufficient repurchase offer that contained the following terms:

“The financial terms of the repurchase offer included: (1) reimbursement of $8,542.85 to plaintiff; (2) payment of the outstanding lease obligation on the vehicle; and (3) reimbursement of $3,000 for plaintiff's attorney fees as a gesture of goodwill. [Defendant] calculated the reimbursement amount of $8,542.85 as follows: [Defendant] added $6,332 (plaintiff's down payment, which included the first month's payment) and $4,626.72 (the total lease payments made through April 2022, excluding the first month's payment). From that sum of $10,958.72, [Defendant] subtracted a statutory mileage offset of $2,415.87. The offset was calculated by dividing the number of miles plaintiff had driven before presenting the vehicle for repair (7,093 miles) by the vehicle's statutory life expectancy (120,000 miles), and multiplying the quotient by the value of the car at the time of the lease as stated in the lease agreement ($40,872.00).

The nonfinancial terms of the repurchase offer included: (1) surrendering the vehicle; (2) signing paperwork legally necessary to complete the transfer and providing [Defendant] with clear certificate of title; and (3) a confidentiality provision regarding the financial terms. The financial confidentiality provision stated: "In further consideration of [Defendant] agreement to repurchase the above-mentioned vehicle, [Plaintiff] must keep confidential the financial terms of this agreement, and therefore must not disclose the financial terms to anyone other than their attorney, accountant, or immediate family members. This provision is intended to comply with California Civil Code Section 1793.26, and nothing herein prohibits your client(s) from disclosing to any person the non-financial terms of this agreement or the nature of any alleged problem(s) with the vehicle." The repurchase offer also provided, "[i]f any consequential or incidental damages were incurred (for example, towing or rental car expenses resulting from the alleged nonconformity), please provide documentation as soon as possible, and [Defendant] will follow up with a revised offer if applicable.” (Id. at 873-874.)

Here, the June 26 correspondence lacked a dollar amount unlike the offer in Carver, including amounts required by Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(B). This is acknowledged by Defendant, who expressly requested additional information from Plaintiffs in order to calculate the repurchase amount. The June 26 correspondence further lacked discussion of other non-financial terms as contrasted to Carver. The correspondence also contained language such as “Ford…would like to repurchase your vehicle…To process your repurchase refund…”

“An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” (Donovan v. RRL Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 261, 271.) The Court finds that the June 26 correspondence was not a sufficient offer to which Plaintiffs could accept and which would thereafter form a binding contract between the parties as to repurchase.

The Court agrees that Dominguez v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 53 is distinguishable where the offers contained dollar amounts for the repurchase of the motorcycle, but where attorneys’ fees were in dispute.

Further that Rupay v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc. 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 180404 involved a replacement offer and is therefore not applicable.

Additionally, that offer in Gonzalez v. Ford Motor Co. 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 185279 appears to have complied with the standards set out in Song Beverly and Carver, containing sufficient financial terms of the repurchase and is therefore distinguishable here.

Finally, Nunez v. Ford Motor Co 2019 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 244614 is distinguishable where the plaintiff signed an initial letter discussing repurchase, checked the box for repurchase, and sent it back to Ford.

Therefore, the Court cannot find that Defendant made a compliant repurchase offer as a matter of law that precludes Plaintiff’s first cause of action. Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment and denies summary adjudication as to the first issue.

Second Cause of Action - Violation of Song-Beverly Act-Breach of Implied Warranty

If the manufacturer makes offer that exceeds the restitution amount required by Song-Beverly, a plaintiff cannot succeed on a breach of implied warranty claim, in the same way that the offer is an element of a claim for express warranty violations. (Carver, supra, 107 Cal. App. 5^th at  890.)

Therefore, under the same analysis above, the Court cannot find Defendant made a compliant repurchase offer as a matter of law that precludes Plaintiff’s second cause of action. As such, the Court denies summary adjudication as to the second issue.  

Third Cause of Action - Violation of the Civil Code section 1793.2(b)

Civil Code section 1793.2(b) states:

“(b) Where those service and repair facilities are maintained in this state and service or repair of the goods is necessary because they do not conform with the applicable express warranties, service and repair shall be commenced within a reasonable time by the manufacturer or its representative in this state. Unless the buyer agrees in writing to the contrary, the goods shall be serviced or repaired so as to conform to the applicable warranties within 30 days. Delay caused by conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer or its representatives shall serve to extend this 30-day requirement. Where delay arises, conforming goods shall be tendered as soon as possible following termination of the condition giving rise to the delay.”

Defendant argues that, under the same analysis as above, it approved the repurchase and was actively reprocessing it prior to the lawsuit. However, the lack of an offer to repurchase, under the same analysis, precludes summary adjudication of this issue, where Plaintiffs seek restitution, replacement, civil penalties, or other Song Beverly remedies based on Ford’s alleged failure to comply with section 1793.2(b).

Therefore, under the same analysis above, the Court cannot find Defendant made a compliant repurchase offer as a matter of law that precludes Plaintiff’s recovery of monetary relief under the third cause of action. As such, the Court denies summary adjudication as to the third issue. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                City of Tulare vs. Mai, Bin Liang

Case No.:   VCU294271

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      City’s Motion for Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Background Facts

Petitioner City of Tulare ("City") moved for and was granted appointment of receiver pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 17980.7(c) and for the receiver to take possession and control over the parcel of real property know as 3087 Hoyt Place, Tulare, CA 93274, Assessor's Parcel Number 172-290-040-000 (the "Property.")

The Court found that appointment was proper due to the failure of the owner, Bin Liang Mai ("Respondent"), to comply with the a Notice and Order to Abate Nuisance issued by the City on August 18, 2022, which was issued approximately 525 days ago. (Declaration of Weirick ¶5.) Prior to the most recent notice, the City issued several other notices on August 28, 2020,  August 31, 2020, October 5, 2020; March 3, 2021; April 21, 2021; and May 13, 2021. (Declaration of Weirick ¶5.)

Specifically, the City’s Code Enforcement Officer, Gregory Weirick, stated:

The Property is owned by Respondent and to the City's knowledge, there are no current occupants and have not been since at least August 28, 2020. (Declaration of Weirick ¶2, 3.) However, the Property, according to Weirick, has substantial overgrowth of vegetation posing a fire hazard and attracting vermin. (Declaration of Weirick ¶4.) Although the Property Owner once corrected overgrown vegetation issues, this issue has returned and has not been corrected. (Declaration of Weirick ¶14.)

The Property also contained an illegal cannabis grow which caused severe mold issues as it had an inadequate ventilation system. (Declaration of Weirick ¶12.) The Property also contains an altered HVAC system that was performed without a permit. (Declaration of Weirick ¶13.)

Relevant here, the Court’s October 1, 2025 order as to appointment of the receiver Mark Adams expressly noted “The Court reserves jurisdiction over identifying the prevailing party and recovery of fees and costs.”

On September 11, 2026, the City filed this motion to determine it as the prevailing party and for recovery of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $63,266.69.

The City notes that work on the Property was delayed as several additional hearings were required over the next several months, addressing Fannie Mae’s requests to limit the funding available to and authority of the Receiver based on federal protections of its lien interests and Respondent Mai’s Motion to Revoke/Terminate Receivership. (Stempniak Dec., ¶ 20.)

Further, that Respondent, throughout this process,  failed to maintain or repair the Property, blighting the local area and neglected to keep his loan obligations to Fannie Mae current. (Stempniak Dec., ¶ 23.) Accordingly, on or about May 19, 2026, the Property came under the control of Fannie Mae. (Stempniak Dec., ¶ 24.) The Property currently remains in a partially destroyed, unrepaired state. (Stempniak Dec., ¶ 25.)

In support of the fee request, the City provides redacted billing records.

In opposition, Respondent provides a declaration of counsel that reviews the various issues stated with the Property, the corrective action taken in the past by Respondent regarding the Property, that the Receiver thereafter failed to prevent further mold contamination and that the redacted billing precludes Respondent, and the Court, from assessing the fees requested in this matter.

Authority and Analysis

Basis for Fees

The City brings this pursuant to Health and Safety Code §§ 17980.7(c)(11) and (d)(1).

Health & Safety Code § 17980.7(c)(11) states that:

“(11) The prevailing party in an action pursuant to this section shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and court costs as may be fixed by the court.”

This provision specifically permits the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and court costs when a prevailing party seeks the appointment of a receiver for a substandard building. (Health & Saf. Code, § 17980.7(c).)

Health and Safety Code § 17980.7(d)(1) says:

“If the court finds that a building is in a condition which substantially endangers the health and safety of residents pursuant to Section 17980.6, upon the entry of any order or judgment, the court shall do all of the following: (1) Order the owner to pay all reasonable and actual costs of the enforcement agency including, but not limited to, inspection costs, investigation costs, enforcement costs, attorney fees or costs, and all costs of prosecution.”

Prevailing Party

City argues it is the prevailing party under the catalyst theory.

Under that theory “…an award of attorney fees may be appropriate where ‘plaintiffs' lawsuit was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought . . . .’ [citation omitted] A plaintiff will be considered a ‘successful party’ where an important right is vindicated ‘by activating defendants to modify their behavior.’” (Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 348, 353.) Moreover, when a court assessing litigation success, the court should be guided by equitable considerations and where the party has “…achieved it main litigation objective." (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140.)

Here, the City sought appointment of a receiver and abatement of the property at issue. Southern California Sunbelt Developers, Inc. v. Banyan Limited Partnership (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 910, 925 notes: "A receivership is designed to be merely a provisional remedy. It preserves the status quo of property while litigation is pending. ‘[T]he “appointment of a receiver in equity is not a substantive right; rather, it is an ancillary remedy which does not affect the ultimate outcome of the action.” [Citations.]’”

Here, a receiver was appointed, but the trust deed holder Fannie Mae has taken over the property and that will perform the repairs. The Respondent Mai, therefore, cannot be said to exactly have been activated to modify their behavior. Further, the receiver selected by the City proved to be ineffective and cost prohibitive.

The Court finds the City achieved little success here under a catalyst theory where, although it petitioned the Court to appoint a receiver, and a receiver was appointed, the City’s role in this process, based on the filings and appearances in Court over the last four years of litigation appears relatively limited. The issues with the property, apparently, have not been abated, the code violations not remedied, and the property not rehabilitated.

As the City states “While the Respondent was not ultimately successful in curing the defects in the Property, he became involved in the care for his Property only after the City filed its Petition.” Respondent becoming “involved in the the care” is an insufficient factual showing under the catalyst theory. “When a lawsuit has been mooted by a defendant's change in conduct, some development of the factual record is required in order to prevail on a catalyst theory. At the very least, a plaintiff must establish “ ‘the precise factual/legal condition that [it] sought to change or affect’ ” as a prerequisite for establishing the catalytic effect of its lawsuit. (Folsom, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 685.) Sometimes this factual background will have been developed in the course of litigation.” (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 576.) The Court does not find the factual record developed here or that Defendant’s change in conduct mooted the lawsuit. Rather, Fannie Mae’s taking over the Property, something not requested or prompted by the City or the Receiver, has mooted this lawsuit.

The Court does not find the City is the prevailing party under the catalyst theory and therefore denies the recovery of fees.

As noted above, Health and Safety Code section 19780.7(d)(1) requires the Court to find “a building is in a condition that substantially endangers the health and safety of residents pursuant to Section 17980.6.” The Court’s orders in this matter do not reflect a finding that a building was in a condition that substantially endangered the health and safety of residents pursuant tot Section 17980.6. At most, the orders reflect that “Petitioner alleges that Respondent BIN LIANG MAI (“Borrower”), the owner of the Property, failed to comply with the Health and Safety Code, allowed the Property to violate City Codes, and requested that the Property be repaired and rehabilitated.” (10-1-25 Order ¶2; 12-3-2025 Order ¶1.)

No judgment has been entered in this matter reflecting a finding of such a violation.

Therefore, the Court will not award attorneys’ fees or costs in this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Shuck, Cameron vs. Turning Point of Central California, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU318698

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter and CMC to October 29, 2026; 8:30 am; D1; to order a supplemental declaration as to the modification of the notice period to opt out or objection from 45 days to 90 days.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $308,926 )

This matter arises out of an alleged Cybersecurity Incident suffered by Defendant Turning Point in May 2024. Plaintiff alleges one or more unauthorized third parties potentially accessed the Settlement Class’s sensitive data including, but not limited to, name, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, patient account numbers, and health information, such as treatment and diagnosis.

On or about February 20, 2025, Defendant began sending out Notice Letters.

Plaintiff Shuck filed this action on February 26, 2025. Plaintiff Shuck alleges several causes of actions pertaining to the Cybersecurity Incident: (1) negligence; (2) violation of the California Consumer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82; (3) breach of implied contract; (4) violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56; (5) unfair business practices; and (6) unjust enrichment.

On April 30, 2025, the Court consolidated the other class action lawsuits filed by Plaintiffs Galvan, Garcia, and Moreno, into one action, Case No. VCU318698.

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on May 30, 2025, alleging the following causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied contract; (3) violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 56, et seq.; (4) violation of California’s Unfair Business Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.; (5) declaratory judgement; and (6) violation of the California Consumer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.80 et seq.

The gross settlement amount is $600,000.00.

Plaintiff estimates 53,000 proposed Settlement Class Members. The Settlement Class Members consists of:

“all U.S. residents whose Private Information may have been compromised as the result of the Cybersecurity Incident sustained by Turning Point in May 2024 and who received a Notice of Data Security Incident or Notice of Data Breach by Turning Point on or about February 2025 or thereafter” and

The California Subclass is defined as “all members of the Settlement Class who were California residents at the time of the Cybersecurity Incident that occurred in May 2024.”

All Settlement Class Members who submit a Claim Form are eligible to receive two years of three bureau Credit Monitoring Services.

All Settlement Class Members may also submit a claim for Documented Losses, up to a maximum of $5,000.00. Settlement Class Members may submit a claim for reimbursement upon presentment of reasonable Documented Losses arising from the Cybersecurity Incident.

In addition to, or in the alternative to, making Claims for Documented Losses, California Subclass Members may elect to receive a statutory cash payment of up to $100 (“California Statutory Payment”).

In the alternative to making Claims for Documented Losses and/or Claims for a California Statutory Payment, Settlement Class Members may elect to receive a Cash Payment of up to $300 on a claims-made basis.

Counsel indicates the relief obtained for Settlement Class Members is well within the range of approval, as compared to other data breach cases.

Defendant informally produced records related to the breach as to the Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The case appears to have resolved after multiple rounds of mediation sessions.

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case. (Declaration of Srourian ¶¶25-34, 59.)

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $600,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees and Costs (33.3%):	$200,000
Proposed Costs of Counsel (up to)	$10,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Shuck:	$3,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Galvan:	$3,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Garcia:	$3,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Moreno:	$3,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$69,074
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$308,926

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 45 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is not approved as to the objection and opt out period.

The Court notes the claims deadline is 90 days from notice date, which the Court approves.

With respect to the contents of the Notice, the Court finds the Notice to be reasonable.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs Shuck, Galvan, Garcia, and Moreno as class representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement awards to Plaintiffs are $3,000 each.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of up to $5,000 routinely and approves the awards as requested in the amount of $3,000.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees and costs no greater than of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $600,000 or $200,000 are sought in this matter.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that Srourian Law Firm, P.C. has spent 86.1 hours at rates ranging from $900 per hour to $200 per hour, that Milberg PLLC has incurred 41.1 hours at rates ranging from $902 to $277 per hour and that Kopelowitz Ostrow incurred 8.2 hours at rates ranging from $950 to $815 per hour, resulting in a base lodestar of $112,521.90.

To award the $200,000 requested, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.78. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of attorney fees and, in its discretion, rules that a 1.5 multiplier adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve 1.5 times the based lodestar or $168,782.85.

The Court notes that it will permit a declaration providing actual expended additional hours between preliminary approval and final approval as to any increase in this approved fee amount.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $5,973.58. The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $10,000 as requested.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Simpluris as the claims administrator for this class action.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. Class Certification for Settlement Purposes

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 53,000 individuals subject to the breach. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate the action. The Court finds a sufficient basis to conditionally certify the class for the purposes of settlement.

As such, the Court continues this matter to October 29, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 as to the modification of the notice period to opt out or objection from 45 days to 90 days. The remainder of the settlement is preliminarily approved, as modified above.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Aspire General Insurance Company vs. Carreon, Johnny et al

Case No.:   VCL309248

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Enforce Settlement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

Plaintiff sued Defendants Johnny Carreon and Valentin Carreon for subrogation in the amount of $14,966.98.

On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement, noting settlement would be complete July 30, 2029.

No dismissal of this matter has occurred.

On August 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the stipulation resolving this matter as a judgment. The stipulation states “judgment may be entered forthwith in favor of PLAINTIFF and against said DEFENDANTS, joint and severally for damages in the principal sum of $14,966.98 plus interest at the rate of five percent (5%) from September 3, 2023 and court costs.”

Further, that installment payments would be paid as follows:

(a) The sum of $250.00 shall be paid on or before the 15% of each month from July 15, 2024 to May 15, 2029; and

(b) The sum of $216.98 shall be paid on or before June 15, 2029.”

Plaintiff indicates that the last payment received was October 15, 2025 and that Defendants had made total payments of $2,750.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360)

As noted above, this case has not been dismissed and therefore the Court has retained jurisdiction.

Section 664.6 permits the Court to enter a judgment in strict conformance with the terms of a settlement agreement.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6(a) [“the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”]  Further, “if the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”  (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.)

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $ 14,903.46, consisting of the principal amount due of  $14,966.98 plus the costs of $546.00, plus interest at 5% from September 3, 2023 through July 13, 2026 in the amount of $2,140.48 less credit for the payments of $2,750.00.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Barraza, Arturo vs. FCA US LLC

Case No.:   VCU331406

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion; to deny the request for sanctions.

Facts

Plaintiff filed this Song Beverly action on February 10, 2026.

FCA filed its Answer on March 30, 2026,

On July 7, 2026, FCA electronically served its Notice of Initial Deposition of Plaintiff (the “Notice of Deposition”). The Notice of Deposition indicated that Plaintiff’s deposition would be taken remotely on July 24, 2026, at 10:00 a.m.

No objection was received.

However, it does not appear that Defendant proceeded with the deposition and obtained a record of nonappearance at the deposition.

Defendant seeks to compel Plaintiff’s deposition pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(c).

In opposition, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates an inability to presently contact Plaintiff, that Counsel wants Plaintiff’s deposition taken and that Counsel seeks denial of the request for sanctions.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(c) as a basis to compel the deposition of Plaintiff, which states, in pertinent part:

“(c) Within 120 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties have the right to conduct initial depositions, each not to exceed two hours, of the following deponents:

(1) The plaintiff…”

However, section 871.26 does not appear to provide an enforcement mechanism which would order compelling the deposition of Plaintiff.

Rather, subsection (j) indicates:

(j) Unless the party failing to comply with this section shows good cause, notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this chapter, a court shall impose sanctions as follows:

…

(2) A one-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($1,500) sanction against the plaintiff’s attorney or two-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) sanction against the defense attorney respectively, paid within 15 business days for failure to comply with the provisions relating to depositions as prescribed in subdivision (c).

(3) For a plaintiff’s repeated noncompliance with subdivision (b), (c), or (d), a court shall order the case dismissed without prejudice and the plaintiff’s attorney to be responsible for costs awarded to the manufacturer.

…

(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of subdivision (o) of Section 6068 of the Business and Professions Code, the court may, in its discretion, require an attorney who is sanctioned pursuant to this subdivision to report the sanction, in writing, to the State Bar of California within 30 days of the imposition of the sanction.”

As such, Defendant appears entitled to, at most $1,500 in sanctions under section 871.26, absent a showing of good cause by Plaintiff. However, the Court will, in the absence of an express section in 871.26 providing a procedure to compel the deposition of Plaintiff, require that Defendant comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450. As to the sanctions available, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates they have lost contact with Plaintiff and therefore the Court will not award sanctions at this time.

Section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

No motion to compel here lies where the deponent merely states they will not attend the deposition and no notice of nonappearance is placed on the record.

Proper service of a notice of deposition is effective to require the attendance of parties as well as compelling production of specified documents or electronically stored information at their deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280(a).)

Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, subdivision (b), provides that any deposition taken after the timely service of a valid objection cannot be used against the objecting party if the party did not attend the deposition, such objection mentioned in section 2025.410 relates to an error or irregularity in a deposition notice that does not comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 2025.210). (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)The types of objections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq., deal with procedural requirements such as when a defendant or plaintiff may serve a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.210), the contents required to be included in a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.220, 2025.230), to whom notice of the deposition must be given (CCP § 2025.240), the location of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.250, 2025.260), the number of days required to be given in advance of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.270), and the manner of service upon party deponents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280).

There is no indication the objections raised by Plaintiff pertained to any irregularity or error in the deposition notice, so there was no reason to believe that service of objections alone would have prevented Defendants from moving forward with the deposition. A notice that a party is unavailable, that the deposition was unilaterally set, and various substantive objections to the categories, are not one of such grounds as provided under Article 2, Chapter 9 of the Civil Discovery Act that would prevent the deposition from moving forward and from a nonappearance being recorded.

Therefore, Defendants cannot move for an order compelling Plaintiff’s attendance at deposition under section 2025.450 because Plaintiff has not "fail[ed] to appear for examination" at any time (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Acevedo, Claudia vs. Valley Healthcare Centers

Case No.:   VCU319349

Date:           October 8, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, as modified herein; to set the motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement for May 13, 2027; 8:30 am; D1. CMC is off calendar.

Background Facts

On September 24, 2026, this Court continued this motion for preliminary approval of class action and PAGA settlement and ordered a supplemental declaration as to as to the notice period, lodestar and presently incurred costs. On October 1, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing those issues.  

Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are now to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period is therefore approved.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $450,000 or $150,000 and costs not to exceed $25,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 100.6 hours on this case, at rates ranging from $950 to $500 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $75,950.

To award the $150,000 requested, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.97.

The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .47 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve $113,925 in fees, equal to 1.5 times the lodestar. The Court notes the supplemental declaration indicates counsel anticipates an additional 40 to 50 hours as to the motion for final approval. The Court will review the additional hours expended and lodestar at the time of the motion for final approval.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $15,953.97. The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $25,000.00 as requested.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $450,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (1.5x):	$113,925
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs:	$8,000
Preliminarily Approved Total PAGA Payment:	$45,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$253,075

The Court sets the motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement for May 13, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 7, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054180	In the Matter of Guzman, Jesus	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	No supplemental documents filed. Previous issues remain
VPR054286	In the Matter of Pennington, John Otis	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054319	In the Matter of the Betty J. Anderson 1999 Trust	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition for removal of current Trustee must be filed under Probate Code § 15642 before appointment of Successor Trustee. 2. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties 30 days prior, Prob C § 17203. 3. Copy of all pages of original Trust not attached
VPR053494	In the Matter of Mota, Yolanda Swaim	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053245	In the Matter of Galindo, Maria Magdalena	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053610	In the Matter of Taylor, John P.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition Schedule AD: need clarification on losses in personal property. 2. Report shall state the period covered by the account, Prob C § 1061
VPR053710	In the Matter of Ochoa, Martha	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Summary of Account: Total Charges shall equal Total Credits pursuant to Probate Code § 1061(c). 2. Schedule C not attached. 3. At least 15 days of service of Notice of Hearing have not lapsed to be completed, Prob C § 1460
VPR054288	In the Matter of Plumley, Marcus A	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054284	In the Matter of See, Kevin Aijai	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Supplemental Information of Conservatee and Capacity Declaration not filed
VPR054256	In the Matter of Samaniego, Joe Alfred	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not filed
VPR033875-90	In the Matter of Kamrath, Pamela	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Review: Discharge of a co-conservator
VPR043045	In the Matter of Dever, Danielle Noel	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Review: Provisional order for transfer out of state orders has been granted

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/5/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054359	In the Matter of E.J.W.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). Service on Father Mr. Addison & Mother Mrs. Wiliams are required Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/6/2026 14:00	Department 09	VPR054113	In the Matter of Madera, Shanylle	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511 on all grandparents
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 02	VPR054358	In the Matter of Johnson, River Lynn	TEMP- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), parents to be personally served 5 court day’s notice prior to hearing
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR052277	In the Matter of Bennett, Zoey Lynn	NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 calendar days before hearing
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR053711	In the Matter of Allende, Jorge Jr	No issues to address
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR047286	In the Matter of Clevenger, Brea Marie	Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. The children may be of Native American ancestry, notice of termination proceedings must be given to the children’s tribe per ICWA NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054192	In the Matter of Venegas, Analise Rose et al	No issues to address
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054155	In the Matter of Hernandez, Julian Carlos et al	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, SERVICE to be completed on paternal grandfather DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian and household member
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of Aviles, Irie A	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of Mendoza, Nolberto	Temporary guardianship for N.M. has terminated by operation of law as ward has reached the age of 18. NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice required by maternal grandparents DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of Mendoza, Paulette	household member is required to complete the DOJ background record check NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, by mail on the maternal grandparents and siblings 15 days prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054321	In the Matter of Pena, Rose Marie	Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for father Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054320	In the Matter of Rosales, Amelia Jade	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). MOTHER to be personally served 5 court days prior to hearing Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	No issues to address – notice to mother to be discussed at hearing