Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, April 13, 2026 (modified as to Case No. VCU310071 only at 11:31 am), are:

Re:               Mendoza, Miguel vs. Valmetal Tulare, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU315822

Date:          April 13, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of PAGA and Class Action Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the final compliance hearing for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on April 13, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On March 18, 2026, the settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On October 29, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 201 individuals.  On November 5, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. A total of 11 notices were returned, 7 updated addresses were obtained and therefore 4 notices are deemed undeliverable.

The settlement administrator indicates Class members had 60 days, until January 5, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) objections were received from class members. Therefore, all 201 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $366,873.69 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest estimated individual payment is $4,243.16, the average estimated individual payment is $1,790.42, and the lowest estimated individual payment is $19.57.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the recovery of attorneys fees in the amount of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $650,000 or $218,750 and costs of $14,186.31

Counsel indicates spending 268 hours at rates ranging from $1,019 to $675, creating an updated total lodestar figure of $265,606. (Declaration of Brown ¶24.) However, the Court notes that at preliminary approval, the stated rates were between $948 and $581 per hour. A such, the Court, using the rates at preliminary approval, calculates an updated lodestar figure of $247,091.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $14,186.31 (Declaration of Brown ¶26.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $6,990. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates Boys & Girls Clubs of the Sequoias in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 as to Plaintiff and finds that the class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $625,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (35%):	$218,750.00
Approved Attorney Costs (expended):	$14,386.31
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,990.00
Approved PAGA Payments (Total)	$13,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$366,873.69

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed form submitted by Plaintiff on March 18, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Pacheco, Adrian vs. K.A. Vanderham Dairy

Case No.:    VCU302174

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to April 27, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7; to order a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar and presently incurred costs.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $154,755.34)

The gross settlement amount is $320,168. Plaintiff estimates approximately 275 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $562.75 per member.

The Class Members consist of all persons who worked for Defendants in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at any time during September 26, 2019, through May 4, 2025.

Plaintiffs primarily alleged the following violations: (1) failure to pay minimum and straight time wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (5) failure to timely pay final wages at termination; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to indemnify employees for expenditures; (8) failure to produce requested employment records; and (9) unfair business practices; and (10) violations of PAGA.

Plaintiffs provide estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Yslas ¶¶ 9 – 21.) The total estimated maximum recovery in the event of an outright victory is $1.58 million and penalties of $1,011,438.13. Plaintiffs have provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount and counsel estimates a realistic recovery of approximately $201,462.19 and $60,686.29 in penalties.

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $320,168 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$106,722.66
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$16,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Pacheco:	$7,500.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Bautista:	$7,500.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,690.00
Proposed PAGA Payment	$20,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$154,755.34

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representatives

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs Pacheco and Bautista as class representatives for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiffs is $7,500.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement as to each class representative.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $320,168 or $106,722.66 and costs not to exceed $16,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $16,000 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Apex Class Action as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $7,960.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Yslas indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Yslas ¶8 – Exhibit 3.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 275 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representatives, through their declarations, indicate they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representatives were employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to April 27, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar and presently incurred costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Perez, Sabrina Veronica vs. Visalia Police Department Police Officer Victor Yates

Case No.:  VCU308153

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside and Enter New Order

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts and Analysis

On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this action.

On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this matter without prejudice.

On October 25, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the dismissal.

The Court, on December 2, 2024, denied the motion to set aside the dismissal.

Thereafter, on April 16, 2025, a motion to “reopen case” was filed. The motion, however, was denied as procedurally improper, having been filed less than 16 court days before the hearing date of May 5, 2025. The Court further noted this appeared to be  motion for reconsideration of the Court’s prior ruling and denied the motion as untimely and insufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a).

Thereafter, on August 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to “renew motion to reconsider filed on 10/25/24.”

However, the Court issued a tentative ruling on August 22, 2025 indicating no documents had been filed in connection with the motion and denying it on that basis. At oral argument, the minutes reflect an appearance by Plaintiff, but that the Court denied the motion on this basis.

Thereafter, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed this present motion to set aside the prior denial and enter a new order.

In sum, Plaintiff is attempting further reconsideration of the Court’s December 2, 2024 ruling and April 16, 2025 ruling denying the motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal.

"[A] trial court is 'free to consider the motion regardless of its label.' [Citations.] ... The proposition that a trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion is one that has existed for many decades. 'The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words.' [Citations.] Neither the Legislature, nor the California Supreme Court, nor any Court of Appeal has ever challenged that notion. To the contrary, several courts have tacitly approved the treatment of a motion for reconsideration as a motion for a new trial, and vice versa. [Citations.] The principle that a trial court may consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is consistent with the court's inherent authority to manage and control its docket. [Citation.]" (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 187, 193.)

While the Court observes that Plaintiff did file, on August 20, 2025, an ex parte motion and therefore the Court’s tentative ruling indicating no documents were filed appears to be in error, this does not justify the granting of this motion for further reconsideration of the prior rulings.

Code Civ. Proc. § 1008, subd. (a) states in pertinent part, “When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law…”

The initial motion for reconsideration was untimely and so too was the August 20, 2025 filing, as both were beyond 10 days from the December 2, 2024 ruling.

Additionally, section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law/ New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"  Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, Plaintiff has not presented new evidence or facts under this standard, and cannot be said to have met the burden under section 1008.

Therefore, this matter remains dismissed and the Court denies this motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                V., J. vs. County of Tulare

Case No.:  VCU311593

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer and Motion to Strike to Fifth Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file a sixth amended complaint; to find the motion to strike moot.

Facts

On October 6, 2025, this Court overruled the demurrer to the third amended complaint and granted a motion to strike portions of the third amended complaint.

The parties stipulated to the further filing amended complaints and on January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint alleging Defendant County is vicariously liable pursuant to California Government Code § 815.2, 815.4, and/or 820.

Defendant demurrers, arguing that K.C. v. County of Merced (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 606 permits the Court to find discretionary immunity applies on demurrer and that the vicarious liability theory is not within the revived claims under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.

Further, Defendant seeks to strike a significant portion of the operative amended complaint.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues discretionary immunity cannot be applied in this case, that the claims are not barred by the statute of limitations and that the various statutes pled are sufficient mandatory duties under which the County has liability.

In the operative amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:

“25. In approximately 1990, Defendants placed Plaintiff in the foster home of Randy and Lupe Weldon (“Foster Parents 1”) located in Porterville, California (“Foster Home 1”). Foster Parents and Foster Home were approved, licensed, trained, supervised and/or compensated by County.

26. In approximately1990, when Plaintiff was approximately three (3) years old, Plaintiff was sexually abused and/or assaulted by Plaintiff’s teenage  “Perpetrators”), on multiple occasions over a period of approximately several months when Plaintiff resided in Foster Home. The acts of sexual abuse and assault took place in Foster Home 1.

…

30. In approximately 1990, Defendants placed Plaintiff in the foster home of Ladell and Sherri Black (“Foster Parents 2”) located in Porterville, California (“Foster Home 2”). Foster Parents and Foster Home were approved, licensed, trained, supervised and/or compensated by County.

31. In approximately 1990 through 1991, also when Plaintiff was three (3) to four (4), Plaintiff was sexually abused and/or assaulted by his Foster Father, Ladell Black (Perpetrator “3”)

32. In approximately 1990 through 1991, also when Plaintiff was three (3) to four (4), Plaintiff was sexually abused and/or assaulted by his Foster Father, Ladell Black (Perpetrator “3”).” (FAC ¶¶25, 26, 30, 32.)

Additionally, that Plaintiff disclosed the same to Plaintiff’s foster father and to “…Plaintiff’s social worker, an agent and/or employee of County. Despite the disclosure, no action was taken by County, no investigation was completed, Plaintiff remained in Foster Home 1 [and 2]” (FAC ¶¶36.)

As to duty, Plaintiff alleges a number of non-delegable duties and mandatory duties under “WIC §§ 328, 16501(f), 16504, 16206 (added by Stats. 1987), and 16504; Health & Safety Code §§1522, et seq., specifically, §§ 1522, 1522.04, 1522.07, 1522.1, 15224, 1522.41, 1522.42, 1522.44, 1522.45, 1524.5, 1525, 1525.3, 1526.5, 1526.75; Penal Code §§ 11165.7, 11165.9, 11166, 11166.3; CWS Manual, Letter No. SS-89-03, No. 30-134, 30-196, 30-198 30-494 (Eff. 8/1/89); Cal. Code of Regulations, title 11, § 900.” (FAC ¶22.)

Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendants were in a special relationship “in loco parentis or caregiver-child with Plaintiff, in which Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable harm. (Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 300, 300.2, 16504; CWS Manual, Letter SS-89-03, Division No. 30-100, 30-110, 30-132, 30-252, 30-492, 30- 494 (Eff. 8/1/89.)” and “with the individuals and/or agents to whom they delegated or assigned custody and/or control of Plaintiff, such that Defendants owed a duty to supervise and control such individuals to prevent foreseeable harm. (Welfare and Institutions Code § 300.2, CWS Manual, Letter No. SS-89-03, No. 30-196, 30-494 (Eff. 8/1/89); Welfare and Institutions Code § 16206 (added by Stats. 1987.)” (FAC ¶20, 21.)

Plaintiff alleges breach as to “(i) failing to protect Plaintiff from sexual abuse, sexual assault and lewd and lascivious acts; (ii) failing to adequately, properly and completely investigate whether Plaintiff was safe and free from maltreatment; (iii) failing to adequately, properly and completely investigate the acts and conduct of the Perpetrator and the sexual abuse of Plaintiff; (iv) failing to enforce policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of children and protect them from sexual abuse; (v) failing to implement and enforce policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of foster children and protect them from sexual and physical abuse; (vi) failing to adequately monitor and supervise Plaintiff; (vii) failing to adequately hire and train employees, agents and case workers; (viii) concealing their knowledge that Perpetrator was unsafe and posed a risk of child sexual abuse; and (ix) failing to report suspected sexual abuse of a minor to law enforcement. (WIC §§ 328, 16501(f), and 16504; Health & Safety Code §§ 1522, et seq., specifically, §§ 1522, 1522.04, 1522.07, 1522.1, 15224, 1522.41, 1522.42, 1522.44, 1522.45, 1524.5, 1525, 1525.3, 1526.5, 1526.75; Penal Code §§ 11165.7, 11165.9, 11166, 11166.3; CWS Manual, Letter SS-89-03, Division No. 30-100, 30-110, 30- 132, 30-196, 30-198, 30-492, 30-494 (Eff. 8/1/89); Cal. Code of Regulations, title 11, § 900.)” (FAC ¶53.)

As to a basis for liability against Defendant, “This Action alleges liability against County and Does 2 through 25, pursuant to California Government Code § 815.2, 815.4, and/or 820” and that “Defendants are vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions of their employees within the course and scope of their employment with Defendants and for the acts and/or omissions of Defendant’s independent contractors that proximately caused Plaintiff’ injuries. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2(a), 820.” (FAC ¶¶59-60.)

The Court notes here that there is no reference to Government Code section 815.6 in the fifth amended complaint.

Additionally, that “County was negligent in the placement and supervision of Plaintiff while in foster care, and in the failure to take reasonable steps or to implement reasonable safeguards to avoid acts of sexual assault and abuse, or to keep Plaintiff safe by removing Plaintiff from the offending foster care placement. (CWS Manual, Letter No. SS-89-03, No. 30-132, 30-134 (Eff. 8/1/89); Penal Code §§ 11165.7, 11165.9, 11166, 11166.3).” (FAC ¶69.)

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062)

K.C. v. County of Merced

As an initial matter, the court in K.C. noted that liability at issue was under Government Code section 815.2 as to vicarious liability. (K.C., supra, 109 Cal. App. 5^th at 615.) The court, without discussing the statute of limitations or revival issues under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, proceeded to examine the immunity raised by the public entity.

This Court, therefore, finds no validity to the argument that the vicarious liability theory is beyond the statute of limitations for these cases. No case is cited by Defendant that directly supports this argument or one that is published after the reinstatement of these claims pursuant to section 340.1. As such, the Court overrules the demurrer on the statute of limitations argument.

In K.C., the operative complaint alleged the following:

“According to the complaint, K.C. “was sexually abused and assaulted in foster care while under the legal custody, care, and control of” County and consequently suffered “physical, psychological, and emotional injuries.” The following facts were alleged:

“23. In approximately 1971, [County] placed Plaintiff in the foster home of … ‘Foster Parents 1’… , located in Merced, California (‘Foster Home 1’). Foster Parents 1 and Foster Home [1] were approved, licensed, trained, supervised, and/or compensated by [County].

“24. From approximately 1971 to 1976 when Plaintiff was approximately four (4) to [nine] (9) years old, Plaintiff was sexually abused and assaulted by Foster Parent’s nephew … (‘Perpetrator 1’), approximately daily for approximately five (5) years while Plaintiff resided in the foster home. The acts of sexual abuse and/or assault took place at Foster Home 1.

“28. In approximately 1976, [County] placed Plaintiff in the foster home of foster mother and foster father (‘Foster Parents 2’), located in Merced, California (‘Foster Home 2’). Foster Parents 2 and Foster Home 2 were approved, licensed, trained, supervised, and/or compensated by [County].

“29. From approximately 1976 to 1977 when Plaintiff was approximately nine (9) to ten (10) years old, Plaintiff was sexually abused and assaulted by Plaintiff's foster brother … (‘Perpetrator 2’), approximately [sic] multiple times for approximately one (1) year while Plaintiff resided in the foster home. The acts of sexual abuse and/or assault took place at Foster Home 2.

“30. The acts of sexual abuse and/or assault perpetrated against Plaintiff by Perpetrator 2 were for Perpetrator 2’s sexual gratification and included Perpetrator 2 fondling Plaintiff's vagina under her clothing, and Perpetrator 2 forcing Plaintiff to perform oral copulation on Perpetrator 2’s penis, and Perpetrator 2 performing oral copulation on Plaintiff's vagina.

“32. [County] w[as] put on notice of the sexual abuse and/or assault Plaintiff suffered while residing in Foster Home 1 several times. Plaintiff repeatedly reported that she was being sexually abused and/or assaulted to her social worker, Ms. P[.], an employee and/or agent of County.

“33. Despite disclosures to [County] and/or [County’s] actual and/or constructive knowledge of the sexual assault and abuse at issue, no corrective action was taken to Plaintiff and Plaintiff remained in Foster Home 1 where she continued to be sexually assaulted and abused after Plaintiff disclosed the same to [County].” (K.C., supra, 109 Cal. App. 5^th at 610-612.)

The court, thereafter, noted, as to government tort liability, that ““Except as otherwise provided by statute … , a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.” (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a).) “A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” (Id., § 815.2, subd. (a).)” (Id. at 615.)

The court then examined raising immunity on demurrer, noting that “…the court may elect to proceed directly to the immunity issue on the grounds of expediency and judicial economy.” (Id.) The court further noted that “if the employee is immune, so too is the [public entity]. [citation omitted]” (Id.)

The court noted that “The operative complaint alleged: (1) K.C. was sexually assaulted at two separate foster care placements in the 1970's; (2) K.C. gave notice to County—via social workers—of this abuse;  and (3) no investigative or corrective action was taken.” (Id. at 616.)

As to the analysis and application of immunity, the K.C. court set forth the following before finding that discretionary immunity applied to the facts alleged in the operative complaint:         

Whether or not a public employee is immune from liability under [Government Code] section 820.2 depends … upon whether the act [or omission] in question was ‘discretionary’.” [citation omitted] However, discretionary immunity “is limited to policy and planning decisions, and does not reach ‘lower level decisions that merely implement a basic policy already formulated.’ [Citation.]” [citation omitted] “Immunity for ‘discretionary’ activities serves no purpose except to assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of government. [citation omitted]” (Id. at 617.)

As applied, the court concluded that the decisions by the social worker related to the investigation of child abuse and discontinuation of foster home placement based on a suspicion of abuse and therefore involved the exercise of analysis and judgment as well as sensitive policy decisions that require judicial abstention, including as to “preliminary determinations” that “reports of possible abuse” “did not warrant initiation” of further action. (Id. at 617-618.) The court noted further strong policy considerations exist as to permitting public employees to perform assigned tasks without fear of civil actions, permitting social workers to make quick decisions based on sometimes incomplete information and therefore providing social workers with absolute immunity from suits alleging improper investigation of abuse and removal based on suspicion of abuse. (Id. at 618.)

The court continued, noting that decisions as to undertake investigative or corrective action in response to reported abuse are no less discretionary than the original placement decision and therefore social workers and their public entity employers are immune. (Id. at 619.)

The K.C. court noted that in instances where the allegations involve social workers who were confronted with reports of abuse that should have prompted investigative or corrective action, but where they failed to properly exercise their discretion to do so, such “‘claims of improper evaluation cannot divest a discretionary policy decision of its immunity.’ [citation omitted]” (Id. at 619-620.)

The K.C. court noted that this determination as to immunity was proper on demurrer:

“While a finding of immunity is precluded “solely on grounds that ‘the [affected] employee's general course of duties is “discretionary”’” [citation omitted] and “requires a showing that ‘the specific conduct giving rise to the suit’ involved an actual exercise of discretion, i.e., a ‘[conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages’” [citation omitted] “a strictly careful, thorough, formal, or correct evaluation” is not mandatory (ibid., italics omitted). “Such a standard would swallow an immunity designed to protect against claims of carelessness, malice, bad judgment, or abuse of discretion in the formulation of policy.” (Id. at 619.) (emphasis added.)

As applied to the allegations of the operative amended complaint in this matter, the Court finds too that the allegations sound in decisions by a social worker related to the investigation of child abuse and discontinuation of foster home placement based on a suspicion of abuse. Such decisions therefore involved the exercise of analysis and judgment, as in K.C. and require judicial abstention for the same reasons stated therein. (Id. at 617-618.)

Therefore, the Court finds discretionary immunity applies to the facts alleged in this matter.

Plaintiff argues that Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972 requires an examination of “deliberate and considered policy decisions, in which a ‘[conscious] balancing [of] risks and advantages ... took place.’” (Id. at 984.) However, the court in K.C. acknowledged and applied Caldwell, which the Court does in turn here. (K.C., supra, 109 Cal. App. 5^th at 619-620.)

 Likewise, K.C. addressed the other recent case on this issue, D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 465, noting:

“This case addressed—inter alia—whether discretionary immunity was a proper basis for granting summary judgment and is therefore inapposite. (See Leo F. Piazza Paving Co. v. Foundation Constructors, Inc. (1981) 128 Cal.App.3d 583, 591, fn. 4 [“The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading, not to test the evidence or other extrinsic matters. [Citation.] Summary judgment, on the other hand, provides a method by which, if the pleadings are not defective, the court may determine whether the triable issues apparently raised by them are real or merely the product of an adept pleading.”].)” (K.C., supra, 109 Cal. App. 5^th at 620, FN9.)

The Court, likewise, finds D.G. inapposite here for the same reasons.

Plaintiff notes that this Court’s prior rulings on demurrer cite to Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, which expressly holds:

“We therefore hold that public entities are liable under Govt. Code §815.6 for injuries to children in foster care which occur as a result of any violation of those duties; such public entities and their employees are not immune under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2 for violations of those duties.”  (Id. at 141.)

However, as noted above, despite the pleading of a significant number of statutes alleging mandatory and/or non-delegable duties, Plaintiff’s operative fifth amended complaint expressly lacks a direct liability cause of action for breach of mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6.

Having applied K.C., supra, to find discretionary immunity precluding liability under Government Code section 815.2, the Court turns to the pleading of liability under section 820.

“Although the Act provides that a public employee generally is liable for an injury caused by his or her act or omission 'to the same extent as a private person' (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a)) and that, when the act or omission of the public employee occurs in the scope of employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the injury (Gov. Code, § 815.2), the Act contains no provision similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Rather, the Act provides that a public entity is not liable for an injury '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute ....' (Gov. Code, § 815.) Certain statutes do provide expressly for public entity liability in circumstances that are somewhat parallel to the potential liability of private individuals and entities but, as past cases have explained, '"[T]he intent of the [Tort Claims Act] is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances ...."' [Citation.]" (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112. at 1127-1128.)

Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 943 summarizes the theories of recovery against a public entity as follows:

“When a party is injured by a tortfeasor and seeks to affix liability on the tortfeasor's employer, the injured party ordinarily must demonstrate either (1) the  employer violated a duty of care it owed to the injured party and this negligence was a proximate cause of the resulting injury (the direct liability theory), or (2) the tortfeasor-employee was liable for committing the tortious conduct that caused the injury while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment (the vicarious liability theory). [Citation.] When the employer is a governmental agency, the statutory framework permits the injured party to pursue the vicarious liability theory in accordance with these general common law principles. [Citation.] However, the statutory framework requires, as a condition to the injured party's recovery on a direct liability theory against a governmental agency, that the injured party identify a ‘specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care’ by the agency in favor of the injured party. [Citations.]” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247–248, fn. omitted)”

In other words: “[T]he public entities' potential liability…has two sources: (1) the public entities' liability based on their own conduct and legal obligations, and (2) the public entities' liability, based on respondeat superior principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of their employment.” (de Villers, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at 251-252.)

Because no direct liability section 815.6 theory is alleged, the Court has no occasion here to evaluate the merits of any mandatory duty alleged under the various statutes cited in the fifth amended complaint or breach thereof.

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer on the basis that section 815.2 liability is precluded, under K.C. by discretionary immunity under section 820.2.

However, the Court cannot sustain the demurrer without leave to amend, as it appears reasonably possible to allege a cause of action under section 815.6 as to mandatory duty.

Therefore, the Court will permit Plaintiff to file the sixth amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Motion to Strike

Based on the ruling on demurrer, the Court finds the motion to strike moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:               Mercury Insurance Company vs. Morris, Bobby

Case No.:  VCU324152

Date:          April 13, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the CMC for April 29, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7; to order Plaintiff to give notice.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff filed this subrogation matter July 29, 2025.

On or about January 6th, 2026, Plaintiff received notice from the Court that an OSC re: sanctions was set for December 17th, 2025 for Failure to Appear on December 3rd, 2025.

On or about January 6th, 2026, Plaintiff checked the courts website and saw that the entire action had been dismissed without prejudice on December 17th 2025 due to No appearance by Plaintiff/Plaintiff's Counsel at the OSC set for December 17th 2025.

Plaintiff’s counsel indicates they were not aware of the OSC set for December 17, 2025, was not aware a case management conference had been set for December 3, 2025 and did not receive the notice as to the OSC until January 6, 2026.

Plaintiff seeks relief from the dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the court must grant relief when an attorney for the party seeking relief submits a sworn affidavit attesting that his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect caused the judgment to be entered against the party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438 [explaining difference between mandatory and discretionary relief under section 473, subd. (b)].)

As to this mandatory relief provision, Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) states, in relevant part, the following:

“…Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b))

Here, the motion is timely as it is made within six months of dismissal.

Counsel for Defendant has submitted a sworn declaration attesting to mistake and neglect with respect to failing attend the case management conference and OSC. “Relief is mandatory when a complying affidavit is filed, even if the attorney's neglect was inexcusable.” (SJP Limited Partnership v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 511, 516-517; Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 225.)

“‘The only limitation is when the court finds [that] the default [or dismissal] was not in fact the attorney's fault, for example when the attorney is simply covering up for the client…’ (Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 816, 821.)” (Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)

Motions brought under section 473 involve “an assessment of credibility by the trial court.” (Behm v. Clear View Techs. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) In Behm, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that an attorney’s affidavit of fault lacked credibility based on “contradictions and discrepancies” between the attorney’s affidavit and his “earlier representations to the court.” (Id.) This included “different excuses” than those that had been provided earlier in the litigation for the same conduct. (Id.) The court concluded that the attorney had “forfeited his credibility when in his subsequent affidavit, he attempted ‘to change the facts and blame himself.’” (Id. at 16.) Thus, the court had not erred in finding the affidavit “incredible” and denying mandatory relief under § 473(b). (Id.)

Behm does not appear to be analogous here, as the Court does not find any such contradictions that would warrant denial.

Therefore, the motion is granted.

The Court sets a CMC on April 29, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of the CMC date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Mendoza, Ivan et al vs. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:  VCU289547

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award a total of $86,360.18 in fees and costs.

Facts

This lawsuit was filed November 23, 2021 alleging that Plaintiffs purchased a new 2018 Chevrolet Malibu (“Subject Vehicle”) with an agreed upon value of $31,538.88 and alleged the Subject Vehicle suffered from serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to a faulty battery and illumination of numerous multifunction warning lights resulting in the Vehicle being presented to GM for warranty repairs on at least six (6) separate occasions.

The parties resolved this matter for $101,000 without return of the Subject Vehicle.

On June 3, 2025, a notice of conditional settlement was filed.

On March 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for recovery of attorneys fees and costs, seeking a total of $130,575.23 consisting of (1) $107,775.50 incurred in attorney fees; (2) a .10 multiplier and (3) $12,022.18 for Plaintiff’s costs as reflected in a memorandum of costs.

In opposition, Defendant challenges the fee rates, 45.85 hours of entries and the requested multiplier.

Authority and Analysis

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover 226.5 hours at rates ranging from $695 to $250 per hour.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the rates of $695 to $425 for counsel are the prevailing rates in Tulare County, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350, except as to Papayanis, which will remain at $250 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 226.5 hours incurred on this matter.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)  

Here, Defendant specifically challenges the following entries, broken down by category as follows:

Hours for Fee Motion - 5.00 Hour Reduction Requested

Here, the Court will enter a 2 hour reduction here as to the time spent on this fee motion. (-2 hours as to Attorney Barry.)

Hours for Anticipated Fee Motion - 13.90 Hour Reduction Requested

The Court does not award anticipated hours and therefore will reduce the hours by 13.90 here as to the review of any opposition, drafting of a reply, attending the hearing and reviewing of a non-existent motion to tax costs. (-13.9 hours as to Attorney Barry)

Hours for Internal Communications - 8.00 Hour Reduction Requested

The Court agrees that some internal communication appears unnecessary from a review of the records and therefore will enter a 3.1 hour reduction here (-2.1 hours as to Attorney Whitman; -.5  hours as to Attorney Galaviz; -.5 hours as to Attorney Barry.)

Hours for Clerical Tasks - 8.80 Hour Reduction Requested

Again, the Court agrees some reduction here is warranted with respect to otherwise clerical tasks identified. The Court will enter a 2 hour reduction here (-2 hours as to Attorney Whitman.)

Hours for Duplicative Tasks - 0.10 Hour Reduction Requested

The Court will reduce this December 7, 2022 entry by Attorney Whitman as duplicative by -.1 (-.1 as to Attorney Whitman.)

Hours for Challenged Entries - 10.05 Hour Reduction Requested

The Court cannot identify the precise challenge to these entries and cannot evaluate the validity thereof. Therefore, the Court will not reduce these hours. 

Multiplier

As to the .10 enhancement sought by Plaintiff, such an award is based on the following factors:

1. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
2. The skill displayed in presenting them;
3. The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
4. The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds that the recovery of $101,000 on a vehicle whose value is approximately $30,000 is sufficient to award the modest multiplier sought in this case. As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from accepting other work. As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the “contingent risk” here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the “contingent” risk of “establishing eligibility for the award” is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].)

The Court will award a .10 multiplier on this matter.

Costs

The memorandum of costs reflects $12,022.18 incurred.

No motion to tax costs appears timely filed.

Therefore, the Court will award the costs as requested.

Conclusion

Name	Requested Hours	Adjusted Hours	Requested Rate	Adjusted Rate	Total
Barry	54.7	38.3	$695	$350	$13,405.00
Quinn	0.3	0.3	$675	$350	$105.00
Hayes III	8.8	8.8	$550	$350	$3,080.00
Matera	4.1	4.1	$550	$350	$1,435.00
Rebieian	7.6	7.6	$525	$350	$2,660.00
Pascal	2.7	2.7	$500	$350	$945.00
Kim	3.3	3.3	$450	$350	$1,155.00
Papayanis	43.1	43.1	$250	$250	$10,775.00
Whitman	90.8	86.6	$425	$350	$30,310.00
Galaviz	11.1	10.6	$565	$350	$3,710.00
	Total Adjusted Hours: 205.4	Total Adjusted Base Lodestar $67,580.00

Therefore, the Court awards fees and costs in the amount of $86,360.18, consisting of 205.4 hours at rates from $350 to $250 totaling $67,580.00 reflected above, a .10 multiplier totaling $6,758.00 and costs of $12,022.18.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Gonzalez, Ricardo vs. Post Brands Pet Care, LLC

Case No.:  VCU317392

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: The parties have stipulated to submitting this matter to arbitration and to stay this case.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Vela, Pastor Isabel vs. Tow Guyz LLC

Case No.:   VCL318386

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant Tow Guyz, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts and Analysis

On May 13, 2025, this Court entered an order deeming Plaintiff a vexatious litigant and required the filing of security under Code of Civil Procedure section 391.1.

No such undertaking has been filed.

On July 21, 2025, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the vexatious litigant ruling.

On July 18, 2025, Plaintiff removed this matter to federal court.

On September 27, 2025, the federal court remanded this matter to this Court.

Plaintiff has failed to file the undertaking and therefore, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.4, the Court dismissed the litigation on July 21, 2025 as to Defendant Breckenbridge only, as Defendant Tow Guyz LLC was unrepresented by counsel.

On February 19, 2026, counsel for Defendant Tow Guyz LLC substituted into this matter and on February 25, 2025, Defendant Tow Guyz, LLC filed this motion to dismiss.

The Court, for the same reason as above regarding Plaintiff’s failure to file the required undertaking, dismisses this matter as to Defendant Tow Guyz, LLC.

No defendants remain.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Mancilla, Gabriel vs. Sierra View Dairy

Case No.:   VCU309938

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the matter off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Anaya, Antonio vs. Williams Family Dairy, LLC

Case No.:   VCU322028

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and compel arbitration of the Type A PAGA claim; to stay this matter as to the Type O PAGA claim, which remains with this Court.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff brings a single cause of action under PAGA, Labor Code sections 2869, et seq, against Defendant Williams Family Dairy.

Defendants moves to compel arbitration of the “individual” PAGA claims and stay this matter as to the “representative” PAGA claims, alleging an arbitration agreement purportedly hand signed by Plaintiff on February 6, 2023.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its Chief Financial Officer and manager who indicates familiarity with the onboarding process and the record keeping of Defendant and who attaches, as Exhibit A, a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly signed by Plaintiff. (Declaration of Williams ¶¶1-8, Ex. A.) Additionally, the declarant provides a copy of a document entitled “ARBITRATION PROCESS” as Exhibit B. (Declaration of Williams ¶8 – Ex. B)

The Court notes Exhibits A and B are written in the Spanish language.

Declarant further states “As the Arbitration Agreement is in Spanish, I am also providing a copy of the English version of the Arbitration Agreement as Exhibit C and of the Arbitration Process handout as Exhibit D.” (Declaration of Williams ¶8.)

In opposition, Plaintiff challenged the failure to provide a certified translation pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g), which requires “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.”

On reply, Defendant submitted the declaration of its counsel’s paralegal, who indicates fluency in Spanish and English and that “I am a qualified translator and interpreter and have undertaken numerous translation and interpreting activities during my career, including translating documents, interpreting and translating conversations and direct dialogue, conducting and interpreting trainings in English and Spanish, and several other interpreting and translation tasks.” (Declaration of Valencia ¶¶3, 4.) Further, that the paralegal created the English translation of Exhibit A and that the attached is a true translation of the Spanish version of the Agreement.

The Court, at the initial hearing on this matter on March 16, 2026, found that the declaration by Defendant’s counsel insufficient as to the translation of the Agreement at issue from Spanish to English and the declaration by the Valencia also insufficient on this issue. The Court, however, permitted supplemental briefing as to the translation issue.

On March 27, 2026, Defendant’s counsel filed a declaration containing the declaration of Janet Green, a Spanish-English translator, stating:

“I certify the Spanish version of the ‘Declaration of Prisma N Valencia In Support of [Defendant’s] Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel…’ is a true and correct translation of the English version of ‘Declaration of Prisma N Valencia In Support of [Defendant’s] Reply to Opposition to Motion to Compel…’”

The declaration of Green contains a certification number from the Judicial Council.

In opposition to this supplemental filing, Plaintiff argues that the Rules of Court require the translator to translate the document and that certifying Valencia’s translation is insufficient. Further, that the Agreement presented in the reply contains an invalid PAGA waiver.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreement, Exhibit A, in purported satisfaction of this requirement, as well as Exhibit B, an English version of the Agreement.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, however, Plaintiff challenges that Exhibit B to the Valencia declaration violates California Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g) which requires, as noted above: “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.”

The Court is readily familiar with certified interpreters who assist the Court with live testimony, including the qualifications thereof. While the declaration is under oath, there is no attempt to set forth qualifications as to translation of the documents. Typically, as to translated documents, the interpreter provides an English language translation, certified under oath, as well as a description of the translator's qualifications or certification. This permits the Court to confirm the accuracy of the translation, if necessary.

Here, because the Court need only find a preponderance of the evidence as to an agreement to arbitrate was formed, the Court will accept the declaration of Green that certifies Exhibit B to the Valencia declaration is a true and correct translation of Exhibit A to the Valencia declaration.

Facts – Application of the FAA

As to governing law, the agreement states “This Agreement is made pursuant to and shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §1 et seq.”

Further, the declaration states that Defendant operates a dairy in California, that Plaintiff workers directly with dairy cows as a feeder, that Defendant purchases fed products from out of state and that the milk produced is distributed throughout the United States, and that Plaintiff was responsible for feeding and maintaining dairy cows. (Declaration of Williams ¶10.)

Plaintiff argues the declaration is insufficient as to Plaintiff’s role in affecting commerce, but Plaintiff does not challenge the designation that the FAA shall govern the agreement.

Authority and Analysis – Application of the FAA

In general, the FAA "governs arbitration provisions in contracts that involve interstate commerce." (Mastick v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1263, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 717.) Title 9 of the United States Code section 2, ("the primary substantive provision of the FAA" as noted by Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 384) provides in part:

"A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract . . . ." (9 U.S.C. § 2,; see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277 ["involving commerce" broadly construed].)

Further, "'the term “[e]nforcement of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the [FAA]'" has been found to properly invoke the FAA. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 343.)

As such, the Court finds the FAA applies to the agreement.

Facts – Scope of Arbitration

The Agreement states it seeks to compel arbitration as to “…all claims, disputes, or controversies arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment and/or the termination of Employee’s employment (“Employment Claims”) and that such claims include: “…claims made by Employee or Employer arising under… California Labor Code…” (Declaration of Valencia – Exhibit B.)

Further, the Agreement states:

“9. AGREEMENT TO BILATERAL ARBITRATION: The Parties intend to arbitrate any disputes between them on an individual basis. To the fullest extent permitted by law, the Parties agree that they shall not join nor consolidate Claims under this Agreement with those of any other person, and that no form of class, collective, or representative action shall be maintained without the mutual consent of the parties.”

Authority and Analysis

The Agreement expressly covers claims under the Labor Code, including the single PAGA claim here by seeking to compel “all claims…” As discussed below, this initial term, therefore, seeks to compel the entirety of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim to arbitration.

Therefore, the Court turns to the “Agreement to Bilateral Arbitration Term” which purports to prevent the maintenance of any form of “representative action” and further states the parties intend to arbitrate any claims “on an individual basis.”

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

However, the Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

In reaching these conclusions, Viking River observed that the word "representative" has been used "in two distinct ways" to describe PAGA actions: "In the first sense, PAGA actions are 'representative' in that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But PAGA claims are also called 'representative' when they are predicated on code violations sustained by other employees. In the first sense, '"every PAGA action is . . . representative"' and '[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action,' . . . Iskanian, [supra,] 59 Cal.4th, at 387, because every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity. But when the word 'representative' is used in the second way, it makes sense to distinguish 'individual' PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from 'representative' (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees. For purposes of this opinion, we will use 'individual PAGA claim' to refer to claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff." (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at 648-649.)

Stated differently, “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.)

In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, there is an intent to arbitrate all claims on an individual basis, which is permitted under the analysis above. The remainder of Section 9 states “no form of…representative action shall be maintained…” This, in the Court’s view, operates as an attempt as a waiver which is impermissible under Adolph, as “Viking River did not disturb Iskanian’s rule that an arbitration agreement purporting to waive an employee’s non-individual claims is unenforceable as a matter of state law.” (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118.)  The waiver attempts to preclude any participation, in any forum, as to a representative Type O PAGA claim.  

Therefore, the Court turns to the severance provision in Section 13. The Court finds that severing the term “representative action” cures this issue, permits the Court to split the claim because of the intent to arbitrate on an individual basis and permit the Type O PAGA claim to proceed in this Court, following the completion of the arbitration process.

As such, the Court grants the motion to compel arbitration of the individual Type A PAGA claim and stays this matter pending completion of arbitration as to the Type O PAGA claim. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1124-1125.) 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              Mendoza, Ramon vs. Contract Labor Management

Case No.:     VCU310071

Date:           April 13, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Motion for Final Approval of PAGA and Class Action Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the final compliance hearing for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on April 13, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On March 19, 2026, the settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On October 31, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 389 individuals.  On November 6, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. A total of 59 notices were returned, 19 updated addresses were obtained and therefore 40 notices are deemed undeliverable.

The settlement administrator indicates Class members had 60 days, until December 22, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) objections were received from class members. Therefore, all 389 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $99,591.23 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest estimated individual payment is $3,120.77, the average estimated individual payment is $252.80, and the lowest estimated individual payment is $24.57.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the recovery of attorneys fees in the amount of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $195,000 or $68,250and costs of $14,186.31

Counsel indicates spending 208 hours at rates ranging from $1,019 to $675, creating an updated total lodestar figure of $265,606. (Declaration of Brown ¶22.) However, the Court notes that at preliminary approval, the stated rates were between $948 and $581 per hour. A such, the Court, using the rates at preliminary approval, calculates an updated lodestar figure of $189,110.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $10,418.77. (Declaration of Brown ¶20.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $7,990. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Farmworker Foundation in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 as to Plaintiff and finds that the class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $195,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (35%):	$68,250.00
Approved Attorney Costs (expended):	$10,418.77
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff:	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,990.00
Approved PAGA Payments (Total)	$3,750.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$99,591.23

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed form submitted by Plaintiff on March 19, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division