Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, January 27, 2026, are:

Re:                 Estes, Jeremy Lee vs. Cheema Transport, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU289306

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Hearing re: Final Compliance

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed as to the distribution of the settlement. Therefore, the Court continues this hearing to March 24, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Haley, Julissa Lenay vs. MWI Veterinary Supply Co.

Case No.:   VCU305462

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the final compliance hearing for August 25, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on January 27, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On January 7, 2026, the settlement administrator ILYM Group, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On July 22, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 588 potential class embers from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. On August 7, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. Fifty-four (54) notices were returned and updated addresses for thirty-eight (38) were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, sixteen (16) notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until October 6, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. One (1) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 557 Class Members or 99.83% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $ is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement, with an average individual share of at least

$1,766.25 per class member and the highest estimated share of $7,115.58. The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing a request for $459,960. .

At the motion for preliminary approval, the Court noted 642.7 hours incurred on this matter, but reduced the hourly rates for counsel, creating an adjusted base lodestar of $306,640, multiplied by the maximum permitted lodestar multiplier of 1.5 for an approved attorney fee award of $459,960.

The declaration of Bibiyan indicates the same hours have been incurred here and the request is for the amount awarded at the time of preliminary approval. (Declaration of Bibiyan ¶16, 17.) Therefore, the Court awards $459,960.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $23,301.52. (Declaration of Bibiyan ¶20.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $9,950.  The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and believes that the requested class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances. Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

The Court’s review of the declaration of Plaintiff indicates justification for the $5,000 award, but no amount higher.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $1,620,000 are approved as follows:

Approved  Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier):	$459,960.00
Approved  Attorney Costs (incurred):	$23,301.52
Approved  Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000
Approved  Settlement Administrator Costs	$9,950
Approved  PAGA payment to the LWDA	$80,000
Approved  Net Settlement Amount	1,041,788.48

The Court sets the final compliance hearing for August 25, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                  Requejo, Christine Leanne vs. Valley Health Team, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU291366

Date:            January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, as modified herein as to the attorneys’ fees, and set the hearing on final compliance as to distribution of the settlement for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on January 27, 2025.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On December 29, 2025, the settlement administrator Phoenix, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On September 2, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 500 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. On September 24, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. Of the twenty-nine (29) returned notices, twenty-one (21) had a forwarding address. Therefore, eight (8) notice packets have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until November 24, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections or disputes were received from class members. Therefore, all 500 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $1,246,397.12 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement, with an average individual share of at least $2,034.89 per class member, a lowest estimated share of $2.02, and a highest estimated share of $5,724.94. The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of $1,750,000 gross settlement amount or $583,333.33. At the time of preliminary approval, Plaintiff’s counsel’s lodestar was $226,265.00, based on 331.4 hours at rates ranging from $950 to $525. The Court preliminarily approved a lodestar multiplier of 1.5 and preliminarily approved fees of $339,397.50.

Adequate information has been provided for an updated lodestar analysis of the attorneys’ fees request. Counsel indicates that 356.50 hours have been incurred at rates ranging from $950 to $525, resulting in a base lodestar of $242,780.00.  (Declaration of Szilagyi ¶29, 30.)

To award the fees requested would require the Court to apply a lodestar multiplier of 2.4. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases.

The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .9 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will approve $364,170 in fees, equal to 1.5 times the current lodestar.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $20,182.88.

The Court believes the requested attorney fees, as modified, and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $9,250. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office as recipient of unclaimed settlement proceeds.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 384.)

The Court previously approved representative payments of $5,000.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $1,750,000 are approved:

Approved Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier):	$364,170.00
Approved Attorney Costs (incurred):	$20,182.88
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Requejo:	$5,000.00
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Helmbolt:	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$9,250.00
Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$100,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$1,246,397.12

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed form, modified as to the above, submitted by Plaintiffs, and orders that notice of entry of judgment be given as provided in the judgment following entry thereof.  

The hearing on final compliance as to distribution of the settlement is set for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Kimble, Lisa vs. Genova Management Group LLC

Case No.:   VCU297657

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion for preliminarily approval of the class action and PAGA settlement, as modified herein; to set the motion for final approval for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

Facts

The Court previously continued this motion and ordered a supplemental declaration as to information to calculate the lodestar and the presently incurred costs.

On January 20, 2026, counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing these issues.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $3,675,000 or $1,225,000 and costs not to exceed $46,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 624.5 hours on this case, at rates ranging from $1,500 per hour to $600 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $593,335. (Supplemental Declaration of Yslas ¶18.)

The Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work” and higher than what this Court approves on these motions.  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total
John G. Yslas	$1,500	$950	186.9	$177,555
Diego Aviles	$850	$650	194.1	$126,165
Harry Erganyan	$600	$400	144.6	$57,840
Mariam Nararetyan	$600	$400	91.3	$36,520
Emily Borman	$850	$650	7.6	$4,940
Total Preliminarily Approved:	624.5	$403,020

Therefore, the Court finds an adjusted lodestar $403,020.

To award $1,225,000 in attorneys’ fees, therefore, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 3.04.

The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases.

The Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional 1.54 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve $604,530 in fees, equal to 1.5 times the adjusted lodestar.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $43,206.48 (Supplemental Declaration of Yslas ¶20.)The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $46,000.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $3,675,000 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier)	$604,530
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$46,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Kimble:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Stockton:	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$32,000
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Penalties	$100,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$2,882,470

Accordingly, the motion to preliminarily approve the Class Action and PAGA settlement is granted, as modified above. Motion for final approval is set for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                LaRumbe-Torres, Josian vs. Kaweah Health Medical Center et al

Case No.:  VCU313564

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (1) Initial Responses to Special Interrogatories as to Defendant Amergis, (2) Further Responses to Requests for Production as to Defendant Amergis (3) Deposition of Defendant Dobbs

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the unopposed motion; (2) To grant the motion as to Nos. 1 through 4, as limited herein; to deny the motion as to No. 5; (3) To deny the motion.

Facts Common to (1) through (3)

Plaintiff’s complaint for medical malpractice initially named Defendant Kaweah, Dr. Barrera, Does 1 through 50 and ABC Companies 1-50.

On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff substituted Doe 1 for Defendant Amergis.

Plaintiff, on October 30, 2025 filed a motion for leave to amend to add Jacqueline Dobbs as a Defendant, an alleged employee of Defendant Amergis. The Court, having granted that motion on December 2, 2025, notes that Dobbs is now a Defendant in this matter.

(1) Facts - Special Interrogatories

Plaintiff, on September 17, 2025, propounded Special Interrogatories (Set One) which stated:

“1. Set forth and identify the phone number and cellular phone carrier for all mobile devices of Jacqueline Dobbs, RN in January 2024.”

As of the filing of this motion on December 22, 2025, Defendant Amergis has not responded to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One. Plaintiff seeks to compel an initial response to this interrogatory.

In opposition, Defendant Amergis states it will provide a further response to this interrogatory.

(1) Authority and Analysis - Initial Responses to Special Interrogatories

Where a party fails to respond to interrogatories, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a) indicates a waiver of objections and that a party may move for an order compelling a response.

As noted above, the sole interrogatory at issue is “1. Set forth and identify the phone number and cellular phone carrier for all mobile devices of Jacqueline Dobbs, RN in January 2024.”

Here, Defendant Amergis indicates it will provide a response to the interrogatory. As such, the Court grants the motion.

(2) Facts - Requests for Production

On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff propounded Requests of Production of Documents, Set Two, on Defendant Amergis:

“1. The Amergis/Maxim Healthcare complete Joint Commission Health Care Staffing Services file.

2. All Amergis/Maxim Healthcare Joint Commission Health Care Staffing Services Certification applications, licenses, certifications, inspection reports, and related documents.

3. All Joint Commission Health Care Staffing Services and Program Performance Measurement manuals, guides, publications, and standards referenced by, applicable to and/or followed by Amergis/Maxim Healthcare between January 1, 2019 and January 30, 2024.

4. All correspondence, letters and emails exchanged with the Joint Commission between January 1, 2019 and January 30, 2024.

5. All documents maintained on, relating to, and/or referencing Jacqueline Dobbs, R.N. including Joint Commission performance measurements, performance reviews, credentialing documents and all other documents maintained in accordance with any other regulatory standard, Amergis/Maxim Healthcare Policy, and/or Amergis/Maxim Healthcare practice.”

On November 10, 2025, Defendant provided verified responses.

Those responses consisted of various objections as to breadth, burden, admissibility, confidentiality, and trade secret, as well as third party privacy and quality assurance privileges.

As to No. 2, Defendant agreed to produce the “Joint Commission Award Letter” and as to No. 5, Defendant stated “Responding party previously produced all documents within its care, custody and control responsive to this request, with its Response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One.”

The parties appear to have met and conferred as to the sufficiency of these responses via correspondence and telephone conference.

Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to these requests.

In opposition, Defendant Amergis argues that the requests are overly broad as to time and scope and that Amergis produced the entire personnel file for Dobbs in its possession.

The Court notes further that Plaintiff also served a subpoena on Defendant Kaweah seeking the personnel file of Nurse Dobbs, as well as another registered nurse. Dobbs objected to the subpoena. Kaweah produced the entire personnel filed maintained by Kaweah to Counsel for Amergis on October 10, 2025.

(2) Authority and Analysis -  Further Responses to Requests for Production

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the Court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4

These requests relate to Joint Commission files, described by Plaintiff as follows:

“The Joint Commission Documents are probative of the standard of care applicable to Amergis as a health care staffing agency and their staff, such as RN Dobbs, placed at healthcare institutions such as Kaweah. These documents address clinical policies, staffing, training, credentialing, documentation, communication, and safety protocols—core issues in medical negligence cases. Evidence of a staffing agency's adoption of the Joint Commission standards, its compliance efforts, and any identified deficiencies is relevant to whether Defendant exercised reasonable care in the circumstances…

Joint Commission certification provides a “framework for organizational structure and management.” Joint Commission standards help staffing companies “develop strategies to address the most complex issues and identify key vulnerabilities in the patient care experience. The standards are laid out in detail in [our] comprehensive certification manual.” “Joint Commission–certified health care staffing firms. . . are required to adopt a set of standardized performance measures specific for per diem and travel temporary clinical staff.” The “Certified health care staffing firms collect monthly data for each required measure in the set. The data is then submitted quarterly to Joint Commission via the Certification Measure Information Process (CMIP).” The Joint Commission also mandates that healthcare staffing agencies measure the performance of its employees such as RN Dobbs and conduct personnel file audits pursuant to the Health Care Staffing Services Certification Program Performance Measurement Implementation Guide.” (Motion 14:11-18, 15:1-12)

Here, the incident occurred January 2024, Nos. 1 and 2 are unlimited as to time, and Nos. 3 and 4 seek records from a five-year period prior to the incident. Given the description of these records above, the Court will order responses to Nos. 1 through 4 limited to a 3 year period from January 2021 to January 2024. As to the scope of the requests, the Court will order further responses that relate to labor and delivery. Any third party privacy concerns would appear to be alleviated via redaction and/or a protective order as to the use of the information sought. Consistent with the above, the Court orders a further response to Nos. 1 through 4.

No. 5

As to the personnel file of Dobbs, Amergis stands by the position that it produced the entire file kept by Amergis. The Court agrees that the request, as phrased, is limited to the documents kept by Amergis, as opposed to files kept by Kaweah.

Given that Plaintiff states that Kaweah produced the entire personnel filed maintained by Kaweah to Counsel for Amergis on October 10, 2025, a further request for production requesting the Kaweah file from Defendant Amergis appears appropriate.

(3) Facts -  Deposition of Dobbs

On October 29, 2025, Plaintiff served, on Defendant Amergis, a notice of deposition of Dobbs (at that time, not a Defendant in this matter) and a request for production of documents.

Amergis served a timely objection stating “Responding party objects as the witness is the subject of motion to amend the complaint to add her as a party to this matter. Responding party objects to the setting of her deposition while her status as a party has not been confirmed.”

On November 14, 2025, the date of the deposition, Plaintiff obtained a notice of non-appearance, as Dobbs did not appear for the deposition.

Via this motion, Plaintiff seeks to compel the deposition of Dobbs and compel the production of documents.

In opposition, Defendant Amergis indicates that the addition of Dobbs as a defendant has delayed the deposition.

(3) Authority and Analysis - Motion to Compel Deposition of Dobbs

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (emphasis added)

A motion to compel a deposition must be accompanied "by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).)

Here, a day after the deposition was noticed, Plaintiff sought leave to amend to add Dobbs, which was granted.

While it is alleged Dobbs is an employee of Amergis, and therefore the deposition notice to Amergis appears proper on its face, the Court’s opinion is that a deposition notice directed at Dobbs, at this point, is more efficient and appropriate, despite the dual representation of Dobbs and Amergis by counsel.

Plaintiff states: “…when the Court made its ruling on December 2, 2025 granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint to include RN Dobbs as a defendant, the Court noted that production of RN Dobbs’ cell phone records should not be an issue "given the addition of Dobbs as a Defendant in this matter and Plaintiff’s ability to request these documents in discovery.” Plaintiff misinterprets this statement, as this indicates that discovery may now be sought directly from Dobbs, once added as a Defendant, as opposed to obtaining it from Defendant Amergis via a deposition notice to Amergis for Dobbs.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion, noting, however, Plaintiffs right under the Code of Civil Procedure to depose Dobbs as a party in this matter, and request discovery from Dobbs, directly.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Hernandez, John Jr. vs. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:   VCU314185

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To elect to convert the motion for summary judgment into a motion for judgment on the pleadings; to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend; to order an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Background Facts

Plaintiffs operative first amended complaint alleges a single cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Defendant GM moves for summary judgment, arguing that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires a viable claim for breach of warranty under state law and Plaintiffs cannot maintain a cause of action under Song Beverly because the vehicle at issue was purchased used.

Material Facts

The vehicle at issue is a model year 2020 GMC SIERRA 1500 bearing VIN: 3GTU9BETOLG318951 (the “Sierra”). (UMF No. 1.) Plaintiffs bought the Sierra used on January 5, 2022, from Visalia Kia. (“Visalia”) with 32,183 miles on its odometer. (UMF No. 2.)

GM was not a party to the transaction between Plaintiffs and Visalia and Visalia is not an authorized retailer of GM vehicles. (UMF No. 3.)

Plaintiffs were not the Sierra’s original owner. The Sierra was originally delivered by Fresno Buick GMC to its original owner(s) on June 13, 2020 with 3 miles its odometer. (UMF No. 4.)

In connection with that transaction delivery to the Sierra’s original owner(s), GM issued a New Vehicle Limited Warranty (the “Warranty”) with (i) bumper-to-bumper coverage for the earlier of 36 months or 36,000 miles and (ii) powertrain coverage for the earlier of 60 months or 60,000 miles. (UMF No. 5.)

GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage to Plaintiffs or the vehicle when Plaintiffs bought the Sierra used; Plaintiffs received only the balance of coverage remaining under the Warranty that GM had issued when the Sierra was originally delivered to its original owner(s). (UMF No. 6.)

Plaintiffs filed an untimely opposition on January 12, 2026.

In opposition, Plaintiffs do not dispute these facts.

Plaintiffs add that shortly after purchasing the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiffs experienced multiple issues and repeatedly presented the vehicle to GM-authorized repair facility Giant Chevrolet Cadillac for repair. (AUMF No. 1.) Additionally, that the repair records reflect numerous system diagnostic and repair efforts, including but not limited to recurrent check engine light conditions, glow plug control module issues, brake control module issues, transmission issues including valve body concerns, emissions-related faults, and ongoing drivability complaints. (AUMF No. 2.)

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act

The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act "authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson-Moss 'calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,' except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule." (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832-833.) Further, the "…failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constitutes a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss." (Id. at 832.)

Under the California Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 a used motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a new motor vehicle under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791, et seq, Plaintiff lacks a warranty claim under Song-Beverly.

Here, it is undisputed the Vehicle was purchased used, from an unauthorized GM retailer, and that GM did not issue or provide any new or additional warranty coverage when the Vehicle was purchased. It is further not in dispute that Plaintiffs sought repair of the Vehicle within the original warranty period.

Plaintiffs, in opposition, argue that no Song Beverly claim is required to maintain a cause of action under Magnusson-Moss, citing to Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928; Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, 353 F.3d 516, 525; Hastings v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 495 F.Supp.3d 919, 923.

In Dagher, the plaintiff purchased a used vehicle from private parties, not a Ford dealership and pled a single cause of action under Song Beverly. (Dagher, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at 912.) In defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of defendant as to the Song-Beverly cause of action because plaintiff could not demonstrate he was a buyer under the Song-Beverly Act
“because the private sellers, who had bought the vehicle new, were not engaged in the business of selling vehicles at retail to him.” (Id.)

However, the appellate court reversed the denial of leave to amend the complaint to allege an additional cause of action under Magnuson-Moss. (Id. at 913.)

The appellate court in Dagher noted that the defendant admitted:

“Used car owners that obtain their vehicles via private sales and who comply with the warranty terms may seek to enforce the express warranty against the manufacturer by bringing an action under the Commercial Code based on breach of express warranty. Such an action does not require that the plaintiff purchase the vehicle from a retail seller.” (Id. at 928.)

Further, that in Dagher:

“It was not disputed that Plaintiff previously obtained warranty repairs under the remaining period of the express warranty that was issued to the original purchasers and transferred to him. Strict adherence to privity rules for express warranty causes of action has not been required in the products liability context…

…

Ford mainly opposed the motion for amendment on grounds of Plaintiff's delay in presenting it…

…

In our case, both Plaintiff and Ford acknowledge that some express warranty claims are viable in this action, whether under the Commercial Code or  Magnuson-Moss. During the unexpired transferred warranty period, Plaintiff sought repairs for apparent defects, unlike in Daugherty, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pages 832 to 833 (where the warranty period had expired when claims were made). Ford makes no argument that the definitions in Magnuson-Moss, for the terms consumer product, consumer, or “supplier,” would preclude any further action by Plaintiff.” (Id.)

The Court notes here that Rodriguez held the beneficiary of a transferrable express warranty may still "sue a manufacturer for breach of an express warranty to repair defects under the California Uniform Commercial Code." (Rodriguez, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 218, citing Cal. Com. Code, §§ 2313, 2714, 2715.)

The Dagher court concluded:

“Plaintiff admittedly has some viable cause of action under Magnuson-Moss, and this record supports a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend the current complaint. We will reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to permit a new motion to amend that reflects the unavailability of remedies under the Act, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion, but that may seek to set forth express warranty and Magnuson-Moss claims.” (Id. at 929.)

This Court views Dagher as requiring an operative complaint to allege a cause of action under the California Uniform Commercial Code in order to support the Magnuson-Moss claim, given that the purchase of a used vehicle cannot support a claim under Song-Beverly.

Therefore, Dagner supports permitting leave to amend the complaint to allege a claim thereunder, despite the timing of the request for leave and the failure to file a motion for leave. Like in Dagher, Defendant here opposes the request to amend mostly as to timing.

A motion for summary judgment by a defendant includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and its legal effect is the same as a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1375-1376, 1384) Therefore, if a court concludes the complaint is insufficient as a matter of law, it “…may elect to treat the hearing of a summary judgment motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant the opposing party an opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the defect.” (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 625 [disapproved on other grounds by Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6].)

The Court here finds Plaintiffs have failed to allege a sufficient state law warranty claim under the Commercial Code, as required to support a claim under Magnuson-Moss in the operative amended complaint and therefore elects to treat this summary judgment as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and grants leave to amend the complaint. Under Dagher, it appears reasonably possible that Plaintiffs could amend the complaint to allege a state law warranty claim, given that in both Dagher and in this matter, the express warranty period had not expired and Plaintiffs presented the Vehicle for repairs during the warranty period.

As such, the Court converts the motion for summary judgment into a motion for judgment on the pleadings, grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend and orders an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Dubose, Thomas vs. Gomes, Kimberly

Case No.:   VCU325823

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion with leave to amend as to the first two causes of action; to deny the motion as to the third and fourth cause of action. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to the first two causes of action.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for breach of oral pooling agreement, breach of implied pooling agreement, fraud and conversion.

As to the first cause of action for breach of oral agreement, Plaintiff alleges:

“4. In September 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in a marriage ceremony in Dinuba, Tulare County, California wherein they exchanged marital vows and executed a marriage certificate. Following said marriage ceremony, Defendant advised Plaintiff that Defendant had filed the executed marriage certificate with the County Clerk of Tulare County. Thereafter, from September 17, 2017 through May 18, 2023 Defendant continuously advised Plaintiff that they were in fact married and held herself out to the general public as Plaintiff's Wife. On or about August 14, 2023, Plaintiff first learned that Defendant had in fact not filed in the executed marriage certificate and she knew that they were not in fact married. On or about February 28, 2025, the Tulare County Superior Court issued a ruling that the parties were not married and ultimately initiated the breach of the pooling agreement hereinafter described.

5. On or about September 17, 2017, in the City of Woodlake, County of Tulare, State of California, while they were living with each other, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement by the terms of which they agreed to treat as joint property the earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith, which resulted from all personal service, skill, effort, and work that each of them, thereafter, individually or jointly, performed, expended, or contributed during their relationship and while they lived with each other. The parties agreed that in the event of a termination of their relationship, each would account to the other for all property treated as joint property under the agreement and divide it equally between them.

6. Thereafter, from approximately September 17, 2017, to May 18, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant continued to live together, accumulating as joint property earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith, which resulted from all personal service, skill, effort, and work that each of them, individually and jointly, had performed, expended, or contributed during the time they lived with each other. On or about May 18, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant ceased to live with each other.” (Complaint ¶4-6.)

The joint property alleged to have been acquired pursuant to the oral agreement consists of real and personal property, as well as ownership of various business entities. (Complaint ¶7.)

Further, that “On or about May 18, 2023, Plaintiff requested Defendant to account for and divide equally all the joint property hereinabove described, both known and unknown to Plaintiff, but Defendant failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to account for any of the joint property, or to divide any portion of the joint property in Defendant’s control and possession with Plaintiff equally, or at all.” (Complaint ¶10.)

Incorporating the above, as to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied contract, Plaintiff alleges the parties had an implied contract via conduct to combine their skills, efforts, labor and earnings with each other. (Complaint ¶14)

As to the third cause of action for fraud, Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 17, 2017, Defendant made representations to Plaintiff they were a legally married couple and that a marriage certificate had been filed. (Complaint ¶22.) Further, that Defendant knew these representations were false when made and that they were made to induce Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶25.)

As to the fourth cause of action for conversion, Plaintiff alleges “from May 18, 2023 and continuing to the present day, Plaintiff was, and still is, the owner of, and was, and still is, entitled to the possession of the following personal property, namely, safe and contents thereof, all personal household furniture, fixtures, appliances, tools, jewelry, clothing, motor vehicles and personal effects.” (Complaint ¶30.) Further, that on or about February 28, 2025, “Defendant took the property described above and converted the same to her own use” and on the same day, Plaintiff “demanded the immediate return of the above-mentioned property but Defendant failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to return the property to Plaintiff.” (Complaint ¶33.)

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action of the complaint. As to all causes of action, Defendant argues these causes of action are beyond the statute of limitations and that the allegations are insufficient to establish the elements thereof.

Defendant has further filed a request for judicial notice of “...the entire case file of Tulare County Superior Court Case No. VFL298412, in particular the ruling from the putative spouse claim made by Plaintiff here.” (Defendant’s RJN.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues a failure to meet and confer, that the claims are not time barred, that there are exceptions to the statutes of frauds present here, that collateral estoppel does not apply and that Plaintiff has standing as to conversion and fraud.

Authority and Analysis

Request for Judicial Notice

Under Evidence Code section 452(d), judicial notice may be taken of records of any court of this state or any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States. The court may take judicial notice of any court orders, findings of facts and conclusions of law, and judgments within court records. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)  “[W]hile courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents filed in family law case and that a judgment of nullity was entered, stating that there was no valid marriage and that Defendant is not a putative spouse.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should grant the motion if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-880.) To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the motion, as on demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

Further, the Court applies Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. Of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4^th 32, 43 to this motion: “ ‘ “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

Breach of Oral Contract and Implied Contract – Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations based on a contract not in writing, that is oral or implied-in-fact contract, is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 339(1); Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206 [section 339(1) "applies not only to actions for breach of oral or implied contracts. …"].)

Further, the applicable limitations period for a particular cause of action "runs from the moment a claim accrues." (Arey v. Cannon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) "A cause of action accrues when it is complete with all of its elements—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation. This is the 'last element' accrual rule; ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from 'the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.'" (Id.)

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish "(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges the contracts were formed September 17, 2017 (Complaint ¶5), that Plaintiff performed fully (Complaint ¶11), and that “On or about May 18, 2023, Plaintiff requested Defendant to account for and divide equally all the joint property hereinabove described, both known and unknown to Plaintiff, but Defendant failed and refused…” (Complaint ¶10.)

Therefore, all elements appear to have accrued when the breach was alleged May 18, 2023.

Here, this matter was filed September 16, 2025, beyond the two-year statute of limitations.

The Court does not consider the determination that no marriage existed to constitute accrual of this cause of action under the facts pled as to breach of the oral contract allegedly formed September 17, 2017.

The Court considers the breach of contract action, as pled, not a breach of a promise to marry or file a marriage certificate, but rather as to the “…oral agreement by the terms of which they agreed to treat as joint property the earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith…” Therefore, the breach occurs, as pled, when the refusal to treat the property jointly occurred on May 18, 2023.  

Therefore, the Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first two causes of action, with leave to amend, as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Fraud

Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d) sets a three-year statute of limitations as to fraud.

“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Marketing West, Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613.)

"Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading … [F]raud must be specifically pleaded. The effect of this rule is twofold: (a) General pleading of the legal conclusion of 'fraud' is insufficient; the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged. (b) Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner (i.e., factually and specifically), and the policy of liberal construction of pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any respect." (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.)

Here, under the same reasoning as above, the fraud is alleged to have been uncovered no earlier than May 18, 2023 where Defendant is alleged to have refused to account for and/or separate the property acquired during the prior years. Although the VFL298412 indicates no marriage had formed, this fact, in the Court’s opinion, assists in pleading the fraud claim, where the allegations are that Defendant represented they were a legally married couple and that Defendant had filed an executed marriage certificate, neither of which occurred.

Therefore, the Court finds this cause of action both within the statute of limitations and sufficiently pled under paragraphs 22-27 of the complaint as to specificity and the elements thereof. As such, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action is denied.

Conversion

The statute of limitations for conversion is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338(c).)

"'Conversion is any act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein.'" (Enterprise Leasing Corp. v. Shugart Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 737, 747 (quoting Messerall v. Fulwider (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1329).) "'It is not necessary that there be a manual taking of the property; it is only necessary to show an assumption of control or ownership over the property, or that the alleged converter has applied the property to his own use.'" (Id.) Membership in an LLC or ownership interests in corporate stock are treated as personal property under California law. (Holistic Supplements, LLC v. Stark (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 530, 542.)

To plead conversion, Plaintiff must allege: (1) "plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of property," (2) "defendant's wrongful act toward or disposition of the property, interfering with plaintiff's possession," and (3) damage to plaintiff. [Citation.]" (PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384, 395.)

Consistent with the above, the Court finds this cause of action accrued no earlier than May 18, 2023, where Plaintiff requested a division of property and Defendant, thereafter, retained the alleged property acquired and accumulated.

Therefore, the Court finds this cause of action both within the statute of limitations and sufficiently pled under paragraphs 30-34 of the complaint. As such, the motion as to the fourth cause of action is denied

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Hernandez, David vs. Mitchell Lewis & Staver CO.

Case No.:  VCU307083

Date:          January 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, as modified herein; to set the motion for final approval for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

Facts

At the prior hearing, the Court continued this matter and ordered supplemental declarations filed as to information to calculate the lodestar. On January 15, 2026, Counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing this issue.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $285,000 or $95,000 and costs not to exceed $30,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 137 hours on this case, at a rates ranging from $1,0000 per hour to $675 per hour, providing a base lodestar of $105,947.50. (Supplemental Declaration of Clark ¶¶3-11.)

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $285,000 are therefore preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorneys’ Fees (33.3%):	$95,000
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$30,000
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs (up to):	$10,000
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment:	$10,000
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$135,000

Therefore, the Court sets the motion for final approval for September 22, 2026, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 FARIAS-GAITAN, JOSE vs. RICE, JANICE et al

Case No.:   PCU308085

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:      Defendant Jerry Walker’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike to First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend as to the first and fourth causes of action; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the second and third causes of action; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges “Defendants JANICE RICE, and DOES 1 to 25, Inclusive, and each of them, kept, owned, harbored and controlled a large German Shepherd, hereinafter referred to as ‘Defendant’s dog.’” (FAC ¶3.)

Further that “Defendants JANICE RICE, JERRY D WALKER TRUST by and through its Trustee JERRY WALKER, and THE EL GRANITO FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED and DOES 1 to 25, Inclusive, were the owners, operators, lessors, managers and maintainers of a residential property located at or near 383 W Date Ave., in the City of Porterville, County of Tulare, State of California, hereinafter referred to as ‘Defendant’s Premises.’” (FAC ¶4.)

Plaintiff alleges further that “On or about April 20, 2022, Plaintiff JOSE FARIAS-GAITAN was outside by a tree in front of the property located at 383 W Date Ave., in the City of Porterville, County of Tulare, State of California awaiting his wife’s arrival.” (FAC ¶6.) Further, that “On or about April 20, 2022, at approximately 5:00 pm, Plaintiff JOSE FARIAS-GAITAN was approached by Defendant’s dog who attacked and bit Plaintiff JOSE FARIAS-GAITAN.” (FAC ¶7.)

Further, that the Defendant’s dog “had an unusually vicious and/or dangerous nature, character and tendency,” that “Defendants, and each of them, knew or should have known, that Defendant’s dog had attacked other persons and/or animals before” and that “This had been the third known bite sustained from Defendant’s dog that had been sustained by a pedestrian.” (FAC ¶15.)

Further, that “Defendants JANICE RICE, JERRY D WALKER TRUST by and through its Trustee JERRY WALKER, THE EL GRANITO FOUNDATION, INCORPORATED, AND DOES 1 TO 25, INCLUSIVE, negligently and carelessly kept, owned and controlled their dog and negligently and carelessly owned, managed, maintained and/or controlled said Defendant’s Premises, in a manner which allowed said dog to jump onto and bite the Plaintiff on Defendant’s premise. The defendants knew or should have known that the premises would not be safe with this vicious dog loose.” (FAC ¶19.)

On these facts, Plaintiff sues for strict liability under Civil Code section 3342, strict liability as to an animal with a known dangerous propensity, negligence and premises liability.

Defendant Jerry Walker demurrers to the complaint as to each cause of action and seeks to strike allegation that Defendant Walker knew or should have known of the animal’s dangerous propensity. Walker further seeks judicial notice of the unlawful detainer matter filed against Defendant Rice on March 4, 2022, for which a judgment awarding possession and damages was entered March 22, 2022, for which a writ of possession was issued, for which a lockout was scheduled April 14, 2022 and that the lockout occurred April 21, 2022.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the operative complaint states causes of action for negligence and premises liability, but seeks leave to amend to clarify the knowledge of Defendant Walker as to the dangerous propensity of the dog at issue.

Judicial Notice

Under Evidence Code section 452(d), judicial notice may be taken of records of any court of this state or any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States. The court may take judicial notice of any court orders, findings of facts and conclusions of law, and judgments within court records. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.)  “[W]hile courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files.” (Id.) Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the documents filed in the unlawful detainer case, but the Court notes it cannot judicially notice the truth of hearsay statements such as “I placed the judgment creditor in quiet and peaceful possession of the premises on 04/21/2022” as stated on the return on writ of possession.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

First Cause of Action – Strict Liability – Civil Code section 3342

Civil Code section 3342, subdivision (a) provides in part:

“The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3342(a).)

Buffington v. Nicholson (1942) 78 Cal.App.2d 37, 42 notes that, in construing a prior, but substantively identical version of section 3342, the court noted " '[a] statute imposing liability on the "owner" of a dog without regard to knowledge of his vicious nature does not apply to one merely harboring or keeping a dog not owned by him, and, to render him liable, previous knowledge of the dog's vicious nature must appear.'"

Here, it is alleged that Defendant Rice owns the dog and only Defendant Rice can be strictly liable under Civil Code section 3342. There are no allegations within the first cause of action as to dangerous propensity (as this is alleged in the second cause of action.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the first cause of action as to Defendant Walker without leave to amend.

Second Cause of Action – Strict Liability – Known Dangerous Propensity and Third Cause of Action – Negligence – Known Dangerous Propensity

Here, Defendant Walker both challenges the sufficiency of the allegations of prior knowledge and that, based on the judicially noticed unlawful detainer matter, Defendant Walker, as landlord, lacked control of the property during the pendency of the unlawful detainer matter to prevent that harm that occurred.

 In addition to liability under the dog bite statute noted above, "[a] common law strict liability cause of action may also be maintained if the owner of a domestic animal that bites or injures another person knew or had reason to know of the animal's vicious propensities. [Citations.]" (Priebe v. Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1112, 1115.)

The court in Donchin v. Guerero (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1832 established a two-step analysis as to landlord liability: First, plaintiff must establish that the landlord had actual knowledge that the dog was vicious and second, plaintiff must establish that the landlord had the ability to prevent the foreseeable harm. (Id. at 1838-1839; See Martinez v. Bank of America (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 890-891)

As to actual knowledge, the Court finds the pleading that the dog at issue had three prior attacks and that Defendant Walker knew or should have known of the dangerous propensity sufficient at this stage. (FAC ¶¶13-15.)

The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts.  (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.)  “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is that his complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint the defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.”  (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 149, 156-157.)  Even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, courts strictly construe a demurrer for uncertainty “because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.”  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

As such, the Court looks to the second step: that the landlord had the ability to prevent the foreseeable harm. Here, Defendant Walker argues that, at the time of the alleged bite on April 20, 2022, unlawful detainer proceedings had commenced. The Court takes judicial notice that the unlawful detainer matter was filed on March 4, 2022 and that judgment was entered March 22, 2022.

The Court agrees that there appear to be no facts pled that Defendant Walker, as a landlord who had already initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against Defendant Rice, the dog’s owner, when the incident occurred, had the ability to prevent the harm.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer, with leave to amend.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Although Defendant Walker cites to Martinez, supra, 82 Cal.App.4^th, the Court does not interpret and apply Martinez to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

In Martinez, the defendant bank purchased the property at issue in a foreclosure sale, initiated an unlawful detainer action, but did not obtain possession on the date of the dog bite, the court noted:

“Without possession, the Bank did not control the property and did not yet have the ability to restrain or remove dogs from the premises. Possession and control form the basis for imposing tort liability for conditions on land. (Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 108, 119.) Until the unlawful detainer action reached a judgment, the Bank lacked the power to remedy the defect by repairing allegedly defective fencing or evicting allegedly vicious dogs. We conclude that under the second Donchin requirement, the Bank lacked the ability to prevent foreseeable harm.” (Martinez, supra,  v. Bank of America (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 894.)

Here, the Court notes, from the judicially noticed unlawful detainer case, that Defendant Walker alleged the property was subject to a written lease entered into in 2017, as opposed to the purchase at a foreclosure sale. As such, the Court does not apply Martinez to hold that because Defendant Walker initiated an unlawful detainer proceeding, Defendant Walker lacked the ability to prevent foreseeable harm, in light of the allegations that the dog at issue had attacked three times prior and the length of the tenancy.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the second and third causes of action as to the second Donchin requirement and orders an amended complaint addressing these issues filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Fourth Cause of Action – Premises Liability

It has been held that “[p]remises liability is a form of negligence....” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp., (1989) 215 Cal. App. 3d 1611, 1619.) As to Defendant Walker, the Court finds no difference between the negligence cause of action asserted in the third cause of action and this fourth cause of action for premises liability. Therefore, as to Defendant Walker, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

(2) Motion to Strike

Based on the ruling above, the Court finds the motion to strike moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Discover Bank vs. Valdez, Roger Jr

Case No.:  PCL308784

Date:           January 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Glade F. Roper

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Continued Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

At the prior hearing on this motion, Defendant appeared and raised issues as to the service of the motion. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve the motion and permitted Defendant to file an opposition or response thereto.

No opposition or other response to the motion has been filed.

Undisputed Material Facts

Defendant applied to plaintiff for a credit card account and entered into a written credit card account agreement with plaintiff for the account number ending in 3547 (the “Account”). (UMF Nos. 1, 10.)

The defendant agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the Cardmember Agreement when the defendant applied for, received or used the credit card account. In addition, the Cardmember Agreement provides that use of the card constitutes acceptance of the agreement. (UMF Nos. 2, 11.)

After receiving the credit card, purchases were made by the use of the account and the charging of various goods, services and cash advances. Plaintiff complied with its obligations under the Agreement by paying vendors for all charges that were made on Defendant’s account. The principal balance of $8,453.15 prayed for in the complaint results from the defendant’s use of said account. (UMF Nos. 3, 12.)

Payments and charges are duly reflected on the computerized credit card record regularly kept and maintained by plaintiff in connection with defendant’s credit card accounts. Those records were mailed on a monthly basis in the form of billing statements to defendant reflecting all debits and credits to defendant’s credit account. (UMF Nos. 4, 13.)

There is no record that there is any unresolved dispute between the parties and/or that the defendant asserted a valid objection to the balance shown as due and owing on the monthly statements provided to the defendant. (UMF Nos. 5, 14.)

Before 02/13/23, the defendant defaulted in making the payments due under the terms of the cardmember agreement and plaintiff accelerated the account balance so that the entire unpaid balance on the account became immediately due and payable. (UMF Nos. 6, 15.)

The last payment applied to the account was on or about 10/30/24. (UMF Nos. 7, 16.)

Defendant owes to plaintiff $8,453.15 principal and court costs. (UMF Nos. 8, 17.)

Defendant’s affirmative defenses, if any, fail to raise any triable issues of fact material to this action and therefore do not preclude granting of summary judgment. (UMF Nos. 9, 18.)

Authority and Analysis

This motion for summary judgment arises out of Defendant’s default on a credit card obligation to Plaintiff. The complaint pleads common counts of open book account and account stated.

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. Aguilar, at 850.  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist as to each of the causes of action set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint.

As to the cause of action for open book account, Plaintiff must prove the following:

1.That Plaintiff and Defendant had financial transactions with each other;

2.That Plaintiff, in the regular course of business, kept a written account of the debits and credits involved in the transactions;

3.That Defendant owes Plaintiff money on the account; and

4.The amount of money that Defendant owes Plaintiff. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460; CACI 372)

Here, the first element is met by UMF Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

The second element is met by UMF Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

The third and fourth elements are met by UMF Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

As to account stated, the essential elements are: “(1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due.  [Citations.]  [Citation.]” (Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

The first element for account stated is met by UMF Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14

The second element is met by UMF Nos. 10 and 11.

The third element is satisfied by UMF Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, and 17.

Moreover, Defendant’s failure to file written opposition creates the inference that the motion is meritorious. Where no opposition to a motion is timely filed with the Court, the Court may only hear argument limited to a request for a continuance of the hearing to afford an opportunity for written opposition, and the Court cannot hear oral argument from the responding party to a discovery motion that goes to the merits of the motion. The basis for this rule is patently intended to prevent the introduction of legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (Mullikin) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division