Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, July 28, 2026, are:

Re: Rojas, Jesusita vs. Sciacca, Leonard Michael et al

Case No.: VCU329752

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Publication of Summons

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order publication in both the Sun Gazette and Fresno Bee.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Leonard Michael Sciacca; Landon; Cole Sciacca as Trustee of the Leonard Michael Sciacca Living Trust; Jessica Zamora Delgado; Matthew Esparza; and Does 1-50 for wrongful death

Plaintiff seeks to serve Defendant Matthew Esparza (“Defendant”) by publication. In support, Plaintiff first notes counsel performed a TLOxp search on defendant Matthew Esparza, which showed an address for defendant on South Redwood Drive in Visalia. (Declaration of Russell ¶4.) Service was attempted on January 28, 2026 at 7:31 p.m. and February 1, 2026 at 11:52 a.m. and on the February 1, 2026 attempt, the process server spoke with a tenant who said he has lived at the house since 2021, indicating that defendant no longer lived there. (Declaration of Russell ¶5.)

Thereafter, on February 2, 2026, counsel performed a search of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's California Incarcerated Records and Information Search (CIRIS) with no results. (Declaration of Russell ¶6.)

Plaintiff's counsel thereafter performed a search of Defendant's criminal cases and found an Order for Transfer of Probation to Fresno County and indicated a mailing address of 804 South Parallel Avenue in Fresno, a Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center. (Declaration of Russell ¶¶7, 8.)

Thereafter, a process server attempted service at the Salvation Army address on February 5, 2026 at 6:03 p.m., but was informed Defendant had moved three years prior thereto. (Declaration of Russell ¶¶9, 10.) Service at this address was again attempted on February 16, 2026 at 1:08 p.m.. wherein the facility's intake coordinator, Deborah Lujano, could not confirm or deny that Mr. Esparza was present at the facility. (Declaration of Russell ¶¶11, 13.)

Counsel thereafter retained a private investigator who again attempted service at the Salvation Army address and spoke with Defendant’s probation officer. (Declaration of Russell ¶¶14, 15.) Further, Counsel hired the Fresno Couty Sheriff’s Department to attempt service at the Salvation Army address, which again resulted in unsuccessful service. (Declaration of Russell ¶16, 17.)

On June 4, 2026, counsel then instructed the private investigator to attempt service on Defendant again at the Salvation Army address. (Declaration of Russell ¶19.) The private investigator met with the resident director who indicated Defendant was no longer resident. (Declaration of Russell ¶20.)

Thereafter, the private investigator obtained additional addresses linked to the name Mathew Esparza, including 495 South Park Street in Woodlake, 1603 East Cooper Avenue in Visalia, and 2530 Oak Road in Walnut Creek. (Declaration of Russell ¶20.) Attempts to serve Defendant at these locations were likewise unsuccessful and counsel notes the Woodlake and Visalia addresses are linked to Defendant’s parents. (Declaration of Russell ¶20.) A further search of the Walnut Creek address revealed information to rule out this address as a possible address for service. (Declaration of Russell ¶22.)

Last, counsel reached out to Defendant’s prior counsel who indicated that Defendant may be incarcerated; however, counsel has searched the inmate records and cannot locate Defendant. (Declaration of Russell ¶23.)

Authority and Analysis

Section 415.50, subdivision (a), states:

“A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article and that either: (1) A cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he or she is a necessary or proper party to the action. (2) The party to be served has or claims an interest in real or personal property in this state that is subject to the jurisdiction of the court or the relief demanded in the action consists wholly or in part in excluding the party from any interest in the property.”

The requirements of section 415.50 are strictly construed. (County of Riverside v. Superior Court (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 443; 450.) Constitutional principles of due process of law, as well as the authorizing statute, require that service by publication be utilized only as a last resort. (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, fn. 5.) If a defendant's address is ascertainable, a method of service superior to publication must be employed. (Id.) The means of service described in Code of Civil Procedure sections 415.10-415.40 make service by publication unnecessary except where a defendant's whereabout and his dwelling house or usual place of abode cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence. (Id.)

The request for service by publication must be supported by a declaration or declarations by persons with personal knowledge. (Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 32, 42.) The declaration must show the defendant cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another authorized manner, requiring a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith by the party or his agent or attorney. (Watts, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 749, fn. 5.)

“[T]he showing of diligence in any given case must rest on its own facts" (Kott v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138.) "In each case where the question here presented is under review the particular facts will control. No single formula nor mode of search can be said to constitute due diligence in every case, [¶] '[l]n proceeding to avail himself … for constructive service of summons, a plaintiff must, in fact, have exercised due diligence. A mere formal compliance with the provisions of the statute, or a statement to that effect in his affidavit, will not suffice; nor will an order for publication based upon such an affidavit, or a judgment following a service of publication thereon, be conclusive of the fact that such diligence was exercised.' [Citation.]” (Donel, Inc. v. Badalian (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 327, 332.) "The question is simply whether" appellant "took those steps which a reasonable person who truly desired to give notice would have taken under the circumstances." (Id.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated diligence in investigation and inquiry to located Defendant, as to the attempts at addresses associated with Defendant, various records searches and the hiring of a private investigator. Defendant’s address does not appear to be ascertainable despite this reasonable diligence.

Next, section 415.50 requires the supporting declaration set forth facts establishing not only the required reasonable diligence but also that a cause of action exists against the party upon whom service is to be made or he or she is a necessary or proper party to the action. "For the purpose of service by publication, the existence of a cause of action is a jurisdictional fact." (Harris v. Cavasso (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 723, 726.) The Harris court concluded a default judgment must be set aside because "the affidavit filed by plaintiffs' attorney [in support of the publication request] is devoid of any facts from which the trial court could draw the conclusion that a cause of action existed against defendants." (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff provides excerpts from the preliminary hearing transcript indicating Defendant Esparza was standing near the decedent at the time decedent was shot. (Declaration of Russell ¶¶2, 24.)

Finally, the application and supporting declaration(s) must present facts regarding the selected publication showing it is "most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served." (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50, subd. (b).) Here, Plaintiff proposes publication via the Sun Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation for Tulare County.

Because of the Defendant’s link to Fresno County regarding the Salvation Army address, the Court will also require publication in the Fresno Bee.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will order publication in both the Sun Gazette and Fresno Bee.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Gonzalez, Adan Chavez vs. DOES 1-10

Case No.: VCL315715

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with the motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar.

Re: Galvan-Padilla, Jose De Jesus vs. Nissan North America, Inc.

Case No.: VCU329280

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts

In this matter filed December 16, 2025, Plaintiff sues Defendants Nissan North America and Groppetti, Ltd, dba Nissan of Visalia, for: 1. Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach Of Express Warranty; 2. Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; 3. Violation of The Song Beverly Act Section 1793.2; and 4. Negligent Repair.

Plaintiff seeks restitution or replacement of the Vehicle and civil penalties under Civil Code section 1794(c) for alleged intentional failures. (Complaint ¶¶32-24, 37, 48.)

Defendant Nissan seeks to strike the following:

1. Complaint Paragraph 33: “By failure of Defendant to remedy the defects as alleged above or to issue a refund or replacement vehicle, Defendant is in breach of its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act.”;

2. Complaint Paragraph 64: “Plaintiff is entitled in addition to the amounts recovered, a civil penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages in that NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. has willfully failed to comply with its responsibilities under the Act.”; and

3. Complaint Page 10, prayer for relief ¶ 5 “For civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages.”

Nissan argues that Plaintiff cannot seek penalties under Civil Code section 1794(c) because Plaintiff has failed to allege prelitigation notice and demand allegations required under Code of Civil Procedure section 871.24.

Nissan seeks judicial notice that Nissan has elected to be governed by the prelitigation notice requirements codified in section 871.24 as well as to the legislation and committee analysis thereof.

In opposition, Plaintiff states “Defendant relies exclusively on the face of the Complaint and identifies only what it contends is a pleading omission. The Motion does not establish that Plaintiff failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 871.24 before commencing this action.” Plaintiff seeks leave to amend.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure § 871.24 provides that at least thirty days prior to filing suit, a plaintiff shall, while in possession of the motor vehicle at issue:

"(1) Notify the manufacturer of the consumer's name, the accurate Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") of the motor vehicle, and a brief summary of the repair history and problems with the motor vehicle[; and] (2) Demand that the manufacturer repurchase or replace the motor vehicle." (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24(a).)

While a failure to comply does not prevent a plaintiff from filing the lawsuit under Song Beverly, the recovery of civil penalties is barred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24 (h).) "Minor deviations in the notice submitted pursuant to subdivision (a) shall not disqualify consumers from seeking civil penalties." (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.24 (b).)

When a statute creates a right but attaches specific conditions to exercise that right, those conditions are mandatory. (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 371,)

Code Civ. Proc. §871.24(h) states:

“An action seeking restitution or replacement under Section 871.20 may be commenced without compliance with subdivision (a). In that event, the consumer shall have possession of the motor vehicle at the time of the filing of the complaint, and shall not seek civil penalties, whether by amendment of the complaint or otherwise. If, however, notice is provided pursuant to subdivision (a) and the manufacturer fails to comply with their obligations under subdivision (e), the consumer may commence an action for restitution or replacement, including, but not limited to, civil penalties under subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code.” (Code Civ. Proc. §871.24(h).)

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with Code Civ. Proc. §871.24(a) as to notifying Nissan at least thirty days prior to the commencement of this lawsuit with information regarding the consumer’s name, the accurate Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) of the motor vehicle, and a brief summary of the repair history and problems with the motor vehicle and a demand for repurchase or replacement.

As such, the Court grants the motion to strike.

However, because the complaint may be amended to cure this deficiency, the Court grants leave to amend. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Re: Garza, Alejandro vs. Gipson Farms, Inc.

Case No.: VCU327171

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion to Permit Substitution of Class Representative and Order for Notice to be Sent to Potential Class Members

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion to permit leave to amend the complaint to name a new representative; to deny the motion as to mailing notice thereof to all potential class members

Facts

Plaintiff Alejandro Garza filed this class action matter for 1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages; 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; 3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods; 4. Failure to Permit Rest Breaks; 5. Failure to Reimburse Business Expenses; 6. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; 7. Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment; 8. Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; and 9. Enforcement of Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”)

At some point, Plaintiff Garza entered into a settlement dismissing Plaintiff’s individual claims.

At the June 4, 2026 case management conference, this Court issued an OSC re: dismissal for lack of a class representative.

On June 5, 2026, counsel filed this motion to permit the finding of a new class representative and for an order sending notice thereof to potential class members.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the former named Plaintiff has settled the claims with Defendant, "shall take all steps necessary to have the lawsuit dismissed with prejudice" and further agrees not to "serve as a class representative in a class action" against Defendant and that this motion violates the settlement agreement.

Authority and Analysis

This case was filed as a putative class action. Therefore, the case cannot be settled or dismissed without Court approval. (California Rules of Court, rules 3.769 and 3.770.) Dismissal may be entered without a hearing and where the class has not been certified, “the action may be dismissed without notice to class members if the court finds that dismissal will not prejudice them.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.770(c).) The underlying purpose of this requirement for court approval is to ensure that the named plaintiff and the class counsel have represented the absent class members adequately. (7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising v. Southland Corp. (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 1135.)

Here, the single named class representative has settled with Defendant, leaving the class “headless.”

The named plaintiff in a class action must be a member of the class he or she purports to represent. (CVS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 300, 307.) Settlement of the individual, represented plaintiff claims, however, “a class representative's voluntary settlement of her individual claim constitutes a voluntary settlement of her only claim” (Watkins v. Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1576, 1590.) Additionally, “[a] voluntarily settling plaintiff no longer has any interest in the action” (Id. at 1592.)

The Court here notes counsel and Plaintiff have assumed a fiduciary duty to the members of the class when bringing a class action. (La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 871.)

In Pirjada v. Superior Court, 201 Cal.App.4th 1074, a wage and hour class action, while discovery requests from the plaintiff seeking the contact information of class members were pending, the defendant’s CEO negotiated and settled with the named plaintiff without attorney involvement, resulting in a letter similar to what was presented in the case at hand. (Id. at 1079.)

In response, Pirjada’s counsel, relying primarily on Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 772, moved for an order providing notice to members of the proposed class that substitution of a suitable class representative was necessary. (Id at 1079-1080.)

The Pirjada court emphasized that counsel was free to communicate with anyone who may wish to pursue a claim, citing the decision in Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, 296 but concluded “[c]ourt-sanctioned notice is neither necessary nor appropriate under the circumstances of this case.” (Id. at 1080.) The trial court denied the motion as to notice to members. (Id.)

“ ‘Precertification class discovery is not a matter of right. … Before allowing class counsel to find a viable class representative, trial courts must apply a balancing test and weigh the actual or potential abuse of the class action procedure against the potential benefits that might be gained.’ (Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 820, 825 [writ of mandate issued directing superior court to vacate order permitting precertification discovery that would have harmed the putative class members' protected privacy rights].)” (Id. at 1084.)

Additionally:

““…precertification discovery may be allowed in appropriate circumstances to identify a substitute class representative in place of one who is not able to serve in that capacity, as well as to assist the lead plaintiff in learning the names of other individuals who might assist in prosecuting the action. But the obligation to notify absent class members before dismissing the case rests with the superior court, not the lead plaintiff or class counsel. The nature and extent of that notice must be decided by the court itself. (See La Sala, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 874 [action should not be dismissed “without undertaking such measures as [the court] may direct to notify the members of the class”]; Rule 3.770(c) [notice of proposed dismissal must be given “in the manner and to those class members specified by the court”].) Indeed, as Rule 3.770(c) provides, no notice to absent class members is required at all “if the court finds that the dismissal will not prejudice them.”

Whether or not the superior court's initial decision not to notify potential class members that Pirjada now lacks standing to represent the class was correct, the court will necessarily revisit that question when it hears its order to show cause regarding dismissal. Counsel's declaration in support of the petition for writ of mandate indicates a new class representative cannot be identified by the informal means authorized in Parris, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 285, and discussed by the superior court during the May 26, 2011 hearing. Assuming that remains the case, Westrup Klick will have an opportunity to demonstrate to the court that some form of notice is required to avoid prejudice to absent class members. It would be inappropriate for us to prejudge the outcome of that hearing or to restrict the superior court's discretion by attempting to outline the factors it should weigh in deciding how to comply with the requirements of La Sala, Kagan and Rule 3.770.” (Id. at 1088.)

The Court takes the same position here as in Pirjada, that counsel may communicate or attempt to locate any suitable replacement class representative, but that the Court will not sanction a notice of potential class members to find a suitable class representative. Here, the Court agrees there is a risk in this case of abuse, given that the only named Plaintiff has entered into a settlement of the individual claims. This appears to the Court, at this stage, that the litigation is driven by counsel, as no suitable replacement has yet been identified. (Howard Gunty Profit Sharing Plan v. Superior Court (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 572, 579-580.)

On the other side of the balancing test, no class has been certified, no notice has been issued and there is no evidence any absent employee has suffered a change in their legal rights due to this lawsuit or its present position.

However, the Court notes that Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff’s individual settlement requires dismissal of this class action lawsuit and that Defendant should recover fees for breach of the settlement agreement are without merit. As noted above, the class action cannot be dismissed by the Plaintiff, as Court approval is required. Pirjada, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at 1080 notes that its trial court stated, correctly, that:

“The fact that a named plaintiff individually settles his claims does not divest him or his counsel of their [fiduciary] obligations to the putative class members. If the trial court concludes that the named plaintiff can no longer represent the claim, ‘It should at least afford plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint, to redefine the class, or to add new individual plaintiffs, or both, in order to establish a suitable representative.’ ” (Id. at 1080.)

Further:

““Pirjada's agreement to request his lawyer dismiss the case with prejudice was not self-executing and, in fact, was only the first step in a process that requires court approval of any such dismissal (see Rule 3.770(a)). Because Pirjada, as well as his counsel, assumed a fiduciary duty to the members of the class when he sued on their behalf (see La Sala, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 871), he may have been required by the court, as a condition of approval of his settlement, to assist in an effort to find a suitable substitute class representative. (Id. at pp. 871–872; see Rule 3.770(c) [notice of a proposed precertification dismissal may be given “in the manner specified by the court”].) Items Nos. 27 and 29 of the outstanding discovery requests could have played a role in that effort. (Cf. National Solar Equipment Owners' Assn. v. Grumman Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1281–1282 [1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325] [“unnamed class members are ‘parties’ for purposes of discovery”]; Earley v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434, fn. 11 [95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57] [same].) Accordingly, although it did not do so, in the circumstances presented here it would not have been an abuse of discretion for the superior court to have acted to safeguard the rights of potential class members by granting the motion to compel and requiring Pacific National to provide names and contact information using the third party administrator, opt-out procedure approved by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th 360, as was done, for example, in Best Buy, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th 772 and CashCall, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th 273.”

As such, the Court is not basing its ruling granting this motion to permit the substitution on the terms of Plaintiff Garza’s individual settlement agreement.

As the Court has already set an OSC re: dismissal for August 18, 2026, the Court will permit such time for a representative plaintiff to be named and obtain a status on counsel’s efforts to obtain a substitute representative. At that time, the Court will consider, in the absence of a replacement representative, dismissal pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.770.

Re: John Deere Financial vs. Toor, Santokh S

Case No.: VCL330600

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion to Serve Defendant Santokh S. Toor Electronically

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Santokh S. Toor for breach of contract and common counts based on a credit application entered into on December 21, 2020 and containing an email address. Plaintiff alleges damages in the amount of $26,266.77. (Declaration of Yacoub ¶3.)

The credit application lists an email address of “bt5323@gmail.com.”

Plaintiff moves to serve Defendant via electronic means via this motion filed June 10, 2026.

In support, Plaintiff’s counsel states:

“On February 9, 2026 through March 1, 2026, our Process Server attempted to serve the Summons and Complaint on the Defendant at her last known residence at 27725 ROAD 92 VISALIA, CA 93277 ("Road 92 address"), however, the Process Server was unsuccessful. The server noted that the property is gated and there was no outside access.” (Declaration of Yacoub ¶4 – Ex B. - Process Server Declaration.)

Exhibit B indicates 5 service attempts.

Plaintiff counsel, thereafter, use of two Skip tracing database systems, TLO and IdiCore, which listed the 27725 ROAD 92 address as Defendant’s most current address. (Declaration of Yacoub ¶5.)

On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff requested that the Post Office verify that Defendant receives mail at the Road 92 address and the Post Office confirmed Defendant does have mail delivered at the Road 92 address. (Declaration of Yacoub ¶6.)

Between April 4, 2026 and April 26, 2026, Plaintiff, via the process server, again attempted service at the Road 92 address, again noting no access the property due to the gate and attempts to contact the residents via a call box that went unanswered. (Declaration of Yacoub 7 – Ex. D - Process Server Declaration.)

On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff mailed the Summons and Complaint, with a Proof of Service of Summons and two copies of a Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt with a prepaid return envelope, to the Road 92 address to accept service of the documents by signing one copy of the Notice and Acknowledgment and returning it to Plaintiff's Counsel. (Declaration of Yacoub ¶8.) The response was due May 28, 2026, no response has been received and the Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt was returned to Plaintiff’s counsel’s office as “Return to Sender.” (Declaration of Yacoub ¶8.)

On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff requested the Tulare County Sheriff’s Office attempt to serve Defendant stating that: “Our office is still currently awaiting the completion of those attempts. Our office followed up with the Sheriff's Department on June 10, 2026; we were made aware that to date, the Sheriff is still actively attempting and that the Defendant has not yet been served.” (Declaration of Yacoub ¶11.)

Plaintiff’s counsel has also emailed the documents to Defendant at a “confirmed email address” on June 10, 2026, but has not received a response as of the date of the declaration, June 10, 2026. (Declaration of Yacoub ¶12.)

On June 17, 2026, a proof of unsuccessful service by the Sheriff’s office was filed, indicating no contact was made due to a locked gate.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant." (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439.) "In order to obtain in personam jurisdiction through any form of constructive service there must be strict compliance with the requisite statutory procedures." (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1417.)

For service within the state, "[a] summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served." (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10.)

Alternatively, if the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, a plaintiff may effectuate substitute service "by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address . . ., in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address . . ., at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left." (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (b)(1).) For purposes of such substitute service, reasonable diligence requires attempting personal delivery in good faith on at least three occasions on three different days at three different times. (Code Civ. Proc., 415.20, subd. (b)(2).)

Further, a summons may also be served within the state by mailing the summons and complaint with a notice and acknowledgment of receipt and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.30, subd. (a).)

Additionally, "[a] summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable diligence be served in another manner specified in this article[.]" (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50, subd. (a).) However, "[i]f a defendant's address is ascertainable, a method of service superior to publication must be employed, because constitutional principles of due process of law, as well as the authorizing statute, require that service by publication be utilized only as a last resort." (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, fn. 5.)

Finally, "if a plaintiff, despite exercising reasonable diligence, has been unable to effect service of the summons by any of the methods authorized under this chapter, the court in which the action is pending may, upon motion, direct that summons be served in a manner that is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served, including by electronic mail or other electronic technology, and that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court." (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.30, subd. (a)(1).) "A plaintiff seeking to establish reasonable diligence under this section shall set forth facts detailing all attempts to serve the defendant by each of the methods prescribed by statute, including facts demonstrating why each method was unsuccessful at every address or location where the defendant is likely to be found.” Code Civ. Proc., § 413.30, subd. (a)(2).)

The Court finds sufficient "reasonable diligence" by "set[ting] forth facts detailing all attempts to serve the defendant by each of the methods prescribed by statute, including facts demonstrating why each method was unsuccessful at every address or location where the defendant is likely to be found." (Code Civ. Proc., § 413.30, subd. (a)(2).

However, the Court does not find a sufficient showing that the email address listed on the credit application in 2020 remains a viable or confirmed email address reasonably calculated to give actual notice. On this issue, the declaration states “Our office also emailed the Summons and Complaint, with a Proof of Service of Summons and two copies of a Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt to the Defendant's confirmed email address on June 10, 2026” and “Defendant's verified email address BT5323@GMAIL.COM.” The declaration, however, is conclusory as to “Defendant's known email address has been actively used for communication.” The Court notes no indication of a recent response from Defendant from this email address nor indication that the background searches have revealed any additional email addresses. The Court usually sees motions or applications for publication and posting when defendants cannot be served due to a locked gate, and has found this would be more reasonably calculated to give actual notice.

As such, the Court denies the motion without prejudice.

Re: Grant & Weber, Inc. vs. Stewart, Vanessa Lopez

Case No.: VCL331702

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: (1) Defendant Mark Stewart’s Motion for Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant Vanessa Stewart’s Motion to Dismiss

Tentative Ruling: (1) To deny the motion; (2) To deny the motion

(1) Defendant Mark Stewart’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Facts and Analysis

Defendant Mark Stewart moves for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473c. However, this motion was filed June 26, 2026 and set for hearing July 28, 2026.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473c(a)(2), notice of the motion and supporting papers must be filed and served on all other parties to the action at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing. Here, while there is no proof of service, the motion is set well less than 81 days from the filing date. “The subdivision does not contain any language authorizing courts to shorten the [81]-day notice period. (McMahon v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 112, 115.) (emphasis added.)

As such, the Court denies the motion.

(2) Defendant Vanessa Stewart’s Motion to Dismiss

Facts and Analysis

Defendant Vanessa Stewart has filed a nearly identical motion to the motion for summary judgment adjudicated above, with the term “summary judgment” struck and the term “motion to dismiss” inserted in its place but that still cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 473c.

The California Supreme Court has held that the strong policy favoring resolution of disputes on their merits requires "flexibility rather than mechanical adherence to motion and pleading labels." (Laguna Village, Inc. v. Laborers International Union of North America (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 174, 182.) "[A] trial court is 'free to consider the motion regardless of its label.' [Citations.] ... The proposition that a trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion is one that has existed for many decades. 'The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words.' [Citations.] Neither the Legislature, nor the California Supreme Court, nor any Court of Appeal has ever challenged that notion. To the contrary, several courts have tacitly approved the treatment of a motion for reconsideration as a motion for a new trial, and vice versa. [Citations.] The principle that a trial court may consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is consistent with the court's inherent authority to manage and control its docket. [Citation.]" (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 187, 193.)

As such, the Court treats this motion as a motion for summary judgment, noting there is no other statutory basis as to a motion to dismiss.

This motion was filed June 26, 2026 and set for hearing July 28, 2026.

As such, the Court denies the motion.

Re: GONZALEZ GARCIA, MARIO vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC

Case No.: PCU315266

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $8,595 in fees and $495 in costs

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicle (“Vehicle”) which allegedly experienced ongoing problems.

On June 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for recover of fees in the amount of $35,692.00 consisting of (1) $26,897.50 in attorney fees; (2) a 1.3 multiplier enhancement on the attorney fees (or $8,069.25); and (3) $725.25 in costs and expenses.

In opposition, Defendant argues the motion is untimely, as the case settled in August 2025, and that the settlement of a case is a “judgment” citing DeSaulles v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1140, Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, and Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 385.

Further, Defendant argues excessive hours incurred, excessive hourly rates and that no multiplier should be awarded. Further, Defendant seeks to strike all claimed costs.

Authority and Analysis

Timing of Motion

Here, no judgment appears to have been entered and therefore this motion appears timely under California Rule of Court 3.1702 stating that a fee motion “must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case . . . .” (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).)

Further, under Rule 8.104(1):

(1) Unless a statute or rules 8.108, 8.702, or 8.712 provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:

(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served;

(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or

However, neither DeSaulles, Goodstein, nor Madrigal discuss the timeliness of a fee motion. Defendant has not cited other authority that indicates for the purposes of an attorneys’ fee motion, settlement starts the time to file.

Carpenter v. Jack in the Box Corp., (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 454, notes “…the time limits imposed by rules 3.1702 and 8.104 for filing a motion for attorney fees undersection 425.16, subdivision (c) do not commence to run until entry of judgment at the conclusion of the litigation.” Absent entry of judgment, the Court finds the motion timely as filed.

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover for 54.2 total hours by Plaintiff at rates ranging from $575 to $250 per hour and to for an award of a .3 multiplier. Additionally, the billing records reflect a $3,500 “flat rate” for “all communications with the client concerning case facts, legal merits, and the applicability of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; the review, analysis, and organization of all client-provided documents and information; preparation, revision, and execution of the attorney-client fee agreement, including the contingency fee arrangement; calculation, analysis, and assessment of the client’s actual, statutory, and potential damages.”

No Multiplier

As to the .3 enhancement sought by Plaintiffs, such an award is based on the following factors:

The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
The skill displayed in presenting them;
The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ justification for the multiplier is conclusory and does not set forth an adequate basis to award an enhancement. The Court does not find that the work cited demonstrates such extraordinary skill to justify an enhancement to the award sought. This case settled before trial, and the Court finds that this appears to be a standard Song-Beverly case, with no additional novelty or difficulty of issues evidenced from the supporting papers filed by Plaintiff.

As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from accepting other work.

As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the “contingent risk” here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the “contingent” risk of “establishing eligibility for the award” is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].)

The Court will not award an enhancement in this case.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.) Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the $575 and $425 rates are the prevailing rates in Tulare County for counsel, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour for counsel. Further, the Court will set all paralegal work performed at the rate of $150 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 22.7 hours billed by attorneys and 31.5 hours billed by the paralegal.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.)

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)

To start, the Court removes $3,500 “flat rate charge” which fails to reflect the number of hours incurred. This is precisely the type of “blockbilled” entry that permits the Court to reduce the fee award. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 441.)

Further, Defendant specifically challenges the following entries:

November 19, 2024 – Here, Defendant challenges the 1.9 hours by the paralegal and .7 hours by counsel as to drafting and revising the complaint and related documents. The Court here observes some necessary review by counsel of a paralegal’s work and therefore will reduce the paralegal entries by .5 hours. (-.5 as to Paralegal.)
February 11, 2025 – Here, Defendant challenges .7 hours billed by the paralegal to draft and serve the CMC statement. In the Court’s view, this time does not appear excessive. No reduction is warranted.
March 7 & 15, 2025 – Here, Defendant challenges the 2.5 hours incurred by the paralegal as to drafting discovery and the 1 hour billed, arguing that the discovery at issue is a template used for other Song Beverly cases and requires minimal modification. The Court will reduce the paralegal entry by 1 hour and the attorney entry by .5 of an hour. (-1 as to Paralegal; -.5 as to Khoubian.)
April 16, 2025 – Here, Defendant challenges the 7.2 attorney hours billed as to reviewing GM’s discovery responses and document production, which GM states are the same, or substantially similar, to prior responses served by GM in other cases. The Court will reduce these entries, in total, by 2.2 hours. (-2.2 as to Khoubian.)
April 21 & 22, May 12, 13, 22, & 23, 2025: Here, Defendant challenges a total of 4 hours billed as to meet and confer correspondence, 1 hour as to counsel and 3 hours as to the paralegal. The Court will reduce the paralegal time by 2 hours. (-2 hours as to Paralegal.)
June 15, 2025: Here, Defendant challenges the 1.2 hours by the paralegal and .5 hours by counsel as to the declaration re: an OSC re: mediation. The Court will reduce the paralegal hours by .5 (-.5 as to Paralegal.)
Clerical Tasks – Throughout: Here, GM argues that 3.1 hours billed throughout are for clerical tasks and are non-compensable under Save Our Uniquely Rural Cmty. Env’t v. Cnty. of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187. However, that case states “…attorneys billed at partner rates for some work that appears, at least, to be clerical, such as preparing binders for a hearing and ‘print[ing] each page cited to in all briefs for easy reference during the hearing,’ saving the administrative record to a computer, and ‘review[ing] and tag[ging] cites to the administrative record.’” (Id.) The Court will not reduce the hours here.
Miscellaneous Correspondence – Throughout: Similarly, GM argues that 19.5 hours should be struck for “excessive miscellaneous correspondence and communications.” GM notes many of these are .2 entries which indicate fee padding and that of the 154 entries, 98 related to communication. The Court, noting the number of .2 entries by the paralegal, will reduce the paralegal hours by 4.5. (-4.5 as to Paralegal.)

May 18 & 27, 2026 – Here, GM challenges the 14.5 hours billed, and entered as anticipated, as to the fee motion and review of the award and dismissal of the case. The Court does not award anticipated hours and strikes those entries totaling 5.3. The Court, however, does not find the other entries excessive. (-5.3 as to Khoubian)

As a result, the Court calculates the fees as follows: 14.7 hours at $350 per hour and 23 hours at $150 per hour for a total of $8,595.00.

Costs

The Court notes that attorneys’ fees and the multiplier have been included on the memorandum of costs. These fees have been adjudicated above.

Remaining in the memorandum, Plaintiff seeks to recover $725.25 in costs as to Category No 14 “Fees for electronic filing or service)”

Defendants seek to strike these costs, arguing “Notably, Counsel has provided no further explanation of these costs. There is no Memorandum of Cost Worksheet, just a summary with receipts attached. Counsel’s Memorandum of Cost summary is vague and there is no further explanation pursuant to a worksheet provided.”

The Court notes $495 in filing and motion fees, which, although miscategorized, appear compensable. The Court notes the invoices form One Legal reflect these fees, plus additional electronic filing charges.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5(a)(14) provides that "[f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents" are recoverable. Here, there is no requirement or order regarding electronic filing and therefore these costs are not expressly recoverable.

Therefore, the Court will strike $230.50 of the costs.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and awards $8,595 in fees and $495 in costs.

Re: Pimentel, Juliana et al vs. FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company et al

Case No.: PCU318741

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Plaintiff’s (1) Motion to Enforce Settlement; (2) Motion for Sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of 35,350; (2) To deny the motion.

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement

In this matter, the parties resolved the underlying Song Beverly action on or about February 19, 2026 when the executed Settlement Agreement was served on Defendant’s counsel. In pertinent part, the Settlement Agreement states:

“In sole consideration of the tender of good and negotiable funds in the amount of $35,000, made by FCA US LLC, we, Juliana Pimentel and Julio Pimentel Cazares, release and discharge FCA US LLC, their representatives, employees, agents, directors, members, shareholders, stakeholders, attorneys, assigns, assignees, acquiring entities, predecessors, successors, direct and indirect parent entities and subsidiaries, affiliated entities, Porterville Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram, and any other authorized FCA US LLC dealership from all known and unknown claims, damages, costs, attorneys’ fees, expenses and loss of services related to my 2023 Jeep Cherokee Overland, VIN: 1C4RJJDG2P8734037 (“Subject Vehicle”) through and including the execution date of this release. This Release shall not limit or modify the terms of any warranty or service contract applicable to the Subject Vehicle. The transaction will be completed within 60 days from receipt of this executed settlement agreement and release.”

The Settlement Agreement further states:

“We agree to indemnify and hold the above parties harmless from all further claims, costs or expenses relating to this claim. We expressly agree that the only consideration we will receive is that listed above and that FCA US LLC has made no other promises to us. We accept the consideration listed above as full satisfaction of any and all claims as set forth herein.

…

This Agreement will remain within the jurisdiction of the Court for purposes of enforcing the obligations of the Parties, pursuant to Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. Section 664.6 and any corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If either party files a motion or other legal proceeding to enforce or interpret this Agreement or any of its provisions, the prevailing party in such proceeding shall be entitled to recover all litigation expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees based on actual time expended in pursuing such motion or proceeding.

This release reflects the final agreement between the parties and is intended to replace any prior release or agreement relating to claims described herein. Any prior agreement and/or release relating to the claims described herein is/are void and unenforceable.”

Plaintiff, however, notes that FCA has not paid the $35,000 due under the agreement, which was due approximately April 20, 2026 . Plaintiff, therefore, filed this motion to enforce the settlement on May 12, 2026.

Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment as follows:

a) Payment by Defendant FCA US LLC, in the amount of $35,000 in a check or checks payable to The Lemon Pros, LLP client trust account for JULIANA PIMENTEL and JULIO PIMENTEL CAZARES, within 30 days of the Court’s Order.

b) Payment by Defendant FCA US LLC to Plaintiffs of prejudgment interest at a 10% annual rate on the unpaid amount of $35,000 from the date of the beginning of this legal action, March 4, 2025, to the date of this motion pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 3287, May 12, 2026, in the amount of $3,915.00, or 435 days at a daily rate of $9.00 ($35,000.00*0.10)/365), and further interest incurred through the date of the Court’s judgment, to be paid within 30 days of the Court’s Order; and

c) Payment by Defendant FCA US LLC to Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $4,567.50 for 8.7 hours for the legal work related to this present motion within 30 days of the Court’s Order.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states:

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360)

Here, this matter has not been dismissed and the Court has jurisdiction to enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Section 664.6 permits the Court to enter a judgment in strict conformance with the terms of a settlement agreement. (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6(a) [“the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”] Further, “if the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.)

The court in Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1176 noted that “[t]he power of the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, however, is extremely limited. Section 664.6 was enacted to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.” When ruling on a section 664.6 motion, the trial court acts as a trier of fact to determine whether a settlement has occurred, which is also an implicit authorization for the trial court to interpret the terms and conditions to settlement. (Weddington Prods., Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 809.)

The Court may not “create the material terms of a settlement,” and must instead decide on what terms the parties agreed upon. (Id.) “In acting upon a section 664.6 motion, the trial court must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement of all or part of the case. In making this determination, trial judges, in the sound exercise of their discretion, may receive oral testimony or may determine the motion upon declarations alone.” (Corkland v. Boscoe (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 989, 994.) “[T]he trial court is under a duty to render a judgment that is in exact conformity with an agreement or stipulation of the parties. ‘If interpretation of a stipulation is in order the rules applied are those applied to the interpretation of contracts. [Citations.] It is not the province of the court to add to the provisions thereof [citations]; to insert a term not found therein [citations]; or to make a new stipulation for the parties.’” (Jones v. World Life Research Inst. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 836, 840.)

Therefore, the Court will enter judgment in the amount of $35,000.

Prejudgment Interest

The Court notes prejudgment interest is an element of damages, and as such, a settlement agreement is presumed to contain the parties' mutual agreement of the amount that the adequately compensate a plaintiff in exchange for a release of claims. (BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1220, 1225-26 ["We disagree that Civil Code section 3287 authorizes an award of prejudgment interest on a judgment entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 where, as here, the parties have reached their own agreement about what compensation is owed for damages that would otherwise be addressed by an award of prejudgment interest.”].)

Therefore, the Court will not award prejudgment interest.

Further Interest

Although further interest from the date of this motion through the Court’s order on entry of judgment is requested, Plaintiff’s motion lacks argument and authority in support of this contention. As the Settlement Agreement is likewise silent on such further interest, the Court will decline to award such here.

Attorneys’ Fees

Here, the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorneys’ fees, stating “If either party files a motion or other legal proceeding to enforce or interpret this Agreement or any of its provisions, the prevailing party in such proceeding shall be entitled to recover all litigation expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees based on actual time expended in pursuing such motion or proceeding.”

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel states “Plaintiffs’ Motion to Enforce Settlement, Motion for Sanctions and respective declarations took me 3.7 hours to draft and finalize.” (Declaration of Urner ¶7)

Here, the Court does not consider time spent regarding the motion for sanctions and declaration in support thereof to be within the scope of the Settlement Agreement to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

The Court notes a rate of $525 in the declaration accompanying the motion for sanctions.

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)

As such, the Court sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour.

The Court will award 1 hour on this motion.

Therefore, the Court will include $350 in attorneys’ fees.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff notes this matter was settled at mediation in October 2025 and that a formal settlement agreement was accepted by Plaintiffs on January 30, 2026, and served on Defendant’s counsel on February 19, 2026. The Settlement Agreement provided that “The transaction will be completed within 60 days from receipt of this executed settlement agreement and release.”

As such, the funders were due April 20, 2026.

As of the filing of this motion, the funds have not been paid.

Counsel for Plaintiff states “…82 days have passed since service of the Release Agreement despite Plaintiffs’ approximately 6 attempts at contacting Defendant on the status of remittance.” (Declaration of Urner ¶4.) Further that:

“…These 82 days follows a prior three (3) month delay after the case was settled at mediation to provide Release in dispute here. Plaintiffs’ numerous requests for updates on the settlement checks are not unique to this issue alone. Defendant’s pattern of avoidance dates back to November 2025 following the Parties’ settlement of the case in mediation on or around October 29, 2025. Defendant FCA US LLC did not issue the Release Agreement until late January 2026, despite Plaintiffs repeated follow up attempts. To this day, FCA’s delays have forced Plaintiffs to continue making payments on their defective vehicle and prevent them from purchasing a new replacement vehicle. As of May 11, 2026, Plaintiffs’ last attempt to contact Defense, Plaintiffs have yet to receive a response regarding the status of the check. Plaintiffs’ counsel exhausted its effort in obtaining a meaningful update from Defendant’s counsel regarding an update on remittance.”

Plaintiff moves for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128 and 128.5, seeking $4,567.50.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5(a) authorizes the Court to “order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5(a).)

“Actions or tactics” are defined under section 128.5(a) and “include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5(b)(1).) Further, the term “frivolous” is defined as “totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.5(b)(2).)

“Whether an action is frivolous is governed by an objective standard: any reasonable attorney would agree it is totally and completely without merit. [Citations.] There must also be a showing of an improper purpose, i.e., subjective bad faith on the part of the attorney or party to be sanctioned.” (In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal. App. 5th 124, 135 (quoting Levy v. Blum (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 625, 635); see also Campbell v. Cal-Gard Surety Services, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 573–574 [party seeking § 128.5 sanctions must show action was “meritless or frivolous, and that it was pursued in bad faith”].)

Procedural Requirements

Notice of a motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 "…shall be served as provided in Section 1010, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected." (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B).)

Here, the declaration and attached exhibits fail to demonstrate service of the notice of motion, memorandum, declaration and exhibits at least 21 days prior to the filing of this motion on May 12, 2026.

Under these provisions, service of the motion initiates a 21-day "safe harbor" period. (Banks v. Hathaway, Perett, Webster, Powers & Chrisman (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 949, 953.) During this time, the issue may be corrected without penalty and if so corrected, the motion for sanctions shall not be filed. (Li v. Maestic Industry Hills LLC (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 585, 591.)

Further, at the time of such initial service, the motion served must set forth the hearing date. (Galleria Plus, Inc. v. Hanmi Bank (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 535, 538.)

Strict compliance, not substantial compliance, with the safe harbor notice provisions is required. (CPF Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 997, 1007.)

Here, the Court denies this motion based on the lack of evidence before this Court as to strict compliance with the safe harbor notice provisions.

Re: LUCINDA TERRELL and Estate of JACK TERRELL, by and through its successor in interest et al vs. FERREIRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. et al

Case No.: PCU334768

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: (1) Plaintiff’s Continued Motion for Trial Preference; (2) Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case

Tentative Ruling: The court grants plaintiff’s motion for trial preference and denies defendants’ motion to stay.

This is a vehicle accident case. On February 9, 2026, Jack Terrell was driving on Highway 190 with his wife, plaintiff Lucinda Terrell, and was engaged in a head-on collision with defendant Carter Lee, who was traveling in the opposite direction. Jack Terrell was killed.

Plaintiff commenced suit on May 8, 2026, with a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim and a negligence claim. The complaint names, as defendants, Lee and various entity defendants, one or more of whom plaintiff evidently believed employed Lee at the time of the accident.

On June 17, 2026, plaintiff moved for trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a). Plaintiff is 79. She asserts she suffered severe polytrauma injuries and because of the severity and ongoing consequences of those injuries, preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing her interest in this litigation.

On June 18, 2026, Lee, along with Ferreira Power West, LLC (Ferreira PW) and Ferreira Coastal Construction Co. (Ferreira Coastal) filed a countervailing motion to stay this action pending resolution of a criminal investigation and proceedings now ongoing with respect to the subject accident in this case.

Defendants assert a stay of this case is necessary to protect Lee’s constitutional rights, including his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and to avoid prejudice to defendants’ ability to present their defense.

Trial Preference under Code Civ. Proc., § 36

The court finds no difficulty in concluding plaintiff is entitled to trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a). There is no dispute plaintiff is over 70 years of age and has a substantial interest in this action, and the supporting declarations of plaintiff and her counsel confirm the health of plaintiff “is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 36.)

Plaintiff’s declaration states:

“As a result of the February 9, 2026 collision, I suffered profound and life threatening injuries in the subject collision, including cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine fractures, severe chest trauma, multiple orthopedic fractures, head trauma with loss of consciousness, and serious respiratory complications requiring tracheostomy.”

“Specifically, I sustained a Type III dens fracture, a 75% compression fracture at T12, a 15% compression fracture at L4, a left pneumothorax and hemothorax, multiple left rib fractures with a flail chest segment, fractures of the left clavicle and left scapula, and a comminuted fracture of the left iliac crest with associated hematomas.”

“I also developed dysphagia and endured significant pelvic and shoulder pain as part of the recovery process.”

“I believe strongly that the more time passes, the less I will be able to assist with my legal case due to my physical health and declining memory.”

Counsel for Plaintiff further declares:

“My office has interacted with Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell as well as her daughter, Stacie Wick. My office has also thoroughly reviewed Ms. Terrell’ past medical treatment and recommendations. It is clear to me that any lengthy delay in adjudicating Ms. Terrell’ claim will lead to significant prejudice to her.”

“Ms. Terrell been under the care of multiple physicians since this ultra catastrophic crash. Ms. Terrell was hospitalized and in a inpatient rehab for months following the crash.”

“Ms. Terrell also suffers from a declining memory and has significant difficulty recalling detail, communicating, and making decisions. My office primarily communicates with Ms. Terrell through her daughter, Stacie Wick.”

“Based on Ms. Terrell’ medical records and condition, it is evident that she severe physical and cognitive/mental health decline. Attached hereto as Exhibit “A” is a true and correct copy of Ms. Terrell’s medical records from Kaweah Health Medical Center and Central California Rehab Hospital.”

“In addition to her severe head and orthopedic injuries, Ms. Terrell also suffers from atrial fabulation, hypertension, shortness of breath, anxiety, and PTSD.”

The right to preference for litigants who qualify under Code of Civil Procedure § 36(a) is mandatory. (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 698-99; Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 86-87.) “The language of Section 36(a) was intended by the Legislature to be mandatory, and thus requires that a litigant qualifying under its terms be given preferential trial setting irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference.” (Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 85.)

In opposition to this motion, Defendants argue first that Plaintiff has failed to provide competent medical evidence, but they fail to address section 36.5. The Court rejects this argument, noting that Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration sufficiently states Plaintiff “…suffers from a declining memory and has significant difficulty recalling detail, communicating, and making decisions.”

Next, Defendant Ferreira Coastal Construction Co. argues that its ability to file a summary judgment is precluded by granting preference. However, “[t]he trial court has no power to balance the differing interests of opposing litigants in applying the provision.” (Swaithes v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085.) The parties’ inability or “[f]ailure to complete discovery or other pre-trial matters does not affect the absolute substantive right to trial preference for those litigants who qualify for preference.” (Id.)

The only question is whether defendants’ motion presents a countervailing concern. For the reasons explained below, the court finds a stay is not warranted at this stage of the case, and accordingly, finds that the motion for trial preference must be granted.

Defendants’ Motion for Stay

To begin, while “the court has no absolute obligation to stay a civil case whenever a parallel criminal case is pending,” “[t]he court, nonetheless, has the authority and discretion to do so when the circumstances indicate that a stay is warranted.” (People ex rel. Burns v. Wood (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 700, 712 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 251].)

The parties agree that, in considering the appropriateness of a stay, the court should consider the extent to which the defendant’s fifth amendment rights are implicated, and, additionally, should consider the following factors set forth in Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision (9th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 322 (Keating): “(1) the interest of the plaintiffs in proceeding expeditiously with [the] litigation or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to plaintiffs of a delay; (2) the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation.” (Id., at p. 325; see People ex rel. Burns v. Wood (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 700, 713 [323 Cal.Rptr.3d 251] [applying Keating factors]; see also Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 885 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 505](Avant!).)

A. Extent to Which Defendant’s Fifth Amendment Rights are Implicated

Defendants submit “not providing a stay … will violate Mr. Lee’s Fifth Amendment right,” because “[i]f Mr. Lee is unable to refuse to answer [questions relating to the subject accident], a jury may automatically find him to be at fault without hearing Mr. Lee’s version of the events.” Defendants additionally contend the “[f]acts leading up to the incident are relevant to the defense,” and, for reasons not explained, “this information can only come from Mr. Lee” and “[w]ithout [his] testimony, either in a deposition or at trial, any defenses would be lost.”

It is true, and not disputed, Lee may assert his Fifth Amendment right in these proceedings (Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973) 414 U.S. 70, 77 [94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281] (Lefkowitz)), but defendants’ stated concerns do not implicate Fifth Amendment rights (Avant! Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 876, 882 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 505] (Avant!), citing People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 867, 884-885 [120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024] (Coleman)).

Lee has a Fifth Amendment right not to be “involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution … [and] not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings,” (Lefkowitz, supra, 414 U.S., at p. 77), but the fact that criminal proceedings are pending against Lee “ ‘cannot give him a blank check to block all civil litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter. Justice is meted out in both civil and criminal litigation’ [citation]” (Coleman, supra, 13 Cal. 3d at p. 885; see also, Avant!, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 882, citing with approval).

“Whatever their response to requests for accommodation of the conflicting constitutional rights of a defendant in concurrent civil and criminal proceedings, courts have consistently refrained from recognizing any constitutional need for such accommodation. Rather, the alleviation of tension between constitutional rights has been treated as within the province of a court's discretion in seeking to assure the sound administration of justice.” (Ibid.)

B. Other Factors

1. Interest of plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with litigation

There is no dispute that plaintiff has an interest in proceeding expeditiously with this litigation. Further, as noted above, plaintiff has made a sufficient showing to establish entitlement to trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36, the very purpose of which “is to protect aged plaintiffs from loss of substantive rights due to passage of time. The statute is itself a legislative determination that that risk exists; its purpose is to safeguard against that risk.” (Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 93 [185 Cal.Rptr. 853].)

This factor militates against the granting of a stay.

2. The burden the proceedings may impose on defendants.

Defendants raise a number of contentions regarding the burden that would be imposed upon them in the absence of a stay.

a. Discovery to Ferreira PW

Defendants first indicate that plaintiff served extensive discovery on Ferreira PW “requesting this entity make a determination as to the liability in this matter” and they contend Ferreira PW is “handcuffed in responding to written discovery related to the accident as it cannot make a factual determination relative to any liability issues on Mr. Lee’s behalf.”

It is not clear from defendants’ motion, however, in what respect Ferreira PW is called upon by plaintiff’s discovery to “make a factual determination relative to any liability issues on Mr. Lee’s behalf.”

Appropriate orders could be warranted in some circumstances where Ferreira PW is directed to make liability determinations “on Mr. Lee’s behalf,” for example, as in Avant!, where requests for admission were served on a corporate defendant with a definition of “you” inclusive of Lee (see id., at pp. 881, 887), but there is no indication that plaintiff has served discovery of this kind here.

In reply, defendants provide a somewhat more extensive description of plaintiff’s discovery demands, but none of the demands appear to support that a stay or other orders are warranted based on Lee’s potential assertion of his Fifth Amendment right. According to defendants, plaintiff has demanded information related to Lee’s supervisor; the truck owned by Ferriera PW that Lee was driving; and the training, supervision and fleet of Ferriera PW, but none of this appears to call for “a determination relative to any liability issues on Mr. Lee’s behalf.”

Defendants additionally contend Ferriera PW is called to “admit certain actions of Carter Lee,” but if they do not have “sufficient information or knowledge” to respond, for example, incident to Lee’s assertion of Fifth Amendment rights or otherwise, they are only required to state as much, along with a representation “that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b)(3).)

As the discovery issues are presented here, Ferreira PW suffers no clear prejudice that the court can discern.

b. Vehicle & materials held by law enforcement

Defendants maintain Ferreira PW has not been able to inspect the vehicle Lee was driving at the time of the accident because it remains in police custody, and further, the “Tulare County police department” (the court does not recognize the name of this law enforcement agency) “has not released the Traffic Collision Report relating to Decedent’s death and has not released the MAIT report” and “[t]he officers and/or other individuals will be identified in these reports and those will be witnesses that all parties will need to depose.”

Plaintiff appears to impliedly concede the significance of such items and information, arguing, in effect, that the importance of Lee as a witness does not support the granting of any stay, as “[m]otor-vehicle collisions, including fatal collisions, are frequently investigated and proven through evidence other than a driver’s testimony,” such as through “physical evidence, scene evidence, vehicle damage, roadway evidence, photographs, video, EDR/ECM data, telematics, GPS or fleet-tracking data, dispatch records, route records, cell phone records, witness testimony, law-enforcement investigation, expert reconstruction, maintenance records, employment records, and corporate safety materials.” Plaintiff, though, does not directly respond to defendants’ concerns.

That said, defendants’ concerns are, as submitted, vaguely stated and, critically, not supported by evidence. Counsel for defendants submits a declaration stating, on information and belief, only that Lee was set to be arraigned on June 29, 2026, and that he has criminal defense counsel. Nothing supports that the vehicle or materials defendants purportedly seek, and which are, or were, under the possession, custody or control of law enforcement, are unobtainable.

c. Prejudice resulting from absence of testimony by Lee

i. As to Lee

The question of prejudice to Lee is a difficult one. If this court grants plaintiff’s motion for trial preference, Lee will face trial soon, at a time that he almost certainly will face possible criminal prosecution involving the same facts as this civil matter. And, as noted, Lee may assert his Fifth Amendment right in these proceedings (Lefkowitz, supra, 414 U.S., at p. 77) and, accordingly, is under “no obligation to disclose to [plaintiff] information [he] reasonably believe[s] might be used against [him] in a criminal proceeding” (Pacers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 686, 689 [208 Cal.Rptr. 743] (Pacers)).

It is foreseeable in this case that Lee will be, at some point, deposed and, if he invokes his Fifth Amendment right, faces the possibility of plaintiff’s seeking to exclude his participation as a witness at trial. In this event, Lee, like the defendants in Pacer, will be “forced … to choose between [his] silence and a ‘meaningful chance of avoiding the loss through judicial process of a substantial amount of property.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “A party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege,” however, “should suffer no penalty for his silence,” and “[i]n this context ‘penalty’ is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, … the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege ‘costly.’” (Ibid., citations and some quotation marks omitted for clarity.)

In Pacers, the court found that a trial court’s order precluding defendants facing criminal prosecution in another case from testifying in their civil trial after having asserted Fifth Amendment rights during a deposition “made asserting that privilege ‘costly’” and, therefore, that the trial court abused of discretion in making such order. (Ibid.) The court, moreover, found that an order, “in accord with federal practice,” “staying discovery until expiration of the criminal statute of limitations would [have] allow[ed] [the plaintiffs] to prepare their lawsuit while alleviating [defendants’] difficult choice between defending either the civil or criminal case.” (Ibid.)

Ultimately, though, the rule stated in Pacers was that “[w]here … a defendant's silence is constitutionally guaranteed, the court should weigh the parties’ competing interests with a view toward accommodating the interests of both parties, if possible.” (Ibid.)

Juxtaposed somewhat to Pacers, Coleman, as noted above, observed that “ ‘the fact that a man is indicted cannot give him a blank check to block all civil litigation on the same or related underlying subject matter.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 885.) Specifically, Coleman observed, “ ‘the overall interest of the courts that justice be done may very well require that the compensation and remedy due a civil plaintiff should not be delayed (and possibly denied). The court, in its sound discretion, must assess and balance the nature and substantiality of the injustices claimed on either side.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Coleman further observed, again somewhat at odds with the later-determined Pacers case, that in the context of concurrent civil litigation, as opposed to concurrent proceedings with “the potential of imposing serious personal deprivations” (e.g., prison disciplinary hearings), “the need for accommodation is far less compelling, and does not appear to be of constitutional dimensions. In such circumstances the defendant’s choice as to the better forum – civil or criminal –in which to make his case is generally one of strategy rather than desperation.” (Id., at p. 886.)

Ultimately, though, the consistent thread in Pacers and Coleman is that the court’s determination is based on a weighting of the parties’ respective interests.

The court finds, with respect to the request for a blanket stay at this stage, the balance of the parties’ respective interests tips in favor of plaintiff, given her established entitlement to trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36.

The court’s determination is also based, in part, on the fact that, at this stage, Lee has not been subject to deposition and there has been no resulting effort to exclude his participation as a witness at trial. If Lee is not faced with a possibility of being excluded from testifying at trial incident to refusing to answer questions in discovery, as the defendants in Pacers were, it will only be Lee’s ultimate election whether to ultimately present his testimony in defense against civil liability, and his “choice as to the better forum -- civil or criminal -- in which to make his case [will] generally [be] one of strategy rather than desperation.” (Coleman, supra, 13 cal. 3d at p. 886.) If Lee is faced with that prospect, however, appropriate orders may be warranted, depending on the circumstances then presented, as within the court’s “discretion in seeking to assure the sound administration of justice.” (Id., at p. 885.)

ii. As to the entity defendants

The question of prejudice to the entity defendants is not as complicated. Avant! specifically distinguished Pacers as a case informed by principles derived from cases involving claims against individual, as opposed to business entity, defendants. (Id., at p. 883.) Moreover, Avant! makes clear that the Fifth Amendment does not provide protection against civil penalties to a corporation alleged to be vicariously liable for an employee either since “it has no Fifth Amendment interests to protect.” (Id., at p. 886.)

Defendants’ argument with respect to the burden on the entity defendants, divorced as it must be from constitutional concerns, is not particularly compelling.

Defendants maintain “Mr. Lee’s inability to testify because of his concerns of self-incrimination would lead to a one-sided trial in which his silence will severely prejudice himself, his employer Ferreira Power West, and Ferreira Coastal Construction Co.”

Defendants explain that “[f]acts leading up to the incident are relevant to the defense position”—whatever that position may be, it is not indicated—and “this information” [for reasons not explained] can only come from Mr. Lee.” According to defendants, “[w]ithout Mr. Lee’s testimony, either in a deposition or at trial, any defenses [for reasons also not explained] would be lost.”

The entity defendants, however, are only indirectly burdened by the potential inability to solicit testimony from Lee, given that Lee’s testimony would only inferably pertain to the issue of whether Lee’s driving conduct was negligent or otherwise unlawful. The only liability question pertaining directly to defendants is whether Lee was driving in the course and scope of his employment, and defendants already concede Lee was driving in the course and scope of his employment with Ferreira PW.

Defendants also assert that, despite having already conceded to plaintiff that Lee was driving in the course and scope of his employment with Ferreira PW and advising that the other entity defendants have been improperly sued, plaintiff has still insisted on “leav[ing] all Ferreira entities in the case to see who has the most insurance,” and that, for reasons not explained, “testimony from Carter Lee as to hiring and employment” is somehow important to “adequately” respond to the contention that the other Ferreira entities, other than Ferreira PW, are vicariously liable for Lee’s conduct.

The court, however, firstly notes that it is plaintiff’s burden to establish that Lee was employed with any Ferreira entity, and acting within the course and scope of his employment with that entity at the time of the accident, to establish liability against any such entity. Secondly, the court fails to see how Lee’s testimony would be critical to defendants’ position in defending against any such vicarious liability issue presented in this case, as the entity defendants would presumably be the primary and principle sufficient source of information on whether Lee was an employee of any of them.

As to the question indirectly confronted by the entity defendants, and directly confronted by Lee, concerning Lee’s liability for his driving conduct, the court is not persuaded, in the absence of an explanation by defendants, that defendants are entirely unable to respond absent Lee’s testimony. As plaintiff notes, “[m]otor-vehicle collisions … are frequently investigated and proven through evidence other than a driver’s testimony.”

Moreover, as already observed, the Fifth Amendment ultimately does not provide protection against civil penalties to a corporation alleged to be vicariously liable for an employee since “it has no Fifth Amendment interests to protect.” (Avant!, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.)

At this stage, while the court foresees the possibility that implication of the Fifth Amendment assertions in this case could, at some point, warrant appropriate discovery or other orders, defendants present no specific showing at this stage warranting a blanket stay of the civil case based on the burden which any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on defendants.

d. Remaining factors

As to the remaining factors, (i) the convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources; (ii) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (iii) the interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation, defendants present no especially compelling considerations.

Defendants contend a stay will facilitate convenience in that it will obviate the necessity of “multiple” discovery motions in will be required to file in light of “anticipated discovery.” Another, better option, of course, would be for the parties to meet and confer in good faith to obviate the need for such motions. However, if this expects too much, the court is well equipped to handle such matters as they arise. Moreover, as a general matter, “ ‘convenience of the courts is best served when motions to stay proceedings are discouraged.’ ” (Avant! Corp., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 888.)

Defendants present no other meaningful considerations with respect to the interests of non-parties and the public, except to state that such interests, in this case, are “minimal,” because “[w]hile [Mr. Terrell’s] death is tragic, the public should not be tracking the civil cases filed by Lucinda Terrell and Darrell Terrell [referencing another civil action apparently initiated by the Mr. and Mrs. Terrell’s son], and the civil lawsuit will not have any impact on the public as a whole.”

The court does not find these considerations tip the balance in favor of granting a stay, and finds, instead, that the interests of third parties who might be called as witnesses would be better served by denial of a stay, so they are not called upon to recall important details long after the relevant events have occurred, and the public has a general, but significant, interest “in a system that encourages individuals to come to court for the settlement of their disputes.” (Avant! Corp., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 889.)

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the motion to stay should be, and therefore is, denied.

Re: Citibank, N.A. vs. Lozano, Maria

Case No.: PCL312597

Date: July 28, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and dismiss the case without prejudice.

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, Plaintiff obtained default judgment on June 11, 2025.

However, Defendant in this action had passed away in or about February 2025 prior to the entry of the judgment.

Plaintiff therefore requests the default and default judgment be set aside and that this case be dismissed with prejudice.

The Court, therefore, grants the motion, vacates default and default judgment and dismisses this matter without prejudice as requested.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 29, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054175	In the Matter of Garges, Jennie J.	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed, TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4)
VPR054151	In the Matter of Rudd, Geraldine Shirley	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR053469	In the Matter of Rosales, Heraclio	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition reports no sales, purchases, or exchanges of assets as required in a waiver of account pursuant to CRC, rule 7.550(b), whereas Inventory and Appraisal consisting of several personal properties not reported as assets on hand.
VPR053899	In the Matter of Moreno, Librado C.	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053237	In the Matter of Avila, Melinda Carolyn	Final Distribution Hearing	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053934	In the Matter of Betterton, Michael	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Competing Petitions— Initial Petitioner: Documents in order. Competing Petitioner: Citation not served; Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree; Orientation not completed. Capacity Declaration (GC-335) and Declaration Medical Ability to Attend Hearing (GC-325) not filed.
VPR054103	In the Matter of Martinez, Hannah Grace	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053608	In the Matter of The Owings Family Revocable Trust, dated February 2, 2006	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of Settlement

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

Probate calendar for JULY 16, 2026

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054150	In the Matter of Smith, Carolyn Rae	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Original will not lodged in case. Improper Notice of Hearing served, rather than Notice of Petition to Administer, DE-121.
PPR053976	In the Matter of Lemus Orozco, Yamilet	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing of appointment hearing with copy of the Petition required to be served
PPR048739	In the Matter of Luna, Guadalupe	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR053492	In the Matter of Broome, Justin Bryton	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared July 24, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054014	IMO R.V.	Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on ALL RELATIVES indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of Thompson, Jaylah Rae	Appoint Guardian, THOMPSON Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed FORM ICWA-030 needs to be filed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of Thompson, Jaylah Rae	Appoint Guardian, RENTERIA/CREECH Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed DOJ BACKGROUND RECORD CHECK needs to be completed
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR045613	In the Matter of Hancock, Felicia Nicole	OSC Hearing
7/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR043409	In the Matter of McGuire, Jayden Allen	OSC Hearing

Judicial Branch of California

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings

Probate Examiner Recommendations

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Current Tentative Rulings

Visalia Division

South County Justice Center

Probate Guardianship cases scheduled in Visalia Division and South County Justice Center

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center