Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, July 16, 2026, are:

Re:                Arroyo, Nayeli vs. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company

Case No.:   VCU312956

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Hearing re: Final Distribution

Tentative Ruling: On June 30, 2026, the settlement administrator, through its case manager, filed a declaration indicating that the deadline to cash settlement award checks was June 8, 2026, that a total of $30,097.62 remains uncashed and that “Per the State Controller’s Office of Unclaimed Property – Dormancy Period, Apex shall hold the uncashed funds for one (1) year from the check-cashing deadline date, at which point Apex will then be able to transmit the unclaimed amounts in the Aggrieved Employee’s name. Apex estimated all unclaimed property from this settlement shall be distributed to the State in approximately June 2027.”

Therefore, the Court will set a status conference for July 29, 2027; 8:30 am; D1 as to the distribution of the $30,097.62 to the State Controller’s Office.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Serrano, Rosa Maria vs. The Villa Park Orchards Association

Case No.:   VCU332558

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To continue the motion re: compliance with Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g) to August 20, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

In this discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in interactive process and wrongful termination action, Defendant Villa Park moves to compel arbitration.

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its Human Resources Manager, who indicates that Plaintiff, in 2022, was presented with the Arbitration Agreement in Spanish, her preferred language, and that Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the executed Agreement in Spanish. (Declaration of  Anguiano ¶¶5, 6 – Ex. A.) Further, that Exhibit B, also in Spanish, is a document explaining arbitration to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Anguiano ¶8 – Ex. B.) Further, the declarant states “Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the 2022 Arbitration Agreement used by VPOA in English.” (Declaration of Anguiano ¶8 – Ex. C.)

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g) which requires, as noted above: “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.”

Defendant’s counsel, in an attempt to satisfy this rule, provides the declaration of an employed legal assistant who states: “I am fluent in both English and Spanish, and can read, write, and speak in both languages. During the last 11 years, I have undertaken various interpreting and translating tasks as part of my employment in the legal field.” (Declaration of Heredia ¶3.) The Court is readily familiar with certified interpreters who assist the Court with live testimony, including their qualifications, education, certification and licensing.  While the declaration is under oath, there is an insufficient statement of qualifications, including the statement “I am a qualified translator and interpreter and have undertaken numerous translation and interpreting activities during my career.” (Declaration of Heredia ¶3.)

Therefore, the Court continues this matter and orders a certified translation of Exhibits A and B to be filed no later than seven (7) days prior to the continued hearing set for August 20, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Square 1 Development, LLC vs. Kinwork, LLC

Case No.:   VCU317240

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Demurrer to Third Amended Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order Cross-Defendants to answer the amended cross-complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Case Management Conference is continued to September 9, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

The third amended cross-complaint alleges purchase of property at 607 E. Main Street, Visalia, CA 93292  ("Property") on December 12, 2022. (TACC ¶10.)

Cross-Complainant alleges on June 5, 2023, Cross-Complainant, as landlord, and Kinwork, LLC, as Tenant, entered into a Standard Multi-Tenant Office Lease-Net ("Lease"), by and through Cross-Complainant Brien and Thomason. (TACC ¶11.) Cross-Complainant notes negotiations regarding the Lease took place over several weeks prior to execution between Singh and Cross-Defendants Brien, Thomason and Bravinder (collectively the “Individual Cross-Defendants”), largely by Cross-Defendant Brien on the behalf of the Individual Cross-Defendants. (TACC ¶11.)

Further, that the Individual Cross-Defendants are the managing members of Kinwork LLC. (TACC ¶25.)

The operative amended cross-complaint further alleges that, according to the Individual Cross-Defendants, “the agreed use of the space was for co working office space, training event and art exhibits.” (TACC ¶16.)

On May 20, 2024, Kinwork LLC entered into The Building Construction Contract Agreement ("Agreement") with Square 1 Development, LLC ("Square 1"), with Cross-Defendant Brien signing the Agreement as the CEO of Kinwork LLC. (TACC ¶¶18, 19.)

“Based upon representations by Brien, on April 15, 2024 [Cross-Complainant] provided Kinwork LLC with $100,500.00 for tenant improvements at the Property, which were to be paid to Square 1 Development through the Individual Defendants, as promised by Brien.” (TACC ¶20.)

Further that:

“During the Lease negotiations, beginning in May, 2023 through the date of execution of the Lease, Kinwork LLC, by and through Seagan Brien and Jalisca Thomason promised to Gurdeep Singh the $100,500 provided for tenant improvements would only be used for tenant improvements to the Property and paid to Square 1 Development. Further, Brien and Thomason verbally represented to Singh that they had enough money to pay for all of the other improvements to the Property, which were necessary to open and operate their business. When [Cross-Complainant] inquired as to Individual Defendants' out of pocket expenses to complete the necessary improvements for the Property, both Brien and Thomason made further verbal assurances to Singh, on the date they delivered the executed Lease to [Cross-Complainant], that with his contribution of $100,500 and each Cross-Defendant's individual contributions they would be able to easily afford the improvements.” (TACC ¶¶21.)

Cross-Complainant alleges additionally that Kinwork LLC did not use the $100,500.00 for tenant improvements and that sometime after August 8, 2024, Kinwork LLC left and vacated the Property without notice. (TACC ¶¶ 23, 24.)

Further that Kinwork, LLC was, and is, a mere sham and organized and operated as the alter ego of the Individual Cross-Defendants. (TACC ¶26.)

As to the fourth cause of action for fraud-concealment alleged against Cross-Defendants Brien, Thomason and Kinwork, LLC, Cross-Complainant alleges that “Cross-Defendants and each of them, requested Cross-Complainant pay $100,500 towards tenant improvements and promised to pay the remaining cost of improvements and rent the Property for 5 years and other obligations under the Lease.” (TACC ¶51.)

Additionally, that:

“Cross-Defendants, specifically Brien and Thomason and each of them, concealed a material fact from Cross-Complainant when they requested $100,500 for tenant improvements from Cross-Complainant and promised to use that towards tenant improvements, and other Lease obligations, pay the remaining cost for tenant improvements and rent the Property for 5 years - i.e., that the Cross-Defendants, and each of them, did not have the ability to pay for the improvements, the intent to use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligation or, in the alternative Cross-Defendants, and each of them, concealed their desire and lack of intent to pay for the improvements or use the amount paid by Cross-Complainant towards improvements or rent the Property for 5 years and pay the Lease obligations. The Cross-Defendants ability to pay their portion of the tenant improvement, among other things, were facts known only to the Cross Defendants, as Cross-Complainant was not privy to the Individual Cross-Defendants financial positions.” (TACC ¶52.)

Cross-Complainant alleges that, due to the Lease and the “…fact that Cross Complainant gave them $100,500 in trust, the Cross-Defendants, and each of them had a duty to disclose material facts, like those concealed and alleged herein.” (TACC ¶54.)

Further, Cross-Complainant alleges that “[f]urther, upon reasonably inquiry into the Cross-Defendant's ability to fulfill their obligations, the Cross Defendant's made verbal assurances to the Cross-Complainant that the Individual contributions would fulfill their obligations. Thus, the Cross-Defendant's actively concealed the status of their financial positions, and in turn their ability to fulfill their obligations under the lease, by making such verbal assurances. These verbal assurances were voluntarily made by the Cross-Defendants and mislead the Cross-Complainant to his detriment due to the concealment of the aforementioned material facts.” (TACC ¶54.)

Cross-Complainant alleges reliance on the representations and was unaware of the concealed material facts and that Cross-Complainant has suffered damages thereon. (TACC ¶¶55, 56.)

As to waste, alleged against all Cross-Defendants, Cross-Complainant alleges that, as tenants, Cross-Defendants were under a duty to preserve and protect the Property and that the Cross-Defendants “substantially or permanently diminished the market value of the Property through their unreasonable conduct in stripping the interior of the building on the Property including its flooring, sheet rock, and everything but the framing. The Cross Defendants demolished a majority of the Property without completing their obligations contemplated within the Lease agreement and failed to return the Property in its pre-existing condition before abandoning the Property.” (TACC ¶¶59, 60.)

Further “After stripping the interior of the building, Cross-Defendants abandoned the property, stopped paying rent, and stopped paying their contractor, thus causing a mechanic's lien to be filed against the Property, further diminishing the value of the Property” (TACC ¶61.)

Additionally, the operative amended cross-complaint alleges that “…the Property reverting back to the Cross Complainant is a shell of a building that it once was causing the Cross-Complainant to sustain damages as the Property's market value has been substantially depreciated due to the actions of the Cross-Defendants.”

Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason demurrer to the concealment cause of action  for failure to meet the specificity requirements and failure to state a cause of action.

Cross-Defendant Brien, Thomason and Bravinder demurrer to the waste cause of action, arguing that the damages are not permanent and can be remedied through monetary recovery.

In opposition, Cross-Complainant argues that the essential facts are sufficiently pled as discussed below and that Cross-Defendants attempt to introduce extrinsic facts beyond the allegations of the operative amended cross-complaint.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Fourth Cause of Action - Concealment

“ ‘[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage [citations omitted]’ Thus, the elements of fraud and deceit based on concealment are the same as for intentional fraud, with the additional requirement that the plaintiff allege that the defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact in a situation in which the defendant was under a duty to disclose that material fact.” (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 844.)

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] ‘Thus “‘the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings … will not ordinarily be invoked to sustain a pleading defective in any material respect.’” [Citation.] [¶] This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 837-838.) “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ [Citations.] The pleading of fraud, however, is also the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings. Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘“to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.”’” [citation omitted]” (Id. at 838.)

Here, Cross-Complainant’s operative amended cross-complaint alleges that the material fact concealed was Brien and Thomason’s inability to pay for the improvements, lack of intent to use the $100,500 towards improvements, lack of intent to rent the Property for 5 years. (TACC ¶52.)

Further, Cross-Complainant alleges that by virtue of the Lease and providing the $100,500, Cross-Defendants  Brien and Thomason owed a duty to Cross-Complainant. (TACC ¶53.) “In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff." (Warner Construction Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 294.)

Additionally, it is alleged that “…the Cross Defendant's made verbal assurances to the Cross-Complainant that the Individual contributions would fulfill their obligations. Thus, the Cross-Defendant's actively concealed the status of their financial positions, and in turn their ability to fulfill their obligations under the lease, by making such verbal assurances. These verbal assurances were voluntarily made by the Cross-Defendants and mislead the Cross-Complainant to his detriment due to the concealment of the aforementioned material facts.” (TACC ¶54.)

The Court finds these facts sufficient regarding concealment as to Cross-Defendant Brien and Thomason, under the elements noted above as to their inability to pay for the improvements, lack of intent to use the funds and lack of intent to maintain the five year lease. Further, that these facts were only known to Cross-Defendants Brien and Thomason and were not known or reasonably discoverable Cross-Complainant given the nature of the alleged material facts. Further, that the concealment, and other active representations, were made verbally between May 2023 through the date of the execution of the lease. (TAC ¶¶20, 21.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fourth cause of action in the third amended cross-complaint.

Fifth Cause of Action – Waste

A cause of action for waste requires a plaintiff allege the defendant is under a duty to preserve and protect the property involved, that damage to the property was sufficiently substantial and permanent to cause injury to its interest in the property. (Schellinger Brothers v. Cotter (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 984, 1000; Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1213.) Further, the requirement of substantial and permanent damage requires a "…substantial depreciation in the market value…" of the property. (Smith v. Cap Concrete, Inc. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 769, 776.)

Cross-Complainant cites Avalon, supra, 2 192 Cal. App. 4^th regarding a waste claim. There, the operative complaint alleged waste on the grounds of ““demolishing a portion of the Premises, without either completing the demolition job or concluding the refurbishment of the Premises,” failing to “return the Premises to their pre-existing condition or finishing the improvements contemplated when the demolition commenced,” abandoning the renovation and construction work on the Premises, failing to maintain the Premises in good condition of repair, allowing the Premises to become damaged from theft and vandalism, and failing to repair damage from theft and vandalism. The first amended complaint alleged Defendants committed waste by “failing to properly secure the premises and abandoning the work of improvement midway through the job, … le[aving] the [P]remises available for intruders and others.” (Id. at 1195.) 

Further that “Avalon's waste cause of action was not based solely on the demolition of the office space. Avalon also alleged Defendants committed waste by “failing to properly secure the premises and abandoning the work of improvement midway through the job, le[aving] the [P]remises available for intruders and others.” The evidence established the Premises had been stripped of copper wiring, fixtures had been stolen, windows  were boarded up, and the landscaping became overgrown. (Id. at 1213.)

Further, the Avalon court noted the definition of “permanent” in the context of waste as follows: ““Permanent” does not inflexibly mean eternal; instead, “permanent” means a degree of irremediableness sufficient to cause injury to a reversion interest that will not become a possessory interest until the end of the lease term.” (Id. at 1215.) Specifically, “…damage from waste likely would have to be both substantial and permanent, particularly when there is a long period remaining on the lease term; in other words, waste occurs when damage is sufficiently substantial and permanent to cause an injury to the reversion interest." (Id.)

Here, the Court finds sufficient allegations under Avalon to support waste, noting that this is a five year lease which commenced May 20, 2024, was abandoned after August 8, 2024, with over four years remaining thereon. Further, that in addition to the demolition, the Cross-Defendants abandoned the property, stopped paying rent, and stopped paying their contractor, thus causing a mechanic's lien to be filed against the Property and that this has caused a depreciation in the value of the Property.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the fifth cause of action for waste.

Having overruled the demurrer, the Court orders the Individual Cross-Defendants to answer the third amended cross-complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Sauceda, Manuel Gabriel Jr. vs. Ratp Dev Usa, Inc. et al

Case No.:   VCU325083

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s (1) Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant Thiessen; (2) Motion to Compel Verified Responses from Defendant Thiessen as to Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Production of Documents, Set One; (3) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production from Defendant RATP

Tentative Ruling: (1), (2), (3): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Aguila, Miguel vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:   VCU334384

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      FCA’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion as to the first, second, and fifth causes of action; to grant the motion without leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action; to grant the motion as to the third and sixth causes of action with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint. Case Management Conference is continued to September 30, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

This matter was filed April 7, 2025.

Plaintiff alleges on or about December 30, 2018, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2019 Jeep Grand Cherokee, vehicle identification number 1C4RJEAG7KCS580183 (hereafter "Subject Vehicle") and “…delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant LAMPE for substantial repair on at least one occasion.” (Complaint ¶¶7, 60.)

Plaintiff alleges that the causes of action arise out of the warranty obligations of FCA in connection with a motor vehicle for which FCA issued a written warranty and that “Defects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, engine defects, transmission defects, electrical defects, climate control defects; among other defects and non-conformities.” (Complaint ¶11, 12.)

Additionally, that Plaintiff “purchased the Subject Vehicle as manufactured with FCA's defective engine” and that “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that FCA knew since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2019 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine have one or more defects that can result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the "Engine Defect").” (Complaint ¶15, 16.)

Further, that the Engine Defect is a safety concern and that FCA “…was well aware and knew that the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter.” (Complaint ¶¶17, 18.) Further, that FCA acquired knowledge of the Engine Defect through sources not available to Plaintiff including “pre-production and post- production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Engine Defect made directly to FCA and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from FCA's network of dealers; testing conducted by FCA in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by FCA from FCA's network of dealers…” (Complaint ¶19.) Further that “while FCA knew about the Engine Defect, and its safety risks since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, FCA nevertheless concealed and failed to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its Engine Defect to its sales representatives and Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter.” (Complaint ¶¶20, 22-26.)

Plaintiff alleges further “Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who interacted with sales representatives, considered FCA's advertisement, and/or other marketing materials concerning the FCA Vehicles prior to purchasing the Subject Vehicle. Had FCA revealed the Engine Defect, Plaintiff would have been aware of it and would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle.” (Complaint ¶21.)

As to the statute of limitations, Plaintiff pleads:

“37. To the extent there are any statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiff's claims- including, without limitation, the express warranty, implied warranty, and negligent repair — the running of the limitation periods have been tolled by, inter alia, the following doctrines or rules: equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment rules, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling (e.g., the American Pipe rule).

38. Plaintiff discovered Defendants' wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA's unsuccessful attempts to repair them. However, FCA failed to provide restitution pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (Complaint ¶¶ 37, 38.)

Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d); (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b); (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3); (4) Violation of Civil Code section 1791.1, 1794, 1795.5.) (5) Negligent Repair (against Defendant Lampe); and (6) Fraudulent Inducement -  Concealment.

Defendants FCA and Lampe move for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action on a number of grounds as indicated below.

Plaintiff filed a late opposition on July 6, 2026 to which Defendant has filed a reply the same date.

Authority and Analysis

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is used to challenge a pleading in the same manner as a general demurrer, i.e., the challenged pleading (1) establishes that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction or (2) does not allege facts sufficient to support a cause of action or defense. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(c)(1), see International Assn. of Firefighters v. City of San Jose (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1179,1196; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group (2008) 162 Cal.App.4^th 1193, 1202.)  Like a demurrer, the grounds for this motion must appear on the face of the pleading or be based on facts capable of judicial notice, including court records.  (See Bufil, at 1202; Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. Superior Court (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 978, 986, and fn. 6.)

First and Second Causes of Action – Time Barred Under Civil Code Sections 1793.2(b) and (d)

Defendant FCA first contends that the January 1, 2025 changes to sections 871.20 and 871.21 bar these causes of action, as section 871.21(a) states “An action covered by Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty” and subsection (b) states “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.”

Defendant notes the complaint here was filed March 7, 2025, which is nine weeks beyond six years from the date of purchase December 30, 2018.

Therefore, Defendant argues: “In other words, according to the express allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint, the statute of repose for Plaintiffs first two causes of action expired in late 2024 (six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle as articulated in § 871.21 ) more than two (2) months prior to the filing of this lawsuit.”

To start, "[W]hile a statute of limitations normally sets the time within which proceedings must be commenced once a cause of action accrues, the statute of repose limits the time within which an action may be brought and is not related to accrual. Indeed, 'the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, [the] period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.' [Citation.] A statute of repose thus is harsher than a statute of limitations in that it cuts off a right of action after a specified period of time, irrespective of accrual or even notice that a legal right has been invaded. (Ibid.)" (Giest v. Sequoia Ventures, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 300, 305.)

The issue for the Court is whether this statute of repose is applied retroactively in a violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights.

"Legislation that shortens a limitations period is considered procedural and is applied retroactively to preexisting causes of action, so long as parties are given a reasonable time in which to sue. [Citations.] When necessary to provide a reasonable time to sue, a shortened limitations period may be applied prospectively so that it commences on the effective date of the statute, rather than on the date the cause of action accrued. [Citations.]" (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1091-1092.)

"Even though generally, the operation of statutes of limitations is considered to be a procedural matter in California, if a limitations period has been legislatively shortened, constitutional and substantive issues will arise concerning retrospective application if: '[I]n a given case, that retrospective application may violate due process by in effect eliminating the plaintiff's right. If the time left to file suit is reasonable, no such constitutional violation occurs, and the statute is applied as enacted. If no time is left, or only an unreasonably short time remains, then the statute cannot be applied at all.' [Citation.] It is a question of law whether a party has a reasonable time after a change in the law to file an action. [Citation.]" (Sznyter v. Malone (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162.)

Here, under Defendant FCA’s theory, Plaintiff’s cause of action expired just before the law became effective January 1, 2025. The Court considers a retroactive application which would deny Plaintiff’s claims before the law became active to be violative of Plaintiff’s due process rights.

The Court, therefore, denies the motion as to this argument.

Third Cause of Action – Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3) – Failure to Allege Sufficient Facts

Civil Code section 1793.2 (a)(3) provides that a dealer must “[m]ake available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period.”

Defendant FCA argues the complaint lacks allegations as to the Vehicles service and repair history, noting no allegations as to service history, repair history and lack of presentation of the Subject Vehicle to an authorized dealer and that dealership was unable to complete a repair due to lack of sufficient service literature and replacement parts.

The Court agrees that the complaint is silent as to the requirements of subsection (a)(3) as to presentation for repair, and inability to repair due to lack of literature or parts.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion as to the third cause of action with leave to amend.

Fourth Cause of Action – Implied Warranty of Merchantability – Time Barred

California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.)

As noted by Defendant, implied warranty claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations under the California UCC, citing Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495. (Comm. Code, § 2725(1).)

Defendant argues that the breach of implied warranty claim accrues upon purchase of the Subject Vehicle and that delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims. The Court notes Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 132 agrees, noting that delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims under Commercial Code section 2725, absent an express warranty explicitly extending to future performance. The Court notes that further, "[i]n the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305.)

Therefore, the Court finds the statute of limitations as to this claim expired four years from purchase of the Subject Vehicle as that is when Plaintiff alleges the breach of warranty occurred. As such, the statute appears to have expired December 30, 2022.

The Court, as such, grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

Fifth Cause of Action – Negligent Repair – Insufficient Facts

The necessary elements for negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a legal duty of care that the defendant owed to the plaintiff; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)

The Court notes the operative complaint alleges no specific repair attempts as to Lampe, with the only reference that “Plaintiffs delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant LAMPE for substantial repair on at least one occasion.” (Complaint ¶60.)

However, Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795 indicates negligence may be pleaded generally, and, while lacking specifics, the complaint pleads a duty to Plaintiffs to use ordinary care and skill in storage, preparation and repair of the Subject Vehicle, a breach by failure to use the ordinary skill to repair the Subject Vehicle, and that the breach proximately caused the damages. Further, any ambiguity via this method of pleading could be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair.

Sixth Cause of Action – Fraudulent Inducement – Statute of Limitations

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

The Court, however, does not believe the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after successive presentations of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the alleged defect.

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

Further,  "[i]t has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. [Citation.] Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an 'otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. [Citations.]" (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)

However, the Court agrees that these theories, as well as the other theories as to tolling, are insufficiently pled. Plaintiff does not allege when the Engine Defect arose, when the Vehicle was presented for the Engine Defect or other such facts that would establish either delayed discovery, fraudulent concealment tolling or any other such theory.

Therefore, without reaching the other arguments as to this cause of action, the Court grants the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action without leave to amend.

Because the Court has permitted leave to amend, the Court declines to rule on the issue of striking punitive damages.

Leave to Amend

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, like a demurrer, cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion with leave to amend as to the third and sixth causes of action. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Aidan Sollars vs. Visalia Unified School District

Case No.:  VCU320906

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Augment Expert Witness Designation

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

In this matter, the amended complaint alleges Plaintiff was assaulted at school and struck his head on the asphalt. Plaintiff sues Defendant VUSD on negligence theories.

Trial is set for August 17, 2026.

On June 17, 2026, Defendant VUSD filed this motion to augment its expert witness designation. After moving ex parte, this matter was set for hearing July 16, 2026.

Defendant indicates that it timely exchanged its designation of expert witnesses on April 6, 2026.

However, in late April of 2026, VUSD states it received the radiology imaging records from Valley Children’s Hospital via subpoena following VUSD’s subpoena order made on or about October 27, 2025. Additionally, on May 5, 2026, Plaintiff served discovery responses to VUSD’s first set of Request for Admissions and VUSD’s second set of Form Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, which included Plaintiff’s production of his radiology records. As such, VUSD did not receive any of Plaintiff’s radiology records until after VUSD had already served its expert witness designation on April 6, 2026.

Therefore, Defendant seeks to add a neuroradiologist, Dr. Posin, as a retained expert pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.620.

Defendant further notes it has met and conferred with Plaintiff, but that Defendant has not received a response to its efforts.

Additionally, at the time of filing this motion, none of the expert witnesses have been deposed and the parties have not yet begun noticing the depositions of the experts in this matter. Further, that expert discovery remains open to August 3, 2026 and that Dr. Posin is available for the taking of his deposition.

In an untimely filed opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has known of Plaintiff’s traumatic brain injury since the October 2024 government claim, the September 23, 2025 discovery responses identifying traumatic brain injury, concussion, and post-concussion syndrome and including medical and billing records, namely the Valley Children’s Hospital radiology report for the CT scan of Plaintiff’s brain. Further, that Defendant subpoenaed the radiology records in October 2025 and retained a neuropsychologist on April 6, 2026 who examined Plaintiff. Plaintiff further argues that the production of the films themselves after the initial expert disclosure deadline is insufficient to support the relief in this motion.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.620 states:

The court shall grant leave to augment or amend an expert witness list or declaration only if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) The court has taken into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied on the list of expert witnesses.

(b) The court has determined that any party opposing the motion will not be prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits.

(c) The court has determined either of the following:

(1) The moving party would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call that expert witness or have decided to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness.

(2) The moving party failed to determine to call that expert witness, or to offer the different or additional testimony of that expert witness as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and the moving party has done both of the following:

(A) Sought leave to augment or amend promptly after deciding to call the expert witness or to offer the different or additional testimony.

(B) Promptly thereafter served a copy of the proposed expert witness information concerning the expert or the testimony described in Section 2034.260 on all other parties who have appeared in the action.

(d) Leave to augment or amend is conditioned on the moving party making the expert available immediately for a deposition under Article 3 (commencing with Section 2034.410), and on any other terms as may be just, including, but not limited to, leave to any party opposing the motion to designate additional expert witnesses or to elicit additional opinions from those previously designated, a continuance of the trial for a reasonable period of time, and the awarding of costs and litigation expenses to any party opposing the motion.

Here, as to (a) and (b), the Court agrees that, as no expert depositions have yet been taken and the expert discovery cut off is not until August 3, 2026, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the augmentation. Further, Defendant has agreed to permit the retention of an expert by Plaintiff in response to Dr. Posin. This would appear to eliminate any prejudice to Plaintiff. Any reliance on the disclosed neuropsychiatrist is therefore minimal.

Here, the Court finds (c)(1) met by the disclosure of the radiology films after the date of Defendant’s disclosure of expert witnesses. Defendant’s proposed additional expert is a neuroradiologist that could not have been retained without the radiology records, as opposed to the disclosed neuropsychiatrist. The Court finds sufficient exercise of reasonable diligence as to the subpoenaing of the radiology records and obtaining the May 5, 2026 responses by Plaintiff containing he radiology records and thereafter seeking to retain a neuroradiologist. Further, Plaintiff has sufficient time to depose Dr. Posin and, if necessary, retain their own expert to rebut the opinions of Dr. Posin. As to (c)(2), the Court finds sufficient inadvertence for having not previously designated an expert based solely on Plaintiff’s previous responses to discovery that he had a CT scan of his brain shortly after the incident on May 3, 2024. The Court finds Defendant has promptly, via the meet and confer process, provided sufficient information as to Dr. Posin, the expected topics of testimony and Dr. Posin’s qualification.

As to subsection (d), Defendant notes Dr. Posin will be prepared to have his deposition taken prior to trial.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Arthur J. Gallagher Risk Management Services, LLC vs. Madpaim Inc.

Case No.:  VCL326680

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside / Vacate Dismissal

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff sued Defendant “MADPAIM INC. DBA MAP AUTO REPAIR DBA ABOVE AND BEYOND AUTO BODY PAINT AND ACCESSORIES DBA FIX AUTO VISALIA” for failure to pay insurance premiums.

No timely proof of service was filed.

On December 29, 2025, this Court set an order to show cause re: sanctions and dismissal for failure to file a proof of service. Notice was sent to the address of counsel stated on the complaint. 

At the OSC hearing on January 29, 2026, no appearances were made and this matter was dismissed without prejudice.

On June 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for relief from dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In support, Plaintiff’s counsel states the following:

“4. Defendant was personally served on 05/15/2026. It was only upon receipt of a filing reject for the proof of service that my office became aware that the case had been dismissed.

5. My office first became aware of the OSC that had been scheduled for 01/29/2026 when researching the reason for the case dismissal. Therefore, due to inadvertence, I either misplaced the notice of this hearing date, or never received notice of the hearing date, and thus, said date never got calendared by my office.

6. I discovered the calendar date only after the Court rejected the proof of service filing and advised that the entire case had been dismissed due to lack of prosecution.

7. In response to being advised of the dismissal, I searched my entire office in an attempt to locate a Notice from the Court. However, I did not find one, and have still not been able to find, a Notice of an OSC re Dismissal.

8. Due to my inadvertence, the OSC was never calendared, and thus, I never appeared at the OSC re Dismissal that was heard on 01/29/2026.” (Declaration of Gaba Jr. ¶¶4-8.)

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Where an “attorney affidavit of fault” is filed, there is no requirement that the attorney’s mistake inadvertence, etc., be excusable.  Relief must be granted even where the default or dismissal resulted from inexcusable neglect by the defendant’s attorney (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4^th 868 897 (disapproved on other grounds in Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4^th 830, 845)

The Court is not concerned with the reason for the attorney’s inexcusable mistake (Billing v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256.) Rather, the trial court may deny the motion if it finds that the attorney’s declaration of fault is not credible. (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4^th 907, 915)

The Court accepts counsel’s declaration as to the calendaring error and lack of receipt of the notice. The purpose of the mandatory relief section of section 473(b) is “to alleviate the hardship on parties who lost their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 26 Cal.4^th 249, 257.)

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and vacates the dismissal.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:    VCU324716 (Consolidated – Lead) (Consolidated with Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al., PCU325122)

Date:           July 16, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      TCWA Motion for Leave to Intervene

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

The Tri-County Water Authority (TCWA) seeks leave to intervene in this action to assert claims arising from an unpaid balance of groundwater extraction fees. 

TCWA’s proposed complaint includes common counts on an open book account and a quantum meruit theory, and a cause of action for declaratory relief.  The complaint identifies the following defendants: Michael and Cynthia Graham; Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity); Ron Cook; CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms); Prosperity Ranch 20, LLC (Prosperity R20); and Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL). 

TCWA is, according to the instant motion, owed an outstanding balance for groundwater extraction fees incurred on an account for Prosperity R20 for an approximately 400-acre pistachio ranch referred to by the parties as “Tulare 20.” 

Background

The underlying action in this case is a receivership proceeding in which Focus Management Group (Focus) has been appointed receiver over certain real and personal property assets of Prosperity, including an approximately 1,800-acre pistachio ranch referred to by the parties as “Tulare 22.” 

The underlying complaint by Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC arises in connection with an approximate $32 million debt secured by, inter alia, Tulare 22. 

The named defendants are Prosperity; Michael and Cynthia Graham; and nominally named defendants Compeer Financial, ACA; Compeer Financial, PCA; and Compeer Financial, FLCA, identified collectively in this litigation as “Compeer.”

About four months after the receivership proceedings commenced, the Grahams filed a 17-cause-of-action cross-complaint asserting various claims against, amongst others, Ron and Jennifer Cook; CAL; and CA Farms.  Additionally identified as cross-complainants are Prosperity; Prosperity R20; and Prosperity Development, LLC. 

The cross-complaint includes claims concerning Tulare 22, a host of other matters, and, as pertinent here, Tulare 20.  Specifically pertaining to that ranch, cross-complainants allege, amongst many other things, that Ron Cook transferred title to Tulare 20 from Prosperity to Prosperity R20 without disclosing the transfer to the Grahams (despite the Grahams owning 50% of Prosperity); that Mr. Cook, acting through CAL, then recorded a deed of trust against the property in connection with a purported $2.5 million loan, which “loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent”; and that the Grahams “subsequently discovered … that Mr. Cook assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to [an entity identified as ‘SA9 Properties, LLC’].”

Prior to commencement of the cross-complainants’ action in this case, the Grahams filed a complaint for declaratory relief in TCSC Case No. VCU324716, naming, as defendants, Ron Cook, CA Farms, and Prosperity R20.  The Grahams alleged that CA Farms and Mr. Cook were attempting to secure a loan or other financing against real property owned by Prosperity R20 without the Grahams’ knowledge.  The Grahams sought (and still seek) “a declaration that any encumbrance on the Property [in Prosperity R20] without [the Grahams’] consent is invalid and void.”  Notable here, the only real property identified as owned by Prosperity R20 by any party to this or any other relevant case is Tulare 20.

Incident to the close relationship of the claims in the declaratory relief action and the Grahams’ claims concerning Tulare 20 in their cross-complaint in this case, VCU324716 was recently consolidated with this case, with VCU324716 designated as the lead case, on unopposed motion by the Grahams. 

TCWA’s motion to intervene

TCWA states it has a groundwater account involving Prosperity R20, for groundwater used at Tulare 20, with an outstanding balance of $151,511.52 and that it is unclear when TCWA will be paid or by whom.  TCWA asserts it filed a lien against properties held by Prosperity R20 (i.e., against Tulare 20). 

TCWA asserts that “[a]s such, TCWA has an interest in the property of the Defendants and is entitled to intervene as a matter of right in the case at bar.”  “Alternatively,” TCWA asserts, “TCWA should be permitted to intervene in this lawsuit because it also meets the standard of having ‘an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either (or any) of the parties, or an interest against both.’ (CCP § 387 (d)(2)).”

The court briefly notes that TCWA references another account involving Prosperity, for groundwater used at Tulare 22, as well as, amongst other things, an associated lien against “properties held by Compeer.”  By “properties held by Compeer,” TCWA is referring to Tulare 22, which—according to a receivership report by Focus recently filed in this case—is, or soon should be, actually held by Prosperity.  The circumstances of that title matter are not pertinent here, but the court highlights TCWA’s reference to the Prosperity/Tulare 22 account for the purpose of making clear that that account is irrelevant to TCWA’s instant motion.   That is because, by TCWA’s own admission, the Prosperity/Tulare 22 account has been “paid in full and the lien [on Tulare 22] is being released.”

Accordingly, TCWA’s motion for leave to intervene stands or falls based solely on the relationship of its claims relating to the Tulare 20/Prosperity R20 account and the subjects at issue in this now consolidated action, specifically as to the matters raised in the cross-complaint in this case and the Grahams’ declaratory relief action concerning Tulare 20 and Prosperity R20. 

Opposition by CAL, CA Farms, and Ron and Jennifer Cook

TCWA’s motion is opposed solely by Ron and Jennifer Cook, CAL, and CA Farms.  They collectively assert the subject matter of this action (referencing both the underlying receivership action and the Grahams’ cross-complaint) have “no relation to TCWA and its claim for alleged unpaid water fees” and that TCWA fails “to show how the disposition in this action will impair or impede its interest in collecting alleged unpaid water fees.”

ANALYSIS

Code of Civil Procedure section 387 permits a nonparty to seek leave to file a complaint in an action “[d]emanding anything adverse to both a plaintiff and a defendant” (and/or adverse to both a “cross-complainant” and “cross-defendant”).  (Id., subds. (a)-(c).)

The nonparty is entitled, as a matter of right, to intervene if “[t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.”  (Id., subd (d)(1)(B).)

Alternatively, a nonparty may be permitted to intervene “if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.”  (Id., subd. (d)(2).)

TCWA does not have a mandatory right to intervene

“In determining whether an unconditional right to intervene exists under section 387, subdivision (b), the threshold question is whether the person seeking intervention has ‘an interest relating to the property [or] transaction which is the subject of the action.’ [Citations.]” (Siena Court Homeowners Assn. v. Green Valley Corp. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1423 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 915].)

“In addition to demonstrating an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, a person seeking intervention must also show that he or she ‘is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede that person's ability to protect that interest.’ [Citations.]”  (Id., at p. 1424.)

Arguably, TCWA makes a showing that it has an interest relating to property that is amongst the subjects of the Grahams’ cross-complaint, as well as their declaratory relief action.  TCWA claims an interest relating to Tulare 20 and Prosperity R20 and the court notes that the Grahams’ cross-complaint includes claims for judicial dissolution of Property R20 (which owns Tulare 20); declaratory relief concerning the entitlement of various parties to crop proceeds from the 2025 harvest at Tulare 20; for money had and received, seeking recovery of the 2025 Tulare 20 crop proceeds; and a prayer for a constructive trust over the 2025 Tulare 20 crop proceeds.

TCWA, however, fails to show that disposition of the consolidated action in its absence will impair or impede its ability to protect its interest in the past due Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account.  TCWA’s interest in the payment of its outstanding balance for the Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account arises from its authority under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) to assess fees and penalties against landowners within its jurisdictional area.  The obligations of the defendants identified in the proposed complaint to pay groundwater fees are not challenged in this consolidated action and are independent of the various issues asserted in the Grahams’ cross-complaint and declaratory relief action.  TCWA fails to show how a judgment in the Grahams’ consolidated actions will affect TCWA’s ability to protect its interest in payment of groundwater fees it has assessed under SGMA.  TCWA has an interest, as a creditor, in the consolidated actions of the Grahams, by virtue of its interest in recovery of the account balance from any judgment for damages, but that interest does not give it the right to intervene in the action.  (See Olson v. Hopkins (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 638, 642 [75 Cal.Rptr. 33].)

TCWA’s point, on reply, that is not merely a “simple creditor,” but, rather, a “a joint powers authority GSA created to implement and enforce SGMA,” and that “[t]he fees at issue are not private contractual obligations,” is immaterial.  TCWA’s status as “a joint powers authority GSA” does not confer any special entitlement to intervention. 

TCWA further contends “resolution of the case at bar may, as a practical matter, determine how or whether TCWA is able to recover the fees owed, particularly where payment sources or priorities may be adjudicated in TCWA’s absence.”  TCWA, though, fails to explain how resolution of any of the Grahams’ several claims in the consolidated action will determine any of the matters indicated.  Again, there is no challenge to the propriety of TCWA’s imposition of fees, penalties or liens in this consolidated action.  While it may be true that these issues might somehow indirectly be affected by the resolution of this matter, there is no direct relationship.  “ ‘The right broadly granted by the code has, however, been strictly limited by the decisions defining “interest,” a word that is of crucial significance and that has a definite legal meaning in intervention proceedings. The interest referred to must be in the matter in litigation and of such a direct or immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Muller v. Robinson (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 511, 515 [345 P.2d 25].)

TCWA emphasizes that it “has already recorded liens against Tulare 20” and it argues that it “seeks adjudication of issues that arise directly from disputed ownership and control of the property.”  In its reply, TCWA cites discusses three cases that it presents as analogous to the circumstances here, but the cases are clearly distinguishable. 

In County of San Bernardino v. Harsh California Corp. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 341 [340 P.2d 617], the California Supreme Court concluded intervention by the United States of America was appropriate in an action by the County of San Bernardino against a developer for unpaid property taxes.  The federal government had determined the developer was entitled to a reduction of property taxes under federal law, but the County assessed the full amount of the property tax anyway.   The County sought the full amount of property taxes in the suit against the developer, who asserted, conversely, entitlement to the federal property tax reduction. (Id., at pp. 342-343.) The California Supreme Court concluded the United States had a “a vital interest in establishing the validity and correct delineation of the fiscal policy set forth by Congress”; that “a federal statute [was] the heart of the litigation, and its validity and operation [was] necessarily directly involved” and that intervention was, therefore, appropriate.  (Id., at pp. 344, 347). 

In Simpson Redwood Co. v. Cal. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1192, 1199 [242 Cal.Rptr. 447], the Court of Appeal concluded intervention by a non-profit that had donated land to the State of California for inclusion in the state parks system was appropriate in a litigation by a lumber company that sought to quiet title to that donated land.  (Id., at pp. 1196-1198.)  The Court of Appeal found “ample evidence” in the record reflecting that the non-profit had a “direct, substantial interest in the case” vis-à-vis its interest in the donated land remaining in the state park system.  (Id., at p. 1200.)

In Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873 [150 Cal.Rptr. 606], the Court of Appeal concluded intervention by a school district was appropriate in litigation by a developer versus the City of Santa Rosa challenging the imposition of school district impact fees.  (Id., at pp. 877-878.)  The Court of Appeal held that “[a]ll public agencies have an ‘interest’ which is ‘direct,’ in meeting their official responsibilities even though necessary funding may depend upon the will of some other public body such as the Legislature, or as here the City.”  (Id., at p. 882.)

Distinguishable in this case, however, neither the validity of SGMA, nor the propriety of TCWA’s assessment of fees and penalties or its imposition of liens thereunder, is directly involved in the instant litigation.  

If TCWA has a claim based on SGMA as against Prosperity R20, or any other defendant identified in its proposed complaint, with respect to the alleged outstanding Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 account balance, it may bring a separate action for that claim, and nothing adjudicated in this consolidated action directly threatens the propriety of any such claim.  Accordingly, TCWA’s claim, as a creditor, even as a government agency creditor, does not supply grounds for mandatory intervention in this consolidated action.

Discretionary intervention is not warranted

“Pursuant to section 387 the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following factors are met: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. [Citation.]” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 807].)

“ ‘The requirement of a direct and immediate interest means that the interest must be of such a direct and immediate nature that the moving party “ ‘will either gain or lose by the direct  legal operation and effect of the judgment.’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Siena Court Homeowners Assn., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428.)

TCWA does not have a direct and immediate interest in the consolidated action incident to the outstanding balance on the Prosperity R20/Tulare 20 groundwater fee account.  TCWA will not gain or lose as a result of any judgment in the consolidated action because the judgment will not affect its entitlement to collect the claimed groundwater fees due.  TCWA, in any event, has failed to identify how any such judgment might affect its interests. 

What’s more, TCWA’s intervention, if permitted, would needlessly enlarge the issues in litigation to include matters concerning the person(s) or entity(ies) obligated to pay the outstanding debt to TCWA, and the enforceability of those obligations, which matters have nothing to do with the claims in the consolidated action. 

TCWA argues in reply that intervention would not enlarge the issues in the consolidated litigation and that denying intervention “would likely result in parallel litigation involving many of the same parties, the same property, and many of the same factual issues.”  While it is likely true that such “parallel litigation” would involve “many of the same parties,” property that is at issue in some of the claims in the consolidated action, and that facts that arise in this consolidated action may resurface as relevant to other issues in “parallel litigation” by TCWA, none of the litigated issues as between the Cook parties and the Grahams and the entities formed between them involve the issues that would be appended to this action by TCWA’s proposed complaint in intervention.  It is, accordingly, entirely appropriate that any such litigation by TCWA take place in a separate case. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, TCWA’s motion for leave to intervene is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 15, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054131	In the Matter of Ochoa, Antonio	Letters of Administration	Approval Conditional	Proof of Publication to be filed and proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054129	In the Matter of Veyna Jessie C	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval
VPR053422	In the Matter of Nicki, Montiero	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1.  Waivers of Account not filed by all heirs, Prob C § 10954(a)(1) 2.  The calculation of statutory compensation is required, whether an account is waived, CRC, rule 7.550(b)(9) 3.  Need Notice to public entities, Franchise Tax Board, DHCS, CA Victim Compensation Board, as required by Prob C § 9202(a-c)  4.  Need Notice of Hearing served on all parties of time and place of hearing, Prob C § 11601
VPR053503	In the Matter of Avila, David Alan	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053631	In the Matter of Strambi, Paul Joseph	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1.  Compensation of attorneys shall include dates of service, nature of service rendered, hours of service rendered, identity of person rendering services, and the hourly rate charged pursuant to TCSC, local rule 1059. 2.  Petition Exhibit G – H: the court to determine whether some costs are reimbursable Costs of Administration. 3.  Notice of Hearing not served on all parties, Prob C § 11601
VPR053130	In the Matter of Nitzsche, Sylvia M.	Review Hearing – Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Order appointing conservator of the estate and Letters not submitted. Bond has not been posted.
VPR054170	In the Matter of Santoyo Gomez, Enrique	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 16, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054150	In the Matter of Smith, Carolyn Rae	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Original will not lodged in case. Improper Notice of Hearing served, rather than Notice of Petition to Administer, DE-121.
PPR053976	In the Matter of Lemus Orozco, Yamilet	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing of appointment hearing with copy of the Petition required to be served
PPR048739	In the Matter of Luna, Guadalupe	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR053492	In the Matter of Broome, Justin Bryton	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  July  16, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR054194	IMO E.M.E.	NOTICE OF HEARING (GC-020) needs to be filed with service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054189	IMO L.V.C.	NOTICE OF HEARING (GC-020) needs to be filed with service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054176	IMO I.A.C.	Matter appears to be in order
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR054063	IMP L.A.D.M.	Matter submitted with issues Probate Code §1514(b)(2); Probate Code §1510.1
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054004	IMO E.I.L.	Notice remains an issue for mother.
7/16/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR051462	IMO M.B.F.V.	Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives named in the Petition for Appointment were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination