Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, August 31, 2026, are:

Re:                Tinajero, Lucille vs. Sequoia Medical Services, L.P. et al

Case No.:  VCU319687

Date:           August 31, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the hearing as to compliance with the settlement agreement as to distribution for April 5, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on April 20, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On August 3, 2026, the settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On February 25, 2026, the administrator  received a mailing list of 46 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On March 9, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 46 members. Six (6) notices were returned and updated addresses for five (5) were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, one (1) notice has been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until April 8, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 46 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $60,293.56 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $3,710.02, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $34.51, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $1,114.13.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of the of the gross settlement fund of $150,000 or $50,000.

Attorney Akhavan indicates 73 hours at the rate of $825 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $60,225 (Declaration of Akhavan ¶12.)

Barahmand Law Group indicates 53.8 hours at the rate of $420 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $22,865. (Declaration of Barahmand ¶18.)

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $10,956.44 in fees. (Declaration of Barahmand ¶25.) The Court notes that this motion and the proposed order seeks approval of up to $20,000 in fees. The Court, on final approval, approves the actually incurred fees.

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $ $3,750. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $150,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$50,000.00
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$10,956.44
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$3,750.00
Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$20,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$60,293.56

Therefore, the Court grants the motion. The Court sets the hearing as to compliance with the settlement agreement as to distribution for  April 5, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Visalia Ceramic Tile, Inc. vs. De Anza Tile Co., Inc.

Case No.:   VCU327154 

Date:           August 31, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: The motion is granted.

Visalia Ceramic Tile, Inc. (VCT) moves to file a third amended complaint newly asserting a “defamation/slander per se” claim against recently dismissed defendant Jordon Mondragon. 

Mondragon opposes VCT’s motion.

A. Background

Since commencing this action, VCT has maintained two narrative accounts of wrongdoing on the part of Richard Papapietro, De Anza Tile Co., Inc. (De Anza), and former defendant Jordon Mondragon. 

First, VCT alleges Mondragon—acting as an agent of Papapietro and De Anza (of which Papapietro is allegedly CEO, CFO and an owner)—attempted to solicit non-party Steve Halliwell to infiltrate VCT as a purported employee, while acting as a spy for De Anza (the Halliwell spy gambit allegations).

Second, VCT alleges Papapietro engaged in subsequent efforts to disrupt VCT’s relationship with a supplier (or multiple suppliers) (the supplier disruption allegations). 

Pertinent, here, are the Halliwell spy gambit allegations.  Previously submitted as a basis of claims for, inter alia, interference with prospective economic relations and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) (UCL), VCT now seeks leave to file a third amended complaint recasting such allegations as the basis of a new “defamation/slander per se” against Mondragon.  The court notes, in prior instances of these allegations, and the current proposed third amended complaint, VCT alleged Mondragon told Halliwell VCT had committed OSHA and Labor Code wage and hour violations.

VCT has faced two rounds of prior demurrers, and, pertinent from that background is that this court recently determined, in ruling on the latter round directed at VCT’s first amended complaint, that VCT’s Halliwell spy gambit allegations failed to support a UCL claim against any named defendant.  Further, this court determined there was no reasonable possibility VCT could sufficiently plead a UCL claim based on these allegations in a further amended complaint. 

The court sustained De Anza’s demurrer with leave to amend, but solely incident to its determination that a reasonable possibility remained that VCT could plead its UCL claim based on a curative account of its supplier disruption allegations (the court expressly determined VCT presented no other reasonable possibility of cure by further amendment).  Mondragon’s demurrer was sustained without leave. 

Following the court’s ruling, Mondragon moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, as to himself, under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(1).  That motion was later granted on June 22, 2026. 

Prior to the granting of Mondragon’s dismissal motion, VCT initially filed a second amended complaint asserting, again, its interference and UCL violation claims, but, this time, solely against De Anza and Papapietro and solely based on an augmented account of its supplier disruption allegations. 

Shortly after, however, and still prior to the granting of Mondragon’s dismissal motion, VCT filed the instant motion for leave to file a third amended complaint wherein it seeks to assert a version of the Halliwell spy gambit allegations as the basis of a separate “defamation/slander per se” claim against Mondragon (Mondragon remains left out of two separate claims based on interference with contractual relations and violation of the UCL). 

Proposed third amended complaint

VCT casts the most recent version of the Halliwell spy gambit allegations, intended to support its “defamation/slander per se” claim, in paragraphs 25 through 36 of the proposed third amended complaint. 

Mentioned as instances of defamation/slander are: (1) an October 16, 2023, telephone conversation with Halliwell in which Mondragon allegedly, “with knowing intent, falsely and maliciously told Halliwell that Plaintiff had been engaging in OSHA and prevailing wage violations, … which Defendant Mondragon knew [was] untrue, and [in which Mondragon also] proposed that Halliwell secretly obtain employment with Plaintiff while acting as a paid spy for Defendants De Anza Tile and Papapietro”; and (2) that “after October 16, 2023, including within the one-year period preceding the filing of this Third Amended Complaint, Defendant Mondragon … repeatedly made the same or substantially similar statements as those made by him to Halliwell to additional third persons in the construction, tile, labor, and public works industries” and “Defendant Mondragon’s willful, malicious and false statements about Plaintiff as detailed hereinabove has not stopped.”

B. ANALYSIS

“A trial court may allow the amendment of a pleading at any time up to and including trial.” (Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 354 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 455], citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 576, 473, subd. (a)(1).)  “That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state since 1901. [Citations.]” (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489 [173 Cal.Rptr. 418].)  “Where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party, the liberal rule of allowance prevails.” (Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564 [176 Cal.Rptr. 704].)  These principles reflect “the fundamental policy that ‘cases should be decided on their merits.’ [Citation.]” (Hirsa v. Superior Court, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 489; see also, Higgins v. Del Faro, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 564-565.)

Preliminarily, the court finds that VCT’s request for leave to file its third amended complaint presents no meaningful prejudice to Mondragon. 

Mondragon contends solely that he would be prejudiced because he “has already been dismissed from this action with prejudice” and, thus, “[t]his is not the normal situation involving just another party to the action.” 

The fact that Mondragon has faced a claim by VCT before and defeated it, however, does not, by itself, establish his entitlement to be free from future claims of VCT, as beyond what “another party” would properly be required to face in “the normal situation.”

What matters, instead, and is addressed further below, is whether Mondragon faced the same claim by VCT before and defeated it. 

1. Effect of Judgment under Code Civ. Proc., § 581d

VCT’s motion begins by anticipating and responding to a Mondragon argument that the court is without power to grant VCT leave to amend its complaint because it ordered Mondragon’s dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(1), after sustaining a demurrer to the UCL cause of action without leave.  VCT contends “[t]he Court retains authority to permit amendment because no signed dismissal has yet been entered as to Defendant Mondragon.”

After VCT filed its motion, however, this court entered a signed order of dismissal on June 22, 2026, which was effective as a judgment for Mondragon and against VCT on VCT’s UCL cause of action.  (Code Civ. Proc., 581d.) 

Mondragon argues, as indicated above, that, incident to entry of judgment in his favor (which had occurred as of the time of his opposition), “the litigation between Plaintiff and Defendant Mondragon is terminated ‘and leaves nothing in the nature of judicial action to be done other than questions of enforcement or compliance.’ ” (Opp., p. 3, citing APRI Ins. Co. S.A. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 176, 181 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 171].)

As VCT notes, however, “the Court’s ruling on Defendant Mondragon’s Demurrer to the UCL claim pled in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint did not adjudicate any defamation claim.”

Mondragon recognizes and expressly disputes this contention, as indicated in a later section of his opposition brief where he asserts “res judicata applies to bar the proposed TAC.”  This is the heart of the matter at issue in Mondragon’s argument that an order permitting VCT leave to file its proposed third amended complaint would be violative of the finality of the order dismissing him from this litigation. 

2. Res judicata

“Res judicata, or claim preclusion, precludes the relitigation of a cause of action that was litigated in a prior proceeding if three requirements are satisfied: (1) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding.”  (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 557 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 382].)

There is no dispute that the second two requirements are satisfied (e.g., final judgment; same parties).  The sole issue in dispute is whether “the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding.” (Ibid.)

Mondragon contends the “defamation/slander per se” cause of action in the proposed third amended complaint is the same as the UCL cause of action, as against Mondragon, in the first amended complaint because it is “substantively premised on the same substance” of the same alleged conversation(s) between Mondragon and Halliwell that was alleged to have occurred in the first amended complaint as part of the facts alleged in support of VCT’s prior UCL claim.  Mondragon further argues that “the FAC and TAC concern the same primary rights and harms purportedly derived from the oral dissemination of the same accusations, [and, therefore] res judicata applies to bar what would be the re-litigation of the same cause of action.”

The fact that two claims are based on the same or similar facts, however, is not necessarily determinative of whether they involve the same primary right.  (See Rothschild v. Tyco Internat. (US), Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 488, 499 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 721] [primary right theory did not bar action for violation of unfair competition law based on same facts as existing action under False Claims Act].)

In Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 557 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 382], cited by both parties, the Court of Appeal explains:

“For purposes of res judicata, a cause of action consists of the plaintiff's primary right to be free from a particular injury, the defendant's corresponding primary duty and the defendant's wrongful act in breach of that duty. The violation of a primary right gives rise to only a single cause of action. The plaintiff's indivisible primary right must be distinguished from both the legal theory on which the plaintiff seeks relief and the remedy sought. The plaintiff may seek various remedies based on different legal theories, all arising from a single cause of action.

“ ‘ “[T]he ‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the litigant. Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief. ‘Hence a judgment for the defendant is a bar to a subsequent action by the plaintiff based on the same injury to the same right, even though he presents a different legal ground for relief.’” Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.’” (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 557 [131 Cal.Rptr.3d 382], citations omitted.)

The primary right VCT seeks to vindicate in this action by way of its proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim is based on injury of its interest in its reputation.  (See Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 397].)  In the UCL cause of action from its first amended complaint, however, VCT sought to vindicate different primary rights, albeit based on allegations this court deemed insufficient to support the claims asserted under that cause of action. 

The UCL defines unfair competition as “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice … .” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.)  “ ‘Because Business and Professions Code section 17200 is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’ In other words, a practice is prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ even if not ‘unlawful’ and vice versa.’ [Citation.]” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 [83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 527] (Cel-Tech.)

In the first amended complaint, with respect to the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, VCT solely alleged its supplier disruption allegations as a basis of the claim, and it is clear such allegations, not premised on any conduct by Mondragon, did not involve the same primary right VCT seeks to vindicate by way of its “defamation/slander per se” claim

VCT also, however, cast a version of the Halliwell spy gambit allegations in support of its prior UCL claims based both (i) on the “unfair” prong of the UCL, which requires “any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187); and (ii) on the “fraudulent” prong, which in the UCL context, requires fraudulent acts that deceive members of the public, i.e., consumers (Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1257 [99 Cal.Rptr.3d 768]).

In the above respects, VCT’s UCL cause of action was based on injuries to competition and to the public’s interest in accurate consumer information, which are primary rights distinct and different from than the primary right VCT seeks to vindicate by way of its proposed “defamation/slander per se” cause of action based on injury of its interest in its reputation. 

Accordingly, the court disagrees that res judicata applies as a bar to VCT’s proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim. 

3. Timeliness “in relation to the court’s orders”

Mondragon’s additionally argues that the third amended complaint is “untimely in relation to the court’s orders.” 

Mondragon asserts that VCT was given 10 days from notice of this court’s ruling “granting Defendant Mondragon’s demurrer” to file an amended complaint, and that VCT failed to file an amended complaint asserting any claim against Mondragon within that 10-day period. 

As a threshold matter, the court notes the obvious fact that VCT was not given 10 days from notice of the court’s ruling on the demurrers to the first amended complaint to file an amended complaint as to Mondragon.  Mondragon’s demurrer, rather, was sustained without leave. 

The court, in ruling on De Anza’s demurrer, granted VCT leave to amend, within 10 days, but that 10-day period, of course, is irrelevant to the timeliness of the instant motion for leave to amend.   

3. Statute of limitations

Mondragon additionally asserts VCT’s proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim is time-barred.  Defamation claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).) 

VCT argues, somewhat ambiguously, that “relation-back” principles might be relevant to the determination of whether its proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim, to the extent premised on the statements Mondragon made to Halliwell on October 16, 2023, is time barred, but it “is not asking the Court to use relation back to revive a publication already time-barred before suit was filed.”

To get this first matter out of the way, the court, first, notes, as is evidently conceded, that VCT did not commence this action until October 20, 2025, after the one-year period ostensibly elapsed, and, second, that any possibile determination that VCT’s proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim relates back to its prior UCL claims is vitiated by this court’s determination that those claims involve different primary rights.  (See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1276-1278 & 1276, fn. 25 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 222].)

VCT also argues, however, that its proposed claim is not time-barred to the extent of its allegations that “after October 16, 2023, including within the one-year period preceding the filing of this Third Amended Complaint, Defendant Mondragon … repeatedly made the same or substantially similar statements as those made by him to Halliwell to additional third persons in the construction, tile, labor, and public works industries” and “Defendant Mondragon’s willful, malicious and false statements about Plaintiff as detailed hereinabove has not stopped.”

Mondragon argues that, notwithstanding these subsequent alleged instances of defamation, VCT’s “defamation/slander per se” claim accrued on October 16, 2023, based on the “[t]he single-publication rule, codified in Cal. Civ. Code § 3425.3.” Section 3425.3 states, in pertinent part:  “No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or slander … founded upon any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as … any one presentation to an audience … .” 

Mondragon’s argument is that because VCT alleges “after October 16, 2023, including within the one-year period preceding the filing of this Third Amended Complaint, Defendant Mondragon … repeatedly made the same or substantially similar statements as those made by him to Halliwell,” which statements were made “to additional third persons in the construction, tile, labor, and public works industries”—persons characterized, by Mondragon, as “in the same general audience”—VCT’s “defamation/slander per se” claim accrued, based on the single publication rule, on October 16, 2023, when the original alleged falsehoods were allegedly stated to Halliwell. 

Based on these arguments, it is clear Mondragon misapprehends the single publication rule and the proper context in which it applies. 

First, for the tort of defamation, one of the elements of which is “ ‘publication,’ ” “each time the defamatory statement is communicated to a third person who understands its defamatory meaning as applied to the plaintiff, the statement is said to have been ‘published,’ ” and “[e]ach publication ordinarily gives rise to a new cause of action for defamation. [Citations.]” (Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576, 80 P.3d 676].)  “The rule that each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a new cause of action for defamation applies when the original defamer repeats or recirculates his or her original remarks to a new audience.” (Id., at p. 1243.) 

This rule is not vitiated by the single publication rule.  Rather, it remains the generally applicable rule to repeated instances of defamation, as alleged in the proposed third amended complaint. 

The single publication rule arose in response to a completely different scenario, distinguishable from VCT’s allegations.  “Under the common law as it existed in the 19th century and early part of the 20th century, the principle that each communication of a defamatory remark to a new audience constitutes a separate ‘publication,’ giving rise to a separate cause of action, led to the conclusion that each sale or delivery of a copy of a newspaper or book containing a defamation also constitutes a separate publication of the defamation to a new audience, giving rise to a separate cause of action for defamation. [Citation.] This conclusion had the potential to subject the publishers of books and newspapers to lawsuits stating hundreds, thousands, or even millions of causes of action for a single issue of a periodical or edition of a book.”  (Id., at pp. 1243-1244.)

“Seeking to avoid both the multiplicity and the staleness of claims permitted by the rule applied [as just described above], courts fashioned what became known as the single-publication rule, holding that, for any single edition of a newspaper or book, there was but a single potential action for a defamatory statement contained in the newspaper or book, no matter how many copies of the newspaper or the book were distributed.”  (Id., at p. 1245.)  The single-publication rule was later codified in Civil Code section 3425.3.  (Id., at p. 1246.)

Following adoption of the single publication rule, it remains the case, of course, that “in defamation actions the general rule is that publication occurs when the defendant communicates the defamatory statement to a person other than the person being defamed,” but “with respect to books and newspapers, publication occurs (and the cause of action accrues) when the book or newspaper is first generally distributed to the public.”  (Id., at p. 1247.)

It is true that Civil Code section 3425.3 refers to “any single publication or exhibition or utterance, such as … any one presentation to an audience” (emphasis added), but that obviously does not render, as Mondragon suggests, successive statements, as alleged here, of “the same or substantially similar [false] statements” a single publication giving rise to a single cause of action just because the statements repeated the same falsehood or because the statements were repeatedly made to persons associated as those to whom the defamed person’s reputation matters (i.e., because they are involved in the same industry as the defamed person, or a related industry).  This is an absurd interpretation of section 3425.3.  Clearly the rule is not intended to forever immunize a person, one year after they defame another person, for continued separate instances of defamation based on the same or similar misrepresentations, so long as the defamatory statements are communicated solely to people in related industries such that the defamed person’s reputation is sure to be harmed. 

The court finds, accordingly, that VCT’s proposed “defamation/slander per se” claim does not facially disclose a statute of limitations defense based on the single publication rule. 

4. Lack of specificity

Mondragon lastly argues, reaching his most persuasive point at the end of his brief, that VCT’s “factual allegations beyond those pertaining to the October 2023 phone call to Mr. Halliwell are unquestionably vague.”

The court agrees these allegations are “unquestionably vague.”  VCT’s allegations are only sufficiently specific as to the alleged defamatory statements communicated to Halliwell, and it is essentially conceded that a claim based on those allegations is not timely.  The balance of the allegations, submitted as establishing timely claims, fail to identify the persons to whom the statements were made, or when they were made (except that they were made within the applicable one-year limitations period).   

That said, while “the failure of a proposed amendment to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action … may support an order denying a motion to amend,” that rule finds “its most appropriate application … where the insufficiency [cannot] not be cured by further appropriate amendment.”  (Cal. Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 280-281 [218 Cal.Rptr. 817].)  

Accordingly, the court is disinclined to deny VCT’s request for leave to amend on the basis of the vagueness of its allegations, but it also cautions that, were the court here faced with demurrer on the same grounds, it would be sustained.  The court is prepared to grant VCT leave to file its third amended complaint because it believes, at this stage, there is a reasonable possibility of cure by further amendment. 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants VCT’s motion.  The court further makes clear that it expects VCT to meet and confer with Mondragon regarding the evident defects in its third amended complaint, as currently constituted, and that it should anticipate the necessity of further amendment to specifically identify incidents of “the same or substantially similar statements as those made by [Mondragon] to Halliwell” by alleging what was said, to whom and when such statements were made.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Pursley, Richard vs. FCA US LLC

Case No.:   VCU330916

Date:           August 31, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Defendant’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures and Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer to the first, second and third causes of action; to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the sixth cause of action; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to this cause of action; (2) To find the motion to strike moot; (3) To find the motion to compel moot via the service of initial disclosures; to impose the statutory sanction of $2,500 against Defendant’s counsel for failure to timely provide initial disclosures.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Facts

The first amended complaint in this matter alleges causes of action against Defendant FCA for violations of Song Beverly and fraudulent concealment, and against Defendant Sonora for negligent repair.

Defendant FCA demurrers to each cause of action against it, arguing the statute of limitations bars the claims and that Plaintiff has otherwise failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Defendant further seeks to strike the references to punitive damages.

Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 20, 2019, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2019 Jeep Cherokee, vehicle identification number 1C4PJMBX4KD216796 (hereafter "Subject Vehicle") (FAC ¶7.) Plaintiff alleges the warranty contract contained warranties including bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty, and a California Emission Warranty. (FAC ¶8.) Further, that the Vehicle was purchased from FCA’s authorized retail dealership. (FAC ¶9.)

Plaintiff alleges review Defendant FCA’s marketing and advertising materials, viewed FCA’s vehicle-specific window sticker, and taking the Vehicle for a test drive, but that at no point prior to purchase was Plaintiff advised the Vehicle and its 9-speed automatic transmission were defective. (FAC ¶10.)

Plaintiff alleges further that:    

“Around August 4, 2021, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant FCA’s authorized repair facility with complaints including, inter alia, an abnormal noise when going over bumps. Defendant’s technician inspected the Vehicle, verified Plaintiff's complaints, and performed repairs including replacing the front struts. At pick up, Defendant’s repair facility represented that the Vehicle had been repaired and was working as designed.” (FAC ¶14.)

Further, that on August 27, 2021 and February 10, 2025, Plaintiff again presented the Vehicle for repair as to an abnormal clunk noise, which was repaired, and as to poor driving characteristics due to a warped engine block. (FAC ¶¶15, 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that “Plaintiff had no way of uncovering Defendant’s deception with respect to the defects given that Defendant performed various diagnostics and/or undertook repairs and claimed that nothing was wrong with the Subject Vehicle or that the Vehicle had been repaired.” (FAC ¶17.)

Further, that “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Defendant FCA knew since prior to Plaintiff purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2019 Jeep Cherokee vehicles equipped with a 9-speed transmission are defective, contained one or more defect(s) to the transmission which may result in hesitation on acceleration, loss of power, hard and/or harsh shifts, and/or jerking (the "Transmission Defect")” (FAC ¶26.) Further, that the Transmission Defect is a safety concern. (FAC ¶28.)

Additionally, that FCA had exclusive knowledge of the Transmission Defect through sources not available to consumers including “pre-production and post production testing data; early consumer complaints about the Transmission Defect made directly to Defendant FCA and its network of dealers; aggregate warranty data compiled from Defendant FCA's network of dealers; testing conducted by Defendant FCA in response to these complaints; as well as warranty repair and part replacements data” (FAC ¶¶28, 29, 32-36.)

As to the statute of limitations, Plaintiff alleges:

“47. To the extent there are any statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiff's claims- including, without limitation, the express warranty, implied warranty, and negligent repair – the running of the limitation periods have been tolled by, inter alia, the following doctrines or rules: equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment rules, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling (e.g., the American Pipe rule).

48. Plaintiff did not discover Defendant's wrongful conduct alleged herein until shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following Defendant FCA's unsuccessful attempts to repair them. However, Defendant FCA failed to provide restitution pursuant to the Song – Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (FAC ¶¶47, 48.)

As to the concealment cause of action, Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendant FCA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle and its transmission were defective which can cause hesitation on acceleration, loss of power, hard and/or harsh shifts, and/or jerking. It can also result in a total loss of power and/or failure to accelerate while driving, significantly impair driver control.” (FAC ¶75.)

Plaintiff alleges FCA owed Plaintiff a duty to disclose the defect because FCA acquired such knowledge through sources not available to consumers, FCA was in a superior position of knowledge, and “Plaintiff could not reasonably have been expected to learn or discover of the Vehicle's Transmission Defect and its potential consequences until well after Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle.” (FAC ¶77.)

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages as to the fraud cause of action.

Defendant FCA demurrers to each cause of action based on the statute of limitations, as well as to the concealment cause of action on a number of other grounds and seeks to strike the punitive damages claim.

(1) Authority and Analysis - Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. Of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4^th 32, 42 states, “ ‘ “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

First, Second and Third Causes of Action – Violations of Civil Code section 1793.2

Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 214-215 notes that a claim for breach of express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is subject to the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Com. Code section 2725.

Defendant argues that this limitations period commences upon purchase of the Subject Vehicle.

However, the Court’s understanding is that claims under section 1793.2 accrue when a manufacturer or its representative fails to meet its requirements under the Song-Beverly Act, not upon the purchase of the Subject Vehicle. Here, Plaintiff alleges presentation of the Vehicle August 4, 2021 and August 27, 2021, alleged to be two repair attempts. As such, the Court finds the statute of limitations as to these causes of action runs from August 27, 2021.

The complaint in this matter was initially filed June 27, 2025, which is within the four year statute of limitations.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer to the first, second and third causes of action.

Fourth Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Warranty

"The Song-Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations. [Citation.] California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.)

Implied warranty claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations under the California UCC. (Comm. Code, § 2725(1).)

In contrast to the above, a breach of implied warranty claim accrues upon purchase of the Subject Vehicle and delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims (Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2020) 487 F.Supp.3d 845, 854 n.3.) The Court notes further notes Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 132 agrees, noting that delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims under Commercial Code section 2725. "In the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend, finding that the amended complaint alleges the Vehicle was purchased September 20, 2019 and the initial complaint was filed June 27, 2025.

Sixth Cause of Action - Concealment

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

Further,  "[i]t has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. [Citation.] Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an 'otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. [Citations.]" (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)

Like with the breach of express warrant claims, the Court does not find the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after some presentation of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the alleged defect.

Here, the fraud cause of action focuses on the Transmission Defect and FCA’s exclusive knowledge thereof.

The presentation in August 2021, however, does not discuss the Transmission Defect but instead alleges a “abnormal noise going over bumps” related to front struts and “abnormal clunk noise” related to a front lower ball joint.

Additionally, the February 10, 2025 presentation involved “poor driving characteristics” related to the warped engine block.

The Court agrees, therefore, that the complaint fails to allege when the Transmission Defect was discovered, or should have been discovered via reasonable diligence.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to this issue. Therefore, the Court will not rule on the other arguments regarding other issues of specificity, lack of duty, transactional relationship and other arguments in support of the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, the Court orders an amended complaint as to the sixth cause of action filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Authority and Analysis – Motion to Strike

As noted above, FCA seeks to strike the references to punitive damages sought under the sixth cause of action for concealment. As the Court has sustained the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend, the Court finds the motion to strike moot.

(3)  Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Disclosures and Sanctions

Facts

Plaintiff states that the complaint was initially filed in this matter June 27, 2025 and that Defendant FCA served a demurrer to this complaint December 17, 2025.

Plaintiff further states that sixty days from service of the demurrer was February 15, 2026, but that FCA, as of the filing of this motion on June 15, 2026, has failed to provide mandatory initial disclosures and documents pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(b).

In response, FCA states that it initially filed the demurrer December 17, 2025 with an understanding that this case would be transferred and the demurrer would needed to be refiled in the proper county. Additionally, that it refiled the demurrer June 2, 2026.

Further on August 14, 2026, FCA served its initial disclosures and non-confidential documents and that “In June and July 2025, FCA handling attorney Sasha Bassi dealt with health concerns which caused her to miss time from work and preceded her departure from our law firm on July 31, 2026” in support of good cause to avoid sanctions.

Authority and Analysis

This mandatory disclosure law, enacted January 1, 2025 applies to “civil action[s] seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to Section 871.20.” This Song Beverly action, therefore, is within the scope of this law.

"Within 60 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to all other parties an initial disclosure and documents pursuant to subdivisions (f), (g), and (h)." (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.26, subd. (b).)

Subsection (h), applicable to Defendant Ford, requires:

(h) The defendant or manufacturer shall provide the following documents to all other parties pursuant to the timelines prescribed in subdivision (b):

(1) Copy of or access to a version of the owner’s manual for a motor vehicle of the same make, model, and year.

(2) Any warranties issued in conjunction with the sale of the motor vehicle.

(3) Sample brochures published for the motor vehicle.

(4) The motor vehicle’s original invoice, if any, to the selling dealer.

(5) Sales or lease agreement, if the manufacturer is in possession.

(6) Motor vehicle information reports, including build documentation, component information, and delivery details.

(7) Entire warranty transaction history for the motor vehicle.

(8) Listing of required field actions applicable to the motor vehicle.

(9) Published technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) for the same make, model, and year reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle.

(10) Published information service bulletins (“ISBs”) for the same make, model, and year reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle.

(11) Records relating to communications between the manufacturer or dealership and the owner or lessee of the motor vehicle, including those related to repair orders or claims involving the motor vehicle.

(12) Warranty policies and procedure manuals.

(13) Service manuals reasonably related to the nonconformities pertaining to the motor vehicle.

(14) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, all call recordings of pre-suit communications with the consumer available at the time of service of the complaint.

(15) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, the manufacturer’s written statement of policies and procedures used to evaluate customer requests for restitution or replacement pursuant to “Lemon Law” claims.

(16) If a pre-suit restitution or replacement request is made, any nonprivileged, prelitigation evaluation.

(17) Any warranty extensions or modifications issued by the manufacturer on the motor vehicle.”

Here, Plaintiff represents that none of the requisite disclosures have been timely made. In response, FCA argues the filing of the initial demurrer did not trigger this deadline and instead the refiling of the demurrer in this County starts the clock on disclosure. The Court does not interpret the statute in this manner and notes that the initial 60 day period expired before the filing of the amended complaint.

Further, FCA argues that Plaintiff’s own failure to perform under section 871.26 precludes its use here. However, FCA made no motion to enforce the obligations under section 871.26.

In any event, the Court cannot order disclosure where disclosure took place on August 14, 2026.

As to sanctions, subsection (j) states:

“(j) Unless the party failing to comply with this section shows good cause, notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this chapter, a court shall impose sanctions as follows:

(1) A one-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($1,500) sanction against the plaintiff’s attorney or two-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) sanction against the defense attorney respectively, paid within 15 business days for failure to comply with the document production requirements as prescribed in subdivision (b)…”

The Court does not find good cause here regarding the failure to serve the required initial disclosures based on the December 17, 2026 demurrer filing. The amended complaint was filed April 28, 2026, well after 60 days from December 17, 2026. The Court finds the remaining sequence of events irrelevant as to Defendant’s failure to timely provide the required disclosures. As such, the Court imposes the sanction of $2,500 on Defendant’s attorney, payable within 15 business days of this ruling.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Zachary, Marshall vs. California Cemetery and Funeral Services, LLC

Case No.:   VCU331588

Date:           August 31, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order the proposed amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed February 17, 2026, alleges causes of action for discrimination, failure to participate in interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, hostile work environment, retaliation, failure to prevent, violations of CFRA, IIED, negligent hiring, defamation and wrongful termination.

Defendants Pablo Silva, California Cemetery and Funeral Services, LLC and SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. answered the complaint on March 30, 2026.

On August 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for leave to file an amended complaint to add three (3) causes of action for Discrimination Based on Sex; Retaliation (Labor Code § 98.6); and Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5) and to remove the cause of action for IIED.

In support, Plaintiff provides a red-line version of the proposed amended complaint as well as a description of the additions and deletions by page and line number.

Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration stats that the parties engaged in written discovery in April 2026, received documents responsive to the discovery, but that “…complaints by Plaintiff and other employees regarding Silva (who is a Regional Manager), as well as disciplinary measures taken against Silva, were omitted from the production.” (Declaration of Chang ¶4.) Counsel states further that, upon conferring with Plaintiff, it was found that “Silva gave preferential work treatment to female employees, and disfavored male employees, in terms of scheduling, support, and work assignments, and engaged in removal practices that are in violation of regulations governing funeral homes/services.” (Declaration of Chang ¶4.)

In opposition, Defendant challenges the substantive merits of the sixth and fourteenth causes of action.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, subsection (a) is satisfied via the description and citation to the changes in the proposed amended complaint and the attached redline version. Additionally, the Court finds subsection (b) has been complied with, noting the additional causes of action, the removal of the IIED claim, the discovery of these additional theories and allegations in support thereof via discovery and the relatively short period of time between the discovery responses and the filing of this motion.

Given the close relation of the proposed amendments to the activities and transactions stated in the initial Complaint, the Court can discern no prejudice to Defendants by permitting the proposed amended complaint.

As to the substantive arguments raised by Defendants, the Court will not generally consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading in ruling on a motion for leave as “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 disapproved of on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders the proposed amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mariner Finance, LLC vs. Macdonald, Cody

Case No.:   VCL331599

Date:            August 31, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 admitted.

Facts

On or about April 10, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 26, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054190	In the Matter of Medina, Jose Luis	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 2d(2):  amount of bond omitted
VPR053497	In the Matter of Chavez, Lily Mendez	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053305	In the Matter of Prine, Audrey R.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition paragraph 12; 14 Statutory Computation:  loss on sale of $165,000 does not reflect loss on sale of $168,000 in Schedule A. 2. Extraordinary Fees Request:  must be accompanied by a statement of the facts specifying the amount and hourly rate for each category as required in CRC, rule 7.702 and 7.703
VPR053501	In the Matter of Martinez, Raymond Carl	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR048986	In the Matter of Hurtado, Samuel Martinez	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054128	In the Matter of Cardona, Olivia M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order. Court investigation not completed
VPR054125	In the Matter of White, Kristophor Gary	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 27, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052593	In the Matter of Carranza, Raul Jr.	Contested Hearing - Probate	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054047	In the Matter of Bedolla, Brian Henry	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	No Order lodged No Letters lodged Required to be completed - Declaration of Guardianship Orientation Attendance needs to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
PPR054205	In the Matter of Cooksey, Kelly	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Requested relief has contradicting issues in relation to related probate case.

 

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 26, 2026 - August 28, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/28/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054122	In the Matter of E.L.C.	NOT LODGED – ORDER APPOINTING GUARDIAN NOT LODGED - LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating FATHER was PERSONALLY served (15 calendar days’ notice, as required by PROB Code §1511)
8/28/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of J.R.T.	Appoint guardian – RENTERIA PETITION NOTICE AFTER CHANGE OF ADDRESS HAS NOT BEEN FILED NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511- service to be completed on parents & grandparents Required to be completed & Declaration of Guardianship Orientation Attendance needs to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
8/28/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053175	In the Matter of N.A.	Matter to be dismissed

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054189	In the Matter of L.V.C.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- no issues to address
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054178	In the Matter of L.A.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice to be addressed for MOTHER and Maternal grandmother. Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance has not been filed DOJ Background record check needs to be completed
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053596	In the Matter of A.A.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice to be addressed for FATHERS Marquez & Chavez
8/27/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053941	In the Matter of A.A.C.	Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance has not been filed DOJ Background record check needs to be completed
8/27/26 11:00 AM	Department 19	PPR054287	In the Matter of K.I.R.F.	Appoint Temporary Guardian