Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, August 13, 2026, are:

Re:                 Alba, Amaranta vs. NewRez, LLC

Case No.:   VCU314002

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion for summary judgment; to find the remaining issues moot.

Facts

Plaintiff sues Defendant Newrez LLC dba Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (“Shellpoint” or “Defendant”) for fraud and promissory estoppel.

Defendant moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff. Alternatively, Defendant seeks summary adjudication of eight separate issues. The Court, however, will focus on Issue No 1: Shellpoint is entitled to judgment because Plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-dispute notice requirement in the Deed of Trust.

In support, Defendant provides a number of material facts. However, as to Issue No. 1, the Court notes the single undisputed fact that “Shellpoint did not receive any pre lawsuit notice of dispute from Plaintiff.” (UMF No. 12.)

Plaintiff’s Untimely Opposition and Defendant’s Objections

Defendant notes first that Plaintiff filed this opposition and supporting documents on July 28, 2026, approximately four days after the deadline of July 24, 2026. Under California Rule of Court, rule 3.1300(d) “No paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely submitted for filing.” The Court, in its discretion, will consider the opposition pleadings and it will analyze whether the evidence submitted establishes that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment, or adjudication, in its favor. (See Slayton v. Superior Court (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 55, 58 n. 2.) 

As to summary judgment and Issue No. 1, however, the Court finds the objections are not material to the disposition of this motion and declines to rule on these objections pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473c(q).

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

Summary Judgment / Adjudication of Issue 1

This issue concerns the pre-dispute notice requirement contained in the deed of trust. The deed of trust states:

“Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any `judicial action (either as an individual litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other party’s actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or that alleges that the other part has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instrument, until such Borrower or Lender has notified the other party (with such notice given in compliance with the requirements of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after the giving of such notice to take corrective action…”

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not provide any notice of the claims contained in Plaintiff’s complaint prior to filing this lawsuit.

"Under the law of contracts, parties may expressly agree that a right or duty is conditional upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an act or event." (Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) “A condition precedent is one which is to be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed.” (Civil Code § 1436; see Platt, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 313.)

However, “[a]n express condition precedent to performance by a party cannot be construed as imposing a duty on that party to fulfill the condition, where…the language employed does not constitute an undertaking to do so.”
(Britschgi v. McCall (1953) 41 Cal.2d 138, 144.)

Here, the Court finds the notice provision above contains express language establishing a condition precedent and is broad enough to encompass these claims related to the deed of trust. The notice term precludes the commencement of judicial action by an individual litigant that arises from the alleged fraud and promissory estoppel related to the foreclosure of the subject property pursuant to the deed of trust “until such” notice has occurred and afforded a reasonable period to take corrective action. No such notice has been provided.

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant has met its burden on summary judgment that notice of these claims were a condition precedent to filing this lawsuit.

The Court, therefore, turns to Plaintiff’s opposition as to Plaintiff’s burden on this issue.

The Court first notes that “The nonoccurrence of a condition precedent may be excused for a number of legally recognized reasons. But when a party has failed to fulfill a condition that was within its power to perform, it is not an excuse that the party did not thereby intend to surrender any rights under the agreement.” (Platt, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 314.)

Here, the Court has not been presented in the opposition with any “legally recognized reasons” why the prelawsuit notice term either is not a condition precedent or is subject to some legal excuse as to the undisputed noncompliance.

In the absence of any such evidence or argument, the Court grants summary judgment based upon the arguments made under the first issue. This ruling is dispositive of both causes of action and renders the remaining issues moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Steverson, Sherkeil vs. The Save Mart Companies

Case No.:   VCU326624

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Capital One, N.A., successor by merger to Discover Bank vs. Abdullah, Riyadh A

Case No.:   VCL329829

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and set aside the default; Defendant shall file an answer no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, default judgment was entered against Defendant on March 27, 2026. However, Plaintiff indicates that, prior to entry of judgment, it agreed to an extension for Defendant to file an answer and that the request for entry of default judgment was inadvertent. The Court, therefore, grants the motion and orders Defendant to file an answer no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Avila, Joanne Porras vs. Adequate Care Hospice, Inc., a California Corporation, dba American Care et al

Case No.:   VCU318473

Date:            August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories - Employment, (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (3): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Sipriano, Minerva vs. Ramirez Ag Labor Services

Case No.:   VCU316014

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant Carlos Hector Ramirez dba Ramirez Ag Labor Service’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

Facts

On July 2, 2026, Defendant’s Counsel Justin T. Campagne filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Carlos Hector Ramirez dba Ramirez Ag Labor Service.

Defendant’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendant’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail and electronic mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, as well as a supplemental declaration attached to the Notice, and indicates that Counsel has attempted to obtain a substitution by stipulation, but that Defendant has refused.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and email on July 2, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s address was confirmed as current by telephone.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendant’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” on Defendant.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this Court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.:    VCU313509

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To continue the hearing to September 10, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to file further declaration in compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1325a&b (see below). Plaintiff shall file his supplemental declaration no later than August 27, 2026.  Defendant may file a supplemental reply by September 3, 2026.

Facts

On July 2, 2026, Plaintiffs filed this motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.

Plaintiffs stated “THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ARISE FROM THE SAME REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTION, INVOLVE THE SAME PARTIES, AND CONCERN THE SAME UNDERLYING DISPUTE THAT HAS BEEN BEFORE THE COURT SINCE THIS ACTION WAS FILED. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SEEK TO INTRODUCE AN UNRELATED CONTROVERSY, BUT INSTEAD SEEKS TO CLARIFY THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND LEGAL THEORIES SO THAT THE ISSUES MAY BE RESOLVED ON THEIR MERITS.”

Further that “PLAINTIFF ACTED PROMPTLY AFTER REVIEWING THE FILE TO PREPARE THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. THE REQUESTED AMENDMENT IS NOT MADE FOR PURPOSES OF DELAY, BUT TO PERMIT THE COURT TO DECIDE THE CONTROVERSY BASED UPON A COMPLETE PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS AND APPLICABLE LEGAL THEORIES.”

Additionally, the motion states “THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT CLARIFIES THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND ASSERTS ADDITIONAL LEGAL THEORIES RELATING TO THE PROPERTY DISPUTE, INCLUDING ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THE DETATCHED GARAGE, THE PURCHASE TRANSACTION, AND THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED.”

The declaration in support states:      

“4. THE PROPOSED FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ADDS AND CLARIFIES ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING, AMONG OTHER THINGS:

A.FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION;

B.FAILURE DISCLOSE MATERIAL FACTS

C.PROPERTY BOUNDARY AND OWNERSHIP ISSUES CONCERNING THE DETATCHED GARAGE;

D.EASEMENTS AND PROPERTY USE RIGHTS;

E.NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF DUTY BY THE REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSACTION.”

Further, that “6.THE REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND WAS NOT MADE EARLIER BECAUSE I WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR MUCH OF THIS CASE. MY FIRST ATTORNEY WAS RELIEVED FROM THIS CASE, I RETAINED BRIAN FOLLAND, WHO REPRESENTED ME FOR APPROXIMATELY SIX MONTHS BEFORE HE WAS ALSO RELIEVED FROM THE CASE.”

Additionally, that “AFTER BOTH ATTORNEYS WERE NO LONGER REPRESENTING ME, I OBTAINED AND REVIEWED MY CASE FILE. DURING MY REVIEW, I DETERMINED THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DID NOT FULLY INCLUDE ALL THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND LEGAL THEORIES THATI BELIEVED WERE: SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE EVIDENCE IN MY POSSESSION. I ALSO IDENTIFIED INFORMATION I BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO ACCURATELY PRESENTS MY CLAIMS.”

Further, Plaintiffs provide a summary of the proposed amendments contained in the first amended complaint.

The first amended complaint appears to have been lodged on May 28, 2026.

In opposition, Defendants argue that the declaration and motion provide no facts supporting why Plaintiffs were unaware of the facts not contained in the original complaint, which was verified by Plaintiffs.

Authority and Analysis

 The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

However, the Court finds a lack of compliance with California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1324. It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, while a copy of the proposed pleading appears lodged as of May 28, 2026, there appears no statement of allegations proposed to be deleted or added by page, paragraph and line number. The general summary on page 6 of the motion is insufficient under this Rule of Court.

As to subsection (b), while the Court acknowledges Plaintiffs were previously represented by two separate counsel, there remains no statement of when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered. Plaintiffs state that upon review of the file after the termination of the attorney-client relationship with the second counsel, it was discovered the operative complaint lacked factual allegations and legal theories. However, when the facts were discovered absent from the operative complaint is not the same as when the facts were actually discovered. It is not alleged, for instance, that discovery in this case uncovered additional facts that were not known at the time of the filing of the operative complaint. Moreover, as noted by Defendant, Plaintiffs’ verified the complaint in this matter, which states Plaintiffs read the complaint and were aware of the contents.

However, the Court should not deny the motion unless the opposing party can show prejudice. (Kittredge Sports Company v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048.)

Prejudice exists where amendment would: (1) cause a delay of trial; (2) increase preparation costs; (3) change the focus of the complaint; or (4) increase discovery burdens. (Magpali, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Additional discovery costs may support a claim for prejudice. (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739 [“Prejudice exists where the proposed amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens.”].) Additionally, whether facts or legal theories are being changed and whether the opposing party will suffer prejudice “represent[ ] a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory—for example, an easement as opposed to a fee—no prejudice can result.” (City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563.)

The Court will review and consider the supplemental pleadings in this matter prior to issuing a final ruling.  A tentative ruling will issue prior to the next hearing date. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:   Lead: VCU3245716; consolidated with PCU325122 

Date:           August 13, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer.  To grant the motion to strike, with leave, as to the words “treble damages” in paragraph 110 and the Grahams’ prayer for “[t]reble damages under Penal Code § 496,” and, in all other respects, to deny the motion. 

This is a demurrer and motion to strike by cross-defendant Alex Aretakis, targeted at the cross-complaint of Michael and Cynthia Graham (and other named cross-complainants) filed in PCU325122, which is now consolidated with these proceedings.  Aretakis challenges 14 of the cross-complaint’s 17 causes of action and moves to strike several portions. 

I. DEMURRER

Aretakis contends that while the cross-complaint “tells a sprawling story of alleged financial misconduct by Ron Cook and entities he controlled, … it does not plead facts showing that Alex Aretakis personally [engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged].”

Aretakis is correct, so far as the bulk of the allegations under the heading “FACUAL ALLEGATIONS” in the cross-complaint, but further allegations in the cross-complaint, specifically at subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97, contain sufficient specificity as to wrongdoing on the part of Aretakis at the pleading stage. 

According, the demurrer is overruled in its entirety.  Each of the challenged causes of action is addressed below.

First & Second Causes of Action – Intentional Misrepresentation & Concealment

A cause of action for intentional misrepresentation must be supported by allegations of a false representation by a defendant, relied upon by the plaintiff to their detriment.  (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 650].) 

Additionally, because “[f]raud allegations ‘ “involve a serious attack on character,” [they must be] pleaded with specificity. … The particularity requirement demands that a plaintiff plead facts which ‘ “ ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’ ” ’ (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 619], citations omitted.) 

There are “certain exceptions which mitigate the rigor of the rule requiring specific pleading of fraud,” including that “less specificity is required when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.’ ”  (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217 [197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660](Committee), citations omitted.) 

Additionally, in circumstances where, as here, myriad representations are alleged as part of a coordinated scheme over a lengthy period of many years, “considerations of practicality enter in” such that a serial listing of alleged misrepresentations specified by time, place and manner “provide less effective notice and [are] less useful in framing the issues [as compared to] a shorter, more generalized version.”  (Ibid.)

Ultimately, the court considers the particularity requirements to fraud claims in light of the “two purposes” it serves.  (Id., at p. 216.)  “The first is notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ ” (Ibid., citations omitted.)  Additionally, “[t]he pleading of fraud … is also the last remaining habitat of the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the basis of the pleadings. Thus the pleading should be sufficient ‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud.” ’ ” (Id., at pp. 216-217, citations omitted.)

As to concealment claims, “the requirement that ‘[f]raud must be pleaded with specificity …’ applies equally to a cause of action for fraud and deceit based on concealment. [Citation.]”  (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 619].)

Whereas intentional misrepresentation requires specific allegation of an affirmative false representation, however, concealment requires allegation of the “concealment or suppression of a material fact … by a defendant with a duty to disclose … .”
(Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40 [324 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 553 P.3d 1213].)  Accordingly, it is harder to apply the rule of specificity with respect to concealment claims.  (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 659] [“As plaintiffs accurately respond … ‘How does one show “how” and “by what means” something didn't happen, or “when” it never happened, or “where” it never happened?’”].)

The court finds that the first two causes of action of the cross-complaint, for intentional misrepresentation and concealment, are plead sufficiently in accordance with these requirements. 

With regard to the intentional misrepresentation claim, while the “FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS” contain sparse, vague and inconclusive reference to Aretakis, the allegations in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97 contain express, specific and reasonable particularized allegations of Aretakis’s direct engagement in affirmative fraudulent misrepresentation directed at the Grahams.  These allegations “point out exactly how [and] in what manner [Aretakis has] transgressed” such that the Grahams sufficient place a “finger squarely and directly upon whatever dereliction is relied upon.”  (Lavine v. Jessup (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 59, 69 [326 P.2d 238].)  In so doing, these allegations “furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which can be intelligently met” (Committee, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 217) and state a claim, that, accepting the allegations as true (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]) is not, on the face of the pleading, unmeritorious (Committee, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 217). 

As to the concealment claim, the allegations, which include the incorporated allegations of the intentional misrepresentation cause of action, are sufficiently particular, given the allegations that Aretakis was amongst a group of cross-defendants that “acted as the Grahams’ mortgage brokers and investment advisors with respect to the Huron, Armona, Supermarket, and Gas Station Loans, and all other hard-money loans,” as well as being, along with Cook, the Grahams’ “partners in Prosperity Farms,” “personally and through CA Farms.”  The Grahams sufficiently allege a relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose, and, moreover, that Aretakis made representations in connection with the transactions described in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97, such that nondisclosure of other facts was deceptive. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the first two causes of action is overruled. 

Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth & Twelfth Causes of Action – Property-Based Claims

Aretakis contends “[t]he Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Twelfth Causes of Action all depend on the same missing predicate: that Mr. Aretakis personally took, received, retained, controlled, benefited from, or knowingly assisted in taking identifiable property belonging to the Grahams.”

Aretakis sets out more specific arguments with regard to these claims, which are addressed, in turn, below. 

A. Third and Fourth Causes of Action

The third and fourth causes of action are for violation of Penal Code section 496 (third cause of action) and conversion (fourth cause of action).

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 354 P.3d 334].)

“[Penal Code] Section 496, subdivision (a) (section 496(a)) defines the criminal offense of what is commonly referred to as receiving stolen property,” and “[s]ection 496(c) … articulates a right to special civil remedies when a violation of section 496(a) has occurred. Subdivision (c) … states that any person who has been injured by a violation of section 496(a) ‘may bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's fees.’ ” (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour (2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 346-347 [296 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 513 P.3d 166] (Siry).)

Both claims are notable as to the intent requirement each requires.  “To prove a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must show the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of another.” (Duke v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 807].) 

Similarly, subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 496 provides for special civil remedies “when property has been obtained in any manner constituting theft.” (Siry, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 343.)

These standards, however, are not the exact same.  A theft claim under section 496 requires more.  “[C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.” (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1158 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 779, 446 P.3d 284].) 

By contrast, with respect to a section 496 claim, “not all commercial or consumer disputes alleging that a defendant obtained money or property through fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of a contractual promise will amount to a theft. To prove theft, a plaintiff must establish criminal intent on the part of the defendant beyond ‘mere proof of nonperformance or actual falsity.’ This requirement prevents ‘ “[o]rdinary commercial defaults” ’ from being transformed into a theft. If misrepresentations or unfulfilled promises ‘are made innocently or inadvertently, they can no more form the basis for a prosecution for obtaining property by false pretenses than can an innocent breach of contract.’ ” (Siry, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 361-362.)

The court finds that, notwithstanding the vagaries of the “FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS” and the conclusory nature of the allegations under the headings of the third and fourth causes of action, the allegations in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97, which are incorporated under the third and fourth causes of action, sufficiently establish the elements of a section 496 violation and conversion.  These allegations support the conclusion that Aretakis acted with planning and deliberation, reflecting the requisite criminal intent, in depriving the Grahams of their money and property through various fraudulent schemes. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the third and fourth cause of action is overruled. 

B. Eighth Cause of Action – Quantum Meruit / Unjust Enrichment

Aretakis attacks the eighth cause of action by pointing out that quantum meruit provides for the recovery for the reasonable value of services (it does, Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 449 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 101]) and that the cross-complaint doesn’t contain allegations that the Grahams rendered services to Aretakis for which they should be equitably permitted recovery. 

A fair reading of the cross-complaint, however, is that the eighth cause of action is more properly characterized as being for unjust enrichment.  “Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, however, or even a remedy, but rather ‘ “ ‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies’ ” … . [Citation.] It is synonymous with restitution.’ ” (McBride v. Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387 [20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115].)

Here, the Grahams generally allege they “conferred benefits on Cross-Defendants [including Aretakis] (funds, guarantees, property interests) at Cross-Defendants’ request, which Cross-Defendants unjustly retained without compensation, including misappropriated principals, profits, and proceeds,” and “[i]t would be unjust for Cross-Defendants to retain these benefits without restitution.”

In this respect, the Grahams’ eighth cause of action is duplicative of its fraud and theft claims, but that is not, itself, fatal.  “[T]he fact that unjust enrichment allegations are ‘duplicative of or superfluous to . . . other claims . . . is not grounds for dismissal.’ [Citation.]” (Lusson v. Apple, Inc. (N.D.Cal. June 20, 2016, No. 16-cv-00705-VC) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 199494, at *9.)

Aretakis’s only contention, as to the unjust enrichment claim specifically, is that “the Grahams provide insufficient facts to establish that Mr. Aretakis was in fact enriched at all,” and “[a]t most, the Cross-Complaint states that he was ‘benefitting’ from Mr. Cook’s alleged misconduct.”  The court finds, however, the allegations in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97 are sufficient to support the claim in the respect challenged by Aretakis. 

Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled to the eighth cause of action. 

C. Ninth Cause of Action – Money Had and Received

Aretakis challenges the ninth cause of action on the similar ground that “the pleading does not identify any specific money Mr. Aretakis received or retained for the Grahams’ benefit.”  (See Avidor v. Sutter's Place, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1454 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d 804] [describing an action for money had and received].)

Once again, the court finds, however, the allegations in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97 are sufficient to support the claim in the respect challenged by Aretakis and, accordingly, overrules the demurrer to the ninth cause of action.  

D. Twelfth Cause of Action – Elder Abuse under Welf. & Inst. Code § 15600

Aretakis challenges the Grahams’ elder abuse cause of action on the similar grounds as the prior challenges, asserting “[a]s with the Penal Code section 496 claim, the Cross-Complaint does not identify the particular property Mr. Aretakis took or retained, or the specific act by which he did so.”

Once again, the court finds the allegations in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97 are sufficient to support the claim in the respect challenged by Aretakis and, accordingly, overrules the demurrer to the twelfth cause of action

Fifth & Sixth Causes of Action – Aiding and Abetting, as to Fraud and Conversion

Aretakis attacks the fourth and fifth “aiding and abetting” causes of action—which are essentially conspiracy claims packaged with the fraud and theft claims—on the same grounds as he attacks the fraud and theft claims. (See AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d 368] [“ ‘Conspiracy,’ is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.’ [Citation.] ”].) 

In light of the court’s determinations above, the demurer to the fifth and sixth causes of action is overruled. 

Seventh Cause of Action – Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The demurrer to the seventh cause of action is overruled. Aretakis solely challenges the sufficiency of the allegations in establishing that he had a fiduciary duty to the Grahams.  Aside from the challenged allegations about Aretakis being a lawyer, the cross-complaint alleges Aretakis is a minority owner of CA Farms, which, in turn, is 50% owner of Prosperity Farms; and, further, with respect to each of Prosperity Farms, LLC; Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC; and Prosperity Development, LLC, that “Mr. Cook, Aretakis, and CA Farms” hold a “50% interest and have acted as managers.”

The court accepts these allegations as true at the demurrer stage (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]) and finds that they are sufficient to establish a fiduciary duty owed by Aretakis to the Grahams vis-à-vis their relationship as partners in the three identified entities. 

Tenth Cause of Action – Indemnity

Aretakis contends the tenth cause of action for indemnity fails “because the Cross-Complaint does not plead facts establishing any joint legal obligation for which Mr. Aretakis could be required to indemnify the Grahams.” 

“To state a claim for equitable indemnity, a defendant must allege the same harm for which he may be held liable is properly attributable -- at least in part -- to the cross-defendant.”  (Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445, fn. 7 [266 Cal.Rptr. 601].)

The court finds the Grahams allege a harm—“liabilities in the Conterra Action, Compeer Action, and BOTS Action”—they face that is properly attributable, at least in part, to Aretakis by virtue of his wrongful conduct as identified with sufficient specificity in subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97. 

Accordingly, the demurrer to the tenth cause of action is overruled. 

Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Cause of Action – Judicial Dissolution of Prosperity Farms, LLC; Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC; and Prosperity Development, LLC

The demurrer is overruled to the thirteenth through fifteenth causes of action, for judicial dissolution of Prosperity Farms, Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, and Prosperity Development. 

The basis of the demurrer is that the cross-complaint does not allege Aretakis is “a member or manager of any entity to be dissolved.”  The cross-complaint, however, alleges Aretakis is a minority owner of CA Farms, which, in turn, is 50% owner of Prosperity Farms; and, further, with respect to all three entities, that “Mr. Cook, Aretakis, and CA Farms” hold a “50% interest and have acted as managers.”

The court accepts these allegations as true at the demurrer stage (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58]) and finds that they establish that joinder of Aretakis under these causes of action is appropriate.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 389.)

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Aretakis moves to strike various portions of the cross-complaint on the grounds that “[t]he claims here fall into several limitation periods,” which, Aretakis maintains, had expired at the time of filing of the cross-complaint. 

On this basis, Aretakis moves to strike:

1. Paragraphs 32 through 39 (events between 2014 and 2018 concerning acquisition and sale of a pistachio orchard);

2. Paragraph 40 (concerning subsequent property acquisitions of Prosperity Farms in 2019);

3. Paragraph 43 (concerning acquisition of property associated with Prosperity Development, in 2021);

4. Paragraphs 44 and 45—but only “to the extent asserted as a basis for the Eighth Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment or Ninth Cause of Action for Money Had and Received against Mr. Aretakis” (these paragraphs concern Cook’s proposal in or around the end of 2023 for Prosperity Farms to acquire 400 acres of farmland abutting Tulare 22, and the eventual acquisition of that property in February 2024); and

5. Paragraphs 47 through 50—also, only “to the extent asserted as a basis for the Eighth Cause of Action for Quantum Meruit/Unjust Enrichment or Ninth Cause of Action for Money Had and Received against Mr. Aretakis”  (these paragraphs concern events associated with the “Gas Station Loan,” occurring in and after June 2023); and

6. From paragraph 110, the words “treble damages” (as sought under the Grahams’ Penal Code section 496 cause of action) and the Grahams’ prayer for “[t]reble damages under Penal Code § 496 (Aretakis contends the request for section 496 penalties is time-barred).

The court finds Aretakis’s motion, in the above respects, constitutes an unauthorized attack on entire causes of action in the cross-complaint (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 19]) and, therefore, denies the motion as to the above-listed paragraphs—except as to the allegations and prayer concerning “treble damages” under Penal Code section 496. 

The Graham’s Penal Code section 496 claim presents, in a critical respect, as a claim for relief, rather than solely a cause of action, in that the section describes, in subdivision (c), the “action” that may be brought for a violation of subdivision (a) of section 496 (proscribing the conduct of theft) solely in terms of the remedy such an action permits: “for three times the amount of actual damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

For this reason, the court does not find a motion to strike unauthorized as directed to the section 496 claim. 

The court additionally finds that the related targeted language of paragraph 110 (“treble damages”) and prayer for “treble damages” must properly be stricken, albeit with leave to amend, as it agrees with Aretakis that a claim for such damages is subject to a one-year limitations period and the complaint supports accrual of this claim outside that period, and no delayed discovery allegations that would otherwise support the claim for relief. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (a), provides a one-year limitations period for “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except if the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.”  Subdivision (a) of section 340 embodies “[t]he ‘ “settled rule” ‘ in California … that statutes which provide for damages that are in ‘ “addition[] to actual losses incurred,” ’ or ‘not based upon actual injury,’ are generally ‘ “considered penal in nature [citations], and thus governed by the one-year period of limitations … .” ’ ” (Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 842 [123 Cal.Rptr.3d 8] (Hypertouch), citations omitted.)  This provision applies in situations “where ‘an individual is allowed to recover against a wrong-doer, as a satisfaction for the wrong or injury suffered, and without reference to the actual damage sustained, or [where there is] . . . punishment for some act which is in the nature of a public wrong.’ [Citation.]” (Low v. Lan (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1381 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 60].)

The court finds that Penal Code section 496, subdivision (c), is properly viewed as providing for precisely this type of recovery against a wrong-doer, as a sanction for the wrong or injury suffered, and as punishment for an act in the nature of a public wrong, and that the Grahams’ claim is properly subject to a one-year limitations period.  

The court is not persuaded, as the Grahams argue, that section 340 does not apply because “treble damages” are discretionary. (See Hypertouch, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 842 [“Code of Civil Procedure section 340 does not apply if the award of a penalty is discretionary, rather than mandatory”].)  The Grahams’ contention is that the award is discretionary because the injured party “may bring an action” under subdivision (c) of section 496.  Obviously, however, the discretion that is pertinent here is the court’s with regard to whether to make an award on the requisite showing.  The court sees none of the requisite discretion in subdivision (c) of section 496.

Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted as the words “treble damages” in paragraph 110 and the Grahams’ prayer for “[t]reble damages under Penal Code § 496.”  The Grahams are granted leave to amend, however, within 10 days of notice of ruling, as a reasonable possibility appears to remain that they can plead delayed discovery to cure the defect with the stricken claim for relief. 

Aretakis additionally moves to strike other portions of the complaint relating to “punitive damages.”  On this basis, Aretakis moves to strike paragraph 146, “as to Mr. Aretakis.”  This paragraph states, in conclusory terms patterned from Civil Code section 3294, allegations intended to support punitive damages.  Additionally, Aretakis moves to strike the Grahams’ prayer, “as to Mr. Aretakis,” for “Punitive damages for Cross-Defendants’ malicious, oppressive, and fraudulent conduct.”

Although the identified allegations at paragraph 146 are, as Aretakis argues, conclusory and insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages by themselves, the Grahams other allegations, particularly those at subparagraphs (e) through (k) of paragraph 97, provide the requisite support for punitive damages at the pleading stage.  Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied with respect to paragraph 146 and the Grahams’ prayer for punitive damages. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 12, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR053997	In the Matter of Garcia Romero, Yanexil Eberardo	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not served on proposed conservatee. Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree.
VPR054009	In the Matter of Pugh, Joseph Robert	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054036	In the Matter of Delgado Barajas, Maximiliano V	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Court investigation report not completed
VPR054010	In the Matter of Gilheany, M. Pierce	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Court investigation report not completed
VPR054008	In the Matter of Vargas, Teodamira Cruz	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree
VPR051438	In the Matter of Ritchie, Wanda	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Status of Arbitration

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 13, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054075	In the Matter of McCue, Patricia Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence & OSC	Appearance required	Amended Petition needs to be filed addressing #11,  #13, and #14. All heirs should have signed this petition, pursuant to Prob C §13006
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Petitioner claims priority in Attachment 3g(2)(a) – NO ATTACHMENT explaining priority NOT FILED - Waiver of Bond all heirs NOT FILED - Notice of Petition to Administer served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C 8110 NOT FILED - Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number NOT FILED - Proof of Publication NO Order submitted

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 12, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/13/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054221	In the Matter of J.I.Z.D.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), re notice to parents
8/13/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054228	In the Matter of K.O.	Matter appears to be in order
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053908	In the Matter of L.A.G.M.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Appointment were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing.
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053168	In the Matter of L.M.	Petition Hearing- VISIT NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed for GUARDIAN indicating party was served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 days before hearing Notice of Change of Address of Ward  needs to be serve on father
8/13/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR052832	In the Matter of V.S.	Terminate Guardianship Hearing NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating CO-GUARDIAN, Ronald Owens, MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS, and PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS were served by mail with 15 court days prior to this Termination hearing (Prob Code §1460, 1510, 1601)                               Petition for Termination at #9, doesn’t list all of the child’s grandparents.
8/14/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of N.M.	Court Investigator requests continuance
8/14/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of P.M.	Court Investigator requests continuance
8/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054112	In the Matter of M.A.C.C.	Matter appears to be in order