Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, September 28, 2026, are:

Re:                  E.W. Merritt Farms vs. Pixley Irrigation District

Case No.:   VCU332714

Date:            September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Respondents’ (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2) To continue this matter to October 5, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9. The Case Management Conference is also continued to October 5, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Valles, Maria vs. Entabi, Fateh Dr.

Case No.:   VCU318850

Date:           September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike / Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and award costs in the amount of $56,430.72.

Facts

This medical malpractice matter came on for trial May 4, 2026.

On May 6, 2026, after presentation of Plaintiff’s case in chief, Defendant moved for a directed verdict.

On May 6, 2026, the Court granted the motion for directed verdict, dismissed the case and stated “judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant.”

On May 11, 2026, the clerk of this Court sent notice of the Court’s ruling on the motion for directed verdict.

On June 10, 2026, Defendant filed a memorandum of costs, seeking $98,036.72 in costs, including $82,212.50 in expert fees.

On June 30, 2026, Defendant submitted, and this Court signed, the judgment on directed verdict in favor of Plaintiff.

On July 28, 2026, Defendant sent notice of entry of judgment.

On July 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to tax costs. Plaintiff argues first the memorandum of costs was untimely served thirty (30) days following the clerk’s notice of the ruling on the directed verdict motion. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the section 998 offer for both sides to “walk away” was a token offer and therefore Defendant should not recover expert fees. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the expert fees sought improperly include pre-offer expert fees and, in their entirety, are unreasonably, unnecessary and unsupported.

In opposition, Defendant argues that the memorandum of costs was timely filed, despite being prior to the entry and notice of judgment and that, instead, Plaintiff’s motion to tax or strike costs was untimely. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the section 998 offer for a waiver of costs was not a token offer. Further, Defendant accepts that all of the fees of Defendant’s expert Dr. Bhoyrul (totaling $6,750) and $5,850 of the fees of Dr. Dubrow (for a total of $12,600) listed in the memorandum of costs were incurred prior to April 6, 2026 and should not have been claimed. However, Defendant argues, the remaining excerpt costs are post-offer fees incurred and are recoverable.

Authority and Analysis

Timing re: Filing of Memorandum of Costs

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1700 entitled “Prejudgment costs” stated, in relevant part, the following:

 “(a) Claiming costs

(1) Trial costs A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. The memorandum of costs must be verified by a statement of the party, attorney, or agent that to the best of his or her knowledge the items of cost are correct and were necessarily incurred in the case.”

Here, the memorandum was filed June 10, 2026,  prior to service of the notice of entry of dismissal by the clerk, prior to service of the judgment and prior to 180 days after entry of judgment.

“A prematurely filed memorandum of costs is 'a mere irregularity at best' that does not constitute reversible error absent a showing of prejudice' and is treated 'as being timely filed.' [Citation.]." (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor District (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 222.)

However, there is authority that a prematurely filed memorandum of costs, while timely, should be treated as filed and served the day after the notice of entry of judgment is served. (Brown v. West Covins Toyota (1994) 26 Cal. App. 4th 555, 560 disapproved on other grounds ["[W]e deem the premature memorandum of costs to have been served and filed ... the day after notice of entry of judgment was served, and the earliest date for service and filing of cost bill [under California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1)]."].)

As such, the Court will deem the memorandum timely filed as of July 29, 2026 pursuant to the above.

Timing re: Filing of Motion to Strike or Tax Costs

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(4).” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1).

Here, the memorandum was filed and served June 10, 2026.

Notice of entry of judgment occurred July 28, 2026.

The motion to strike was filed July 29, 2026.

As noted above, the Court has deemed the memorandum of costs filed July 29, 2026 and therefore this motion to strike is timely filed July 29, 2026.

Striking Costs

The right to recover costs is entirely statutory, with the measure of the statute as the measure of the right. (Moss v. Underwriters’ Report. Inc. (1938) 12 Cal. 2d 266, 274; Posey v. State of California (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 836, 852. The statutes permitting costs are strictly construed. (Sequoia Vacuum Systems v. Stranskv (1964) 229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 289.) “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.)

Here, the only item of costs objected to is the expert costs in the amount of $69,609.50, having accepted Defendant’s reduction of the costs by $12,600 as incurred prior to the section 998 offer and the $3.00 scrivener’s error.

Section 998 Offer

If a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff may not recover his post-offer costs and must pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1).)

Here, Plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the section 998 offer served April 6, 2026 offering to waive Defendant’s costs in exchange for dismissal. Plaintiff argues this was a token offer and therefore cannot shift the expert costs to Plaintiff.

Validity of 998 Offer

“To be valid, an offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 may include nonmonetary terms and conditions, but it must be unconditional. The offer must be sufficiently specific to allow the recipient to meaningfully evaluate it and make a reasoned decision whether to accept it. (Citation.) Further, the offeree must be able to clearly evaluate the worth of the offer.” (Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 499.)

There appears to be little discussion as to the validity of the offer. However, the Court finds the exchange of dismissal for waiver of costs sufficiently unconditional, specific and permitted Plaintiff to make a reasoned decision as to its validity.

Token Offer

An offer under section 998, in addition to being valid, must be made in good faith. (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 918, 924.) In order to be in good faith, the offer must carry “some reasonable prospect of acceptance.” (Id. (citing Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507, 531).) Where a defendant obtains a judgment more favorable than its section 998 settlement offer, that results in a presumption that the  offer was reasonable. (Melendrez v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 648.)

In evaluating the reasonableness of the offer, the court considers not just the sum that the plaintiff sought, but also the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail at trial. (Id. at 649.) Even a “token” offer may be reasonable when a defendant has concluded that he has a very significant likelihood of prevailing at trial. (Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 210, 220.) 

Whether a section 998 offer has a reasonable prospect of acceptance requires evaluation of (1) whether the offer was within the range of reasonably possible results at trial considering all the information the offeror knew or should have known; and (2) whether the offeror knew the offeree had sufficient information to assess the reasonableness of the offer, based on what the offeree knew or should have known. (Id. at 924-925.)

“These two considerations assess whether the offeror knew that the 998 offer was reasonable, first, from the offeror’s perspective and, second, from the offeree’s perspective.” (Id.) Whether a section 998 offer has a reasonable prospect of acceptance is a function of two considerations, both to be evaluated in light of the circumstances “at the time of the offer” and “not by virtue of hindsight.”  (Id. (citing Burch v. Children’s Hospital of Orange County Thrift Stores, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 537, 548).)

Here, the standard requires the Court to evaluate whether the 998 offers were within the range of reasonably possible results at trial considering the information available to Plaintiff. Reasonableness is generally measured by first “determining whether the offer represents a reasonable prediction of the amount of money, if any, defendant would have to pay plaintiff following a trial,” based on “information that was known or reasonably should have been known to the defendant.” (Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 699.)

The offer must carry with it some reasonable prospect of acceptance. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Gen. Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1271.) “One having no expectation that his or her offer will be accepted will not be allowed to benefit from a no-risk offer made for the sole purpose of later recovering large expert witness fees.” (Id.)

A defendant may make a reasonably low offer, including waiving costs and fees, if they reasonably believe they are fault free and have a significant likelihood of prevailing. That a defense section 998 offer was modest in comparison to the amount the plaintiff sought does not preclude a finding of reasonableness. (Melendrez v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 649; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267.) Where a defendant obtains a judgment more favorable than its section 998 settlement offer, that results in a presumption that the  offer was reasonable. (Melendrez v. Ameron Internat. Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 648.)

Finally, whether a section 998 offer is reasonable and made in good faith is left to “the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Bates v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 210, 221.)

Plaintiff argues that as of April 6, 2026, the parties were squarely at issue, the case was supported by competing expert testimony, and trial was roughly a month away. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the offer “ gave Plaintiff nothing” and  therefore had no reasonable prospect of acceptance.

Defendant, in response, notes that Defendant’s expert had opined, at the time the offer was made, that there was no breach of the standard of care and no causal link between Defendant’s acts and the damages. Further, that the deposition of Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Romano occurred April 15, 2026 and that Dr. Romano could not say to a reasonable degree of medical probability that any breach any the standard of care by Defendant actually caused the Plaintiff any harm. Plaintiff argues, therefore, the offer was still able to be accepted after this deposition testimony.

The Court notes here that it commonly sees dueling expert opinions as to the standard of care, breach thereof and causation in medical malpractice cases. Expert testimony in professional negligence matters is necessary as a matter of law. However, where Plaintiff’s expert cannot opine as to the issue of causation as to Defendant’s acts or failures to act, the Court agrees that, in such a case, a plaintiff is unlikely to prevail.

This guides the Court’s finding that the offer here was not a token offer and that the waiver of costs (and expert fees) represents a reasonable prediction of the outcome of the case. Moreover, Defendant is presumed to have made a reasonable offer, having prevailed at trial.

The Court agrees that neither Wear v. Calderon (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 818 nor Elrod, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 692 preclude such a finding and that both set out the same law applied above.

As such, the Court denies the motion to strike the post-offer expert fees incurred on the basis of a token offer.

Reasonableness, Necessity and Support for Amount of Expert Fees

As noted above, $69,609.50 of expert fees incurred after April 6, 2026 are at issue.

The Court reviews the invoices for fees incurred after the section 998 offer was served, noting a rate of $650 per hour and fees for 27 hours record review in preparation of deposition and 33 hours of review in preparation for trial. Further, there is a $20,000 flat rate charge for Dr. Dubrow’s deposition and $8,500 for a travel fee. Finally, the Court notes telephonic conversations with counsel.

The Court will reduce the 60 hours incurred for review in preparation for the deposition and trial to 40 hours. The Court will also reduce the flat rate charge of $20,000 to $10,000 and the travel fee to $4,000.

As such, the Court will award $40,609.50 in expert fees.

The Court notes here that the majority of these costs are expert fees awarded pursuant to section 998. LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1124 notes that:

 “…‘section 998 gives the trial court discretion to consider  a party's ability to pay costs, when considering costs recoverable under that section.” [citations omitted] However, the appellate court disagreed that a court had the same discretion under section 1032: ‘There is no language in section 998 which would transfer the discretion of that section to a motion to tax costs recoverable by the prevailing party under sections 1032 and 1033.5, and unrelated to section 998.’ [citation omitted].”

Here, however, Plaintiff has not made any argument or provided evidence through declaration of an inability to pay.

Therefore, the Court awards costs in the amount of $56,430.72 as follows:

Cost	Amount Requested	Amount Awarded
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$531.50	$531.50
2. Jury Fees	$264.62	$264.62
4. Deposition costs	$8,046.56	$8,046.56
5. Service of Process	$85.00	$85.00
11. Court reporter fees	$6,359.00	$6,359.00
12. Models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits	$534.54	$534.54
16. Other	$82,215.50	$40,609.50
Total	$98,036.72	$56,430.72

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Yanez, Arlene vs. Orsi Public Utility District et al

Case No.:   VCU314641

Date:           September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Mesa Lotco, LLC vs. Hawkins, Leah Quade

Case No.:   VCU323661

Date:           September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion re: Notice of Deadlines

Tentative Ruling: The Court notes this matter appears to have resolved at the settlement conference. As such, the Court will inquire as to the status of the completion of the settlement agreement at this hearing. The parties may appear in any manner.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Paige, Brittney vs. Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group (West Coast), Inc.

Case No.:   VCU335068

Date:           September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice; to require a separate motion to stay this matter on issues unrelated to arbitration

Background

On May 15, 2026, Plaintiff sued Defendant Metro One Loss Prevention Services Group (West Coast), Inc., dba Metro One LPSG (West Coast), Inc. under Labor Code section 2968, et seq under the Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”).

The complaint expressly states “This is a representative PAGA-only action. Plaintiff does not assert any individual cause of action, class claim, or claim for individual damages, restitution, unpaid wages, statutory penalties recoverable only in an individual capacity, waiting time penalties, or wage statement penalties on an individual basis. Plaintiff seeks only civil penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief available under PAGA.” (Complaint ¶17.)

The Court notes here that the notice of claim is dated January 28, 2026.

Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of the individual component of the PAGA claim, despite Plaintiff’s lack of pleading thereof and stay the representative component of the PAGA claim pending arbitration. Alternatively, Defendant seeks to stay this matter if arbitration is denied based on pending, prior filed class action and PAGA cases in Orange and Alameda Counties.

For clarity, the Court will adopt the terminology from Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, noting that the term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (Id. at 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) Further, the term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Id. at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

Headless PAGA Actions

Section 2699 was revised effective July 1, 2024 and the revisions, pursuant to subdivision (v)(2), “shall not apply to a civil action with respect to which the notice required by" section 2699.3 "was filed before June 19, 2024.”

Prior PAGA Statute

The appellate court’s opinion in Galarsa, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at 4, appears limited to such pre-amendment matters, stating:

“The first question is whether the version of PAGA in effect from mid-2016 to mid-2024 authorized an aggrieved employee to bring a PAGA action that seeks to recover civil penalties imposed for Labor Code violations suffered only by other employees. Such lawsuits are sometimes referred to as “headless” PAGA actions because the plaintiff employee has chosen not to pursue civil penalties for violations he or she suffered personally. (CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, 882 [334 Cal.Rptr.3d 647] (CRST Expedited), review granted Sept. 17, 2025, S292005.) We again conclude such PAGA actions were allowed. (CRST Expedited, at p. 882.)”

The amendment to section 2699, which appears applicable here, involves subsection (c) and revisions thereto.

Prior to the amendment, subsection (c) stated “For purposes of this part, ‘aggrieved employee’ means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed”

The courts in CRST Expedited, supra, Galarsa, supra, Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Servs. LTD., LLC, 109 Cal.App.5th 69, 75, and Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 533, 536 all found that, under this pre July 2024 version, no individual claim was necessary and headless PAGA (Type O Only) claims were permitted.

By contrast, Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1005, also under the prior version of the PAGA statute, notes “every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim” (that is a Type A and Type O claim) (See also Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 932, 943 [agreeing with Leeper that "the inclusion of an individual PAGA claim [is] mandated by PAGA's text"].)

Those matters all appear to be on appeal pending consideration and disposition of related issues.

Current PAGA Statute

However, these decisions, and their pending status, would not appear to impact the analysis in this matter, as, noted above, subdivision (c) was revised, effective July 1, 2024, to state the following:

(c)

(1) For purposes of this part, "aggrieved employee" means any person who was employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered each of the violations alleged during the period prescribed under Section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure…”

As such, the Court interprets this version to eliminate headless PAGA claims, like the one before the Court.

This applicable version of the PAGA statute requires that an aggrieved employee personally suffered each violations alleged. In other words, that the revised statute requires a plaintiff to have been employed and to have personally suffered each violation alleged during the requisite statutory period.

Plaintiff’s position, that this is a Type O PAGA claim only, is impermissible under the current PAGA statute.

The Court will not, and cannot, modify Plaintiff’s pleading to include a Type A claim and therefore evaluate whether the Type A claim is subject to the arbitration agreement at issue in this matter.

The Court also cannot grant the motion to compel a non-existent Type A claim.

While the Court is not faced with a sufficiency of the pleading challenge (that is, via demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion to strike), the Court believes there must be some underlying viable claim to compel to arbitration. Based on the pleadings in this matter and Plaintiff’s argument in opposition of this motion, the Court finds no such claim for which to consider compelling arbitration thereto.

The Court, therefore, must deny the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice, on the basis that no PAGA claim has been properly alleged.

As to the request to stay this matter pending other, prior filed actions, the Court will require a separate motion to stay this matter on an issue unrelated to arbitration or the arbitration agreement.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Ponce, Gabriel vs. Central California Baking Company

Case No.:   VCU311927

Date:           September 28, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: The Court notes it continued this hearing previously as to the notice period, lodestar, and presently incurred costs. No updated declaration appears to have been filed. The Court, therefore continues this motion to October 12, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Background Facts

At the outset, the Court acknowledges its prior ruling did not discuss the opposition to the motion and reply brief filed in support thereof.

The Court finds that the memorandum of understanding, fully executed March 6, 2026, lacked any negotiated term related to Plaintiff’s resignation of employment. The Court further agrees that the argument Plaintiff could not act as a class representative if still employed as to the Waiting Time claim is a defense to liability and/or class certification. However, these defenses are subsumed by the settlement in this case. The Court notes the declaration by Davies indicates “Although the Class arguably could have seen a payout of approximately $1,723,074 for waiting time penalties…” and that “Plaintiff discounted these claims assuming a 30% chance of class certification and 20% chance at the merits for both claims (the same estimates as used for the meal period claims), resulting in a realistic value of approximately $103,300 for the waiting time claim.” (Declaration of Davis ¶38.) The Court finds the negotiated settlement adequately takes into account such defenses placing it within the recognized range of reasonableness.

As such, the Court rejects the argument set forth in the opposition as confirming a settlement as to terms contained with respect to Plaintiff’s employment status in the admittedly unsigned long-form agreement.

The Court notes it continued this hearing previously as to the notice period, lodestar, and presently incurred costs. No updated declaration appears to have been filed. The Court, therefore continues this motion to October 12, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 28, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054252	In the Matter of Servin, Joe Jr	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs: missing petitioner’s, Prob C § 8481(a)(2)
VPR054267	In the Matter of Ellis, Robert James	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054298	In the Matter of Herrera, Jose Luis	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	1.  The property appears to be separate property and shall be passed to all heirs by intestate succession; the court to determine that the property is community property, Probate Code § 6401. 2.  Notice of Hearing to minor:  must be sent to the person or persons having legal custody of the minor, with whom the minor resides, CRC Rule 7.51(d).
VPR054237	In the Matter of Chaires, Joe III	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Supplemental documents in order
VPR054260	In the Matter of The James Johnson & Rose Brown Revocable Trust Dated August 17, 2014	Appoint Successor Trustee	Appearance Required	At least 30 days have not lapsed for service of Notice of Hearing to be completed, Prob C § 17203
VPR054105	In the Matter of The Diane M. Flores Living Trust	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued hearing for status of related case
VPR052706	In the Matter of Rodriguez Hernandez, Eucario Alfredo	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR045375	In the Matter of the Ashley Rogers Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053199	In the Matter of Faught, Cheryl Ann	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR052351	In the Matter of Flores, Loida	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053934	In the Matter of Betterton, Michael	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	1.  Investigator’s Report not completed. 2.  Initial Petition:  Documents in order. 3.  Competing Petition:  Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree; Certificate of Completion of Orientation and Capacity Declaration not filed.

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 24, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052024	In the Matter of Cannon, Preston Lloyd	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Appoint Conservator	Appearance required	Orientation not completed by proposed successor conservators. Screening Forms incomplete for both proposed successor conservators.
PPR053556	In the Matter of Quintero, Leonides	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121)  needs to be served all persons listed in the Will. Petition Item 8: Names of all persons mentioned in decedent’s Will.
PPR053975	In the Matter of Lopez, Ronald	Contested Hearing - Probate	Appearance required	No court filings since the 8/13/26 conference.
PPR054179	In the Matter of Lara, Paul Sr	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	#3.e –  heirs at law are not all adults. Guardian Ad Litem must sign for a minor to waive bond on behalf of the minor. #2.d(2) re BOND setting is too low. NEEDS to be filed - Notice of Hearing—Decedent's Estate or Trust (DE-120)
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	There have been no filings to correct previous issues since last hearing. Numerous filings are required.
PPR054254	In the Matter of Siterlet, Lorraine M	Letters of Administration		Conditional Approval
PPR054283	In the Matter of Orr, James Olin	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054006	In the Matter of R.F.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing were personally on PARENTS, and served by mail on GRANDPARENTS, pursuant to Probate Code §1511 DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member Petition for Appointment ATTACHMENT GC-210(CA) is incomplete – no relatives are listed at #2
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053989	In the Matter of M.M.	Co-Petitioner has not yet submitted to DOJ Background record check
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054297	In the Matter of A.G.W.	Submit proof of parent’s D.O.D. the Notice of Hearing and TEMP Appointment Petition, are required to be personally served on parents with 5 court days notice, pursuant to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR054294	In the Matter of Cardenas Medina, Angel Abdiel	DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054293	In the Matter of B.U.T.	Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating MOTHER & GUARDIAN were personally served with a copy of the Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, with 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054277	In the Matter of Ayon, Osiris Malakai	No issues to address for this hearing