Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, October 15, 2026, are:

Re:                C S vs. DOE 1

Case No.:   VCU293358

Date:           October 15, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Demurrer; (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To overrule the demurrer; however, in  light of Plaintiff’s request and the Court’s ruling on the motion to strike, the Court will permit the filing of the fourth amended complaint; (2) To deny the motion to strike as to Nos. 16, 17, 23, 25 (in part) and 37; to grant the motion to strike with leave to amend as to the remaining Nos.; to order Plaintiff to file the proposed fourth amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.  CMC is continued to December 17, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

The operative third amended complaint alleges Defendant County of Tulare “…provided child welfare, child protective, and childcare services to foster children in Tulare County, including Plaintiff.” (TAC ¶8.)

Further, that Defendant County “had a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care in the investigation, licensing, supervision, and/or monitoring of foster care facilities, homes, and/or families with whom they placed foster children, and to develop or implement programs, guidelines, procedures, and/or training to prevent the abuse of foster children placed within foster care facilities, homes, and/or families” and “S owed a non-delegable duty to Plaintiff to use reasonable care to protect the safety, care, well-being, and health of Plaintiff while under DEFENDANTS’ care and custody. (California DSS Manual Section 30-100; 30-101; 30-102; 30-109; 30-113; 30-205; 30-206, effective 11/3/1980)” (TAC ¶¶11, 12.)

Further, that Defendant “owed a non-delegable duty to establish and implement policies and procedures in the exercise of reasonable care for the prevention of sexual assault and abuse and protection of the safety of children in their care, custody and/or control.(California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30-113 effective 11/03/1980).” (TAC ¶13.)

Additionally, that Defendant owed non-delegable duties to children in foster care, including Plaintiff:

a. To evaluate and investigate all reports of child abuse and/or neglect; (California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30-113, effective 11/03/1980);

b. To visit children in foster home/facility placements in accordance with the requirements for children in custody (California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30 113 effective 11/03/1980);

c. To investigate all relevant conditions of the foster home/facility that might affect the child; (California DSS Manual Section 30-113 effective 11/03/1980);

d. To report any violations of the foster home/facility’s operating license or requirements; (California DSS Manual Section 30-113 effective 11/03/1980);

e. To continually assess the adequacy and safety of a child’s particular placement (California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30-113; 30-009, effective 11/03/1980);

f. To make appropriate referrals for evaluations or services, and provide each child in foster care with quality services to protect her safety and health (California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30-113 effective 11/03/1980);

g. To report all known incidents of sexual assault, abuse, or aggression occurring in the foster home/facility (California DSS Manual Sections 30-100; 30-101; 30-102; 30-109; 30-113 effective 11/03/1980);

h. To ensure that foster children are not left in dangerous conditions, including being subjected to sexual, emotional, or physical abuse; (California DSS Manual Section 30-109; 30-113; 30-206, effective 11/03/1980)” (TAC ¶14.)

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant was “in a special relationship of in loco parentis or caregiver-child with Plaintiff” and therefore Defendant “owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to protect her from foreseeable harm.” (TAC ¶15.) Further, that Defendant County was “in a special relationship with the individuals and/or agents to whom they delegated or assigned custody and/or control of Plaintiff” and owed a duty to supervise and control such individuals to prevent foreseeable harm. (TAC ¶16.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant County owed mandatory duties under the following: “Welfare and Institutions Code section 16504; Health and Safety Code section 1522, Penal Code sections 11165.7, 11165.9 and 11166; Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections 30-100; 30-101; 30-102; 30-109; 30-113; 30-205; 30-206, effective 11/3/1980.” (TAC ¶17.)

Plaintiff alleges further that “In approximately 1984 to 1986, when Plaintiff was approximately fifteen (15) years old, Plaintiff was sexually abused and assaulted by, her Foster Father, in whose home she was placed by DEFENDANTS. The acts of sexual abuse and assault perpetrated against Plaintiff by PERPETRATOR took place in Tulare County, California. At all times relevant and material hereto, PERPETRATOR was over eighteen (18) years of age.” (TAC ¶20.)

Further, that after the PERPETRATOR would sexually abuse and assault Plaintiff, “Plaintiff disclosed the same to her assigned County of Tulare social worker, Margaret Johnston. Despite the foregoing, no action was taken, no investigation was completed, and PERPETRATOR continued to sexually abuse and assault Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s County social worker told Plaintiff in response to her disclosure of sexual abuse that she had nowhere else to put Plaintiff and that she would have to stay put until she found another option. She then told Plaintiff to ‘hang in there’.” (TAC ¶¶21, 22.)

Additionally, that “DEFENDANTS breached their duties by (i) failing to protect Plaintiff from sexual abuse, sexual assault and lewd and lascivious acts; (ii) failing to adequately, properly and completely investigate whether Plaintiff was safe and free from maltreatment; (iii) failing to adequately, properly and completely investigate the acts and conduct of the PERPETRATOR of sexual abuse of Plaintiff; (iv) failing to establish policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of children and protect them from sexual abuse; (v) failing to implement and enforce policies and procedures that were adequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of foster children and protect them from sexual and physical abuse; (vi) failing to adequately monitor and supervise Plaintiff; (vii) failing to adequately hire and train employees, agents and case workers; (viii) concealing their knowledge that PERPETRATOR was unsafe and posed a risk of child sexual abuse; and (ix) failing to report suspected sexual abuse of a minor to law enforcement. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §16504; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1522; Cal. Pen. Code §§ 11165.7, 11165.9, and 11166; Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections 30-100; 30-101; 30 102; 30-109; 30-113; 30-205; 30-206, effective 11/3/1980.” (TAC ¶38.)

Further, that “DEFENDANTS failed to conduct visits to Plaintiff’s foster care placement that were of sufficient frequency and/or reasonably calculated to determine whether Plaintiff was safe and not being subjected to maltreatment while in foster care placement; DEFENDANTS visits by the case worker or social worker to the various group homes and foster homes were brief, superficial, and perfunctory. Further, actual and/or constructive notice of the sexual abuse and/or assault was given to the employees and agents of DEFENDANTS, and the employees and agents failed to act upon the information to protect Plaintiff from sexual abuse.” (TAC ¶39.)

Additionally, that “employees and/or independent contractors of DEFENDANTS failed to properly investigate such abuse and failed to remove Plaintiff from the aforementioned foster care placement, as a result of which Plaintiff suffered sexual assault and abuse.” (TAC ¶40.)

“This Action alleges liability against County pursuant to California Government Code § 815.2, 815.4, and/or 815.6” (TAC ¶44.)

“County is directly liable for negligence under California Government Code Section 815.6 for its failure to discharge mandatory duties set forth in, inter alia, Welfare and Institutions Code section 16504; Health and Safety Code section 1522, Penal Code sections 11165.7, 11165.9 and 11166; Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections 30-100; 30-101; 30-102; 30-109; 30-113; 30-205; 30-206, effective 11/3/1980” (TAC ¶47.)

Further, that “County is vicariously liable for Plaintiff’s injuries proximately caused by the acts and/or omissions of County’s employees, agents, and/or independent contractors. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 815.2(a), 820.” (TAC ¶48.)

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges a single cause of action for negligence against Defendant County.

Defendant County demurrers to the operative amended complaint. Defendant argues first that it cannot be vicariously liable for the acts of or criminal behavior of foster parents under Government code section 815.4.

Further, that Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under Government Code section 815.2 based on discretionary immunity as to the County’s employees’ decision making. Additionally, that Plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient mandatory duty, the source of that duty and how the statute was breached.

Finally, the County argues that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 did not revive actions against a public entity on a vicarious liability theory.

In opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike, Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that the CSS Manual sections were referenced in the operative third amended complaint were replaced by October 1, 1983 regulations, which were the operative text through at least April 20, 1984 and seeks to file a fourth amended complaint addressing these changes. Further, Plaintiff argues that the complaint alleges a breach of mandatory duty and that discretionary immunity does not apply.

In support, Plaintiff seeks judicial notice of the relevant CSS Manual sections applicable in 1984.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.)

Demurrers do not lie as to only parts of causes of action, where some valid claim is alleged. (Poizner v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 [“A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”].)

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  (Gov. Code § 815(a).)  “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]”  (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)  It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) 

Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code § 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.)

Koussaya v. City of Stockton (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 909, 943 summarizes the theories of recovery against a public entity as follows:

“When a party is injured by a tortfeasor and seeks to affix liability on the tortfeasor's employer, the injured party ordinarily must demonstrate either (1) the  employer violated a duty of care it owed to the injured party and this negligence was a proximate cause of the resulting injury (the direct liability theory), or (2) the tortfeasor-employee was liable for committing the tortious conduct that caused the injury while acting within the course and scope of his or her employment (the vicarious liability theory). [Citation.] When the employer is a governmental agency, the statutory framework permits the injured party to pursue the vicarious liability theory in accordance with these general common law principles. [Citation.] However, the statutory framework requires, as a condition to the injured party's recovery on a direct liability theory against a governmental agency, that the injured party identify a ‘specific statute declaring [the entity] to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care’ by the agency in favor of the injured party. [Citations.]” (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 247–248, fn. omitted)” (emphasis added.)

Further, the Court notes Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125, which expressly holds:

“We therefore hold that public entities are liable under Govt. Code §815.6 for injuries to children in foster care which occur as a result of any violation of those duties; such public entities and their employees are not immune under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2 for violations of those duties.”  (Id. at 141.)

The Court’s review of the first cause of action is that it alleges liability under Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4 and 815.6.

Direct Liability – Government Code Section 815.6

As noted above, the operative amended complaint lists a host of alleged mandatory duties, including Penal Code section 11166.

The California Supreme Court has held that Penal Code section 11166(a) imposes a mandatory duty to make the report but does not require an investigation. (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal. 4th 168, 188.) Such a report must be made “…to a law enforcement agency or a county welfare department ‘whenever the mandated reporter, in [the mandated reporter's] professional capacity or within the scope of [the mandated reporter's] employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect.’” (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 186; see Pen. Code, §§ 11166, subd. (a), 11165.7, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)” (Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 31-32.)

Holman v. County of Butte  (2025) 111 Cal. App. 5th 177 appears to extend, the mandatory cross-reporting duty noted in B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at 181 under section 11166 to county welfare agencies.

In Holman, the plaintiff sued the defendant county under Government Code section 815.6, claiming that it breached mandatory duties under, relevant here, Penal Code section 11166 related to the evaluation, investigation, and cross-reporting of a referral alleging child abuse perpetrated against plaintiff to law enforcement and the district attorney's office. (Holman, supra, 111 Cal. App. 5^th at 184.) The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s Health and Human Services Agency (the county’s welfare department) received a report of suspected child abuse, which the defendant then “evaluated out” without investigation. (Id.)

The trial court granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion and, as to the cause of action under section 11166, the court ruled the statute “…demonstrates the Legislature did not intend to require county welfare departments to cross-report every referral “‘reported to it’” and that the statute “clearly exempts [referrals]” that are “unfounded or ‘evaluated out.’” (Id. at 188.)

The appellate court, in reversing the trial court, noted that B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4^th holds  that when social workers receive a mandated report of suspected child abuse, section 11166, subdivision (j), imposes a mandatory duty to cross-report the alleged abuse to law enforcement and other agencies.  (Id. at 193.)

The Holman court found that B.H. found the duty to cross-report is triggered by receipt of a mandated child abuse report, since such reports are made only when the mandated reporter “knows or reasonably suspects” a child has been the victim of child abuse or neglect and that determining whether a particular report involved child abuse or neglect does not involve an exercise of discretion, despite the possibility of exercising judgment. (Holman, supra, 111 Cal. App. 5^th at 196 citing B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4^th at 181, 185.)

As to extending this cross-reporting duty to county agencies, the Holman court noted “the purpose of CANRA is to protect children from abuse and neglect by mandating reciprocal cross-reporting duties” and “the Legislature intended that the various law enforcement and child welfare agencies immediately communicate to each other information received on alleged child abuse or neglect so that they may in turn coordinate their investigative procedures.” (Id. citing B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4^th at 183, 185.) Further, that “even though section 11166, subdivision (k), includes the term “reported to it,” and section 11166, subdivision (j), does not, we conclude the intent of the provisions is the same: To require “[t]he agency that receives the initial report [to] share the information with [the] various other agencies.” (Id.)

Finally, the court noted “California Supreme Court unequivocally held that determining whether a reported incident meets the definitions of abuse or neglect is a ministerial or operational function, not a discretionary activity. ([B.H.], supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 181.) Accordingly, even if social workers are required to cross-report only those allegations determined to meet the definitions of abuse or neglect, there is still a triable issue of fact in this case as to whether the County violated a mandatory duty by failing to cross-report the referral. (Id. at pp. 180–186 [failure to cross-report can be the basis for imposing civil liability].)” (Id.)

Plaintiff here alleges disclosure of ongoing sexual abuse and assault by the foster father “…to her assigned County of Tulare social worker, Margaret Johnston. Despite the foregoing, no action was taken…” (TAC ¶22.) Plaintiff alleges further that “said sexual abuse and assaults were not reported as required” and that Defendant County breached its duty by “…(ix) failing to report suspected sexual abuse of a minor to law enforcement” referencing section 11166. (TAC ¶¶35, 38.)

Therefore, Plaintiff appears to have alleged, at least, a mandatory duty to cross-report under Penal Code section 11166 by virtue of Plaintiff’s disclosure to a County employee and that the duty was breached by failing to report. This appears sufficient under Holman.

As no partial demurrer lies, the Court has found at least one mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6 and therefore need not reach the issues as to the applicability of other mandatory duties or vicarious liability issues argued by Defendant.

The Court, therefore, would overrule the demurrer.

However, Plaintiff’s opposition to demurrer states:

“Plaintiff requests leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint that: (1) replaces the 1980-era Division 30 citations with the provisions listed in Appendix A, identifying for each the specific subdivision and the act it required; (2) replaces Penal Code sections 11165.7 and 11165.9 with Penal Code sections 11165, subdivision (k), and 11166, subdivisions (a) and (g), as amended by Statutes 1982, chapter 905; (3) alleges the operative dates of each enactment; and (4) alleges, as to each enactment, the specific act the County’s social worker failed to perform.”

As such, the Court will sustain the demurrer with leave to amend.

(2) Motion to Strike

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1).) The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion and upon terms it deems proper: (1) strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; Stafford v. Shultz (1954) 42 Cal.2d 767, 782.)

Here, Defendant seeks to strike a number of portions of the operative third amended complaint.

As noted above, Plaintiff proposes to replace a number of DSS Manuel citations with ones that are active in 1984:

“The proposed Fourth Amended Complaint cites those provisions, including DSS Manual sections 30-132, 30-134, 30-342, 30-344, 30-442, and 30-444, and the definitions in section 30-002.”

No. 1. ¶ 12, pg. 3: 22-25

Here, Defendant this paragraph sounds in general negligence, and fails to set forth the non-delegable duty in specific terms. Further, that the DSS Manual Sections alleged were repealed prior to 1984.

The Court agrees that these sections of the DSS would not appear valid in 1984 and grants the motion to strike ¶ 12 with leave to amend.

No. 2. ¶13, pg. 3:26 to 4:1.

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶13 with leave to amend.

No. 3. ¶14, pg 4:4-5 (subsection a)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(a), with leave to amend.

No 4. ¶ 14, pg 4:6-8 (subparagraph b)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(b), with leave to amend.

No 5. ¶ 14, pg. 4: 9-10 (subparagraph c)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(c), with leave to amend.

No. 6. ¶ 14, pg. 4: 11-12 (subparagraph d)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(d), with leave to amend.

No. 7. ¶ 14, pg. 4:13-14 (subparagraph e)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(e), with leave to amend.

No. 8. ¶ 14, pg. 4: 15-17 (subparagraph f)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(f), with leave to amend.

No. 9. ¶ 14, pg. 4: 18-20 (subparagraph g)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(g), with leave to amend.

No. 10. ¶ 14, pg. 4: 21-23 (subparagraph h)

For the same reason as to No. 1, the Court grants the motion to strike as to ¶14(h), with leave to amend.

No. 11. ¶ 15, pg. 4: 24-26

Here, Defendant seeks to strike this paragraph because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court agrees and strikes paragraph 15 as requested with leave to amend.

No. 12. ¶ 16, pg. 4:27 to pg 5:2

Here, Defendant seeks to strike a portion of paragraph 16 referencing a “…duty to supervise and control such individuals to prevent foreseeable harm” because it because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 12 with leave to amend.

No. 13. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7 ; ¶ 38, pg. 8:7-10; ¶ 47, pg. 10:5-8, ¶ 58, pg 11:15-18

Here, Defendant seeks to strike references to Health and Safety Code section 1522. The Court will grant the motion to strike, as there are no allegations in the complaint that indicate a background check, or the failure to conduct a background check, proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries. The Court grants the motion as to No. 13 with leave to amend.

No. 14. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7; ¶ 38, pg. 8:7-10; ¶ 47, pg. 11:5-8, ¶ 58, pg 11:15-18

Here, Defendant seeks to strike references to Penal Code section 11165.7, which was added in 1987 and therefore cannot serve as a basis for liability for events alleged to have occurred in 1984. The Court grants the motion as to No. 14 with leave to amend.

No. 15. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7; ¶ 38, pg. 8:7-10; ¶ 47, pg. 11:5-8, ¶ 58, pg. 11:15-18

Here, Defendant seeks to strike references to Penal Code section 11165.9, which was added in 1987 and therefore cannot serve as a basis for liability for events alleged to have occurred in 1984. The Court grants the motion as to No. 15 without with leave to amend.

No. 16. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7; ¶ 38, pg. 8:7-10; ¶ 47, pg. 11:5-8, ¶ 58, pg. 11:15-18

Defendant seeks to strike references to Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections 30-100 and 30-200 on the basis that these sections were repealed in 1980 and cannot form the basis of liability for acts alleged to have occurred in 1984.

Plaintiff appears to acknowledge this issue, seeks leave to amend to correct the CWS Manuel citations and therefore the Court grants the motion as to No. 16 with leave to amend.

No. 17. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7; ¶ 38, pg. 8:7-10; ¶ 47, pg. 11:5-8, ¶ 58, pg. 11:15-18

Here, Defendant seeks to strike references to Penal Code section 11166. The Court has adjudicate the relevance of this Penal Code section above on demurrer and therefore denies the motion to strike as to No. 17. However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend these paragraphs via the fourth amended complaint, the Court grants leave to amend.

No. 18. ¶ 17, pg. 5:3-7

Here, Defendant seeks to strike “At all times relevant and material, County also owed Plaintiff certain duties set forth in…” because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 18 with leave to amend.

No. 19. ¶ 18, pg. 5:8-10

Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 18 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 19 with leave to amend.

No. 20. ¶ 25, pg. 6:8-11
Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 25 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 20 with leave to amend.

No. 21. ¶ 26, pg. 6:12-15

Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 26 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 21 with leave to amend.

No. 22. ¶ 27-28, pg. 6:16-18

The Court will deny the motion as to paragraph 27, which involves allegations against the Perpetrator. As to paragraph 28 regarding “reasonable foreseeability” of Defendant, the Court does not consider this to sound in a theory of general negligence or otherwise lacks a necessary reference to a statutory enactment. The Court notes Plaintiff alleges reporting the abuse, that no action was taken and therefore foreseeability, based on the report, is adequately pled. The Court denies the motion as to paragraph 28.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to No. 22 However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend these paragraphs via the fourth amended complaint, the Court grants leave to amend.

No. 23. ¶ 29, pg. 7:24-28

For the same reasons as stated above as to No. 22, the Court denies the motion to strike as to No. 23. However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend these paragraphs via the fourth amended complaint, the Court grants leave to amend.

No. 24. ¶ 31, pg. 7:41-2

Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 31 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 22 with leave to amend.

No. 25. ¶ 32-36 at pg. 8:7-19

The Court will strike paragraphs 32 through 34, and 36 because the allegations fail to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence.

The Court will deny the motion as to paragraph 35, as Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a mandatory duty with respect to reporting.

The Court, therefore, grants No. 25 in part, with leave to amend, and denies No. 25 in part. However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend these paragraphs via the fourth amended complaint, the Court grants leave to amend.

No. 26. ¶ 37 at pg. 7:21-22

Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 37 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 22 with leave to amend.

No. 27. ¶ 38, pg. 7:26-27 (subsection(i)); No. 28. ¶ 38, pg. 7:27-28 (subsection ii and iii); No. 29. ¶ 38, pg. 7:11-28 at lines 15-17 (subsection iv); No. 30 ¶ 38, pg. 7:2-4 (subsection v); No. 31. ¶ 38, pg. 8:2-4 (subsection vi); No. 32. ¶ 38, pg. 8:5 (subsection vii); No. 33 ¶ 38, pg. 8:5-7 (subsection viii)

Here, Defendant seeks to strike a number of subsections of paragraph 38. These subsections are followed by references to “Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §16504; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1522; Cal. Pen. Code §§ 11165.7, 11165.9, and 11166; Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections 30-100; 30-101; 30 102; 30-109; 30-113; 30-205; 30-206, effective 11/3/1980”

Welfare section 16504 appears to apply to initial intake reporting duties when a minor has not yet been placed in the foster system. Section 16504(a) specifically states “Any child reported to the county child welfare services department to be endangered by abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall be eligible for initial intake and evaluation of risk services.” As such, this section would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof.

The Court has noted above the inapplicability of Health & Safety Code section 1522 above and notes this section would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof.

Penal Code section 11165.7 simply defines a mandatory reporter and does not, in and of itself, create a mandatory duty. As such, this section would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof.

As to Penal Code section 11165.9, it appears to require reports of suspected abuse to be made to various law enforcement, county probation department or county welfare department. However, this section appears to have been added in 1987. As such, this section would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof. 

The Court has examined Penal Code section 11166 above as to a reporting duty, but notes that the allegations in Nos. 27-33 do not appear to relate to such reporting. As such, this section would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof. 

As to the Department of Social Services Child Welfare Services Manual sections listed, the Court does not find these allege a mandatory duty, or breach thereof, connected to the allegations of the complaint. As such, these sections would not appear to support the allegations in Nos. 27-33 as to mandatory duty or breach thereof. 

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike as to Nos. 27-33 with leave to amend.

No. 34. ¶ 39, p. 8:11-15 and No. 35. ¶ 39, p. 8:11-15

Here, Defendant seeks to strike most of paragraph 39 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to Nos. 34 and 35 with leave to amend.

No. 36. ¶ 41, p. 8:24-27

Here, Defendant seeks to strike paragraph 41 because it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. The Court grants the motion as to No. 36 with leave to amend.

No. 37. ¶ 48, pg. 10: 9-11; ¶ 59, pg. 11:19-21

Here, Defendant seeks to strike the references “agents and/or independent contractors” arguing that County can only be liable for the torts of it own employees in the course and scope of their employment in connection with sexual abuse. Here, the allegations found sufficient on demurrer relate to an alleged breach of mandatory duty by Defendant’s employee. However, the Government Code appears to provide for vicarious liability if Defendant’s agent or independent contractor also breaches a mandatory duty. To the extent that Plaintiff may plead liability in the alternative at the pleading stage with respect to the relationship between an employee, agent and/or independent contractor who breaches a mandatory duty that proximately causes Plaintiff injury, the Court denies the motion as to No. 37.  However, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend these paragraphs via the fourth amended complaint, the Court grants leave to amend.

No. 38. ¶ 54, p. 10:27-11:1

Here, Defendant seeks to strike the reference to “failed to protect or otherwise make the foster home safe” as sounding in discretionary acts for which immunity applies. However, the Court will grant this request to strike this portion on the basis that it fails to provide a statutory enactment and instead sounds in general negligence. Therefore, the Court grants the motion as to No. 38 with leave to amend.

No. 39. ¶ 55, pg. 11:3-4, No. 40. ¶ 56, pg. 11:3-4, and No. 41. ¶ 57, pg. 11:3-4

Here, the County seeks to strike these paragraphs on the basis that these allegations sound in general negligence. Therefore, the Court grants the motion as to Nos. 39, 40, and 41 with leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                  Castiblanoc, Mario vs. Sutton National Insurance Company

Case No.:   VCU333370

Date:           October 15, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Plaintiff to (1) Special Interrogatories, Set One and (2) Requests for Production of Documents, Set One

Tentative Ruling: There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Bankunited, N.A. vs. Ruiz, Alejandro et al

Case No.:    VCU320033

Date:            October 15, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Amend Complaint to Correct APN

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order the amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Prove-up hearing is off calendar.  Case Management Conference is re-scheduled to January 6, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff filed the operative complaint on April 7, 2025.

Paragraph 13 identifies the relevant real property as 575 South Cottage Street, Porterville, CA 93257  and having an Assessor’s Parcel Number of 290-090-042-000.

However, Plaintiff indicates the correct APN is 260-090-042-000.

The Court discovered the error and alerted Plaintiff’s counsel at the default prove up hearing on July 29, 2026 and Plaintiff agreed to correct the error by means of the instant motion to amend.

Code of Civil Procedure section (a)(1) states: 

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect…”

Here, as indicated by Plaintiff, the mistake as to the APN is clerical and therefore the Court, in furtherance of justice, grants the motion to correct the APN in the complaint.

Plaintiff is ordered to file the amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Covarrubias Gonzalez, Felisa vs. Case Vander Eyk Dairy, LLC et al

Case No.:   VCU293120

Date:           October 15, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Hearing re: Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: On September 23, 2026, the settlement administrator, through its case manager, filed a declaration indicating the check-cashing period for Settlement Class Members will expire on January 16, 2027 and that as of the date of this declaration, two hundred thirty (230) checks, totaling $141,379.84, remain uncashed.

Therefore, the Court continues this matter to February 18, 2027; 8:30 am; D1. If a further declaration by the settlement administrator is filed indicating full distribution of the settlement proceeds, no appearances will be required at the hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.:   VCU313509

Date:           October 15, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: To continue the motion to October 29, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and order the notice of this motion filed in VCU332655.

Facts and Analysis

The Court, at the prior hearings, noted its inclination to grant the motion to consolidate this matter and VCU332655 upon the filing of the notice of related case in VCU332655, the notice of this motion in VCU332655 and the proposed order re: consolidation in both VCU332655 and this matter, VCU313509.

Here, the notice of related case was filed in VCU332655 on September 21, 2026.

Here, the proposed order was lodged in both VCU313509 and VCU332655 on October 6, 2026.

However, Plaintiffs must still file the notice of this motion in VCU332655. Upon such filing, the Court intends to consolidate VCU332655 and VCU313509. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 14, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054305	In the Matter of Nixon, Sandra Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054306	In the Matter of Emerson, Randall Gary	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 14 omitted: all names of successors, relationships to decedent, ages, and mailing addresses
VPR053914	In the Matter of Sokoloff, Bruce John	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053662	In the Matter of Martin Solorzano, Jose Manuel	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053893	In the Matter of Jennings, Gary Wayne	Final Distribution Hearing	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053378	In the Matter of Ramirez, Robert Gonzales	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Declaration in support of extraordinary fees must comply with CRC, rule 7.703(e) if including services of a paralegal
VPR053608	In the Matter of the Owings Family Revocable Trust, dated February 2, 2006	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Settlement Conference Statement received
VPR054169	In the Matter of Pacheco, Daniel	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Initial Petition: Capacity Declaration not filed. Competing Petition: Duties of Conservator and Capacity Declaration not filed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday, October 15, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053427	In the Matter of Wheeler, Sidney C	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance recommended	Order not submitted
PPR053476	In the Matter of SELK, SUITJYE	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance recommended	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054047	In the Matter of Bedolla, Brian Henry	Appoint Conservator	Appearance required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054188	In the Matter of Nieblas, Marciela	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Caption- NOT SELECTED Authorization to Administer Under the Independent Administration of Estates Act. Selection made at 2c to act with FULL authority under IEAE    Petition item 3e re BOND WAIVER omitted - NO SELECTION MADE, NO ATTACHMENT  Petition item 5, (7) or (8) omitted - re any issue of a predeceased child Notice to Minor, pursuant to ProbC §1461.1, notice has not been properly given to a parent, guardian, or other person having legal custody of the minor, with whom the minor resides. NOT LODGED Orders & Letters
PPR054210	In the Matter of Singo, Sila	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Discrepancies: Petition Item 5(1) shows decedent is survived by spouse, whereas Item 8 lists spouse as “deceased” Petition Item 8: relationship of Lisa Singo to decedent is omitted Notice of Petition to Administer: notice of the court address is South County Justice Center; Page 2 – POS is incomplete Proof of Publication not filed Original will not lodged
PPR054235	In the Matter of Smothers, Barbara	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Matter submitted to court; no Objection filed
PPR054236	In the Matter of Everhart, Joann	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Matter submitted to court; no Objection filed
PPR054301	In the Matter of Marure, Jose Antonio	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Petition item 8- inventory and appraisal not attached to the Petition Petition item 9- (3) or (4) omitted – re registered domestic partner; (7) or (8) omitted - re any issue of a predeceased child Petition item 11- 11(2) Missing facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the described real property was the decedent’s primary residence – ie. copy deed, property tax, death certificate with the home address, mortgage statement from 2011. There is no statement of decedent’s interest in the property, doesn’t say the amount of interest decedent owned. Petition item 11- 11(3) Missing facts that show whether the property was community, separate, or quasi-community property Petition item 13-   The interest of each petitioner in the property is not included in Attachment 13 Petition item 14 - CIVIL POS FILED other names included in the POS are Moises Marure, Diana Marure, Yolanda Marure, John Marure but these persons are not listed in the Petition – this form doesn’t meet the probate notice requirement; Notice of Hearing—Decedent's Estate or Trust (DE-120) has not been filed and served on all parties, Prob C § 13153.

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/5/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054359	In the Matter of E.J.W.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). Service on Father Mr. Addison & Mother Mrs. Wiliams are required Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/6/2026 14:00	Department 09	VPR054113	In the Matter of Madera, Shanylle	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511 on all grandparents
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 02	VPR054358	In the Matter of Johnson, River Lynn	TEMP- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), parents to be personally served 5 court day’s notice prior to hearing
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR052277	In the Matter of Bennett, Zoey Lynn	NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 calendar days before hearing
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR053711	In the Matter of Allende, Jorge Jr	No issues to address
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR047286	In the Matter of Clevenger, Brea Marie	Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. The children may be of Native American ancestry, notice of termination proceedings must be given to the children’s tribe per ICWA NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054192	In the Matter of Venegas, Analise Rose et al	No issues to address
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054155	In the Matter of Hernandez, Julian Carlos et al	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, SERVICE to be completed on paternal grandfather DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian and household member
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of Aviles, Irie A	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of Mendoza, Nolberto	Temporary guardianship for N.M. has terminated by operation of law as ward has reached the age of 18. NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice required by maternal grandparents DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of Mendoza, Paulette	household member is required to complete the DOJ background record check NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, by mail on the maternal grandparents and siblings 15 days prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054321	In the Matter of Pena, Rose Marie	Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for father Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054320	In the Matter of Rosales, Amelia Jade	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). MOTHER to be personally served 5 court days prior to hearing Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	No issues to address – notice to mother to be discussed at hearing