Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, July 14, 2026, are:

Re:                 Engle, Al vs. Cantrell, Steven

Case No.:   VCU325651

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges “negligence/malpractice” against Defendant Steven Cantrell, a medical doctor.

Defendant Dr. Cantrell moves for summary judgment. In support, Defendant provides the following material facts.

Plaintiff was diagnosed as having glaucoma and cataracts on January 4, 2022 by Dr. Cantrell. (UMF No. 1.) On November 25, 2024, because of the worsening of cataracts leading to decreased vision, surgery was discussed with Mr. Engle. He consented to surgery and signed an informed consent on November 25, 2024 for left eye surgery. (UMF No. 2.)

Plaintiff executed an informed consent for the right eye on December 13, 2024. Both consents noted that plaintiff may still need glasses after the surgery. (UMF No. 3.)

Surgery was performed on the left eye by Dr. Cantrell on December 12, 2024. He performed surgery on the right eye on December 19, 2024. The operative report for both procedures did not note any complication. (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff was seen for a post-op visit on the left eye on December 13, 2024. He was seen for a post-op visit on the right eye on December 20, 2024. No problems at either visit were noted. (UMF No. 5.)

Plaintiff was seen on January 15 complaining of blurry vision, which is a risk of the procedure. (UMF No. 6.)

The records show that Mr. Engle met the criteria for cataract surgery. (UMF No. 7.) The records show that the surgery was completed without any problems. (UMF No. 8.) The records show that his vision prior to the cataract surgery was 20/40 in the left, and 20/50 in the right. Thus, even though Mr. Engle perceived his vision was worse following the cataract surgery, the cataract surgery actually improved his vision once he used glasses to 20/20. (UMF No. 9.)

Further, Defendant submits expert testimony that Dr. Cantrell met the standard of care in the treatment of Mr. Engle and that there is no evidence which would demonstrate any causal connection between any professional action or inaction on the part of Dr. Cantrell and plaintiff's claimed injuries or damages. (UMF  Nos. 10 and 11.)

No opposition appears to have been filed. The court exercises its jurisdiction to hear the matter within 30 days of trial pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(a)(3) finding that defendant sought an earlier hearing date but none was available on the court’s law and motion calendar.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Medical Malpractice

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence.  [citations.]”  (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.”  (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.)  The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts.  (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)  Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony.  (Id.) 

Defendant’s Expert – Standard of Care

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Larry A. Pasquali, M.D. The Court’s review of Dr. Pasquali’s declaration and CV indicate sufficient experience and education in the filed of ophthalmology. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶¶1, 2.)

Dr. Pasquali indicates retention by Defendant Dr. Cantrell’s counsel to provide expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment and care provided by Dr. Cantrell to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶3.) Dr. Pasquali indicates familiarity with the degree of skill ordinarily possessed by physicians in the care and treatment of patients such as Defendant, and an awareness that the standard of care requires that medical health providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar or like circumstances, and awareness that the failure to both have the requisite skill and knowledge or the failure to exercise that skill or knowledge is a violation of the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶2.)

The Court finds Dr. Pasquali qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Pasquali indicates review of the medical records from Defendant and the operative reports from Sierra Ambulatory Surgery Center. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶4.)

Dr. Pasquali thereafter provides a factual chronology of this matter and, thereafter, opines that Dr. Pasquali opines that Plaintiff met the criteria for cataract surgery, that Plaintiff consented to the surgery via written documents which advised that it is possible that a patient, following surgery, would require glasses and that this is especially true with patients with residual astigmatism and that, in this case, Plaintiff’s vision improved to 20/20 after surgery. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶6.)

The Court finds Defendant has carried the initial burden as to the standard of care and breach thereof.

Plaintiffs’ Expert – Standard of Care

“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”  (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff has failed to file an opposition and therefore has not come forward with sufficient conflicting expert evidence.

Causation

In order to establish that defendant's negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm.  (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498.)  “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.  Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  [Citations.]  That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion.  There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.  This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.”  (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Expert

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) Dr. Pasquali declares further “that the legal standard for medical causation testimony is that causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of causation. Put differently, I am aware that competent medical expert testimony is needed to establish that the action or inaction of a health care provider was a substantial factor in causing harm to the patient, and that said competent medical causation testimony can only be offered by expert medical testimony. It is my understanding that conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would have occurred without that conduct.” (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶2.)

As to causation, Dr. Pasquali opines that that no act or omission on the part of Dr. Cantrell violated the standard of care and therefore did not cause of contribute to, or was a substantial factor in causing, injury to Defendant. (Declaration of Dr. Pasquali ¶7.)

The Court finds Defendant has met the burden on the issue of causation.

Plaintiff’s Expert

As noted above, Plaintiff has failed to oppose this motion and therefore has not come forward with conflicting expert evidence to defeat summary judgment. (Munro, supra, at 984-985.)

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 LaRumbe-Torres, Josiah vs. Kaweah Health Medical Center et al

Case No.:   VCU313564

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition of Defendant Dr. Barrera; for Appointment of Deposition Referee; For Additional Deposition Time

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, to appoint the referee for the continued  deposition of  Dr. Barrera only, and to permit an additional one hour of time as to the deposition of Dr. Barrera.

Facts

In this medical malpractice action, Plaintiff alleges professional negligence against, amongst other defendants, Defendant Dr. Barrera regarding the delivery of Plaintiff and resulting hypoxic brain injury in the nature of Hypoxic Ischemic Encephalopathy (“HIE”) (Complaint ¶¶1, 3.) Plaintiff alleges a number of breaches of the standard of care with respect to Dr. Barrera, including delay of delivery of Plaintiff, failure to monitor, failure to assess and respond, failure to properly deliver Plaintiff, failure to comport with “safety culture/culture of safety principles” and others. (Complaint ¶39.)

On May 12, 2026, Plaintiff deposed Defendant Dr. Barrera.

Plaintiff, however, suspended the deposition and filed this motion to order Defendant Dr. Barrera to answer the deposition questions, appoint a deposition referee, and address various other “misconduct” that occurred during the deposition. Plaintiff, in support, has filed a separate statement containing a table summarizing the questions, answers, objections and instructions at issue. Further, Plaintiff indicates that the parties agree to a deposition referee, but disagree as to the scope of the referee’s authority and procedures the referee should undertake during the depositions. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks an additional two hours beyond the seven hour limit to make up for the conduct described above.

In opposition, Dr. Barrera argues that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in hostile, sarcastic, derivative, argumentative and insulting questioning and agrees to the appointment of a discovery referee to the remaining time allotted to Dr. Barrera’s deposition. Further, that Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration in support of the motion lacks personal knowledge. Additionally, that the terms “safety culture” and “just culture” are beyond the scope of discovery in this matter.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.480(a) provides, "If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production."

Subsection (b) states “This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”

Here, the motion is timely, as the deposition occurred May 12, 2026, this motion was filed June 18, 2026 and the parties appear to have sufficiently met and conferred.

“Not less than five days prior to the hearing on this motion, the moving party shall lodge with the court a certified copy of any parts of the stenographic transcript of the deposition that are relevant to the motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (h).) The declaration of counsel attaches relevant excerpts from the deposition.

“For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement…”” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1013.) Information, “unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1546.)

A deponent may be instructed not to answer to protect privileged or private information. (Code Civil Procedure, § 2025.460(a); Stewart, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 1015.)

Further, counsel must object to defects in the form that might be cured if promptly raised or the defect is waived (Code Civil Procedure, § 2025.460(b)).

However, defects in the form of a question asked are not grounds for instructing a witness not to answer and the witness must answer over the objections to form, unless the deponent's counsel suspends the deposition to seek a protective order. (Stewart, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at 1015.) Deponents may not be “prevented by counsel from answering a question unless it pertains to privileged matters or deposing counsel’s conduct has reached a stage where suspension is warranted.” (Id.) “The fact that suspension is available only where an interrogation into improper matters reveals an underlying purpose to harass, annoy etc. indicates that witnesses are expected to endure an occasional irrelevant question without disrupting the deposition process.” (Id.)

Here, the Court notes each instruction not to answer does not appear connected to a privilege, but included objections as to the form of the question. As noted above, however, this objection does not permit the instruction not to answer.

Additionally, Plaintiff notes that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, the following are examples of missuses of the discovery process:

(a) Persisting, over objection and without substantial justification, in an attempt to obtain information or materials that are outside the scope of permissible discovery.

(b) Using a discovery method in a manner that does not comply with its specified procedures.

(c) Employing a discovery method in a manner or to an extent that causes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.

(d) Failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.

(e) Making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery.

(f) Making an evasive response to discovery.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Dr. Barrera’s counsel coached Dr. Barrera by reframing questions, answering questions, making physical contact with the witness, engaged in numerous speaking objections and interrupted the deposition questions.

The Court’s review of the separate statement and transcript confirm to the Court that Dr. Barrera’s counsel engaged in this conduct, which resulted in a number of questions going unanswered by the deponent.

Further, the areas of deposition questioning, as to the term “safety culture,” training, hospital policies, physician obligations, knowledge, training and duties, patient safety and medical risks appear within the bounds of discovery applicable to this case. To the extent plaintiff intends to use this testimony to explore Reptile Theories at trial, the court notes it has generally and routinely granted in limine motions that exclude this type of evidence or other Golden Rule evidence at trial. As counsel is well aware, discoverable and admissible are not always synonymous. Trial evidence will be focused on the relevant standard of care.

The Court’s review of the portions of the deposition reveal no purpose to harass or annoy, but counsel for plaintiff should understand that much of the testimony he tried to elicit at the deposition about culture will likely be inadmissible at trial if the intent is to pursue the theories discussed above. (Stewart, supra, 87 Cal. App. 4^th at 1015.) Counsel for Defendant should be cognizant of his tenancy to jump in mid-question with objections or contentions that prevent the deponent from providing a coherent answer.

The Court rejects the argument that the declaration of Mungcal lacks personal knowledge of the events of the deposition and therefore should be disregarded. The Court notes no objection to the excerpts of the deposition transcript provided and the Court’s review of the declaration of Mungcal and attachments reveals no issue as contents thereof.

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and will order the further deposition of Defendant Dr. Barrera.

Deposition Referee

Plaintiff indicates, and Defendant notes, the parties have agreed the appointment of a deposition referee is necessary and seeks appointment thereof under Code of Civil Procedure section 638, which states:

A referee may be appointed upon the agreement of the parties filed with the clerk, or judge, or entered in the minutes, or upon the motion of a party to a written contract or lease that provides that any controversy arising therefrom shall be heard by a referee if the court finds a reference agreement exists between the parties:

(a) To hear and determine any or all of the issues in an action or proceeding, whether of fact or of law, and to report a statement of decision.

(b) To ascertain a fact necessary to enable the court to determine an action or proceeding…

Plaintiff proposes the following scope of the proposed referee:

As to the deposition of Dr. Barrera and witnesses whose depositions are being defended by his Counsel, and all other witnesses as designated by any party, the scope of authority for the appointed deposition referee shall be as follows:

The scope of the referee’s appointment shall be limited to enforcing compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure governing discovery depositions and enforcing orderly deposition protocol. The Referee will be present at designated depositions for purposes of real time enforcement which shall include the power to 1.) require witnesses to provide responsive answers to all questions which do not implicate privilege, regardless of whether the witnesses have been instructed not to answer; and 2.) prohibit the following: a.) improperly instructing witnesses not to answer, b.) witness coaching (or other direct or indirect communication with the witness during questioning), c.) obstructing the deposition, or d.) other improper conduct. The Referee shall not conduct any sidebars or accept argument during the depositions. The parties may submit arguments, briefings, and submissions in advance of the depositions concerning matters within the scope of the referee’s authority. The Referee shall not accept any argument or decide the admissibility of any deposition testimony, which shall be reserved for the trial judge to rule upon in limine or at trial. The parties retain the right to seek relief from the trial court and appeal the referee’s decisions to the trial court.

Defendant seeks to limit the use of the referee to Dr. Barrera’s deposition and seeks to permit argument and sidebar during the deposition.

The Court is inclined to appoint the referee for the continued deposition of Dr. Barrera only. Despite the contentious tone of the deposition the parties agreed that a referee would be useful at the continued deposition of  Dr. Barrera and can likely agree on the future use of a referee, if necessary.  The Court will not limit or instruct the referee as suggested by plaintiff other to instruct him to perform his duties in accordance with  Code of Civil Procedure section 638.

Additional Time

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.290 states, in part:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), or by any court order, including a case management order, a deposition examination of the witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of record, shall be limited to seven hours of total testimony. The court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.

Here, the Court agrees that the conduct at the deposition has impeded or delayed the examination and therefore will grant the request to extend the deposition time an additional one hour beyond the seven-hour limit, for a maximum of eight hours of deposition of Dr. Barrera.

 If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Lobel Financial Corp., a California Corporation vs. Sandoval, Valerie Marie

Case No.:   VCL308016

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: No documents have been filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes this hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Gonzalez, Israel vs. Community Services and Employment Training Inc. et al

Case No.:   VCU312939

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Compliance as to Request for Production of Documents, Set One and Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and orders compliance “…subject to a Belaire-West notice procedure and under the protection of an appropriate protective order” and to deny the motion as to any other requested relief.

Background

As an initial matter, the Court notes Defendant DYMA’s filed opposition to “Plaintiff's Motion for Order Implementing Belaire-West Notice Process and Enforcing Defendant's Agreement to Produce Class Member Contact Information.” The Court’s file reflects only a single motion to compel compliance filed June 16, 2026.

Facts

Plaintiff filed this wage and hour class action on September 12, 2024, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated employees of Defendants Community Services and Employment Training Inc. (“CSET”) and DYMA Brands Inc. (“DYMA”)

On December 11, 2024, Plaintiff propounded a first set of written discovery upon Defendant consisting of Requests for Production of Documents and Special Interrogatories.

On January 16, 2025, Defendant emailed Plaintiff regarding early mediation of this matter and proposed submitting a stipulation staying the case, including discovery, pending mediation.

Plaintiff agreed to mediation, but sought an agreement as to what documents and information Defendant would produce ahead of the mediation, and the date by which those documents would be produced.

On February 21, 2025, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Court ordered this matter stayed as follows:

“1. The action is stayed pending the conclusion of mediation”

Mediation was scheduled for August 27, 2025.

On February 12, 2025, Plaintiff sent Defendant DYMA a list of informal requests for documents Plaintiff sought in order to have an informed mediation. As part of the requests, Plaintiff asked that the requested documents and information be produced 60 days in advance of mediation.

On July 7, 2025, Defendant DYMA served identical objection-only responses to each special interrogatory and request for production, chiefly on the basis of Defendant’s interpretation of the stay.

On August 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to Requests for Production, Set One (as well as to the Special Interrogatories, not at issue on this motion)

On September 16, 2025, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered Defendant DYMA to provide verified answers with fifteen (15) days of the date of the hearing and denied the requests for sanctions.

On October 1, 2025, Defendant, served further verified responses to Plaintiff’s RFPs, Set One. The supplemental responses to RFP Nos. 3, 4, and 5 stated, in pertinent part:

“Defendant has produced a sampling of responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control. Defendant will produce the remaining responsive information subject to a Belaire-West notice procedure and under the protection of an appropriate protective order, as outlined in Belaire-West Landscaping, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554. Defendant will meet and confer with Plaintiff to finalize the terms of the notice and protective order prior to disclosure.”

Plaintiff notes that on September 26, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sent Defendant’s counsel a proposed Belaire West Notice in anticipation of Defendant DYMA’s forthcoming production of the class contact list, and Protective Order in anticipation of its document production.

However, Plaintiff further notes that no edits or responses to the proposed Belaire West Notice have been provided and that no Belaire West Notice is necessary as to the production of time and pay records responsive to RPF Nos. 3, 4 and 5. Plaintiff argues that production of this information can occur with redactions as to personal information of employees.

In opposition, Defendant notes a near complete settlement of this matter with a discrepancy in the settlement agreement and that Defendant requires additional time to finalize the settlement.

Authority and Analysis

 “If a party filing a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling under Sections 2031.210, 2031.220, 2031.230, 2031.240, and 2031.280 thereafter fails to permit the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling in accordance with that party’s statement of compliance, the demanding party may move for an order compelling compliance.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.320, subd. (a).)

There is no fixed time limit on this motion and no requirement to show any attempt to resolve the matter informally. The only required showing is that the responding party failed to comply as agreed. (Standon Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 903.) 

Here, as noted by Plaintiff, Defendant agreed to produce further documents responsive to Request Nos. 3, 4 and 5 “…subject to a Belaire-West notice procedure and under the protection of an appropriate protective order.”

The Court understands there has been a delay regarding any edits or agreement as to the Belaire-West notice.

However, the Court cannot adjudicate, on a motion to compel compliance, whether the documents should be produced without completion of the Belaire-West process. Nor can the Court, on a compliance motion, compel or approve a proposed Belaire-West notice.

At most, the Court may order compliance with the promised production: that it occur subject to the Belaire-West notice procedure and under the protection of an appropriate protective order.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders compliance “…subject to a Belaire-West notice procedure and under the protection of an appropriate protective order.”

The Court, however, will decline to award sanctions. (Mattco Valley Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437 [court’s authority to deny sanctions upon mixed results].)

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Doe C.H., Jane vs. Nguyen, MD, John T.

Case No.:   VCU324049

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer as to the causes of action for battery, assault and IIED; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action for negligence; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to the fifth cause of action only.

Background Facts

The Court’s prior ruling on the demurrer to the battery, assault and IIED causes of action in the first amended complaint stated:

“Allegations of intentional wrongdoing must be pled with specificity. (Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 215.)

In this case, the Court finds the allegations insufficient as to the type of medical procedure or examination for which Plaintiff arrived at the medical center and scope of consent of Plaintiff. The Court will require additional detail as to the scope of the medical examination for which Plaintiff sought treatment. The Court finds the allegation “without Plaintiff’s consent” conclusory and requiring further specificity.” (April 28, 2026 - Ruling on Demurrer.)

As to negligence, the Court found a failure to allege a duty of care, or breach thereof, that was separate from professional negligence. (April 28, 2026 - Ruling on Demurrer.)

On May 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint alleging assault, battery, IIED, negligent hiring, negligence and professional negligence. Defendant Dr. Nguyen demurrers to the causes of action for assault, battery, IIED, and negligence.

Plaintiff alleges:

On or about July 27, 2024, Plaintiff JANE DOE C.H. was receiving medical care from Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD, at Sequoia Family Medical Center. During the examination, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD instructed her to sit on the examination table and then forcibly pushed her shoulders back, causing her to lie down. Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD proceeded to touch her abdomen, pulled down her pants, and placed his hand on her private area. When Plaintiff reacted to the contact, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD stated, ‘Oh, I was just looking for your C-section scar.’” (SAC ¶7.)

As to assault, and integrated into the causes of action at issue for battery, IIED and negligence, Plaintiff pleads:

“On or about July 27, 2024, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD sexually harassed and assaulted Plaintiff as he examined her at the subject premises. Plaintiff’s complaints were back pain, headache and hot flashes. After she communicated these complaints, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD, asked her questions including whether she used protection and how often she had sex with her partner, suggested that she might have a Urinary Tract Infection (UTI) and instructed Plaintiff to perform a urine test. Plaintiff left the room, performed the urine test, handed the sample to a staff member who was in the hallway, and re-entered the examination room which was then unoccupied. After a short wait, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD re-entered the room. Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD, informed Plaintiff that she had a UTI, discussed medication and provided pharmacy information. Next, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD unexpectedly instructed her to sit on the examination table and then forcibly pushed her shoulders back, causing her to lie down. Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD proceeded to touch her abdomen, pulled down her pants, and fondled her vagina. When Plaintiff reacted to the contact, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD stated, “Oh, I was just looking for your C-section scar.” Plaintiff’s C-section scar is 22 years old and had no reason to be examined. Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD performed the examination and touched Plaintiff’s vagina without a female (or any other) staff member present, without gloves, without discussing a vaginal examination, and without asking Plaintiff to undress herself for any reason.” (SAC ¶¶12, 17, 23, 35.)

Further, that Plaintiff “did not consent to Defendant’s conduct” (SAC ¶¶ 13,19), that Defendant Dr. Nguyen intentionally did the acts alleged above and that Plaintiff was harmed or offended by the conduct. (SAC ¶¶10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 21, 24.) Further, that the conduct was outrageous, socially unacceptably and beyond what a reasonable person in a civilized society would be expected to endure.” (SAC ¶¶25, 26, 27.)

As to negligence, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Dr. Nguyen “…owed a duty of care to all customers and patients, including Plaintiff, to provide a reasonably safe environment, protect them from unsafe conditions and prevent reasonably foreseeable harm” and that Defendant “…breached their duty of care to Plaintiff in that Defendants, as the owners, lessors, sub-lessors, managing agents, landlords, renters, managers, operators, marketers, inspectors, maintainers and controllers of the SUBJECT PREMISES in which the subject sexual assault and harassment occurred, failed to implement and enforce reasonable policies and procedures to prevent sexual assault including obtaining pertinent consent, ensuring other staff are present for sensitive examinations and safe undressing protocols. As a medical doctor and part of management of the facility, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD was involved in this failure to create safe conditions and breach of duty which allowed Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD to conduct himself in such a manner that resulted in the sexual assault and harassment of Plaintiff.” (SAC ¶¶35, 36.)

Defendant Dr. Nguyen’s demurrer first argues that allegations that “Dr. Nguyen fondled her vagina” are inconsistent with the prior pleadings and subject to the sham pleading doctrine. Further, that, if disregarded, the causes of action for battery, assault, IIED and negligence fail to constitute a cause of action. Further, that the conduct alleged as to negligence is duplicative of the professional negligence cause of action.

On July 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed an untimely opposition to the demurrer arguing that the allegations in the newly amended complaint do not constitute a sham pleading, that sufficient facts are alleged to substantiate the intentional tort causes of action and negligence.

Authority and Analysis

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Sham Pleading Doctrine

Under the sham pleading doctrine, "[a] plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict facts pleaded in the original complaint, or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877-878.) Therefore, where an amended complaint omits harmful allegations without explanation, the Court may take judicial notice of the prior pleadings and disregard any inconsistent allegations in the amended pleading. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751)  The sham pleading doctrine can be invoked when the newly alleged facts contradict or substantively alter the prior allegations. (See Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379.)

The pleadings in Owens differed when the plaintiff alleged that the slip and fall occurred on a street adjacent to the supermarket initial complaint and then alleged that the slip and fall occurred on the defendant's premises rather than on the street in a subsequent complaint. (Id. at 384.) The court found that the purpose of this change was to avoid demurrer on a premises liability theory. (Id.) Therefore, absent a satisfactory explanation for the change, the court properly disregarded the sham pleadings. (Id.)

As to the application of this doctrine, the court in Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426 notes:

“‘Allegations in the original pleading that rendered it vulnerable to demurrer or other attack cannot simply be omitted without explanation in the amended pleading. The policy against sham pleadings requires the pleader to explain satisfactorily any such omission.’ (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2005) ¶ 6.708, p. 6-142.1.)”

Further, the Deveny court cited to Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 147, 151, noting “If a party files an amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the original complaint by either omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.” (Id.)

Here, the Defendant argues that the allegation Defendant fondled Plaintiff’s vagina is inconsistent with the prior pleadings.

However, the Court’s prior ruling sought specificity as to the type of medical procedure or examination and scope of consent of Plaintiff, finding the allegation of touching “without Plaintiff’s consent” to be conclusory.

In the Court’s view, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint comports with the Court’s prior ruling. To start, Plaintiff has characterized, in both the complaint and first amended complaint, that Defendant Dr. Nguyen “sexually harassed and assaulted” Plaintiff. 

The further details in the second amended complaint that Plaintiff presented for treatment for back pain, headache and hot flashes, was initially diagnosed with having a urinary tract infection and which was confirmed after urine sample was provided are sufficient for the Court to find Plaintiff has alleged the type of medical treatment sought, the scope of the examination and scope of consent.

Further, that, after confirming the diagnosis, Plaintiff alleges Dr. Nguyen then “unexpectedly instructed her to sit on the examination table and then forcibly pushed her shoulders back, causing her to lie down. Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD proceeded to touch her abdomen, pulled down her pants, and fondled her vagina” which is sufficiently specific intentional conduct.

The Court finds no application of the sham pleading doctrine in this matter.

Assault and Battery

"The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant's conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have been offended by the touching. [Citations.]" (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.) In order to establish a case of civil battery, the complaint must plead that Defendant acted with wanton, willful or reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights. (Lopez v. Surchia (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 314, 318.)

"The essential elements of a cause of action for assault are: (1) defendant acted with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs harm." (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)

Allegations of intentional wrongdoing must be pled with specificity. (Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 207, 215.)

The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the elements of assault and battery. Plaintiff’s second amended complaint sufficiently pleads she sought treatment for back pain, headaches and hot flashes, was diagnosed with UTI, was tested for UTI and that the test confirmed the UTI. This sufficiently pleads the purpose of Plaintiff’s examination and scope of consent. Allegations that, after confirming the UTI, Dr. Nguyen had Plaintiff sit on the examination table, forcibly push her shoulders back, caused her lie down, and then “proceeded to touch her abdomen, pulled down her pants, and fondled her vagina” properly plead a lack of consent to this conduct, that Plaintiff was harmed or offended and that a reasonable person, under these circumstances, would likewise have been offended.

The Court, therefore, overrules the demurrer to the first cause of action for battery and second cause of action for assault.

IIED

“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” (Cervantez v. J. C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.)

"Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress." (McDaniel v. Gile (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 372.) This factor appears to assist as to whether the conduct is outrageous. (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 230.)

Under the same facts as above, the Court finds, on demurrer, the conduct alleged as to touching Plaintiff’s vagina after diagnosing Plaintiff with the UTI, and given the relationship of patient and doctor, a cause of action for IIED has been sufficiently pled.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer as to IIED.

Negligence

The elements of negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages. (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

The Court notes the sixth cause of action is pled as “professional negligence.” Bellamy v. Appellate Department (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 797, 804 notes that "…a plaintiff cannot, on the same facts, state causes of action for ordinary negligence as well as professional negligence, as a defendant has only one duty that can be measured by one standard of care under any given circumstances."

Here, the fifth cause of action contains allegations that sound in medical negligence, as Plaintiff pleads Defendant “…failed to implement and enforce reasonable policies and procedures to prevent sexual assault including obtaining pertinent consent, ensuring other staff are present for sensitive examinations and safe undressing protocols. As a medical doctor and part of management of the facility, Defendant JOHN T. NGUYEN, MD was involved in this failure to create safe conditions and breach of duty…” (SAC ¶37; emphasis added.)

As such, the Court finds a failure to state a cause of action pursuant to the above and sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action for negligence only. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file the amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 In the Matter of Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust

Case No.:   VCU331662

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Trial Preference 

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and set trial within 120 days of this hearing. The Court will set trial for November 2, 2026, at 9:00 in Dept. 2 unless the parties wish to stipulate to another date.

Facts

Petitioner Jimmy L. Dreo (“Corky”) filed this petition for invalidation of power of attorney, successor trustee appointment, to invalidate trust amendment, for financial elder abuse, for breach of fiduciary duty, for orders determining title, for fraud, to compel an accounting, to prohibit use of trust funds and to revoke the trust, naming Ricky Lee Dreo, individually and as Successor Trustee of the Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust; Pamela Lynn Dreo-Dotson, an individual and the Pamela Dreo Living Trust as Respondents.

On June 9, 2026, Corky filed this motion for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a). Further, Corky’s declaration establishes he is 87 years old, is the surviving settler and trustee of the Jimmy L. Dreo and Charlotte L. Dreo 1996 Living Trust, is currently being treated by a physician for coronary artery disease, is at a risk of being incapacitated if trial preference is not granted. (Declaration of Corky ¶¶1-7; Ex – A – Letter from Physician.)

The Court continued this matter and ordered as supplemental declaration in compliance with section 36(c)(1). On June 30, 2026, Corky filed a supplemental declaration addressing this issue.

Authority and Analysis

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a), any party to a civil action who is over 70 years of age may “petition the court for a preference, which the court shall grant if the court makes both of the following findings:

“(1) The party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole;

(2) The health of the party is such that a preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation.”

The right to preference for litigants who qualify under Code of Civil Procedure § 36(a) is mandatory. (Koch-Ash v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 689, 698-99; Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 86-87.) “The language of Section 36(a) was intended by the Legislature to be mandatory, and thus requires that a litigant qualifying under its terms be given preferential trial setting irrespective of the circumstances leading to the motion for preference.” (Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 85.)

First, Corky is the  Petitioner in this action and over the age 70, thereby giving Petitioner a substantial interest in this action before the court in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 36(a)(1).

There is no automatic preference based solely on age and the granting is conditioned on a finding of necessity under (a)(2). (Kline v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 512, 514.) The Court must consider “the party's health when determining whether preference is required, and considering whether the party's health necessitates the preference to avoid prejudice to the party.” (Id.) Here, Corky’s declaration and letter from the physician are sufficient to meet this element.

Here, the supplemental declaration of Corky filed June 30, 2026, indicates, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c)(1) “…that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared.” (Supplemental Declaration of Corky ¶8.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will set trial within 120 days of this hearing. The court has reviewed its calendar and November 2, 2026 appears to be the best date within the statutory framework. The court is willing to discuss a different date if all parties stipulate to an alternate setting.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Discover Bank vs. Valdez, Roger Jr

Case No.:   PCL308784

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff, on February 23, 2026, filed a stipulation whereby Plaintiff and Defendant agree that Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff in the amount of $3,803.15.

The parties agreed to resolve this matter for the sum of $3,100 for 24 monthly payments of $129.32 commencing February 28, 2026 with a final payment on January 28, 2028.

In the event of default, the Parties agreed that the Court was authorized to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $3,803.15, plus court costs and less payments received. 

On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enter judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, noting that Defendant has failed to make any of the scheduled payments. Plaintiff has likewise filed a memorandum of costs seeking recovery of $990.11.

The Court notes this matter has not been dismissed.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter pursuant to the filed stipulation and order dismissing this matter..”

Based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $4,793.26, consisting of the $3,803.15 in principle, plus $990.11 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Figueroa, Shallon vs. Rivera, Primitivo et al

Case No.:   PCU325958

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant Valazquez as to (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1), (2) and (3): To deny the motions; to deny the requests for sanctions.

Facts Common to (1), (2) and (3)

In this negligence, breach of habitability, nuisance and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment action, Plaintiff sued, amongst other defendants, Defendant Alex Velasquez (“Defendant”). On January 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the same causes of action.

On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff served first sets of (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents.

On March 18, 2026, Defendant served responses to these sets of discovery.

On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter identifying various issues with the sufficiency of the responses and objections, seeking further, supplemental responses by April 14, 2026 or seeking an extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to file a motion to compel further responses.

On April 3, 2026, Defendant responded to the meet and confer letter, stating:

“In the interest of cooperation and to allow the parties additional time to resolve any issues without court intervention, I agree to the three-week extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to file a Motion to Compel, extending the deadline to May 26, 2026. This agreement is made without waiving any objections, rights, or protections previously asserted.

I remain willing to meet and confer in good faith. However, I stand by the objections and responses previously served, as they are appropriate, complete, and compliant with my discovery obligations.”

No further meet and confer appears to have occurred and these motions were filed May 26, 2026.

In addition to seeking further responses, Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $1,760 as to each motion.

In opposition, Defendant indicates service of documents on May 21, 2026 and that this otherwise satisfies the discovery obligations of Defendant as to the interrogatories.

Authority and Analysis Common to (1), (2) and (3)

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code of Civil Procedure 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2))

The meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quoting Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus, there must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

 “[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Id.) The particular level of effort required in each case depends on the circumstances including the amount of discovery propounded, the time available to confer before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which a party was complicit in the lapse of available time. (Obregon v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success.” (Id. at pp. 432–33.)   To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Id. at 433.)

In this matter, the Court notes Plaintiff properly initiated the meet and confer process via the March 31, 2026 letter.

Defendant’s timely response to the letter on April 3, 2026, though standing by the responses, invited further discussion to avoid Court intervention and extended the deadline to file these motions to compel further responses by three weeks.

Despite obtaining the extension under the guise of resolving the issues, or at least engaging in further meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff appears to have made no such efforts during the almost two months between Defendant’s responsive meet and confer letter and the filing of these motions. Some higher level of effort, therefore, appears reasonable and Plaintiff was complicit for the two month period between the response to the meet and confer letter and the filing of these motions. As such, the Court does not find a sufficient meet and confer process evidenced by the single exchange, a period of inaction, and the subsequent filing of these motions.

Therefore, the Court denies the motions and denies the requests for sanctions.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Barclays Bank Delaware vs. Martin, Timothy

Case No.:   PCL326208

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to deem the order effective upon proof of personal service on Defendant.

Facts

On June 9, 2026, Defendant’s Counsel Jerry Wang filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Timothy Martin. Defendant’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendant’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents electronically.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality and indicates that Counsel has attempted to obtain a substitution by stipulation, but that Defendant has refused.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was made electronically on June 8, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendant’s electronic mail address was attempted to be confirmed as current, but that Defendant has failed to respond thereto.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendant’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendant.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Capital One, N.A., successor by merger to Discover Bank vs. Senior, Albert

Case No.:    PCL327514

Date:            July 14, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice.

Facts

On May 26, 2026, Counsel Christina Toroyan filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Albert Senior. Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail and electronic mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties. 

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052).

The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under CCP §284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality by reference to Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(4), but is silent as to an attempt to first secure a “Substitution of Attorney” and that the client refused to so stipulate. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and electronic mail on May 26, 2026. The declaration of Counsel indicates that Defendant’s addresses were attempted to be confirmed as current was confirmed as current, but that Defendant has failed to respond thereto.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Synchrony Bank vs. Caudillo, Angel

Case No.:   PCL195930

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Entry of Judgment and Dismiss Case

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and dismiss the case as requested by Plaintiff

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, after Plaintiff obtained default judgment, but upon review of the file has confirmed fraud occurred with respect to the account at issue and therefore requests the default and default judgment be set aside and that this case be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

The Court, therefore, grants the motion, vacates default and default judgment and dismisses this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Ritchie, Rhonda vs. Karman, Timothy et al

Case No.:   PCU332515

Date:           July 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: The demurrer is sustained as to the second cause of action with leave to amend; sustained as to the third and fifth causes of action without leave to amend; and, in all other respects, overruled. 

Defendants Timothy and Yvette Karman demurrer to the complaint of plaintiff Rhonda Ritchie. 

BACKGROUND

The following is derived from Ritchie’s complaint.

Starting on September 23, 2023, Ritchie was the tenant of an apartment at 267 W. Belleview Ave., in Porterville.  Timothy and Yvette Karman were the owners of the premises. 

Ritchie implies there was one or more rental agreements, for example, by way of allegations that there were “violations of the rental agreement” and that “[u]nder each of the rental agreements, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees,” but she does not expressly allege she entered into any written or oral rental agreement with any defendant. 

In any event, during the unspecified length of time Ritchie resided at the apartment (though apparently her occupancy persists to present date) “there existed, and continues to persist, substantial habitability defects and dangerous conditions,” “including without limitation,” “malfunctioning HVAC,” “severe pest infestation,” and “plumbing defects.”

On March 12, 2026, Ritchie filed a complaint for unspecified damages (“according to proof”) alleging five causes of action against the Karmans, as well as the Equity Group (which is solely identified as being, “at all relevant times … , a California Corporation registered and operating in the State of California”):   (1) Negligence; (2) Breach of Warranty of Habitability; (3) Private Nuisance; (4) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment in a Contract; (5) Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment as a Tort.

ANALYSIS

The Karmans demurrer to the whole of the complaint based on the insufficiency of one allegation made on information and belief, and also demurrer to the second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action on separately stated grounds.

A. Allegation of Fact on Information and Belief

The Karmans’ demurrer to every cause of action on the ground that, in her “General Allegations,” Ritchie alleges on information and belief that “Defendants did not make proper repairs despite knowledge of the substandard, untenantable, and continuing nuisance conditions” (Comp., ¶ 14), but she does not allege “the information that led Plaintiffs to believe the allegations are true” (Demurrer, p. 2). 

The Karmans cite Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149 [121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819] (Gomes), which states, “[a] ‘ “[p]laintiff may allege on information and belief any matters that are not within his personal knowledge, if he has information leading him to believe that the allegations are true”’ [citation], and thus a pleading made on information and belief is insufficient if it ‘merely assert[s] the facts so alleged without alleging such information that “lead[s] [the plaintiff] to believe that the allegations are true.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 1158–1159.)

The court declines to sustain the demurrer to the whole of the complaint on this ground.  Ritchie alleges “[t]he Subject Property experienced habitability defects including but not limited to malfunctioning HVAC, lack of proper heating, severe cockroach infestation, severe pest infestation, plumbing defects, and other habitability defects” (Comp., ¶ 14), which the court finds a sufficient allegation of the “information that “lead [the plaintiff] to believe [to be true]” (Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159) that “Defendants did not make proper repairs despite knowledge of the substandard, untenantable, and continuing nuisance conditions” (Comp., ¶ 14).

Generally speaking: “[A] lessor out of possession must exercise due care and must act reasonably toward the tenant as well as to unknown third persons. [Citations.] At the time the lease is executed and upon renewal a landlord has a right to reenter the property, has control of the property, and must inspect the premises to make the premises reasonably safe from dangerous conditions. [Citations.]” (Mora v. Baker Commodities (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 771, 781 [258 Cal.Rptr. 669].)

Ritchie alleges substantial conditions of dilapidation beginning upon her moving to the apartment in September of 2023 and it is reasonably inferable from the complaint that, based on these circumstances and the duration of time over which they allegedly persisted, she is asserting that her landlord at least had constructive notice of the alleged “substandard, untenantable, and continuing nuisance conditions” she specifically describes, and that the landlord failed to make “proper repairs.” 

B. Breach of the Warranty of Habitability – Failure to Allege Notice to Landlord

The Karmans demurrer to the second cause of action for breach of the warranty of habitability on the ground that Ritchie fails to allege notice to the landlord of the habitability conditions within a reasonable time after discovery of the conditions and fails to allege that the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency and resulting damages.  (See Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 159] (Erlach) [identifying the foregoing as elements of an affirmative claim based on breach of the habitability warranty.].)

The court agrees with the Karmans on this point and finds Ritchie’s allegation that “Defendants breached the warranty of habitability … with regard to Plaintiff by knowing of and failing to repair the dangerous and Defective Conditions alleged herein” as an entirely conclusory and insufficient allegation of ultimate fact that Ritchie provided notice to the landlord of the habitability conditions within a reasonable time after discovery of the conditions and that the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency and resulting damages. (See ibid.)

The court is not yet prepared to conclude there is no reasonable possibly of cure of this defect by further amendment (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 92, 831 P.2d 317])—though, given Ritchie’s only having submitted that, “if further facts are required, [she] would request leave to amend,” the court is very close to reaching that determination. 

At this point, the court sustains the demurrer to the second cause of action with leave, and with the express direction that Ritchie must expressly plead ultimate, non-conclusory facts supporting “notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, [and that] the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency” in any further amended complaint asserting this cause of action again. (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297.)

C. Nuisance – Whether Claim is Duplicative of Negligence and Habitability Claims

The Karmans demurrer to the third cause of action for private nuisance on the grounds that it is duplicative of Ritchie’s first negligence cause of action and her second habitability cause of action. 

The Karmans cite Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521 [107 Cal.Rptr.3d 481] (Melton) which states: “Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ [Citation.] ‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.’ [Citation.] The nuisance claim ‘stands or falls with the determination of the negligence cause of action’ in such cases. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 542.)

Ritchie does not directly dispute the Karmans point on the nuisance claim.  She asserts, rather: “The above does not mean a nuisance cause of action is subsumed by the negligence cause of action. Rather it means the nuisance cause of action cannot proceed if the negligence claim cannot proceed. That is not something to bring up on a demurrer.”

Ritchie is wrong.  The court in Melton expressly held that a trial court properly sustained a demurrer to a nuisance cause of action on the ground that the nuisance claim merely restated another negligence claim “ ‘using a different label.’ ” (Id., at p. 543, citing El Escorial Owners’ Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 524].)

In accordance with Melton, the court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend.  It is manifestly clear from the complaint that all Ritchie’s claims derive from her allegations regarding the habitability issues and that plaintiff’s nuisance claim “has no independent vitality” from her other claims. (Ibid.)

D. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment Claims – Boilerplate Allegations

The Karmans demurrer to the fourth and fifth cause of actions together (breach of the quiet enjoyment covenant “in a contract” and “as a tort”) on the ground that “the Complaint only contains boiler plate language that the purported breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment is substantial with no explanation as to why.” 

The Karmans cite Petroleum Collections Inc. v. Swords (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 841 [122 Cal.Rptr. 114], which explains the covenant of quiet enjoyment as follows:  “In recent years, the covenant of quiet enjoyment has been expanded, and in this state, for example, it insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant's right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. [Citations.] Under this view, the landlord's failure to fulfill an obligation to repair or to replace an essential structure or to provide a necessary service can result in a breach of the covenant if the failure substantially affects the tenant's beneficial enjoyment of the premises. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 846, italics added.)

The court is disinclined to sustain a demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action on the ground that they are supported solely by “boilerplate” allegations. 

To be sure, Ritchie’s complaint is not a model framing of her purported claims.  Amongst other regrettable defects, it is replete with vague and conclusory allegations regarding the central factual matters at issue.  That said, the court finds the specifically identified conditions, HVAC failures, pest infestations, plumbing defects, etc., suffice to establish a “sufficient” breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment at the pleading stage. 

E. Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment as a Tort – Failure to Allege Tenant Displacement

The Karmans demurrer to the fifth cause of action based on breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment “as a tort” on the ground that “[a] tort claim arises only out of the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when … the tenant no longer remains in possession of the premises.” 

The Karmans cite Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 62] (Ginsberg), where, after surveying cases involving claims for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the court concluded the cases “do not support the proposition that a tort claim arises out of the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, when there has been no eviction and the tenant remains in possession of the premises.”  (Id., at p. 901.)

Ritchie responds that she need not establish she is no longer a tenant in possession of the premises in her claim for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment “as a tort” based on Erlach. 

In Erlach, the plaintiff separately alleged causes of action for constructive eviction, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and retaliatory eviction.  (Id., at p. 1289.)  Regarding these claims, the court observed “that every lease includes a covenant of quiet possession and enjoyment”; that “[t]his covenant is breached upon actual or constructive eviction of the tenant”; and that “[a]ny interference by the landlord that deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises or renders the premises unfit for the purposes for which they are let amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and vacates within a reasonable time.”  (Id., at pp. 1299-1300, italics added.)

While the court observed that “ ‘[i]t is not necessary to show that the landlord acted with the subjective intent to compel the tenant to leave the property or deprive the tenant of quiet enjoyment,’ ” it still yet recognized that a disturbance of the tenant’s possession that “has the effect of depriving the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, amounts to a constructive eviction,” only if “the tenant vacates the premises within a reasonable time.”  (Id., at p. 1300, italics added.)

Pertinent here, an important distinction is observed in Ginsburg.  There, the plaintiff cited Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004 [90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453] as purportedly supporting that a tort claim arises out of the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment when there has been no eviction and the tenant remains in possession of the premises.  Ginsburg found that reliance misplaced, noting that, “[i]n Spinks, the court explicitly distinguished between a claim for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, which it identified as a contract claim, and a claim for wrongful eviction, which it identified as a tort. (Id. at pp. 1030–1031, 1036.)” (Id., at p. 901.)

Ginsburg essentially concluded that, “when the landlord has breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, but the tenant remains in possession of the premises, the tenant's remedy is to ‘sue for breach of contract damages.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 902.)  But a tort claim based on the same alleged conduct, however, in effect constituting a wrongful eviction or constructive eviction, requires that the tenant no longer remain in possession of the premises.  (Ibid.)

From this, the court concludes that the demurrer must properly be sustained as to the fifth cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment “as a tort” because that cause of action, insofar as it is distinguishable at all from the fourth cause of action, requires plaintiff to establish, as she clearly cannot, that she was effectively displaced from the premises as a result of the breach. 

So long as Ritchie remains in possession of the premises, the court finds that her sole remedy with respect to the covenant of quiet enjoyment is to “ ‘sue for breach of contract damages’ [citation]” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 902 [141 Cal.Rptr.3d 62]) or, as particularly asserted here, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment in a contract. 

The court, accordingly, sustains the demurrer to the fifth cause of action without leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 13, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054130	In the Matter of Bower, Glen Alan	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054127	In the Matter of Price, Patricia Annette	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a(2), (a) or (b) omitted: spouse deceased or decedent divorced/never married 2. Petition Item 5a (7) or (8) omitted: any issue of predeceased child 3. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representative not filed, Prob C § 8404(a) 4. Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed, TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4)
VPR054132	In the Matter of the Worley 2020 Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054121	In the Matter of the Charlotte Tyson Revocable Living Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053515	In the Matter of Fleming, Ben James	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR042950	In the Matter of the Eduardo Gonzalez Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050199	In the Matter of Boykin, Thelma	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed including removal of conservator of estate for failure to appear
VPR053710	In the Matter of Ochoa, Martha	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Accounting does not comply with CRC, rule 7.754 and CRC, rule 7.575. Need Notice of Hearing to be served on all parties with time and place of hearing, Prob C § 1460. Filing fees of $435 due, Superior Court of California Fee Schedule, section 150; GC § 70658(a)(4).

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 9, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Terminate Conservatorship Hearing	Appearance required	Notice of Hearing of Termination hearing not filed.
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Appoint Conservator	Appearance required	Orientation not completed. Screening Forms incomplete. Notice of Hearing of the Appointment hearing date not filed.
PPR054064	In the Matter of Gasco, Gregory	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054075	In the Matter of McCue, Patricia Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence & OSC Hearing	Appearance required	OSC hearing
PPR054111	In the Matter of Andrews, Laura	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Inventory and Appraisal needs to be completed by the Probate Referee, Prob C § 13152(b) and the form needs to be complete

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  July  10, 2026 - July 15, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Department	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/10/26 Department 02	VPR054163	IMO B.K.	Matter appears to be in order
7/10/26 Department 19	PPR054192	IMO A.R.V.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Temporary Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §2250(e)(3) for Mother, Father, A.R.V.

Hearing Date & Department	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/13/26  Department 01	VPR054149	IMO S.S.	Appoint & SIJF- NOT LODGED - LETTERS OF GUARDIANSHIP All adult household members need to complete DOJ Background Record Check.
7/13/26 Department 01	VPR050006	IMO  S.A.S	Confidential Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026
7/13/26 Department 09	VPR051156	IMO R.R.P.	NOT LODGED - Order Appointing Guardian & Letters of Guardianship
7/14/26 Department 01	VPR052294	IMO R.A.C.	Petition re visitation- Declaration filed 7/1/26 was not served on parties
7/14/26 Department 01	VPR052277	IMO Z.L.B.	Review hearing CCRC Report
7/14/26 Department 01	VPR047904	IMO A.J.S.	Terminate Guardianship- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed indicating MINOR, FATHER, and MOTHER were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing, 15 calendar days, as required by PROB Code §1460.
7/14/26 Department 09	VPR048099	IMO A.M.	Petition Hearing & OSC- NOTICE AFTER CHANGE OF RESIDENCE OF CONSERVATEE OR WARD (GC-080) was not filed within 30 days of the date of any MOVE.

7/15/26 Department 01

VPR054178

IMO L.A.

Appears to be in order