Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, September 14, 2026, are:

Re:                Montes De Oca, Jeniffer vs. Saputo Cheese USA Inc.

Case No.:  VCU314147

Date:          September 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories (3) Requests for Production and (4) Requests for Admission as to Bill Stafford

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): The Court previously granted Stafford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend as to the single cause of action under Labor Code section 1102.5, found Stafford’s motion for protective order regarding this same discovery moot, and therefore finds these motions to compel further discovery responses moot, as there is presently no cause of action against Stafford via this ruling.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Navarro, Yesenia vs. AWI Management Corporation

Case No.:   VCU332067

Date:           September 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration 

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant AWI Management Corporation under PAGA.

Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of the “individual” PAGA claim and stay this matter as to the “representative” PAGA claim.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of its Human Resources Manager who indicates they are the authorized custodian of records, including the retention of business and employee personnel files and records for Plaintiff. (Declaration of Reilly ¶¶1-3.) Reilly indicates Plaintiff’s personnel file reflects an Arbitration Agreement signed by Plaintiff in handwriting. (Declaration of Reilly ¶¶8-11 – Ex. C.) Further, that Plaintiff was presented with the Agreement on December 12, 2022, that it was signed the same day and that this was the first date of employment. (Declaration of Reilly ¶11.) Further, that Plaintiff did not opt out of the Agreement. (Declaration of Reilly ¶12.)

Plaintiff does not challenge that Plaintiff signed the Agreement, but instead argues that the Agreement’s purported waiver is unenforceable.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, this burden is met through attachment of Exhibit C as to Plaintiff’s handwritten signature to the Agreement.

Therefore, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate.

Facts – FAA Application

Here, the Agreement states, as to the FAA:

“This Agreement is covered by and made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (the ‘FAA’), 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq, and shall be construed, interpreted and governed in accordance with the FAA”

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Plaintiff does not oppose the application of the FAA to the Agreement.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states it applies to:    

“…any and all claims, disputes, causes of action, lawsuits, proceedings, and/or controversies ("Claims"), past, present, or future, relating to or arising out of Your employment with the Company. This includes Claims that the Company may have against You or that You may have against the Company and its parent companies, holding companies, agents, subsidiaries and affiliated companies, officers, directors, successors, assigns, or alleged joint employers (collectively, the "Parties" to this Agreement). This Agreement also specifically covers all Claims, asserted or unasserted, that You or the Company has or may have against each other, which predate the execution of this Agreement, including Claims brought on Your behalf in any potential class or representative action filed before or after this Agreement was signed.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement broadly covers claims including the single cause of action under PAGA.

Facts – Waiver

Here, the Agreement states:

“You and the Company acknowledge and agree that You and the Company are each voluntarily waiving the right to a trial or to participate in any class or representative action.”

Additionally, there Agreement contains a more specific waiver:

4. California Private Attorneys General Act Waiver. The Class and Representative Action Waiver also specifically includes any claims or causes of action brought under California's Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), California Labor Code § 2698 et seq., to the maximum extent allowed by applicable law. You therefore agree that the Class and Representative Action Waiver covers all PAGA claims, whether characterized as individual claims, non-individual claims, representative claims, or derivative claims. Any dispute as to  the enforceability of the Class and Representative Action Waiver shall be decided exclusively by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by the arbitrator.

Further, the Agreement states:

“3. Class, Collective, and Representative Action Waiver. If there is more than one Claim between the Company and You, all such claims will be heard in a single arbitration. Claims between the Company and other employees will each be heard in separate arbitration. You hereby voluntarily waive any right to participate, in any manner, in a class, collective, or representative action ("Class and Representative Action Waiver")…”

Authority and Analysis – Waiver

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

 “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, the PAGA Waiver expressly “includes any claims or causes of action brought under California’s Private Attorney General Act” and that the “Representative Action Waiver covers all PAGA claims, whether characterized as individual claims, non-individual claims, representative claims or derivative claims.”

As such, the Court turns to the Representative Action Waiver, which states “You hereby voluntarily waive any right to participate, in any manner, in a class, collective, or representative action ("Class and Representative Action Waiver").”

This Court finds this language is a wholesale waiver of Plaintiff’s entire PAGA claim, as it seeks to voluntarily waive any right to participate, in any manner, in any representative action whether characterized as individual, non-individual or representative. The specific language of the Agreement does not split PAGA claims into an arbitrable individual PAGA claim and non-arbitrable representative PAGA claim, but instead seeks to bar adjudication, in any form, of the entirety of the PAGA claim.

As such, the Court will not enforce the waivers and therefore denies the motion to split the PAGA claim and compel arbitration of the Type A claim.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Talbot, Barbara E

Case No.:   VCL333379

Date:          September 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant under breach of written contract and breach of implied contract.

Defendant applied for and was issued a Wells Fargo credit card ("Subject Account") ending in 2360. (UMF Nos. 1, 16.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant the credit card along with the written Customer Agreement associated with the credit card. (UMF Nos. 2, 17.) Defendant accepted the terms of the written agreement when they used the Wells Fargo Visa Credit Card. (UMF Nos. 3, 18.)

Pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement associated with the card, Plaintiff would extend credit to Defendant whereby Defendant could charge goods, services, or obtain cash advances on the credit line. (UMF Nos. 4, 19.) In exchange, Defendant was to repay the principal amount lent plus applicable interest and finance charges. (UMF Nos. 5, 20.)  In accordance with the Customer Agreement, Defendant used the account, and made payments, charges, and incurred a balance thereon. (UMF Nos. 6, 21.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant monthly statements of the Subject Account each and every billing period. (UMF Nos. 7, 22.) The statements of the account reflected all charges, payments, minimum payment due that billing period, and any fees and interest incurred for each billing period. (UMF Nos. 8, 23.)

There is no record of any unresolved disputes on the account. (UMF Nos. 9, 24.) There is no record of any active lawsuits against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. for unresolved disputes on this credit card account. (UMF Nos. 10, 25.)

Defendant’s last payment on the Subject Account was on April 17, 2025. (UMF Nos. 11, 26.)

Thereafter, no further payments were made by the Defendant, and therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement, Defendant was in default. (UMF Nos. 12, 27.)

The balance due on Defendant’s Subject Account is $7,171.57. (UMF Nos. 13, 28.) As a result of Defendant’s unpaid balance, Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $7,171.57. (UMF Nos. 14, 29.)

Defendant admitted all of the above facts in response to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions. (UMF Nos. 15, 30.)

No opposition has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 850.)  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Id. at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist.

To establish a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiffs' performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants' breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

“A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.)

Here, the first elements are met by Nos. 1 through 8 and 16 through 23. 

The second elements are met by Nos. 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 24, 25, 27, and 28.

The third elements are met by Nos. 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 26, 27, 28, and 29.

The fourth elements are met by Nos. 13, 14, 28, and 29. 

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will sign the proposed order.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ponce, Gabriel vs. Central California Baking Company

Case No.:   VCU311927

Date:           September 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to September 28, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9; to order a supplemental declaration as to the notice period, lodestar, and presently incurred costs filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $442,416.67)

The gross settlement amount is $820,000.00. Plaintiff estimates approximately 479 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $923.63 per member.

The Class Members consist of all non-exempt employees employed by Defendant in the State of California at any time from October 8, 2019 to April 20, 2026.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime wages; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks; (5) failure to reimburse business expenses; (6) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) failure to pay all wages due upon separation of employment; (8) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq; and (9) Enforcement of Labor Code section 2698, et seq (“PAGA”)

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Davies ¶¶26-39.)

Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates a  potential recovery of approximately $1,205,642.10, including the PAGA claim.

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendant informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement months after the mediation.

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $820,000.00 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$273,333.33
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$35,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$10,000.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$9,250.00
Proposed Total PAGA Payment:	$50,000
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$442,416.67

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 45 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is therefore not approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Gabriel Ponce as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $820,000.00 or $273,333.33 and costs not to exceed $35,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $35,000.00 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declaration of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves IYLM Group, Inc. as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court and the proposed estimate attached to the declaration of counsel. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $9,250.00.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Davies indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd.  (s)(2).) (Declaration of Davies ¶¶60, 61 – Exs. 3 and 4. )

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 479 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to September 28, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the notice period, lodestar, and presently incurred costs filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Walter, Ryan vs. Golden, Josh

Case No.:  VCU320087

Date:           September 14, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Special Interrogatories, (2) Requests for Production of Documents and (3) Requests for Admissions; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1), (2) and (3): There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 14, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054227	In the Matter of McKay, Janice Marie	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval
VPR054222	In the Matter of Burns, Gregory A	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 3c omitted: Decedent's residence at time of death. 2. Petition Item 3e(3): Bond Waivers not filed by all beneficiaries listed. 3. Petition Item 3f(2): Copy of decedent's will dated 1/28/2025 not attached. 4. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representatives (DE-147) not filed. 5. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed. 6. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 7. Proof of Publication not filed. 8. Original will not lodged
VPR054200	In the Matter of Horst, Mark Edward	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 3f(2): Copy of the will is missing pages 8 – 12. 2. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 3. Proof of Publication not filed. 4. Original will not lodged
VPR054223	In the Matter of Hernandez, Margarita R	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054255	In the Matter of Flores, Marcelino	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR052031	In the Matter of Becerra, Francisco	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053324	In the Matter of Williams, Ruth	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition paragraph 30-31, Statutory Fee Computation is incorrect: 2% of $65,000 is $1,300. Correct statutory fee is $8,300.00 2. Distribution to Stepchild: Declaration not filed pursuant to Probate Code § 6454
VPR052992	In the Matter of Gregory, Regina Valina	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053960	In the Matter of the Diane M. Flores Living Trust	Petition to Compel	Appearance Required	Opposition filed by Respondent
VPR054225	In the Matter of Jerry and Merilyn Davis Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR049062	In the Matter of Lorenzo, Michael	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 10, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054259	In the Matter of Ashden, Laura Carol	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054247	In the Matter of Puente, Marian	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration incomplete
PPR053587	In the Matter of Hamilton, Linda	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Proposed order to be submitted. Possible issue with Proof of Posting by Clerk, Prob Code §§ 10308, 1230

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared September 11, 2026  that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/11/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053990	In the Matter of J.R.T.	GC-080   Notice After Change of Residence of Conservatee or Ward – Required to be filed within 30 days after change of minor's residence.  ICWA- NEED ICWA-030 Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child to be filed and served. Guardianship Orientation needs to be completed. DOJ Background record check needs to be completed.  Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating PARENTS were personally served (15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1511). MATERNAL GRANDPARENTS & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS need to be served by mail with a copy of the Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing  ProbC §1511.