Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, August 25, 2026, are:

Re:              Montelongo, Esteban vs. Venida Packing Company

Case No.:     VCU302568

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the Final Compliance Hearing for March 16, 2027, 8:30 am in Department 2.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on August 25, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On August 3, 2026, the settlement administrator IYLM, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On February 18, 2026, the administrator  received a mailing list of 449 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On March 3, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 449 members. 24 notices were returned and updated addresses for 16 were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, 8 notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until May 4, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 499 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of  $138,451.62 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $1,847.56, the average payment is currently estimated to be approximately $303.46 and, the lowest payment is currently estimated to be approximately $6.92.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $300,000 or $100,000.

Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 125.1  at rates ranging from $950 to $470 per hour, creating a total lodestar of $83,965. (Declaration of Moon ¶67.) Therefore, to award the amount requested, the Court would apply a permissible 1.19 multiplier.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $23,698.38. (Declaration of Moon ¶74.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $7,850.00.

The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $300,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$100,000.00
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$23,698.38
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,850.00
Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$25,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$138,451.62

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff on August 3, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for March 16, 2027, 8:30 am in Department 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Haley, Julissa Lenay vs. MWI Veterinary Supply Co.

Case No.:     VCU305462

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Hearing re: Final Compliance

Tentative Ruling: On August 10, 2026, the settlement administrator filed a declaration the deadline for the Participating Class Members to cash their settlement award check is September 6, 2026 and that on or around October 23, 2026, in accordance with the terms of the Parties’ Settlement Agreement, the necessary paperwork and unclaimed funds will be sent to the California State Controller’s Office - Unclaimed Property Fund. Therefore, the Court continues this matter to November 3, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 as to the remaining uncashed checks and transmittal to the State Controller.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Guerrero, Ana vs. Stillwater Property & Casualty Insurance Company

Case No.:     VCU333390

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Defendant’s Motion to Compel Initial Discovery as to (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One; (2) Form Interrogatories, Set Two; (3) Special Interrogatories, Set One; and (4) Requests for Production of Documents, Set One; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To grant the motions and order responses within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to impose sanctions totaling $690 against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Defendant shall give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (4)

On May 4, 2026, in this first-party insurance breach of contract lawsuit, Defendant served (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One, (2) Form Interrogatories, Set Two, (3) Special Interrogatories, Set One, and (4) Requests for Production of Documents electronically on Plaintiff’s counsel.

Responses were due no later than June 5, 2026.

As of the date of filing these motions on June 24, 2026, no responses have been received.

Defendant seeks to compel initial responses to the above, without objections, and for sanctions of $1,410 per motion consisting of 6 hours (incurred and anticipated) at the rate of $225 per hour plus a $60 filing fee as to each motion.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

(1), (2) and (3) Interrogatories

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first and second sets of form and first set of special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first and second sets of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

(3) Requests for Production

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions. However, the Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Therefore, the Court will award one half-hour as to each motion at the stated rate, plus $240 in filing fees, for a total of $690 against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Felix, Jose vs. D.R. Klassen Packing, Inc.

Case No.:     VCU318452

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Continued Motion for Prelim Approval

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court continues this hearing to September 22, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2. The supplemental declaration shall be filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the continued hearing date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Discover Bank vs. Lopez, Jose

Case No.:     VCL302772

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion for Entry of Judgment Under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff indicates that the parties, on or about December 19, 2023, entered into a stipulation to resolve this matter. The parties’ stipulation indicates Defendant acknowledges the principal amount of $6,713.64 and that the parties agreed that no judgment would be entered against Defendant so long as Defendant paid an agreed settlement amount in certain monthly installments of $250 commencing November 15, 2023.

In the event of default, the settlement agreement indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credits and plus costs. The agreement indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

This matter does not appear to have been dismissed.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendant made payments totaling $1,000 but has failed to make any further payments.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $6,140.09 consisting of the $6,717.64 principal amount, less $1,000 in payments made plus $422.45 in court costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Ferrer Arellano, Luis Domingo vs. OHK Transport, LLC

Case No.:     VCU325142

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to September 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2; to order a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar and presently incurred costs.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $75,500)

The gross settlement amount is $195,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 68 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $1,110.29 per member.

The Class Members consist of all persons who were employed as non-exempt employees by Defendant OHK Transport, LLC in the State of California at any time during the period from August 26, 2021, to the date that is sixty (60) days from August 6, 2026, or the date the Court grants Preliminary Approval, whichever comes first.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) Failure to provide rest breaks; (2) Failure to provide meal breaks; (3) Failure to pay overtime wages; (4) Failure to pay minimum wage and pay for all wages earned; (5) Failure to reimburse business expenses; (6) Failure to maintain accurate payroll records and provide accurate wage statements; (7) Failure to pay wages upon separation; (8) Unfair business practices under Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; and (9) Civil penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699.

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Counsel Seyedfarshi ¶¶ 14 – 47.) Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates a  potential recovery of approximately $207,013.70. (Declaration of Seyedfarshi ¶47.)

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $195,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (35%):	$68,250
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$10,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,250
Proposed Total PAGA Payment	$10,000
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$75,500

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.  Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Ferrer Arellano

as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $195,000 or $68,250 and costs not to exceed $25,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $25,000 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves ILYM Group, Inc. as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $6,250.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Seyedfarshi indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Seyedfarshi ¶77 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 68 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to September 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar and presently incurred costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, MaryCruz

Case No.:     VCU330278

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint.

Facts

On May 12, 2026, this Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage with leave to amend.

On May 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. In support, Plaintiff alleges:

“7. Plaintiff maintained existing and ongoing prospective economic relationships and opportunities, including existing online business operations, professional engagements, anticipated contracts, business-development opportunities, and ongoing income-generating activities requiring stable housing, uninterrupted access to personal property, communications, work materials, and operational continuity.

8. Plaintiff also maintained prospective economic relationships and opportunities involving existing and prospective customers, suppliers, vendors, service providers, commercial landlords, distributors, contractors, business contacts, and other identifiable third parties reasonably expected to participate in or contribute to Plaintiff’s planned business expansion activities.

9. Beginning on or about 2022 and continuing through 2025, Plaintiff developed a business-expansion plan in the wellness, recovery, and lifestyle sector intended to build upon Plaintiff’s existing online business operations, digital-marketing experience, social-media presence, and travel-and-hospitality content creation.

…

14. Defendant became aware of Plaintiff’s intended business expansion, relocation plans outside Defendant’s county, supplier and sourcing research, branding concepts, and efforts to establish independent economic activity through direct discussions concerning the intended wellness-business expansion, contemplated physical business location, product-branding concepts, supplier communications, relocation planning, and integration of Plaintiff’s existing online audience and digital-marketing activities into a future commercial operation.

15. After becoming aware of Plaintiff’s expansion efforts and intended economic independence, Defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to discourage, obstruct, delay, or prevent Plaintiff’s pursuit of those opportunities, including dismissing the viability of Plaintiff’s proposed business model, repeatedly urging Plaintiff to abandon entrepreneurial pursuits in favor of alternative occupations, creating housing instability, interfering with Plaintiff’s access to property and work materials, and engaging in communications that interfered with Plaintiff’s pursuit of independent business-development activities.

16. Prior to the wellness-business expansion described herein, Plaintiff had independently pursued cosmetology and special-effects makeup opportunities, including attending orientation activities, taking preliminary enrollment steps, and researching financial-aid opportunities.

17. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant repeatedly discouraged Plaintiff from pursuing those opportunities and instead pressured Plaintiff toward vocational and educational paths Defendant preferred, thereby interfering with Plaintiff’s independent vocational development and economic autonomy.

18. Defendant’s conduct included repeated housing destabilization, repeated displacement, interference with Plaintiff’s access to personal and professional property and work materials, disruption of Plaintiff’s operational continuity, interference with Plaintiff’s ability to maintain stable communications and business-development activity, and conduct that foreseeably disrupted Plaintiff’s ability to pursue prospective commercial relationships and planned business expansion activities.”

On July 23, 2026, Defendant filed this demurrer, arguing the cause of action for intentional interference is “is duplicative of the other cases; the unlawful detainer and related issues are res judicata, and the Complaint is missing the element of Defendant engaging in unlawful conduct.”

Plaintiff appears to have filed a late opposition on August 14, 2026 which seeks to preserve objections regarding service of the first amended complaint, the expiration of the response period, the filing of a successive demurrer, and an objection to “cross-case aggregation.”

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Interference with Economic Advantage

The elements of a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include: "(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional or negligent acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant." (Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404, citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.)

The third element of the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage "also requires a plaintiff to plead intentional wrongful acts on the part of defendant designed to disrupt the relationship." (Marsh v. Anesthesia Services Medical Group, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 480, 504) "An act is independently wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard, not merely the product of an improper, but lawful purpose or motive." (Redfearn v. Trader Joe's Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 1006, internal citations and punctuations omitted.) "Such conduct must also be independently actionable, meaning the legal standards must provide for, or give rise to, a sanction or means of enforcement for a violation of the particular rule or standard that allegedly makes the defendant's conduct unlawful." (Id., internal citations and punctuations omitted.)

Here, the Court lacks factual allegations as to what either intentional acts by Defendant disrupted the economic relationship between Plaintiff and unidentified third parties. There are no wrongful acts alleged. The pleading that “Defendant intentionally engaged in conduct designed to disrupt Plaintiff’s prospective economic relationships and opportunities, including repeated housing destabilization, interference with Plaintiff’s access to personal and professional property, repeated displacement, disruption of Plaintiff’s business continuity, and conduct intended to impede Plaintiff’s pursuit of economic independence and planned business expansion” is insufficient as it lacks allegations of the intentional, wrongful act by Defendant against Plaintiff. Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 376, 393 requires the conduct to be “wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.”

Further, Plaintiff does not allege the identity of a single customer, prospective customer, bid, contract, or other anticipated transaction capable of supporting a probability of future economic benefit. A mere speculative expectancy of future business, without an existing relationship with an identifiable third party, is insufficient. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 546-547.) Actual disruption of the economic relationship is a required element of the claim. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1165.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, Marycruz et al

Case No.:     VCU334821

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       (1) Motion to Deem Plaintiff Vexatious; (2) Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: (1) To deny the motion without prejudice; (2) To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Deem Plaintiff Vexatious

Defendants move to classify Plaintiff as a vexatious litigant.

In support, Defendants state:

“Plaintiff, Nicole Dowling, (“NICOLE”) is the daughter of Defendant, Marycruz Leyva (“MARYCRUZ”). NICOLE lived at a property owned by MARYCRUZ and Jeff Ghilarducci. NICOLE was evicted by unlawful detainer from said property in case VCL326198 which resulted in a judgment and eviction against NICOLE. See Req, for Jud. Not. 1.

NICOLE proceeded to file a lawsuit in Tulare County (Case Number: VCL330272) against MARYCRUZ. Case VCL330272 was reclassified and dismissed. NICOLE subsequently filed four separate lawsuits against her mother essentially arguing that the notice given in the eviction was unlawful and that MARYCRUZ failed to return property to NICOLE. See cases VCU330278; VCU331283; VCU334821; and VCU335752. All of these lawsuits are in the process of being served or being heard on demurrer. See Req. for Jud. Not. ¶2.)”

Defendants move under Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(2), which states:

“(b) “Vexatious litigant” means a person who does any of the following:

(2) After a litigation has been finally determined against the person, repeatedly relitigates or attempts to relitigate, in propria persona, either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.”

As to this standard, Defendants state:

“In this case NICOLE had her rights determined regarding in an unlawful detainer lawsuit VCL330272. NICOLE was then evicted from the real property, but was unhappy about the outcome. NICOLE is now attempting to relitigate these issues in numerous separate lawsuits, or otherwise cause damage to MARYCRUZ and other defendants in the form of legal fees even through the lawsuits will eventually be dismissed. NICOLE has yet to pick up her-key to get her personal possessions after the eviction.”

Further, that

“Nicole Dowling alleges in all these lawsuits that she was improperly noticed in case VCL326198 and/or that Nicole’s personal property was somehow misappropriated. The fact that there are five separate lawsuit involving the same subject matter and the same or similar parties indicates an intent to harass.”

Authority and Analysis

To start, it appears VCL330272 was consumed by VCU331283 when reclassified from limited civil to unlimited civil.

The Court notes VCU330278 and VCU331283 appear involve post-eviction conduct regarding Plaintiff’s personal property and there is no final determination on these matters, as demurrers have been sustained to amended complaints with leave to amend. The Court, therefore, does not consider these two cases to be dipositive or conclusive.

As to case VCU335752, there is a pending demurrer that has not been adjudicated. However, the Court’s review does indicate similar facts underlying VCU335752 as in this matter, VCU334821.

As to this case, VCU334821, the Court notes a pending demurrer that is adjudicated below that appears to involve the unlawful detainer matter VCL326198.

As such, the Court does not find the requisite “repeatedly relitigate or attempts to relitigate…either (i) the validity of the determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined or (ii) the cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determined or concluded by the final determination against the same defendant or defendants as to whom the litigation was finally determined.”

Three of the cases cited, VCL330272, VCU331283, and VCU330278, appear to relate to post-eviction conduct.

One case cited, VCU335752, has not been adjudicated on demurrer and Defendants have not met their burden here as to the “same cause of action, claim, controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law” or validity of the determination.

This matter has been evaluated via a demurrer for the first time below.

As such, the Court cannot say Plaintiff has “repeatedly relitigate[d]” at this point in time. The Court’s ruling on this matter on demurrer below appears to be the first attempt at relitigating the issues and basis for the unlawful detainer.

While a potential ruling on VCU334821 may reach the same conclusion, the Court has not evaluated that matter yet. If all these matters are eventually litigated  to conclusions favorable to the moving party and against plaintiff, then the court could come to a different conclusion if this motion is refiled.

The Court is also aware that defendants have offered through counsel at more than one Case Management Conference hearing to return any stored property to plaintiff without charge at any time she wants to receive it. The court is not considering this as evidence in making this determination but if, after trial, it appears plaintiff unreasonably continued this litigation when she could have just picked up the key to the storage unit containing her household goods offered by attorney Brown, this could then be seen as an example of “frivolous tactics causing delay” which could then lead to a vexatious litigant designation

Therefore, the Court, without prejudice, denies the motion to deem Plaintiff vexatious at this point.

(2) Demurrer

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Marycruz Leyva and Jeffrey Ghilarducci for 1. Wrongful Eviction 2. Negligence 3. Negligence Per Se 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 5. Fraud / Intentional Misrepresentation 6. Declaratory Relief.

Plaintiff alleges she was a lawful resident of 2421 Capitol Court, in Tulare County, California (“the Premises”) and sets forth allegations concerning issues related to an eviction process.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants misdirected mail, caused and prepared a 3 day notice to pay rent or quit, demanding $9,000 total, including for a month outside the lease period, that Defendant’s lacked standing to evict Plaintiff, that the service of the 3 day notice was improper, that in April 2025, “Defendant admitted continued withholding of essential access devices and stated in substance that Defendant had the garage door opener, gate-related access, and other keys,” that there were unresolved habitability issues, that “an unlawful detainer action predicated upon the foregoing 3-day notice and related service assertions” was filed, that the order for posting and mailing was improperly obtained, that a prejudgment claim of right of possession was improperly provided, that default and default judgment were obtained, that on November 5, 2025, the possession only judgment was entered, that a writ of possession was issued, that on or about November 14, 2025 the writ was enforced and Plaintiff was removed from the Premises, that Defendants offered another residence for Plaintiff to rent, that the Premises was re-rented following the eviction. (Complaint ¶¶8-68.)

Defendants demurrer based on res judicata from the eviction case, failure to state a cause of action, and that injunctive relief seeks to address past wrongs.

Plaintiff appears to have filed a late opposition on August 14, 2026 which seeks to preserve objections regarding service of the first amended complaint, the expiration of the response period, the filing of a successive demurrer, and an objection to “combined adjudication.”

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

First through Fifth Causes of Action - Res Judicata

"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them." (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.) This doctrine precludes the relitigation of legal claims where: "(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding." (Id.) "The res judicata effect of an unlawful detainer proceeding is narrow, but is not nonexistent. Generally speaking, an unlawful detainer judgment has limited res judicata force because it typically follows a summary proceeding focused only on deciding a party's right to immediate possession of property. But when litigants to an unlawful detainer proceeding fully try other issues besides the right of possession, the unlawful detainer judgment is conclusive as to those other litigated issues. [Citations.]" (Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371.)

"The burden of proving that the requirements for application of res judicata have been met is upon the party seeking to assert it as a bar or estoppel." (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257.)

As to unlawful detainer matters, unlawful detainer actions are summary in character and ordinarily only claims bearing directly upon the right to immediate possession are cognizable, and cross-complaints and affirmative defenses, legal or equitable, are permitted only if they would prelude removal of a tenant from the premises if successful. (Id. at 255.) Therefore, “a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title (citations), or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties. (citations)” (Id.) “The approach courts take to applying collateral estoppel in this [unlawful detainer] setting is broadly consistent with that taken to the collateral estoppel effect given other forms of summary,  informal or specialized adjudication.  As a general matter in such cases, collateral estoppel will only apply if the party to be bound agreed expressly or impliedly to submit an issue to prior adjudication [citation omitted] and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate [citation omitted] under circumstances affording due process protections [citation omitted].” (Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1327.)

The Court notes that it is immaterial that judgment in the unlawful detainer proceedings was entered in the form of default judgment. (Martin v. Gen. Fin. Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 438, 443 ["A judgment by default is as conclusive as to the issues tendered by the complaint as if it had been rendered after answer filed and trial had on allegations denied by the answer"]; Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.(2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 871 ["[A] judgment of default in a civil proceeding is res judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant is estopped from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in the former complaint"].)

Here, the unlawful detainer judgment was entered November 5, 2025.

“An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1049.) California law is settled that a judgment is not final for purpose of res judicata or collateral estoppel “during the pendency of and until the resolution of the appeal." (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954 n.11; Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936-937.)

Under California Rule of Court, rule 8.822, the time to appeal a limited civil case is either 30 days after service of notice of entry of judgment or judgment by either the clerk or a party or 90 days after entry of judgment. (California Rule of Court, rule 8.822(a).)

Here, 90 days have elapsed and the judgment is final.

The first cause of action for wrongful eviction is premised on a defective 3-day notice, lack of standing, improper service of the notice, improper prejudgment claim of right to possession, and retaliation, which are all issues contained in the unlawful detainer action regarding party's right to immediate possession of property. California follows the “primary right theory,” which provides that “the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.” The primary right is to be distinguished from the legal theory or remedy sought because “even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681-682.) “Numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory.” (Id. at 682.)

California permits the introduction of “equitable” and “legal” defenses whenever such defenses, if proven, would have preserved possession in the tenant. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 634, FN. 19.) Such defenses retaliatory eviction. (Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507, 513-517.)

As such, the Court finds res judicata applies to the wrongful eviction cause of action.

The negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud causes of action arise from the same conduct surrounding the unlawful detainer matter. Plaintiff alleges Defendants were negligent in preparing the notices for the underlying eviction. The Negligence Per Se action cites CCP 1162 and relates to service of the notices in the unlawful detainer. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress cause of action states the alleged intentional conduct related to service of the notices in the eviction. Likewise, the alleged fraud references preparation of the notices in the eviction. The propriety of the notices was decided as an essential element of the unlawful detainer proceeding. As such, the Court finds res judicata applies to the second through fifth causes of action.

Finally, the complaint’s allegations support privity between the parties, that Defendants filed the unlawful detainer matter against Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the first through fifth causes of action on the basis of res judicata.

Sixth Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief

In order to properly state a cause of action for declaratory relief, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy between the parties relating to their respective legal rights and duties, and request that these rights and duties be adjudged. (Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 29, 40.)

The elements of declaratory relief are “‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Plaintiff’s] rights or obligations.... [Citation.]’”  (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582.)  “The broad discretionary power of the trial court to deny declaratory relief may be invoked by general demurrer.” (General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 471.)

“ ‘Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest. If there is a controversy that calls for a declaration of rights, it is no objection that past wrongs are also to be redressed; but there is no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved. Hence, where there is an accrued cause of action for an actual breach of contract or other wrongful act, declaratory relief may be denied.’ [Citation.]”  (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.) (emphasis added.)

Here, the sixth cause of action seeks declaratory relief as to “past wrongs” involving the eviction process.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer.

Without Leave to Amend

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of amendment will cure these issues. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, Marycruz

Case No.:     VCU331283

Date:           August 25, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint.

Facts

The Court, on May 12, 2026, sustained a demurrer with leave to amend as to conversion and continuing conversion, and without leave to amend as injunctive relief.

On May 22, 2026, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint and a second amended complaint.

The operative second amended complaint alleges causes of action for conversion and continuing conversion stating:

“7. At all times prior to November 14, 2025, Plaintiff was the sole owner and lawful possessor of the personal property described herein, including but not limited to: personal identification and documents, work-related materials, clothing, electronics, personal effects, and items necessary for daily living and employment ("Personal Property").

8. Plaintiff lawfully stored her Personal Property within the residential premises located at 2421 Capitol Court, in Tulare County, California ("the Premises"), where Plaintiff resided immediately prior to her forcible removal.

9. On or about November 14, 2025, Defendant, acting individually and through agents, caused Plaintiff to be forcibly removed from the Premises pursuant to a writ of possession arising from disputed unlawful detainer proceedings, while knowingly allowing Plaintiff's Personal Property to remain inside the residence.

10. Following the lockout and forcible removal, Defendant knowingly retained possession and control over Plaintiff's Personal Property.

11. Defendant exercised dominion and control over Plaintiff's Personal Property by excluding Plaintiff from access, retaining possession, and refusing to allow retrieval, beyond any limited custodial authority associated with temporary post-writ possession.

12. On November 14, 2025, immediately after being forced to leave the Premises, Plaintiff contacted Defendant and expressly warned Defendant not to dispose of, damage, conceal, or interfere with Plaintiff's Personal Property, and demanded its preservation and prompt return.

13. Defendant acknowledged possession of Plaintiff's Personal Property and represented that she would later "send an email" to arrange a date to allow Plaintiff to retrieve her belongings.

14. No such arrangements were subsequently provided.

15. Despite repeated demands, Defendant failed to return Plaintiff's Personal Property and instead retained exclusive control over it.

16. Defendant's conversion has been ongoing and continuous from November 14, 2025, through the present, as Defendant continues to withhold Plaintiff's Personal Property without legal justification.

17. Each day of continued retention constitutes a separate and continuing harm, increasing Plaintiff's economic loss and loss-of-use damages.

18. On or about December 21, 2025, Plaintiff again contacted Defendant and demanded the return of confiscated identity documents. During this communication, Plaintiff also inquired about the status of her remaining Personal Property.

19. Defendant falsely claimed not to know what Personal Property Plaintiff was referring to, despite Defendant's prior acknowledgments that Plaintiff's belongings remained inside the Premises.

 20. Defendant then stated that she was "preparing" to move Plaintiff's property into storage, without Plaintiff's consent, authorization, or agreement, further interfering with Plaintiff's ability to recover possession.

21. On or about January 9, 2026, Plaintiff again contacted Defendant and demanded the return of her Personal Property.

22. Defendant then admitted that she had already "packed all your stuff and put it in a storage room," and further asked Plaintiff, "if you found a place? I might be able to move your stuff to an apartment."

23. Plaintiff expressly informed Defendant that Defendant never obtained consent to make any unilateral decision regarding Plaintiff's property, reminded Defendant that she is not the lawful owner of the property, and objected to Defendant's continued interference.

24. Plaintiff further informed Defendant that Defendant's suggestion of making a "second decision" regarding Plaintiff's property constituted additional and ongoing conversion.

25. Defendant has never provided proof of storage, an inventory, access to the property, or any meaningful opportunity for Plaintiff to retrieve her belongings.

26. As of the filing of this Complaint, Defendant continues to intentionally withhold Plaintiff's Personal Property.

…

28. Following execution of the writ of possession, Defendant became subject to the statutory procedures governing the storage, notice, safekeeping, and recovery of personal property remaining on the Premises, including Code of Civil Procedure section 1174(g) and related statutory obligations concerning post-tenancy personal property.

29. Despite those obligations, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with compliant written notice identifying the location of storage, the manner by which the property could be reclaimed, or any meaningful inventory or condition disclosure concerning Plaintiff's Personal Property.

30. Defendant further failed to provide Plaintiff with any meaningful or reasonably accessible retrieval procedure despite repeated demands for return of the property, and instead retained discretionary control over the location, movement, access, and release of Plaintiff's Personal Property through informal and shifting communications outside the statutory framework.” (SAC ¶¶7-26, 28-30.)

On July 23, 2026, Defendant demurred to the complaint arguing there are duplicative complaints filed and that the causes of action are uncertain and fail to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action.

On August 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed a late opposition that argues the causes of action have been sufficiently pled.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Conversion Following Writ of Possession

The elements of a conversion claim are: (i) Plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (ii) Defendant's conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (iii) Damages. (Burlesci v. Petersen (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066).

A writ of possession issued by a court as to an unlawful detainer matter typically states:

“WRIT OF POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY….Except for a mobile home, personal property remaining on the premises will be sold or otherwise disposed of in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1174 unless you or the owner of the property pays the judgment creditor the reasonable cost of storage and takes possession of the personal property not later than 15 days after the time the judgment creditor takes possession of the premises.”

Therefore, under the facts pled, the Court cannot find a sufficient allegation as to “wrongful act or disposition of property rights” via storage of personal property pursuant to a writ of possession following an unlawful detainer matter and Code of Civil Procedure section 1174(g). The conclusory allegation that the writ was issued “wrongfully” is insufficient and Plaintiff has not otherwise demonstrated conduct beyond what is permitted pursuant to the writ’s plain language noted above. Neither has Plaintiff properly challenged the underlying basis for the issuance of the writ of possession.

Further, section 1174(g) states no requirement as to where the storage must occur, only that it is “in a place of safekeeping.”

Plaintiff alleges:

“29…Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with compliant written notice identifying the location of storage, the manner by which the property could be reclaimed, or any meaningful inventory or condition disclosure concerning Plaintiff's Personal Property.

30. Defendant further failed to provide Plaintiff with any meaningful or reasonably accessible retrieval procedure despite repeated demands for return of the property, and instead retained discretionary control over the location, movement, access, and release of Plaintiff's Personal Property through informal and shifting communications outside the statutory framework.” (SAC ¶¶29, 30.)

However, subsection (h) requires:

“The landlord shall release the personal property pursuant to Section 1965 of the Civil Code or shall release it to the tenant or, at the landlord’s option, to a person reasonably believed by the landlord to be its owner if the tenant or other person pays the costs of storage as provided in Section 1990 of the Civil Code and claims the property not later than the date specified in the writ of possession before which the tenant must make his or her claim or the date specified in the notice before which a person other than the tenant must make his or her claim.” (emphasis added)

Here, there is no allegation that Plaintiff, an apparent former tenant, has paid the costs of storage and/or claimed the property not later than the date provided in the writ of possession, which appears to be 15 days from the date of the writ.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the complaint.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days from the date of this hearing to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:     VCU310362

Date:              August 25, 2026

Time:              8:30 A.M. 

Dept.              9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions to Enforce Court Orders re: Defendant Kamohai as to (1) Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One); (2) Further Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set Two); (3) Further Responses to Request For Production of Documents (Set One) (4) Further Responses to Requests for Admissions (Set One)

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To inquire as to the coordination of the deposition and other issues raised by these motions with respect to notice and service on Defendant Kamohai.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              RENFRO, MARGIE M vs. PRIME TOWING & TRANSPORT, INC, et al

Case No.:     PCU317211

Date:            August 25, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as to Nos. 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, and 24; To deny the motion as to Nos. 5 through 15, 19, 20, 22, 25; to deny the request for sanctions.

Background Facts

Following multiple demurrers and amended complaints, the Court notes a single cause of action for negligence under Vehicle Code section 22651.07 remains at issue in this matter against Defendants  Prime Towing and Alvin Delatorre.

Under this section, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide a copy of the towing and storage fees and access notice to any owner or operator of a stored vehicle (Vehicle Code section 22651.07(a)(2)), failed to provide an itemized invoice to the vehicle owner or their agent (Vehicle Code section 22651.07(b)), failed to permit a vehicle owner or their agent to receive personal property, inspect the vehicle without paying a fee, and request a copy of the fee and access notice (Vehicle Code section 22651.07(c)(1), (3), (4)).

The Court’s ruling on demurrer noted:

“…Exhibit 8 attached to the Second Amended Complaint and incorporated herein, indicates an issue date of June 5, 2024 as to the certificate of title. (SAC – Ex. 8)

Thus, the allegations as to the visit in May 2024 and a second visit, at an unknown time, would not, given the lack of registered ownership in Plaintiff’s name, violate this statute. Plaintiff alleges a third encounter in March 2025 wherein Plaintiff’s agent was permitted to retrieve personal property and inspect the Trailer. (TAC 18:21-25.) However, the operative amended complaint alleges further that in March 2025, Plaintiff’s representative “requested the bill under this code and was denied.” At that point in time, as noted above, the certificate of title reflected ownership by Plaintiff.”

As such, the March 2025 encounter serves as the basis of the alleged violation of the statute.

Facts as to Motion to Compel

On May 27, 2026, Plaintiff indicates service of Special Interrogatories, Set One, consisting of 25 interrogatories, as to Defendant Delatorre.

On or about June 23, 2026, Defendant provided a verified response to this discovery.

Plaintiff attaches an email sent on June 24, 2026 stating “Can you please ask your client to answer the questions; I will prepare a formal meet and confer with the reasons answers need to be given; but this is just a simple request to have your client answer the questions” and thereafter alleging Defendant acted inappropriately with the responding officer.

Defendant’s counsel responded that “I will not ask the client to respond to questions that are irrelevant to the issues before the Court or questions that are solely intended to annoy or harass” and that “The email below is inappropriate and appears to be an attempt to use unrelated matters as leverage in this action. Communications of this nature are not acceptable and maybe presented to the Court as evidence of intimidation tactics

Plaintiff thereafter provides further emails which identify issues with Special Interrogatory Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25. Plaintiff notes the responses to these interrogatories contained objections that the interrogatories were vague, ambiguous, “not relevant to any issue before the Court and will not likely lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and “Given the irrelevant nature of the question, Responding Party will not be responding to this Special Interrogatory.”

On July 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel further responses and for sanctions. On August 12, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition to this motion.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) The moving party must demonstrate a “reasonable and good faith attempt” at an informal resolution of each issue presented. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).)

As to the vague and ambiguous objection, these are considered nuisance objections. (Standon Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 898, 901.) The interrogatories are not so vague that Defendant cannot understand them and provide a substantive response.  Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783 notes even if a discovery request is somewhat ambiguous, the appropriate response is to provide a substantive response when “the nature of the information sought is apparent.” 

As to the relevance and not likely to lead to discovery of admissible, Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010, “Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery of any other party to the action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Further, “[A]ny party may obtain] discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.)

“[F]or discovery purposes, information is relevant to the ‘subject matter’ of an action if the information might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.” (Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. (2003) 111] Cal.App.4th 698, 711-12.) “[I]nformation, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and contrary to popular belief, fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal-App.4th 1539, 1546.)

With those principles in mind, the Court turns to the individual questions.

No. 5

Special Interrogatory No. 5 involving the size of the yard does not appear to have any relevance to the subject matter of this action, which is currently limited to the alleged request for a bill of storage and towing fees.

The Court, therefore, will not order a further response to No. 5

Nos. 6 through 15, 19

These interrogatories seek information as to break ins, encounters with unhoused persons and/or prostitutes, which do not appear to have any relevance to the subject matter of this action as noted above.

The Court, therefore, will not order a further response to Nos. 6 through 15.

Nos. 16 through 18, 21

The Court considers these to be contention interrogatories that are relevant to the issue of the presentation of a bill of towing and storage fees to an owner of a vehicle. Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.010(b) authorizes such discovery expressly:

“An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 2030.010(b).)

The Court, therefore, will order a further response to Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 21.

No. 20

The complaint does not allege activity regarding any May 2025 encounter and the Court, therefore, does not find this interrogatory relevant to the subject matter of this action as noted above.

The Court, therefore, will not order a further response to No. 20.

Nos. 22, 25

The Court does not consider offers made in this case as to settlement proper subjects of interrogatories. The Court, therefore, will not order a further response to Nos. 22 and 25.

No. 23 and 24

As to these interrogatories regarding the bill and pink slip, the Court finds a sufficient relevance to the subject matter of this case.

The Court, therefore, will order a further response to Nos. 23 and 24.

Sanctions

The Court denies the request for sanctions based on the mixed results of this motion. (Mattco Valley Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437.)

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              BALES, JACQUELINE vs. SEQUOIA RIVER FRONT CABINS et al

Case No.:     PCU322981

Date:              August 25, 2026

Time:              8:30 A.M. 

Dept.              19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Defendant’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One, (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One, and (3) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (3): To grant the motions and order responses due no later than thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to impose sanctions against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $517.50; sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to order Defendant to give notice.

Facts

In this bed bug matter, Plaintiff sues for 1. Battery 2. Negligence 3. Premises Liability 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 5. Fraudulent Concealment 6. Private Nuisance 7. Public Nuisance 8. Breach of Contract.

Defendants Sequoia River Front Cabins and A.F.T Property Investments, L.L.C, on March 30, 2026, electronically served (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One, (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One, and (3) Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiff, via counsel.

Responses were due May 1, 2026.

Plaintiff’s counsel sought, and received, multiple extensions to respond to the discovery. However, as of July 23, 2026, no responses had been received.

Defendants seeks to compel initial responses to the aforementioned discovery and for sanctions of $735 per motion against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally.

No opposition to the motions appears filed.

(1) and (2) Interrogatories

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

(3) Requests for Production

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $735 consisting of 3 hours at $225 per hour and the $60 filing fee for each motion. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes total sanctions against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $517.50, consisting of 1.5 hours total for all three motions at the stated rate plus $180 in filing fees. Sanctions are due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 24, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054219	In the Matter of Jungk, Ronny	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054210	In the Matter of Singo, Sila	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Discrepancies: Petition Item 5(1) shows decedent is survived by spouse, whereas Item 8 lists spouse as “deceased”. 2. Petition Item 8: relationship of a party to decedent is omitted. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer: notice of the court address is South County Justice Center; Page 2 – Proof of Service is incomplete. 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120. 5. Original will not lodged
VPR054215	In the Matter of Lujano, Eusibio Torrez	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representatives not filed, Prob C § 8404(a). 2. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number not filed, LR, rule 1000c(4). 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not served on all parties, Prob C § 1220. 4. Proof of Publication not filed, Prob C § 8120. 5. Objection filed
VPR054212	In the Matter of Malone, Norma Jean	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 8c: DE-300 not attached as required by Probate C § 13152(e)
VPR053581	In the Matter of Frausto, Esther C.	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR044737	In the Matter of Christina Rivera Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054229	In the Matter of Sandoval, Juventina	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not filed
VPR039372-00	In the Matter of Beatty, Kim Maureen	Appoint Successor Conservator	Appearance Required	1. Petition filed without a vacancy in conservatorship, Prob C § 2650, 2680. 2. Documents not filed:  Order Appointing Court Investigator, GC-330; Supplemental Information, GC-312; Conservator Screening Form, GC-314; Capacity Declaration and Medical Ability to Attend Hearing; Questionnaire, PRO-006
VPR049370	In the Matter of Sample, Alexis	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Regarding transfer of case

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 20, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	The copy of the Will is not attached to the petition; the attachment appears to be a Trust. Petition concerning Trust administration/internal affairs has not been filed.
PPR054184	In the Matter of Arroyo-Rico, Gabriela	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Terminate Conservatorship Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Termination petition filed. Appointment not necessary

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 21, 2026 - August 25, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054250	In the Matter of D.V.W.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- matter appears to be in order
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053996	In the Matter of C.A.	NOT FILED- MC-356 (mandatory use form 2021) - Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order for the Deposit of Money Into Blocked Account. The MC-355 Order is supposed to be attached to this form. NOT FILED- GC-051 (mandatory use form 2005) - Notice of Opening or Changing a Guardianship or Conservatorship Account or Safe Deposit Box (completed by banking institution). NOT FILED GC-040 - Inventory and Appraisal GC-042 - Notice of Filing of Inventory and Appraisal and How to Object to the Inventory or the Appraised Value of Property
8/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053439	In the Matter of J.A.	Appoint Guardian, matter appears to be in order, Petitioner is required to appear for OSC.
8/21/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR054253	In the Matter of M.L.M.	The notice of hearing must state the complete title of the pleading to which notice relates (Cal Rules of Ct 7.50) NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Mr. Rivera Jr.
8/21/26 10:00 AM	Department 09	VPR054243	In the Matter of K.K.M	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Mr. Rivera Jr.
8/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053691	In the Matter of A.A.	Appoint Guardian & OSC. Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance is required to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511- PARENTS & CHILDREN AGE 12 AND OLDER
8/25/26 11:00 AM	Department 19	PPR054277	In the Matter of O.M.A.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), service to be completed on father, Declaration of Due Diligence has been received for mother.