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Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430.  The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, November 17, 2026, are:

Re:                Ramirez, Miriam A et al vs. FCA US, LLC. et al

Case No.:   VCU313718

Date:           November 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $10,120 in fees and $5,308.21 in costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiffs purchased a 2021 Jeep Grand Cherokee (“Vehicle”) which allegedly experienced various defects during the warranty period.

On December 11, 2025, Defendant served a 998 offer in the amount of $25,000, plus attorneys’ fees, or attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses by motion. Plaintiffs accepted this offer. Plaintiffs move for a total award of $30,632.96 consisting of attorney fees in the amount of $23,652.00, representing a base lodestar of $17,520.00 enhanced by a multiplier of 1.35, plus costs and expenses in the amount of $5,480.96, plus an additional $1,500.00 in anticipated attorney fees for reviewing any opposition, preparing a reply and attending the hearing.

In opposition, Defendant appears to challenge nearly every entry, a number of costs and seeks to reduce the hourly rates of counsel, as discussed below. The Court overrules the defense objections filed on November 3, 2026 but considers only the relevant portions the declarations submitted and ignores the argument and citations to unpublished authority and cases in plaintiff’s declarations.

Authority and Analysis

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover 38.7 hours at rates ranging from $650 to $195 per hour, as well as to apply a 1.35 multiplier.

No Multiplier

As to the 1.35 enhancement sought by Plaintiff, such an award is based on the following factors:

  1. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
  2. The skill displayed in presenting them;
  3. The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
  4. The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ justification for the multiplier is conclusory and does not set forth an adequate basis to award an enhancement. The Court does not find that the work cited demonstrates such extraordinary skill to justify an enhancement to the award sought. This case settled before trial, and the Court finds that this appears to be a standard Song-Beverly case, with no additional novelty or difficulty of issues evidenced from the supporting papers filed by Plaintiff.

As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from accepting other work.

As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the “contingent risk” here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the “contingent” risk of “establishing eligibility for the award” is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].)

The Court will not award an enhancement in this case.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the attorney rates ranging from $650 to $345 per hour for counsel, and $195 per hour for law clerks, are the prevailing rates in Tulare County for counsel, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour for counsel. Further, the Court will set all clerk work performed at the rate of $150 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiffs’ counsels’ records indicate 38.7 hours incurred.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)

The Court notes ten attorneys and nine clerks staffed  this matter, some contributing 1 hour, or less, to the litigation. It is difficult to argue this kind of staffing was the most efficient way as it appears many of those lawyers and clerks left the firm during the pendency of this matter and six of the attorneys who worked on the matter have less than five years’ experience.

As noted above, Defendant challenges nearly every entry. The Court, however, will reduce only the following entries:

  • January 13, 2025 – Stipulation and Protective Order: Defendant seeks to reduce the 2.5 hours incurred, arguing this is a template used in other cases. The Court will reduce the hours from 2.5 to 1. (-1.5 as to Smith)
  • March 10, 2025 – Plaintiff’s Discovery Responses: Defendant seeks to reduce  3 hours incurred, arguing it was performed by an “unlicensed law clerk” and was excessive. The Court will reduce the hours from 3 to 2 (-1 as to Pendang.)
  • March 26, 2025 – Plaintiff’s Discovery Responses: Defendant seeks to reduce the 3 hours incurred, arguing it was performed by an “unlicensed law clerk” and was excessive. The Court will reduce the hours from 3 to 2 (-1 as to Iriabho-Okugbe.)
  • November 25, 2025 – Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine: Defendant seeks to reduce the 2.9 hours incurred as to the motions in limine as excessive and boilerplate. The Court will reduce this entry by from 2.9 to 2 (-0.9 as to Boules)
  • December 8, 2025 – Deposition of Expert: Defendant seeks to reduce the 2 hours incurred here because 2.2 hours was previously billed as to preparation for the deposition of this expert. The Court will reduce this entry from 2 to 1 (-2 as to Butler.)

Therefore, the Court will award 33.2 hours resulting in $10,120 in fees.

Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover $5,480.96 in costs, based on submitted billing records.

To start, section 1033.5 sets forth allowable costs reasonably necessary to "the conduct of litigation." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5.)

However, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) enables the prevailing "buyer" in a Song-Beverly matter to be "…allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses…” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d), emphasis added.) Courts have interpreted Section 1794's "expenses" provision to include "out-of-pocket expenses beyond the costs identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450, 457 [citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, disapproved on other grounds].)

As such, arguments that costs are not recoverable because they have not been court ordered is inapplicable here.

Filing and Motion Fees

Here, the filing and motion fees include electronic filing costs, which are prohibited by section 1033.5 except where expressly ordered by the Court. However, the Court finds electronic filing costs are proper out-of-pocket expenses that are reasonably necessary to the litigation in this case and are recoverable as a prevailing party under Song Beverly.

The Court will strike $20 as to rush fees incurred as to January 9, 2026 entry.

Jury Fees

Defendant seeks to strike the jury fees. However, recovery of jury fees are expressly permitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032. (See Perko's Enterprises Inc. v. RRNS Enterprises (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 238, FN 5.) Moreover, this Court, like notes that jury fees are a reasonably incurred cost, even when a case does not go to trial because under Code of Civil Procedure section 631, jury fees must be paid by the first case management conference in the action.

The Court denies the request to strike the jury fees.

Other

The Court agrees that service of the complaint as to the dealership is not related to the Song Beverly claims and will therefore strike $124.25. Further, that filing the proof of service regarding service of the dealership is not recoverable and therefore the Court will strike $28.50

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court will award $10,120 in fees and $5,308.21 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Jasmin Megana Delgado, Jacquelin vs. Ruiz Food Products, Inc. et al

Case No.:  VCU320097

Date:          November 17, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Compliance as to Supplemental Discovery Responses; Alternatively, to Reconsider the Prior Rulings on Plaintiffs’ Motions to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production

Tentative Ruling:

To grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further Responses as to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents as to both Defendants

As to the Motions to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories, the Court orders the Bellaire-West notice process to occur as to Nos. 1 and 4 and to order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the competition of the notice process; to grant the motion as to Nos. 2-9 and order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing;

As to the Motions to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production, the Court orders the Bellaire-West notice process to occur as to Nos 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and to order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the competition of the notice process; to grant the motion as to Nos. 2, 3, and 6 and order a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing;

To issue sanctions against Defendant Products, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally in the amount of $730; to issue sanctions against Defendant Exports, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally in the amount of $730; Sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this class action and PAGA matter, Plaintiff alleges, via the amended complaint, causes of action for:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197];

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198];

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512];

4. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7];

5. Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses [Cal. Lab. Code § 2802];

6. Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203];

7. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements [Cal. Lab. Code § 226];

8. Unfair Business Practices [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.]; and

9. Civil Penalties Under PAGA [ Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, et seq.].

On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff propounded Special Interrogatories, Set No. One and Requests for Production, Set No. One on Defendants Ruiz Food Products, Inc. (“Defendant Products”) and Ruiz Food Exports, Inc. (“Defendant Exports”).

Defendants served responses on August 8, 2025, consisting of objections of vague, ambiguous, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information, compound, unduly burdensome, oppressive, confidentiality, attorney-client privilege and work product, and that Plaintiff is subject to an arbitration agreement that includes a class waiver.

The parties appear to have met and conferred and extended the deadline to file the motions to compel further a number of times, including up to June 5, 2026.

Thereafter, Plaintiff moved to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories, Set No. One and Requests for Production, Set No. One as to both Defendants.

In opposition to the motions to compel further, Defendants stated:

“Following the filing of the instant Motions, the parties met and conferred further regarding the Motions as well as efforts to mediate this matter. Defendants agreed to supplement their responses to discovery, as it does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement, and to mediate this matter... Nevertheless, as Defendants have agreed to amend discovery responses, Plaintiffs Motion is moot.”

The Court, therefore, found the motions to compel further responses moot by the promise to provide supplemental responses, based on the statement above. The Court, however, awarded sanctions, jointly and severally against Defendants and their counsel of record as follows:

  • Defendant Exports, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $1,520, consisting of 2 hours for each motion at the rate of $350 per hour, plus $120 in filing fees.
  • Defendant Products, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $1,520, consisting of 2 hours for each motion at the rate of $350 per hour, plus $120 in filing fees.

The Court entered its order on the motions to compel on July 21, 2026 and served notice of the order by mail.

Thereafter, Defendants moved to compel arbitration. The Court denied the motion on September 29, 2026.

On August 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion seeking to compel compliance with Defendants’ statement to “supplement their responses to discovery.” Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to compel compliance with Defendants’ agreement to provide supplemental responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Sets No. One, Nos. 1 through 12, and Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Sets No. One, Nos. 1 through 9.

Plaintiff further seeks monetary sanctions of $2,549 and for issue sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, and/or terminating sanctions as this Court deems just and proper. Alternatively, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that the motions to compel further were moot.

In opposition, Defendant argues there is no order or agreement upon which to compel compliance, that reconsideration is unavailable and that the Court should stay discovery in this matter pending the decision of the Court of Appeal

Authority and Analysis

The Court starts by noting that Plaintiff timely moved to compel further responses to Requests for Production, Sets No. One, Nos. 1 through 12, and Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Sets No. One, Nos. 1 through 9 as to both Defendants.

In opposition, as noted above, Defendants agreed to provide supplemental responses. As a result, the Court issued no order to compel further responses, finding the motion moot.

However, Defendants have failed to provide such supplemental responses and Plaintiff moves to obtain the supplemental responses.

There does not, however, appear to be a method of compelling compliance based upon an opposition to a motion to compel, as opposed to a statement of compliance in a verified response to a request for production under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320. Additionally, as to the interrogatories, there is no motion to compel compliance available under the Code of Civil Procedure.

As such, the Court will reconsider its prior order finding the motions moot.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, states:

"(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown."

Here, the motion is timely the Court’s order finding the motions moot was sent by mail on July 21, 2026, providing ten days, plus five days for service, to bring this motion.

Section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"  Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.)

Here, the new facts are Defendants’ failure to provide supplemental responses as noted in the opposition to the motions, Defendants’ filing of the motion to compel arbitration in contrast to the position taken in the opposition and Defendants’ continued refusal.

As such, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration.

Special Interrogatories

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)

The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Nos. 1, 4

The Court considers these interrogatories, as to the identification of current and former employees, to raise privacy issues as to employees of Defendants that necessitates the notice process set forth in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554. “The current and former employees are potential percipient witnesses to [the employer's] employment and wage practices, and as such their identities and locations are properly discoverable.” (Id. at 562.)  

In employment law wage and hour class actions discovery of putative class members' contact information is often permitted even in the face of privacy concerns. (Lee v. Dynamex, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1325 (allowing discovery of contact information by use of interrogatories for putative class members in a misclassification class action); Belaire, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th 560 (granting motion to compel employer to provide names and contact information of all current and former employees after sending out an opt-out notice requiring an objection within a certain amount of time). Disclosure of contact information in the wage and hour context is permitted because employees [are] reasonably "expected to want their information disclosed to a class action plaintiff who may ultimately recover for them unpaid wages that they are owed."" (Id. at 561.)

A party asserting a privacy claim has the burden of establishing each element, specifically: 1. A legally protected privacy interest; 2. A reasonable expectation of privacy; and 3. A serious invasion of the privacy interest. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1)

Here, fellow employees may reasonably expect that contact information be given to a plaintiff seeking to vindicate their rights and "would have no reason to expect their information would be categorically withheld, without even an opportunity to opt in or opt out of disclosure." (Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at 554-555.) 

However, any serious invasion can be eliminated by engaging in the Belaire-West notice process. (Id. at 555.)

Therefore, the Court finds a Belaire-West notice is reasonable before Defendants disclose the information sought in Nos. 1 and 4. The Court orders the parties to meet and confer as to the contents of the notice.

The parties shall split the costs of the Belaire-West notice procedure.

Defendants shall have thirty (30) days following close of the agreed notice process to provide verified further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 4.

Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,  and 9

The Court’s review of these interrogatories indicates none involve privacy interests of potential class members and instead seek raw data as to number of employees, amount of premiums paid and other similar information.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel as to Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,  and 9 orders further responses thereto no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

No. 5

This interrogatory seeks the identification of exempt employees supervising potential class members. This appears to be a interrogatory directed at discovering a percipient witness to the claims alleged in the complaint.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel as to Nos. 5 and orders a further response thereto no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Requests for Production

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

Nos 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

As with the above interrogatories that implicate privacy concerns, the Court finds the Belaire-West notice process is reasonable before Defendants disclose the documents sought as to Nos 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12. Defendants shall have thirty (30) days following close of the notice process to provide a verified further responses thereto.

Nos. 2 and 3

These document requests seek policies and handbook samples that do not implicate privacy interests. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks the production of the general policy document, as opposed documents specific to individual potential class members (that are not Plaintiff), the Court orders further responses to Nos. 2 and 3 no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

No. 6

This request relates to Plaintiff own personnel file and therefore no privacy interest of any third party is at issue. The Court, therefore, grants the motion as to No. 6 and orders a further response no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides for the issuance of sanctions for misuse of the discovery process as follows:

“The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that the one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . . If the monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

The Court will award sanctions as to this motion, necessitated by Defendants’ agreement to produce supplemental responses and the refusal, thereafter, to provide such responses. Plaintiff seeks $2,549 in fees and costs, representing 7 total hours at the rate of $350 per hour and $99.26 in costs.

The Court will permit 4 total hours on this motion at the $350 rate, plus costs of $60 as to its filing fee, and split the sanctions follows:

  • Defendant Exports, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $730; and
  • Defendant Products, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $730.

Sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

The Court will not order issue, evidentiary or terminating sanctions at this time.

Appeal

Defendants’ counsel filed a declaration stating, “Defendants are seeking a Petition for Writ of Supersedeas or Other Appropriate Stay Order Pending Appeal and Request for Immediate Temporary Stay, in the appellate proceedings, which asks the Court of Appeal to stay, among other things, the November 17, 2026 hearing on this Motion.”

The Court has denied Defendants’ request for stay in this Court. There appears to be no basis to stay this discovery at this time. As the Court stated at the last hearing, this Court will stay the matter if directed to do so by the Fifth District.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 David, Ramil Bungcayao vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.:   VCU323083

Date:           November 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $24,570 in fees and $4,419.96 in costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff purchased new 2024 Honda Ridgeline (“Vehicle”) which allegedly suffered from issues with blue smoke emerging from the tailpipe. The Court previously adjudicated the issue of whether a civil penalty should be awarded under Civil Code section 1794(c) in favor of Plaintiff, awarding $57,000.

On October 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for fees and costs, seeking fees in the amount of $59,830.58, consisting of 92.65 hours at rates ranging from $650 to $325 and $5,864.33 in costs and expenses.

In opposition, Defendant challenges the hourly rates, as well as a number of entries, seeking to reduce the hours to 52.25. Further, Defendant seeks to strike the travel hours and travel costs of Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court considers only the relevant portions the declarations submitted by counsel for plaintiff and ignores the argument and citations to unpublished authority and cases in counsel’s declaration.

Authority and Analysis

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover 92.65 hours at rates of $650 for legal services and $325 for travel.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the attorney rate of $650 for counsel is the prevailing rates in Tulare County, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour for counsel.

As to the travel rate, the Court will not award that rate or any hours incurred, as Plaintiff’s counsel resides out of state and the Court lacks any evidence that a local attorney was unavailable for this Song Beverly action. 

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 92.65 hours incurred on this matter, divided into 73.40 hours of legal services and 19.25 hours of travel.

As noted above, the Court will not award the hours incurred as to travel.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)

As to the non-travel hours, Defendant challenges a number of entries. The Court will reduce the following entries:

  • March 23, 2026 - Review and analyze approximately 791 pages produced by Honda including repair, warranty and Tech Line materials: Defendant seeks to reduce the 2.6 hours incurred here to 1.5, arguing the time is excessive. The Court will reduce the entry to 2 hours. (-.6 hours)
  • May 10, 2026 – Communicate with and provide legal advice to client regarding discovery requests, response and preparation and supporting records: Defendant seeks to reduce the 1.5 hours to 1 as excessive. The Court will reduce the entry to 1 hour. (-.5 hours)
  • June 22, 2026 - Prepare approximately 465 focused questions for Honda expert Newallis deposition: Here, Defendant seeks to reduce the 3.1 hours incurred as excessive. The Court will reduce the hours to 2. (-1.1 hours)
  • June 30, 2026 - Prepare eleven case-specific motions in limine concerning anticipated trial evidence and disputed legal issues: Here, Defendant argues that preparation of motions in limine was unnecessary because resolution was reached prior to trial. The Court will reduce this entry to 4.5 (-1 hour.)

Therefore, the Court will award 70.2 hours at the $350 rate totaling $24,570.

Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover $5,864.3 in costs.

To start, section 1033.5 sets forth allowable costs reasonably necessary to "the conduct of litigation." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5.)

However, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) enables the prevailing "buyer" in a Song-Beverly matter to be "…allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses…” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d), emphasis added.) Courts have interpreted Section 1794's "expenses" provision to include "out-of-pocket expenses beyond the costs identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450, 457 [citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, disapproved on other grounds].)

Here, Defendant challenges the airfare and hotel cost associated with the mandatory settlement conference. While the Court does require personal appearances at mandatory settlement conferences, the Court agrees that an out of state attorney, absent a showing that local counsel was unavailable, cannot recover these costs. Therefore, the Court will strike the $1,444.37 in travel costs.

Therefore, the Court will award $4,419.96 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Enriquez, Veronica vs. All American Labor Service, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU310439

Date:           November 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Hearing re: Final Compliance

Tentative Ruling: The Court previously noted that the check cashing deadline was November 2, 2026 and continued this hearing to this date. No supplemental declaration as to distribution of the uncashed settlement fund has been filed. The Court, therefore, continues this hearing to December 8, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ramirez Naranjo, Anthony vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.:   VCU328025

Date:           November 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Defendant’s PMQ

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order the deposition to take place no later than December 4, 2026.

Facts

In this Song Beverly matter, trial is set for December 14, 2026.

On October 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ.

Plaintiff notes that on June 11, 2026, Plaintiff served an amended deposition notice of Defendant’s PMQ, including requests for production, which set the deposition date for October 16, 2026. (Declaration of Ardi ¶¶10, 11 – Ex. 1.) Plaintiff indicates that counsel for Defendant stipulated to this deposition date. (Declaration of Ardi ¶11.)

Defendant sent objections on October 9, 2026. (Declaration of Ardi ¶12.) Defendant offered an alternative date after the current trial date. (Declaration of Ardi ¶12.)

Further that “Plaintiff’s counsel attempted to call opposing counsel on the morning of the agreed to deposition, but could not get through. Plaintiff’s counsel then took a non-appearance on the record at the October 16, 2026, deposition, and thereafter emailed Defendant’s counsel.” (Declaration of Ardi ¶17.) No reply, however, has been provided. (Declaration of Ardi ¶17.)

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450

Section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

Here, Defendant’s PMQ has failed to appear for the examination, Plaintiff recorded a notice of non-appearance and attempted contact with Defendant’s counsel to inquire as to the non-appearance. 

Proper service of a notice of deposition is effective to require the attendance of parties as well as compelling production of specified documents or electronically stored information at their deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280(a).)

Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, subdivision (b), provides that any deposition taken after the timely service of a valid objection cannot be used against the objecting party if the party did not attend the deposition, such objection mentioned in section 2025.410 relates to an error or irregularity in a deposition notice that does not comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 2025.210). (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)The types of objections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq., deal with procedural requirements such as when a defendant or plaintiff may serve a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.210), the contents required to be included in a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.220, 2025.230), to whom notice of the deposition must be given (CCP § 2025.240), the location of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.250, 2025.260), the number of days required to be given in advance of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.270), and the manner of service upon party deponents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280).

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ.

The Court further notes that this motion to compel is timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.020 which states “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any party shall be entitled as a matter of right to complete discovery proceedings on or before the 30th day, and to have motions concerning discovery heard on or before the 15th day, before the date initially set for the trial of the action.”

Here, this motion to compel is timely, as it heard more than 15 days prior to the trial date.

However, the Court has now compelled a deposition to occur within 30 days of trial, set for December 14, 2026.

As such, the Court must determine whether Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050 has been satisfied as to reopening discovery as to the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ and production of documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2024.050(a).)

Section 2024.050(b) requires the Court to consider:

(b) In exercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.

(2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.

(3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.

(4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.

On this issue, the Court examines Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568.

There, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel defendant to provide discovery responses, after the discovery motion cut-off date. (Id. at 1574-1575.) The trial court granted the motion to compel, over defendant's objection that the motion was untimely. (Id. at 1577.) Further, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions, based on a finding that defendant had not complied with the prior order compelling responses. (Id. at 1583-1584.)

However, the court of appeal reversed, finding that an abuse of discretion in hearing plaintiff's original motion to compel responses, absent a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2024.050:

“Although Pelton-Shepherd had no right to have its motion to compel heard after the passage of the discovery motion cutoff date, we do not question that the trial court had discretion to hear the motion. But ‘[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the 'legal principles governing the subject of [the] action ' Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 'abuse' of discretion." [Citation.] Here, the trial court's discretion to hear Pelton-Shepherd's motion to compel was governed by section 2024.020, which provided that (1) the last day for Pelton-Shepherd to have its motion to compel heard as a matter of right was October 31, 2005, and that (2) the postponement of the trial date did not "operate to reopen discovery proceedings" "[e]xcept as provided in Section 2024.050"—that is, except upon a successful motion for leave to reopen discovery. Moreover, under section 2024.050, subdivision (b), the trial court's discretion to grant such a motion was not unfettered, but could be exercised only upon [the consideration of the items specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050(b)] …” (Id. at 1587-1588.)

Here, the Court expressly considers the subsection (b) factors and finds a necessity to depose Defendant’s PMQ in this Song Beverly matter, that Plaintiff was diligent in securing a stipulated deposition date no later than June 2026, the Court does not find any prejudice to Defendant under the circumstances of the stipulated deposition date or that, at this time, the case will be prevented from going to trial.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ, including document production, and reopens discovery limited to the deposition and production. The Court orders the deposition to take place no later than December 4, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 La Marsna, John Phillip Herrera vs. Holiday Inn Express

Case No.:   VCU330625

Date:           November 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendants Saffron Hotels LLC, and Azure Management Group, Inc.’s Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; to order an amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Holiday Inn Express, and DOES 1 to 10, inclusive, checking the boxes on the form complaint for “general negligence” and “premises liability” and attaching PLD-PI-001(4) as to premises liability.

The complaint pleads:

“Defendant owed Plaintiff, a guest at defendant's hotel a duty to maintain the hotel premises, including the bathroom and shower fixtures, in a reasonably safe condition and to protect guests from unreasonable risks of harm.

Defendant breached this duty by failing to properly inspect, secure, repair, maintain, and/or replace the shower head and shower equipment, allowing a dangerous condition to exist.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff was injured when the shower head and equipment fell and struck him.”

No other boxes on PLD-PI-001(4) are checked as to various counts.

Plaintiff further pleads “Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 1-10 inclusive were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment.”

Relevant here, Plaintiff substituted Doe 1 for Defendant Saffron Hotels LLC and Doe 2 for Azure Management Group, Inc.

Defendants Saffron Hotels LLC, and Azure Management Group, Inc. (hereinafter “Defendants”) demurrer on grounds of uncertainty and failure to state sufficient facts that these Defendants owned, possessed, maintained, managed, operated, or controlled the premises on January 22, 2024.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the incorporation of the Doe Defendants into the complaint sufficiently alleges, as against Defendants Saffron Hotels LLC, and Azure Management Group, Inc., negligent maintenance.

Authority and Analysis

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.  (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing defendant cannot tell what he or she is suppose to respond to. (Williams v Beechmint Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2).

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1226.)

Premises Liability and Negligence

The Court acknowledges that the complaint checks boxes for negligence and premises liability, but that the attachment pleads a single cause of action labeled premises liability.

"The elements of a cause of action for negligence are duty, breach, causation, and damages." (Johnson v. Prasad (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 74, 78.) "The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages." (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)

As such, the checking of both boxes as to negligence and premises liability does not appear to either change the analysis of the allegations contained on the attachment or create any uncertainty here.

However, the Court notes that, at the time the complaint was initially filed, it references a singular defendant, as no Doe Defendants had been substituted. With the substitution of various Doe Defendants, including Saffron Hotels LLC, and Azure Management Group, Inc., the allegations that “Defendant owed Plaintiff, a guest at defendant's hotel a duty to maintain the hotel premises, including the bathroom and shower fixtures, in a reasonably safe condition and to protect guests from unreasonable risks of harm” and “Defendant breached this duty by failing to properly inspect, secure, repair, maintain, and/or replace the shower head and shower equipment, allowing a dangerous condition to exist” render the complaint uncertain as to Saffron Hotels LLC, and Azure Management Group, Inc.’s duties and breaches thereof, whether arising independently due to control or management or resulting from some agency relationship.

While the Court notes the complaint pleads “Doe defendants (specify Doe numbers): 1-10 inclusive were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment,” the relationship between these former Doe Defendants and Defendant Holiday Inn Express requires additional clarity. 

As such, the Court will sustain the demurrer here and permit leave to amend to allege, now that various Doe Defendants have been substituted in, the duties alleged to be owned by these substitute defendants and breaches alleged to violate the duties.  Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared November 16, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number

Case Name

Type

Status

Comments

VPR054353

In the Matter of Abarca Valencia, Juan Carlos

Letters of Administration

Recommended for Approval

VPR054340

In the Matter of Gonzalez, Irasema

Letters of Administration

Recommended for Approval

VPR054309

In the Matter of Schneider, James Joseph

Probate Will/Issue Letters

Recommended for Approval

VPR054335

In the Matter of Jordan, William Russell

Probate Will/Issue Letters

Appearance Required

1. Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner.

2. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representatives (DE-147) not filed.

3. Original will not lodged

VPR054352

In the Matter of Bridges, John H

Spousal Property Hearing

Appearance Required

1. Petition Attachment 7: the facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the property is property passing to the surviving spouse necessary to establish the community property claim omitted, Prob C § 13651(a)(3),(4).

2. Petition Item 9: relationships of parties to decedent omitted.

3. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C § 13655

VPR054382

In the Matter of Garcia Castaneda, Adolfo

Determine Succession to Primary Residence

Appearance Required

Petition Item 11(2) omitted: facts showing that the real property was decedent’s primary residence in California, Prob C § 13152(a)(3).

VPR054346

In the Matter of the Russell R. and Madge M. Ezell Family Trust

Petition to Confirm Trust Asset

Recommended for Approval

VPR053142

In the Matter of Jensen, Paul Michael

Attorney Fee Allowance Hearing

Appearance Required

Documents in order

VPR054311

In the Matter of Kane, Chase John

Appoint Temporary Conservator

Appearance Required

Documents in order

VPR054266

In the Matter of Pimentel, Mark C

Appoint Conservator

Appearance Required

Documents in order

VPR054095

In the Matter of Aguayo, Armando

Appoint Conservator

Appearance Required

Documents in order

PROBATE ADMINISTRATION 

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday,  November 12, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number

Case Name

Type

Status

Comments

PPR054392

In the Matter of Shishido, Graycie Noriko

Letters of Administration

Appearance required

Orders and Letters (DE-150/DE-140) not lodged.

Pursuant to Probate Code §8571, notwithstanding a waiver of bond, the court in its discretion may require the nonresident of California personal representative to give a bond.

PPR054386

In the Matter of Serrato, Mario

Determine Succession to Primary Residence

Appearance required

A written settlement agreement/consents not filed for the buyout provision.

Continued jurisdiction to enforce is beyond the scope of a summary administration.

PPR054377

In the Matter of Ramos Bedolla, Fernando Angel

Appoint Temporary Conservator

Appearance required

Matter appears to be in order

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

PROBATE GUARDIANSHIP 

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time

Department Number

Case Number

Case Name

Comments

11/16/2026 08:30 AM

Department 2

VPR054402 

IMO R.E.G.

REQUIRED TO BE FILED- Guardianship Questionnaire                   

PETITION ITEM #1 (c) – no selection made regarding BOND

PETITION NOT DATED

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511

PROPOSED GUARDIAN needs to attend the Guardianship Orientation & DOJ background record check