Tentative Rulings
Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.
Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.
Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.
Civil Tentative Rulings
The Tentative Rulings for Monday, November 23, 2026, are:
Re: E.W. Merrit Farms vs. Pixley Irrigation District, et al
Case No.: VCU332014
Date: November 23, 2026
Time: 8:30 A.M.
Dept. 9-Honorable Nathan D. Ide
Motion: Demurrer
Tentative Ruling: Pixley’s demurrer is overruled.
Pixley demurrers to Merritt’s first cause of action seeking relief under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and its second cause of action based on Pixley’s alleged failure to enforce its Subsidence Management Plan.
Merritt dismissed its second cause of action leaving solely its first cause of action, under CEQA at issue on demurrer.
Merritt’s CEQA Claim
As now framed in the amended petition, Merritt’s CEQA claim is a challenge to the inclusion of any Precipitation Credit beyond a nominal amount in the 2026 Allocations, based on a late 2025 determination by Pixley’s consultants, EKI, that “the evidence supported, at most, a Precipitation Credit of between 0.03 af/acre to 0.09 af/acre.”
Merritt describes differing hydrological conditions of an “Upper Aquifer” and “Lower Aquifer” of the Subbasin, which “are separated by a layer of very low-permeability Corcoran Clay, which severely impedes the movement of water between the two aquifers.” According to Merritt: “Because Corcoran Clay is a barrier to vertical flow, water pumped from the Lower Aquifer does not return there for many years, if at all, after it is applied to the land … [and] [i]nstead, the Corcoran Clay layer traps water in the Upper Aquifer, severely impeding the Lower Aquifer's ability to recharge.”
Merritt alleges: “In late 2025, the District’s [Pixley’s] technical consultants, EKI Environment + Water (‘EKI’), reported they had refined the model used to monitor subsidence and discovered that the original model had been ‘overly optimistic’ and that subsidence was actually far worse than previously thought.” Merritt describes, in detail, determinations of EKI reflecting a “deteriorating state of the aquifer” and it alleges that “[a] major factor underlying” that “deteriorating state … was the District's chronic overestimate of the Precipitation Credit.”
Inferably, it is the Lower Aquifer, or, primarily the Lower Aquifer, that Merritt asserts has been rendered in a “deteriorating state” incident to “the District's chronic overestimate of the Precipitation Credit.” “EKI explained,” according to Merrit, “precipitation should ‘not [be] translated to a pumping credit’ because precipitation does not result in the ‘deep percolation’ necessary to prevent subsidence” (i.e., percolation down to the Lower Aquifer) and Merritt alleges that, “[a]ccording to EKI, the evidence supported, at most, a Precipitation Credit of between 0.03 af/acre to 0.09 af/acre—nowhere near the 0.71 af/acre Precipitation Credit the District had allocated during 2025.”
Merritt alleges: “Properly understood, the Precipitation Credit is an overdraft/transitional allocation,” but, “[h]owever, unlike use of the Transitional Water Credit, which is disincentivized by the Transitional Water Fee, the Precipitation Credit is subject only to the nominal Base Fee and its use is therefore not disincentivized in any way.”
Precipitation Credit, Sustainable Yield Credit, and the District Allocated Credit, are based, respectively, on “estimates of precipitation, natural recharge, and surface water deliveries,” and collectively “represent the basin's sustainable yield.” These credits are subject to a “nominal” Base Fee of $1.93/af.
Transitional Water Credit “is an amount of water recognized to exceed the basin’s sustainable yield and is intended to serve as a disincentive mechanism against the use of groundwater while easing the transition to sustainability.” Under Pixley’s groundwater sustainability plan (GSP), Transitional Water Credits are to be “ramp[ed] down” according to a schedule to achieve its sustainability goals under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA). (See Wat. Code, § 10727.2, subd. (b)(1) [GSP’s must include ‘[m]easurable objectives, as well as interim milestones in increments of five years, to achieve the sustainability goal in the basin within 20 years of the implementation of the plan.”) Transitional Water Credits are subject to a “modest” disincentivizing Transitional Water Fee of $187.20/af.
The aforementioned four credits—precipitation, sustainable yield, district allocated, and transitional—comprise a landowners “Allowable Limit.” Any use beyond the Allowable Limit is ‘considered a violation’ subject to enforcement measures, including civil penalties.” Specifically, “use beyond the Allowable Limit [is] subject to an Exceedance Fee of $824.71/af,” which Merritt characterizes as a “highly” disincentivizing amount.
Comparing the cumulative total allocations in 2025 and 2026, it is undisputed that total allocations were reduced in 2026.
Merritt’s amended petition includes the following chart reflecting credit allocations in 2025 and 2026, the latter being the challenged “2026 Allocation”:
|
2025 |
2026 |
|
|
Precipitation Credit |
0.71 af/acre |
0.72 af/acre |
|
Sustainable Yield Credit |
0.15 af/acre |
0.15 af/acre |
|
District Allocated Credit |
0.55 af/acre |
0.54 af/acre |
|
Transitional Water Credit |
0.75 af/acre |
0.37 af/acre |
|
Total Allocation |
2.16 af/acre |
1.78 af/acre |
As reflected in this chart, Pixley only nominally increased the Precipitation Credit allocation by 0.01 af/acre, while also decreasing, by the same 0.01 af/acre amount, the District Allocated Credit allocation, and it kept the allocation level the same for the Sustainable Yield Credit.
The total 2026 Allocation was reduced by a net 0.38 af/acre total incident to Pixley’s reduction, by that exact amount, of the Transitional Credit allocation, going from 0.75 af/acre to 0.37 af/acre.
“Although the District [Pixley] reduced the Transitional Water Credit by 0.38 af/acre,” Merritt explains, however, “any benefit associated with this reduction was more than offset by the District's decision to approve a 0.72 af/acre Precipitation Credit, contrary to EKI's recommendation,” and: “By approving a Precipitation Credit of 0.72 af/acre, the District effectively approved an overdraft/transitional allocation … .”
Merritt asserts “the 2026 Allocation permits more overdraft than a properly calibrated allocation program would while also reducing the financial disincentive against overdraft extractions” (original emphasis), essentially, because, given EKI’s determinations, any Precipitation Credit amount was “effectively … an overdraft/transitional allocation.”
While it is true that the 2026 Allocations lower the Allowable Limit bar at which Exceedance Fees kick in as a disincentive to excess extractions, Merritt’s amended petition frames that “the 2026 Allocation fails below” that Allowable Limit bar by providing a purportedly sustainable allocation of Precipitation Credit that is nothing more than mischaracterized overdraft.
Class 7 and Class 8 Exemptions
Pixley asserts the 2026 Allocation falls within the class 7 and class 8 categorical exemptions.
“[T]he class 7 and class 8 categorical exemptions exclude from CEQA review actions taken ‘to assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource’ or ‘the environment.’ ” (Russian Riverkeeper v. County of Sonoma (2026) 122 Cal.App.5th 382, 412 [347 Cal.Rptr.3d 454] (Russian Riverkeeper), citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15307, 15308.)
“CEQA and the Guidelines [Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15000–15387] ‘establish a three-tier process to ensure that public agencies inform their decisions with environmental considerations.’ [Citation.]” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 409.)
These “tiers” are sometimes characterized in slightly different ways but generally involve the following process: (1) agency determination of whether an activity constitutes a project; (2) agency consideration of whether a project is “exempt” from CEQA review; and (3), if required, agency preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). (See Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409-419, citing Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 380-381 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116]; Sunflower Alliance v. Department of Conservation (2026) 20 Cal.5th 22, 40-41 [345 Cal.Rptr.3d 631, 591 P.3d 829] (Sunflower Alliance); cf. Save Our Big Trees v. City of Santa Cruz (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 694, 704-705 [194 Cal.Rptr.3d 169] (Save Our Big Trees), citing San Lorenzo Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified School Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1372-1373 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 128].)
Given Pixley’s assertion that the 2026 Allocation falls within the class 7 and class 8 categorical exemptions, this case concerns the “tier” of the process wherein “the agency considers whether a project is ‘exempt’ from CEQA review.” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 409, citation omitted.)
“Several categories of projects are statutorily exempt from CEQA review for policy reasons. Other classes of projects are ‘ “categorically exempt” ’ from CEQA review because the secretary of the Natural Resources Agency ‘ “has found” … [they] “… do not have a significant effect on the environment.” ’ ” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 705, citing Berkeley Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1092 [184 Cal.Rptr.3d 643, 343 P.3d 834] (Berkeley Hillside Preservation); see also, Pub. Resc. Code, §§ 21080, 21084; Guidelines, § 15300.)
“ ‘If a public agency properly finds that a project is exempt from CEQA,’ either under a statutory exemption or one of the categorical exemptions set forth in the Guidelines, ‘no further environmental review is necessary.’ [Citation.] At that point, the agency has the option of filing [a Notice of Exemption (NOE)], which cites to the applicable statutory or categorical exemption (Guidelines, § 15062, subd. (a)(3)), supported by a ‘brief statement of reasons to support the finding [of exemption].’ (Id., subd. (a)(4).)” (Sunflower Alliance, supra, 20 Cal.5th 22, 41.) “Copies of the NOE, once filed, must be available for public inspection. The notice must be posted within 24 hours of receipt by the county clerk’s office and must remain posted for 30 days, after which the county clerk must return it to the agency. ([Pub. Resc. Code,] § 21152, subd. (c); CEQA Guidelines, § 15062.)” (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 498-499 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 858, 227 P.3d 416].)
The court notes that, here, nothing in the amended petition, nor the documents of which Pixley requests judicial notice, supports that Pixley filed a Notice of Exemption in connection with the 2026 Allocation. Though filing of an NOE is optional (Pub. Resc. Code, § 21152, subd. (b)), the court observes that a NOE, when utilized, serves a couple of notable functions.
First, it results in a shorter statute of limitations for CEQA challenges than might otherwise apply to a project. “ ‘An action or proceeding alleging that a public agency has improperly determined that a project is not subject to this division [i.e., is exempt from CEQA] pursuant to [section 21080, subdivision (b)] … shall be commenced within 35 days from the date of the filing … of the [NOE] authorized by … [section 21152(b)].’ ” (Ibid., citing Pub. Resc. Code, § 21167(d) and Guidelines, § 15112, subd. (c)(2), italics omitted.)
“CEQA reserves its very shortest limitations periods for cases where the agency has given public notice, in a form required or permitted by the statute, of an agency act or decision that is relevant to CEQA’s statutory scheme. Thus, where the agency approves a project without determining whether it will have a significant effect on the environment (and therefore presumably filing no CEQA notice), the limitations period is 180 days from project approval or, if there was no formal approval, 180 days from the commencement of [the project]. ([Pub. Resc. Code, § 21167, subd. (a).)” (Id., at p. 500.)
The second notable function of a NOE is public notification. “Public notification serves the public’s right, under CEQA, to be informed of, and to have a voice in, the process of evaluating the environmental issues surrounding a contemplated action or decision.” (Id., at p. 502.) Indeed, the reason for CEQA’s reservation of the shortest limitations periods for cases where the agency has given public notice is specifically that such notice serves the public’s right to be informed of, and to have a voice in, the process of evaluating the environmental issues surrounding a contemplated action or decision. (Ibid.)
As noted, however, nothing in the amended petition, nor the documents of which Pixley requests judicial notice, support that Pixley filed a NOE in connection with the 2026 Allocation and, thus, if it is the case that substantial evidence did not support Pixley’s reliance on the class 7 and class 8 exemptions, it would also appear to be the case that the public’s right to be informed of, and to have a voice in, the process of evaluating the environmental issues surrounding the 2026 Allocation was not even served by even the basic measure of an NOE.
That said, though, “CEQA does not generally impose procedural requirements, including for a public hearing, on an agency making an exemption determination and most statutory exemptions do not require findings to document the basis for the claimed exemption … . [Citations.] Once it has been properly determined that an exemption from CEQA applies, an agency need not conduct further analysis or progress to the second or third tiers of the scheme's environmental review. (Guidelines, §§ 15002, subd. (k)(1), 15061, subd. (b)(1).)” (Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 956, 967 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 506].)
In either event, a categorical exemption “can be relied on only if a factual evaluation of the agency’s proposed activity reveals that it applies,’ ” and the agency invoking the exemption “ ‘has the burden of demonstrating’ that substantial evidence supports its factual finding that the project fell within the exemption.” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 705, citations omitted.)
This court has, understandably, created some confusion about the standard applicable to the analysis of whether the class 7 and class 8 exemptions apply based on the following statement in the prior ruling on demurrer:
“[T]he court’s only determination here is solely that it is possible that a regulatory activity intended to disincentivize activity harmful to a natural resource or the environment, such as the 2026 Allocation and resulting fee and penalty impositions with respect to groundwater overdraft, could be so ineffectual as compared with a baseline condition of prior disincentivizing activity, that the regulatory activity is not categorically exempt under the class 7 and class 8 exemptions because it does not assure ‘maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of’ ‘a natural resource” or the ‘environment.’ (CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15307 & 15308.)”
As Merritt points out, “the concept of a baseline is not applicable to the class 7 and class 8 categorical exemptions.” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 412, fn. 20, citing Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.) The baseline concept, instead, is applicable to whether an agency must prepare an EIR for a non-exempt project. “CEQA ‘requires a public agency to prepare an [EIR] only on projects that may have significant environmental effects.’ ‘To decide whether a given project's environmental effects are likely to be significant, the agency must use some measure of the environment's state absent the project, a measure sometimes referred to as the ‘baseline’ for environmental analysis.’ ” (Citizens for East Shore Parks v. State Lands Com. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 549, 557 [136 Cal.Rptr.3d 162].)
As a threshold matter, “where there is no substantial evidence a proposed project may have a significant environmental effect, further CEQA review is unnecessary; no categorical exemption is necessary to establish that proposition.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1086 at p. 1099.)
However, with respect to the categorical exemptions, “the Legislature, through the Guidelines, intended to enumerate classes of projects that are exempt from CEQA because, notwithstanding their potential effect on the environment, they already ‘have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment.’ (§ 21084, subd. (a).) The Guidelines implement this intent, by setting forth the ‘classes of projects’ that the Secretary, acting ‘[i]n response to [the Legislature's] mandate,’ ‘has found … do not have a significant effect on the environment.’ (Guidelines, § 15300.)” (Id., at p. 1102.) “In listing a class of projects as exempt, the Secretary has determined that the environmental changes typically associated with projects in that class are not significant effects within the meaning of CEQA, even though an argument might be made that they are potentially significant.” (Id., at pp. 1104-1105.)
Nevertheless, however, “even if a proposed project faces no opposition, an agency invoking a categorical exemption … must ‘consider the issue of significant effects … in determining whether the project is exempt from CEQA where there is some information or evidence in the record that the project might have a significant environmental effect.’ … Thus, an agency may not apply a categorical exemption without considering evidence in its files of potentially significant effects, regardless of whether that evidence comes from its own investigation, the proponent's submissions, a project opponent, or some other source.” (Id., at p. 1103, citations omitted.)
And, “ ‘[w]hen an agency concludes an activity is exempt [from CEQA] based on factual considerations, a court reviews for substantial evidence.’ ” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, citations omitted.) “Substantial evidence ‘means enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached.’ (Guidelines, § 15384, subd. (a).) Substantial evidence includes ‘expert opinion supported by facts’ but not ‘[a]rgument, speculation, [or] unsubstantiated opinion or narrative.’ (Id., § 15384, subds. (a), (b).)” (Ibid.)
Accordingly, the analysis of whether Pixley demonstrates, based on allegations in the amended petition, or documents of which it requests judicial notice, that the class 7 and class 8 exemptions apply is not based on the whether Merritt’s allegations fail to support (or facts subject to judicial notice refute) that the 2026 Allocations “will have a significant effect on the environment” but, instead, whether Merritt’s allegations fail to support that Pixley lacked “substantial evidence support[ing] the determination that [the 2026 Allocation would] assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of the environment,” or alternatively, whether the facts of which Pixley seeks judicial notice establish that “substantial evidence supports [Pixley’s] determination that [the 2026 Allocation would] assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of the environment.” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.)
Still, though, our higher courts have observed, generally: “ ‘Case law is instructive as to which actions fall within these exemptions, and which do not. The prohibition of an activity that evidence shows is associated with “environmental problems, [such as] the contamination of farmland,” constitutes an action to assure “protection of the environment.” ’ (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 707.) ‘By contrast, actions that remove existing wildlife protections, authorize and regulate hunting, or relax existing environmental safeguards do not assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of the environment.’ (Id. at p. 707.) ‘These legal guideposts indicate that’ the class 7 and class 8 exemptions ‘embrace[] projects that combat environmental harm, but not those that diminish existing environmental protections.’ (Ibid.)” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 412, italics added.)
Based on the foregoing, what the court more accurately could have stated in its prior ruling is that while it appeared possible, based on the allegations in the original petition, Merritt could allege the 2026 Allocation “diminish[ed] existing environmental protections” (ibid.) by removing or relaxing existing protections, Merritt had ultimately failed, fundamentally, to include any allegations “concerning [Pixley’s] allocations amongst the various categories comprising the 2026 Allocation,” or “allegations about [Pixley’s] imposition of fees and penalties (or lack of imposition of fees and penalties) incident to those allocations.”
Viewed in light of these standards, the court finds that Merritt has cured the defects from its original petition in its amended petition. Merritt’s amended petition now includes allegations concerning Pixley’s specific allocations amongst the various categories comprising the 2026 Allocation and allegations about Pixley’s imposition of a demand shaping program by way of its imposition of fees and penalties incident to those allocations.
What’s more, Pixley specifically alleges that Pixley lacked “substantial evidence support[ing] the determination that [the 2026 Allocation would] assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of the environment” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 711) and that it specifically failed to “consider[] evidence in its files”—namely, EKI’s determinations—“of potentially significant effects” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1086 at p. 1103) of adopting anything beyond a nominal Precipitation Credit in the 2026 Allocation.
The court declines the invitation by Pixley to invert, on demurrer, its “ ‘ burden of demonstrating’ that substantial evidence supports its factual finding that the [2026 Allocation] fell within the [class 7 or class 8] exemption.” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 705, citations omitted.) Merritt’s petition does not establish that Pixley had substantial evidence to support this finding and the court declines to determine, at the pleading stage, without the benefit of a complete administrative record, that Pixley had substantial evidence based on the documents of which it requests judicial notice.
Additionally, while the court recognizes an argument could be made that the 2026 Allocations should be determined, as a matter of law, not to have “diminish[ed] existing environmental protections” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 412), given the allegations that conclusively establish the 2026 Allocations lowered the Allowable Limit bar at which Exceedance Fees kick in as a disincentive to excess extractions, the court declines to conclude that the only operative consideration in determining whether the 2026 Allocation “diminish[es] existing environmental protections” (ibid.) is whether it resulted in a higher or lower allocation that prior year allocations. The fundamental question at issue is still whether “substantial evidence supports [Pixley’s] factual finding that the [2026 Allocation] fell within the [class 7 or class 8] exemption” (Save Our Big Trees, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 705, citations omitted), and if Pixley, as alleged, allowed for a purportedly sustainable allocation of Precipitation Credit that was, based on evidence in its own files, merely disguised overdraft, and that was not otherwise supportable as exempt based on substantial evidence, then it follows the 2026 Allocation “diminish[ed] existing environmental protections” (Russian Riverkeeper, supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 412).
In the case significantly relied upon by Pixley, California Construction & Industrial Materials Assn. v. County of Ventura (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1 [315 Cal.Rptr.3d 190], the court did not simply determine, as Pixley indicates, “ that ‘no rational dispute’ that an ordinance creating wildlife corridor overlay zones qualified [for class 7 and class 8 exemption], because it fell ‘squarely within the plain language’ of the exemptions.” Rather, the court specifically found, on review of a trial court’s denial of a CEQA petition on a complete record, “more than ample evidence to support the finding of an exemption” including “studies and other documents citing the need to preserve wildlife corridors and the establishment of development standards compatible with wildlife movement, as well as preservations by experts.” (Id., at p. 12.)
The court finds that it requires a complete administrative record to evaluate the same class 7 and class 8 exemption applicability question presented here. Accordingly, the court finds the demurrer cannot be sustained based on asserted applicability of the class 7 and class 8 exemptions.
Whether Merritt’s CEQA Claim is Time-Barred
The court additionally declines to determine at the pleading stage that Merritt’s claim must be construed as a challenge to how the Precipitation Credit is calculated under Rule 3.1, and construed in that manner, is time barred.
Pixley maintains “the limitations period to challenge how [the Precipitation Credit] is characterized or calculated has long since expired” because “is automatically computed each year based on the average of prior years’ precipitation under Rule 3.1, which has been in place since the first version of the Pixley Rules were adopted in February 2020.”
The court does not agree with Merritt that Pixley is constrained in this argument by the court’s prior demurrer ruling because the original petition could not be construed as a challenge to the Precipitation Credit. Again, the court determined Merritt had, in the original petition, entirely “ignore[d] [the] critical demand shaping aspects” of the 2026 Allocation, having included “no allegations concerning [Pixley’s] allocations amongst the various categories comprising the 2026 Allocation” and “no allegations about [Pixley’s] imposition of fees and penalties (or lack of imposition of fees and penalties) incident to those allocations.” Merritt supplies those allegations here, and, again, now frames its attack, specifically, at the Precipitation Credit.
The court is not prepared to conclude, however, absent a full administrative record, that an attack on the inclusion of a Precipitation Credit in the 2026 Allocation that is allegedly mere disguised overdraft is necessarily a challenge to a prior decision to adopt a manner of calculating such credits.
This is perhaps an issue that could resurface, depending on what a full administrative record reflects about Pixley’s CEQA determinations, if any were made, associated with adoption of the method of calculating Precipitation Credit and the manner of allocating it on a year-to-year basis, but the court, again, declines to grasp at determining the issue here, based on the pleadings and documents of which Pixley seeks judicial notice.
Relatedly, the court declines to reach the associated conclusion advanced by Pixley that the 2026 Allocation of the Precipitation Credit was a mere “ministerial” decision exempt from CEQA under Guidelines § 15378, subdivisions (a) and (b).
Pixley contends: “Where a City approves a housing project by right in an area zoned for housing, the fact that it technically has authority to amend its General Plan to prohibit housing as an allowed use does not mean that allowing the by-right housing constitutes an exercise of discretion.”
Pixely does not cite any authority for this proposition and does not otherwise address the question that obviously arises, and that appears could also arise here, as to whether the submitted proposition would hold true if the hypothetical city had, in the initial exercise of discretionary authority in approving the general plan, failed to comply with CEQA. Of course, the precise manner in which the city failed to comply with CEQA would be a very relevant consideration here, as it would be here.
But all of this gets well past what Pixley has submitted in support of its argument. The court is not prepared to determine, on the allegations and what is submitted for judicial notice here, that the 2026 Allocation of the Precipitation Credit was a mere “ministerial” decision exempt from CEQA under Guidelines § 15378, subdivisions (a) and (b). Put simply, the hypothetical purported analogy offered by Pixley, without citation to authority pertaining even to the hypothetical circumstance (let alone the circumstances as they are actually presented in this case), is not self-evidently persuasive that Pixley’s demurrer must be sustained.
Accordingly, the court finds the demurrer cannot be sustained based on asserted grounds that Merritt’s challenge is time barred or that approval of the 2026 Allocation, as to the Precipitation Credit allocation, was an exempt ministerial act.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is overruled.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.
Probate Examiner Recommendations
Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2
Examiner notes for probate matters calendared November 23 – 25, 2026, that allow for posting:
Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.
|
Case Number |
Case Name |
Type |
Status |
Comments |
|
VPR054355 |
In the Matter of De Avila, John Santiago |
Letters of Administration |
Appearance Required |
1. Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed (DE-147S). LR, rule 1000(c)(4). 2. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 3. Proof of Publication not filed |
|
VPR054393 |
In the Matter of Renteria Rivas, Felipe |
Letters of Administration |
Appearance Required |
Petition Item 3b: decedent is a citizen of a foreign country —notice shall be given to a recognized diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country, Prob C § 8113 |
|
VPR054367 |
In the Matter of Melonson, Charles L. |
Letters of Administration |
Appearance Required |
Prob C § 8571: the court in its discretion may require a nonresident personal representative to give a bond in an amount determined by the court |
|
VPR054370 |
In the Matter of Lemons, Patrick |
Letters of Administration |
Recommended for Approval |
|
|
VPR054369 |
In the Matter of Haley, Jamison Christian |
Letters of Administration |
Recommended for Approval |
|
|
VPR054366 |
In the Matter of Figueroa Huidor, Josefina |
Determine Succession to Primary Residence |
Appearance Required |
Petition Item 9a, (3) or (4) and (7) or (8) omitted: any surviving registered domestic partner or issue of a predeceased child |
|
VPR054076 |
In the Matter of Maldonado Arroyo, Celia |
Final Distribution Hearing |
Recommended for Approval |
|
|
VPR051712 |
In the Matter of J.G. 2022 Statutory Minor's Trust |
Instruction Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR054128 |
In the Matter of Cardona, Olivia M. |
Appoint Conservator |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR049933 |
In the Matter of Arteaga, Miguel |
Appoint Successor Conservator |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR054029 |
In the Matter of Palomino, Russell |
Motion Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR054375 |
In the Matter of Willitts, Daniel L. |
Probate Will/Issue Letters |
Recommended for Approval |
|
|
VPR054376 |
In the Matter of Patino, Juvencio |
Letters of Administration |
Appearance Required |
Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed (DE-147S), TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4) |
|
VPR054318 |
In the Matter of West, Cheryl Annette |
Determine Succession to Primary Residence |
Approval Conditional |
Proposed order to be submitted for review |
|
VPR052824 |
In the Matter of Winnett, Lance E. |
Final Distribution Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Petition, paragraph 29: missing schedule for the income receipts included in fee base as required in report on waiver of account, CRC, rule 7.550(b)(6) |
|
VPR050038 |
In the Matter of Egge, Shirley A |
Final Distribution Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR053786 |
In the Matter of Bouthillier, Brian Paul |
Final Distribution Hearing |
Appearance Required |
1. Petition: No reported total fees paid, sales, purchases or exchanges of assets as required on waiver of account, CRC rule 7.550(b). 2. Notice to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors not addressed in petition, Prob C § 9050. 3. Notice to the public entities not addressed in petition, Prob C § 9202(a-c). 4. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties, Prob C § 11601 |
|
VPR049737 |
In the Matter of the Keano I. Rivera Trust |
Accounting Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR049736 |
In the Matter of Jesabell E. Rivera Trust |
Accounting Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR049735 |
In the Matter of the Nicolas M. Sanchez Trust |
Accounting Hearing |
Appearance Required |
Documents in order |
|
VPR039372-00 |
In the Matter of Beatty, Kim Maureen |
Appoint Conservator |
Appearance Required |
Notice of Hearing: a valid service shall be by a non-party pursuant to Probate C § 1261; CCP § 1013 |
PROBATE ADMINISTRATION
Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19
Examiner notes for probate matters: Thursday, November 12, 2026
Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.
PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430
|
Case Number |
Case Name |
Type |
Status |
Comments |
|
PPR054392 |
In the Matter of Shishido, Graycie Noriko |
Letters of Administration |
Appearance required |
Orders and Letters (DE-150/DE-140) not lodged. Pursuant to Probate Code §8571, notwithstanding a waiver of bond, the court in its discretion may require the nonresident of California personal representative to give a bond. |
|
PPR054386 |
In the Matter of Serrato, Mario |
Determine Succession to Primary Residence |
Appearance required |
A written settlement agreement/consents not filed for the buyout provision. Continued jurisdiction to enforce is beyond the scope of a summary administration. |
|
PPR054377 |
In the Matter of Ramos Bedolla, Fernando Angel |
Appoint Temporary Conservator |
Appearance required |
Matter appears to be in order |
South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia
PROBATE GUARDIANSHIP
SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding
Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias
Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:
PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.
|
Hearing Date & Time |
Department Number |
Case Number |
Case Name |
Comments |
|
11/23/26 8:30 AM |
Department 02 |
VPR053391 |
In the Matter of M.L. |
NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating SIBLINGS were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing, 15 calendar days, as required by PROB Code §1460 |
|
11/24/26 8:30 AM |
Department 01 |
VPR054383 |
In the Matter of F.I.G. |
Petitioner was instructed to file an amended questionnaire to reflect correct information for household member NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served ON PARENTS & GRANDPARENTS, pursuant to Probate Code §1511 DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for HOUSEHOLD MEMBER |
|
11/24/26 8:30 AM |
Department 01 |
VPR054294 |
In the Matter of A.A.C.M. |
Matter appears to be in order |