Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, July 21, 2026, are:

Re:              Jones, Richard A. Jr vs. Lower Tule River Irrigation District

Case No.:     VCU329566

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:  Writ of Mandate Hearing

Tentative Ruling: There is no tentative ruling.  Parties are directed to appear.

Re:              In the Matter of The Marina Monica Dunn Trust of 1987

Case No.:     VPR053881

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion to Modify Order re: Instructions

Tentative Ruling: There is no tentative ruling.  Parties are directed to appear.

Re:              Jasmin Megana Delgado, Jacquelin vs. Ruiz Food Products, Inc. et al

Case No.:     VCU320097

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Further (1) Special Interrogatories, Set One as to Defendant Ruiz Food Products, Inc., (2) Requests for Production, Set One as to Defendant Ruiz Food Products, Inc.,  (3) Special Interrogatories, Set One as to Defendant Ruiz Food Exports, Inc., and (4) Requests for Production, Set One as to Defendant Ruiz Food Exports, Inc.,

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To find the motions to compel further responses moot; to issue sanctions against Defendant Products, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally in the amount of $1,520; to issue sanctions against Defendant Exports, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally in the amount of $1,520; Sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

(1) through (4) - Facts and Analysis

In this class action and PAGA matter, Plaintiff alleges, via the amended complaint, causes of action for:

1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197];

2. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198];

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512];

4. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7];

5. Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses [Cal. Lab. Code § 2802];

6. Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203];

7. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements [Cal. Lab. Code § 226];

8. Unfair Business Practices [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.]; and

9. Civil Penalties Under PAGA [ Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, et seq.].

On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff propounded Special Interrogatories, Set No. One and Requests for Production, Set No. One on Defendants Ruiz Food Products, Inc. (“Defendant Products”) and Ruiz Food Exports, Inc. (“Defendant Exports”).

Defendant served responses on August 8, 2025, consisting of objections of vague, ambiguous, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible information, compound, unduly burdensome, oppressive, confidentiality, attorney-client privilege and work product, and that Plaintiff is subject to an arbitration agreement that includes a class waiver.

The parties appear to have met and conferred and extended the deadline to file these motions to compel further a number of times, including up to June 5, 2026.

Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to the discovery at issue and for sanctions in the amount of $3,025 as to each motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, $3,025 as to the motion to compel further responses requests for production as to Defendant Exports and $6,267.26 as  to the motion to compel further responses requests for production as to Defendant Products

Defendant indicates, in opposition to these motions: “Following the filing of the instant Motions, the parties met and conferred further regarding the Motions as well as efforts to mediate this matter. Defendants agreed to supplement their responses to discovery, as it does not intend to enforce its arbitration agreement, and to mediate this matter.”

As such, the motions to compel further responses are moot by the service of supplemental responses.

Sanctions

California Rules of Court rule 3.1348, which provides the Court with discretion to "award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed." (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 409 [citing to California Rules of Court rule 3.1030, which  was renumbered as Rule 3.1348].)

The Court does not find that the objection under the mere presence of an arbitration agreement that Defendants now do not seek to enforce is a sufficient substantial justification for delaying substantive responses to discovery.

Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $3,025 as to each motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, $3,025 as to the motion to compel further responses requests for production as to Defendant Exports and $6,267.26 as  to the motion to compel further responses requests for production as to Defendant Products

Plaintiff’s counsel notes a rate of $550 per hour and filing fees of $79.76 per motion.

The Court will set the hourly rate at $350. The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  

Further, the filing cost per motion is $60.

The Court will award sanctions as follows, jointly and severally against Defendants and their counsel of record as follows:

• Defendant Exports, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $1,520, consisting of 2 hours for each motion at the rate of $350 per hour, plus $120 in filing fees.
• Defendant Products, and counsel of record: Total sanctions of $1,520, consisting of 2 hours for each motion at the rate of $350 per hour, plus $120 in filing fees.

Sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Sequoia Healthcare Alliance vs. Collins, Monique N.

Case No.:     PCU317393

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           15-The Honorable Gary M. Johnson

Motion:       Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order the proposed cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for a single cause of action for breach of contract arising out of the payment of a bonus of $90,000 and a subsequent alleged refusal to repay the bonus after Defendant resigned.

Defendant answered the complaint May 6, 2025.

Trial in this matter was initially set for January 29, 2026. Trial in this matter is now set for September 21, 2026.

On June 24, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for leave to file a compulsory cross-complaint against Plaintiff to assert causes of action for 1. Interference with Rights Under the California Family Rights Act; 2. Failure to Provide Notice of CFRA Rights; 3. Constructive Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 4. Failure to Prevent Violations of FEHA 5. Unlawful Collection or Clawback of Wages 6. Violation of California Wage Law 7. Unjust Enrichment 8. Declaratory Relief 9. Unfair Business Practices.

In support, counsel for Defendant states:

8. Through inadvertence, these claims were not initially pled. Governor Newsom signed into law, effective January 1, 2026, codified in Business and Professions Code § 16608   and Labor Code §926, which reevaluates “stay or pay” contracts that employers make with employees. A few of the guidelines provide that employees must be advised of their right to consult with an attorney, repayment must be prorated, and the retention period cannot be more than two years. Contracts that do not meet the requirement, such as the RBA, are void as contrary to public policy.

9. The statute is proactive and therefore is not the basis of the motion for leave, but rather, the statute language calls for a different analysis of COLLINS viable cross claims. Thus, in preparation of trial, it became evident that there was a need to protect COLLINS’s own action to avoid forfeiture her claims.” (Declaration of Hill ¶¶8, 9.)

Defendant has attached the proposed cross-complaint to the declaration and states further that the causes of action and allegations arise out of the bonus and repayment issues central to the complaint.

In opposition, Plaintiff notes the complaint was filed January 27, 2025 and that Defendant answered the complaint May 6, 2025 without filing a cross-complaint. Further, that during the litigation, Defendant has propounded no discovery, issued no subpoenas and taken no depositions. Plaintiff further notes discovery propounded on Defendant and the deposition testimony discussed the details of Plaintiff’s employment and termination thereof. Further, Plaintiff notes that Defendant has failed to mediate this matter, including unilaterally cancelling the mediation and failing to attend, in person with Defendant, the mandatory settlement conference. Further that “Since the filing of the Complaint plaintiffs have spent time and money serving discovery upon defendant, filing motions to compel appropriate responses from defendant because she refused to provide basic new employment information, taking defendants deposition and interviewing potential witnesses. If the instant motion is granted plaintiff will be required to send new discovery responses, re-notice and take plaintiff's deposition a second time and conduct further investigations which will double the litigation costs and delay the matter from proceeding to trial.” (Declaration of Pritchett ¶15.) Finally, that “Because of the significant delay since the filing of the Complaint, it is likely that key witnesses and information that would have existed in the defense of a Cross Complaint will be unavailable or lost. Plaintiff would suffer severe prejudice if the motion for Leave to File a Cross-Complaint is filed.” (Declaration of Pritchett ¶17.)

Authority and Analysis

A cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the initial complaint or cross-complaint against the cross-complainant must be filed before or at the same time as the answer to the initial complaint or cross-complaint, which answer must be filed within 30 days of service of the complaint or cross-complaint.  (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 412.20(a)(3), 428.50(a), 432.10.)  Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date.  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 428.50(b).) If a party fails to file a cross-complaint within the time limits described above, he or she must obtain permission from the court to file the cross-complaint.  (Code of Civ. Proc.§§ 426.50, 428.50(c).)

Here, trial has been set and therefore Defendant properly seeks leave to file the proposed cross-complaint.

The Court’s review of the proposed cross-complaint indicates it is compulsory. Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30(a) defines a compulsory cross-complaint as having any related cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in the complaint. Code of Civil Procedure section 426.10 (c) defines “related cause of action” means a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. The courts use a logical relationship test, which requires “’not an absolute identity of factual backgrounds for the two claims, but only a logical relationship between them.’” (Currie Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 774, 777.) “At the heart of the approach is the question of duplication of time and effort; i.e., are any factual or legal issues relevant to both claims?” (Id.) Here, the cross-complaint involves the same employment relationship at issue in the complaint, including the circumstances surrounding the bonus.

Where the proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, the court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint so long as defendant is acting in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.)  Section 426.50 further provides that:

“A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.” (Emphasis added.)

Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.  (Id., § 428.50(c).)  Indeed, where a cause of action would otherwise be lost, leave to amend is appropriate even if the party was negligent in not moving for leave to amend earlier:  “The legislative mandate is clear.  A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court.  A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result.”  (Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.)

“[W]hat constitutes “good faith” or lack of it under Code of Civil Procedure section 426.50 must be determined in light of and in conformity with the liberality conferred upon the trial courts by the section and by prior law. . . . [T]his principle of liberality requires that a strong showing of bad faith be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section. (Foot's Transfer & Storage Co., supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at 902.) 

When ruling on whether a party has acted in bad faith, there must be substantial evidence to support a trial court’s decision. (Silver Organizations, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at 99.) Substantial evidence is “evidence of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (Id.) “‘Bad faith,’ is defined as ‘[t]he opposite of “good faith,” generally implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake ..., but by some interested or sinister motive[,] ... not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather ... the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; ... it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.” (Id. at 100.) 

Here, while the explanation as to the timing of review of the law and facts of this case appear to be triggered by law that came into effect nearly seven months ago and is not retroactive, the Court cannot find substantial evidence of bad faith as to the timing of this motion. Further, while Plaintiff notes it will suffer prejudice if this cross-complaint is permitted, the standard appears to be whether Defendant acted in bad faith, not whether the other party will be prejudiced. Here, although there has been a delay between the answer and this motion for leave, and although the parties appear to have failed to otherwise mediate this case, the Court does not find sufficient substantial evidence of bad faith has been presented.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders the cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              CREDITORS ADJUSTMENT BUREAU, INC., vs. LANE, KELSEY E

Case No.:     PCL326241

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Special Interrogatories and (2) Production of Documents; (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To grant the motions order responses within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; (3) To deem Admission Nos. 1 through 11 admitted; to impose sanctions of  $530 total due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Plaintiff shall give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (3)

In this breach of contract, open book account, account stated and reasonable value matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Kelsey E Lane AKA Kelsey Lane AKA Kelsey Elizabeth Lane DBA Toros ADBA Toros Tree Service.

Defendant answered the complaint on September 24, 2025.

On March 6, 2026, Plaintiff served firsts sets for Special interrogatories, Demand for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions on Defendant at the address stated on the answer.

Plaintiff further indicates that on April 14, 2026, Plaintiff emailed Defendant reminding her that her discovery responses were past due and that if Defendant did not respond to the discovery requests by April 17, 2026, motions to compel would be filed and sanctions would be sought.

Plaintiff filed these motions April 23, 2026, noting no responses to the discovery noted above have been provided as of the filing date.

Plaintiff seeks to compel initial responses to special interrogatories and requests for production and to deem admissions admitted.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

The Court notes an April 19, 2026 proof of service filing by Defendant which appears to indicate service, on April 9, 2026 of responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1 through 12 and Requests for Documents Nos. 1 through 19. The Court notes, however, that the proof of service appears to indicate the responses were serve to a person in Visalia and, in any event, do not reference the requests for admissions.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Interrogatories

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set of form interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(2) Requests for Production

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(3) Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 11 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions as requested by Plaintiff on Defendant in the total amount of $530.00, consisting of 1 hours total for all three motions plus $60 filing fee for each motion. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time. Further, the Court sets $350 as the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in this community  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

Sanctions are due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              LUCINDA TERRELL and Estate of JACK TERRELL, by and through its successor in interest et al vs. FERREIRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. et al

Case No.:     PCU334768

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial Preference

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion to July 28, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19 in order to adjudicate this motion with Defendants’ Motion to Stay. The Court notes that if it grants the motion for preference, it intends to set trial within 120 days of this initial hearing date in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 36.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Martin, Jesse vs. Martin, Guadalupe

Case No.:     PCU321765

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Plaintiff’s (1) Demurrer to Amended Answer and (2) Motion to Strike Amended Answer; (3) Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the Second Affirmative Defense (Laches), Third Affirmative Defense (Waiver), Eighth Affirmative Defense (Fraud, Deceit and Misrepresentations by Plaintiff), and Seventeenth Affirmative Defense (Good Faith). Defendants shall have ten (10) days to file  further amended answer;

To sustain the demurrer to the Tenth Affirmative Defense (No Breach by Defendant) and Eleventh Affirmative Defense (No Damages) without leave to amend;

To overrule the demurrer as to the Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises)

(2) To deny the motion to strike as to Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises) and Paragraph 2 of the Prayer – “Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees;”

To grant the motion to strike without leave to amend as to Eighteenth Affirmative Defense (Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses)

(3) To grant the motion to strike as to Paragraph 10(a), in its entirety: “Rent for nine years of usage by J. MARTIN of office/shop/yard at Teapot Dome Property” and “Paragraph 18, in its entirety: “In addition, based on his intentional and malicious conduct, G. MARTIN is entitled to recovery of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof” and No. 3. Paragraph 2 of the Prayer, in its entirety: “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof” with leave to amend; Cross-Complainants shall have shall have ten (10) days to file further amended cross-complaint;

To grant the motion to strike as to No. 4 - Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Prayer and No. 5 - Paragraph 9 of the Prayer as to “attorneys” fees without leave to amend;

To deny the motion to strike as to No. 5 - Paragraph 9 of the Prayer as to “costs of the suit incurred herein”

Plaintiff’s (1) Demurrer to Amended Answer and (2) Motion to Strike Amended Answer

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

Plaintiff pleads causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, cancellation of instrument, partition, accounting, dissolution of partnership, constructive trust and for common counts.

On June 9, 2026, Defendants filed a first amended answer containing a general denial and eighteen affirmative defenses.

Plaintiff demurrers to the following affirmative defenses:

1. Second Affirmative Defense (Laches), on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

2. Third Affirmative Defense (Waiver), on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

3 Eighth Affirmative Defense (Fraud, Deceit and Misrepresentations by Plaintiff), on the ground that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense and is not pleaded with the required particularity. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

4. Tenth Affirmative Defense (No Breach by Defendant), on the ground that it pleads no new matter and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

5. Eleventh Affirmative Defense (No Damages), on the ground that it pleads no new matter and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

6. Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises), on the ground that it pleads no cognizable defense and no new matter, and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

7. Seventeenth Affirmative Defense (Good Faith), on the ground that it pleads no new matter and fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. Code of Civil Procedure § 430.20(a).

Further, Plaintiff moves to strike:      

1. Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises), in its entirety, as redundant and irrelevant matter;

2. Eighteenth Affirmative Defense (Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses), in its entirety, as improper and irrelevant matter;

3. Paragraph 2 of the Prayer, to the extent it seeks an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees,” as a request for relief not supported by contract or statute.

In opposition, Defendant argues sufficient pleading of the affirmative defenses at issue and that the issue of attorneys’ fees is one of proof.

(1) Demurrer - Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 430.20(a) permits a demurrer to an answer where the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. (Timberidge Enters. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 880.)

An answer to a complaint must contain: "(1) The general or specific denial of the material allegations of the complaint controverted by the defendant[;] [and] (2) A statement of any new matter constituting a defense." (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.30(b).) The phrase "new matter" refers to something relied upon by a defendant which the plaintiff does not put at issue. (See Department of Finance v. City of Merced (2019) 33 Cal. App. 5th 286, 294-295.)

As courts have explained, "[w]hat is put in issue by a denial is limited to the allegations of the complaint … A defense in the nature of 'yes, those allegations are true, but … ' is not put in issue by the denial." (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 383-384). With regard to pleading requirements for "new matters" in an answer, the same pleading of ultimate facts rather than legal conclusions is required as in pleading the complaint. In particular, the answer must set forth facts "as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint." (Id. at 384.)

An affirmative defense set forth in an answer will lie when the facts alleged in that defense constitute “new matter,” i.e., facts relied on by the defendant that the plaintiff’s complaint has not already put at issue.  (State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725).  Where the text of an affirmative defense merely contradicts an essential allegation of the plaintiff’s complaint, the affirmative defense does not set forth facts that constitute “new matter” sufficient to sustain the affirmative defense, but only a traverse. (Id.) A new matter is one in which the defendant has the burden of proof. (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 239.)

An affirmative defense must be pleaded with the same sufficient ultimate facts – and not “evidentiary” matter or “legal conclusions” - that a plaintiff would be required to set forth in a complaint.  (Youndall v. Kaufman (1921) 55 Cal.App.363, 368.) The answer must aver facts “as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384.)

Second Affirmative Defense (Laches)

A defendant must plead facts giving rise to laches in the answer. (Protopappas v. Protopappas (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 659, 664-665 ["facts justifying the defense of laches must appear in the pleadings"].)

The Court agrees that the amended answer does not allege “new matter” in support of this defense and sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Third Affirmative Defense (Waiver)

Waiver is an affirmative defense, “and a defendant desiring to take advantage of it must set up in his answer the facts upon which he bases his claim.” (Wienke v. Smith (1918) 179 Cal. 220, 225.)

The Court agrees that the amended answer does not allege “new matter” in support of this defense and sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Eighth Affirmative Defense (Fraud, Deceit and Misrepresentations by Plaintiff)

To establish the defense of fraud when alleged as an affirmative defense, the defendant must prove: (1) that the plaintiff made a fraudulent representation; (2) that the plaintiff knew the representation was not true; (3) that the plaintiff made the representation to persuade the defendant to agree to the contract; (4) that the defendant reasonably relied on this representation; and that the defendant would not have entered into the contract if he had know the representation was not true. See, (See CACI 335.) The Court further agrees that the heighted pleading requirements as to specific that are necessary to plead fraud as a cause of action apply here.

The Court agrees that the amended answer does not allege “new matter” in support of this defense and sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Tenth Affirmative Defense (No Breach by Defendant)

As breach is an element of the cause of action for breach of contract, the Court does not consider this to be an affirmative defense, but instead is substantiated by the general denial to the facts of the complaint, including that the contract was breached.

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

Eleventh Affirmative Defense (No Damages)

Similarly, as damages are an element of some of the causes of action pled in the complaint, the Court does not consider this to be an affirmative defense, but instead is substantiated by the general denial to the facts of the complaint.

As such, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises)

Here, Plaintiff argues that occupancy of partnership property by a general partner is not a defense to a use of action and that no new matter is pled because allegations of the complaint are restated in support thereof.

However, to the extent that these allegations were denied by the general denial, the Court finds the repleading of them here constitutes sufficient “new matter” in support of the defense.

As such, the Court overrules the demurrer here.

Seventeenth Affirmative Defense (Good Faith)

The context of "good faith" constitutes a response outside the scope of the underlying complaint, and therefore places a burden on defendant to support the allegations. It is unclear to the Court whether this constitutes an affirmative defense, but in any event, the amended answer fails to sufficiently set forth the requisite new matter on which the defense is based.

The Court finds that the amended answer does not allege “new matter” in support of this defense and sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Leave to Amend

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish an affirmative defense under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the party can amend to do so. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226. [as to complaints and causes of action].)

Therefore, as to the Second Affirmative Defense (Laches), Third Affirmative Defense (Waiver), Eighth Affirmative Defense (Fraud, Deceit and Misrepresentations by Plaintiff and Seventeenth Affirmative Defense (Good Faith), the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend Defendants shall have ten (10) days to file a further amended answer.

(2) Motion to Strike - Authority and Analysis

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) This provision is for “the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense (Occupancy of the Premises)

The Court has overruled the demurrer above as to this affirmative defense and therefore will deny the motion strike thereto for the same reasons

Eighteenth Affirmative Defense (Reservation of Additional Affirmative Defenses)

The Court will strike the reservation of other defenses without leave to amend, noting that a motion for leave to amend the answer to assert discovered additional affirmative defenses remains an option for the Defendants.

Paragraph 2 of the Prayer – “Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees”

The Court notes that the partition action permits recovery of "…(a) Reasonable attorney's fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit…” (Code Civ. Proc. § 874.010.)

As such, the Court denies the motion to strike as to this portion of the prayer.

(3) Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of First Amended Cross-Complaint

Facts

The first amended cross-complaint pleads causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and dissolution of partnership.

Relevant here, Cross-Complainants allege:

“The expenses, upkeep and other items paid by G. MARTIN and owed by J. MARTIN include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. Rent for nine years of usage by J. MARTIN of office/shop/yard at Teapot Dome Property.

b. Value of inventory (working power tools) unilaterally sold by J. MARTIN, which proceeds should have been shared equally with G. MARTIN

c. Fuel and lodging costs

d. Mileage costs.” (FAXC ¶10.)

Further, as to breach of fiduciary duty, that “In addition, based on his intentional and malicious conduct, G. MARTIN is entitled to recovery of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof.” (FAXC ¶18.)

Additionally, the prayer pleads “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof,” compensatory and special damages sought on the Second Cause of Action for Accounting and for attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein, as permitted by law” (FAXC – Prayer ¶¶2, 4, 5, 9.)

Cross-Complainant seeks to strike the following:

1. Paragraph 10(a), in its entirety: “Rent for nine years of usage by J. MARTIN of office/shop/yard at Teapot Dome Property.”

2. Paragraph 18, in its entirety: “In addition, based on his intentional and malicious conduct, G. MARTIN is entitled to recovery of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof.”

3. Paragraph 2 of the Prayer, in its entirety: “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof.”

4. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Prayer (compensatory and special damages sought on the Second Cause of Action for Accounting).

5. Paragraph 9 of the Prayer, in its entirety: “For attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred herein, as permitted by law”

In opposition, Cross-Complainant argues punitive damages are available in context of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, that the attorney fee claim is a matter of proof and that the past due rent claims in paragraph 10(a) is a “non-exclusive list of unpaid items” and not a specific list of damages.

Authority and Analysis

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) This provision is for “the striking of a pleading due to improprieties in its form or in the procedures pursuant to which it was filed.” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 528.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc § 437.) “When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.” (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)

No. 1 - Paragraph 10(a), in its entirety: “Rent for nine years of usage by J. MARTIN of office/shop/yard at Teapot Dome Property.”

Here, Cross-Defendant argues that the statute of limitations reaches back no more than four years from the filing of the cross-complaint under the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 343 and therefore seeking five additional years of rent beyond the four year period is subject to the motion to strike.

As noted above, the Court may strike irrelevant matter, which includes references to damages beyond the four year statutory period.

The Court agrees and grants the motion as to No. 1 with leave to amend. Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days to file an amended cross-complaint as to this issue.

No. 2 - Paragraph 18, in its entirety: “In addition, based on his intentional and malicious conduct, G. MARTIN is entitled to recovery of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof” and No. 3 - Paragraph 2 of the Prayer, in its entirety: “For exemplary and punitive damages in an amount according to proof.”

In reviewing a motion challenging the sufficiency of punitive damages allegations, the Court must consider whether the factual allegations concerning the actual conduct alleged “apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citations.]”  (Kiseskey v. Carpenters' Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 222, 234.)

While punitive damages appear available as to breach of fiduciary duty, the claim for such damages requires allegations beyond the mere commission of a tort. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895.)  “Notwithstanding relaxed pleading criteria” permissible with other claims, punitive damages “demand firm allegations.”  (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)

"[P]unitive damages are available in cases where the trier of fact finds slander per se," provided the defendant is guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Tilkey v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 521, 557; see Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “Oppression,” “fraud” and “malice” each describe discrete grounds for an award of punitive damages.  “Civil Code section 3294 provides for recovery of exemplary damages for either or all of the three defined delicts -- oppression, fraud or malice.”  (Pistorius v. Prudential Insurance Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 541, 556, fn. 8)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c) defines the terms “malice,” “oppression,” and “fraud” for purposes of punitive damages liability: “(1) ‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. [¶] (2) ‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. [¶] (3) ‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.”

Here, the complaint merely alleges “knowingly and intentionally breach[] [of] fiduciary duties” which does not rise to malice, fraud or oppression. (FAXC ¶16)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to strike with leave to amend as to Nos. 2 and 3. Cross-Complainant shall have ten (10) days to file an amended cross-complaint as to this issue.

No. 4 - Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Prayer (compensatory and special damages sought on the Second Cause of Action for Accounting).

“…[T]he nature of a cause of action in accounting is unique in that it is a means of discovery. An accounting is a ‘species of disclosure, predicated upon the plaintiff's legal inability to determine how much money, if any, is due.’ [citation omitted] Thus, the purpose of the accounting is, in part, to discover what, if any, sums are owed to the plaintiff, and an accounting may be used as a discovery device.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 180.)

As such, the Court agrees that no damages are available as to this cause of action and grants the motion to strike No. 4 without leave to amend.

No. 5 - Paragraph 9 of the Prayer, in its entirety: “For attorney’s fees and costs of suit incurred herein, as permitted by law”

The American rule holds that "each party must pay his [or her] own attorney fees." (Gary v. Don Miller & Assocs., Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 505). "Attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless a statute or contract expressly authorizes them." (Sessions Payroll Management, Inc. v. Noble Const. Co., Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 671, 677.)

Here, Cross-Defendant argues that attorneys fees are not available as to the causes of action pled for breach of fiduciary duty, accounting and dissolution of partnership where the allegations pled an oral partnership agreement.

As such, the Court agrees that no attorneys’ fees are available as to these causes of action and grants the motion to strike No. 5 without leave to amend as to attorneys’ fees.

However, the Court will not strike the “costs of suit incurred herein” portion of Paragraph 9 of the prayer.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Teodo Holdings, LLC vs. Nicholson, Delores

Case No.:     PCL327458

Date:           July 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Defendant/Judgment Creditor Motions to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Special Interrogatories and (2) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2) To find the motions moot via service of responses on June 17, 2026; to order sanctions imposed against Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $470; sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this matter, Defendant/Judgment Creditor obtained a judgment after trial in the amount of $9,250 and indicates further costs incurred in attempting collection thereof.

As part of the collection efforts, Defendant/Judgment Creditor served, on May 5, 2026, Special Interrogatories and Demands for Production on Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor via counsel.

Responses were due no later than June 9, 2026.

As of the filing of these motions on June 16, 2026, no responses had been received.

Defendant/Judgment Creditor seeks to compel initial responses thereto and for sanctions in the amount of $515 as to each motion.

In opposition, Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor indicates service of responses on June 17, 2026 and that therefore these motions, and the request for sanctions, are moot.

Authority and Analysis

A judgment creditor may propound interrogatories and requests for production to the judgment debtor, which may be enforced in the same manner as written discovery in a civil action. (Code Civ. Proc, §§ 708.020(a), (c); 708.030(a), (c).) The written discovery here seeks facts about the nature and location of a judgment debtor’s assets, which is permissible.

(1) and (2) - Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents

Based on the service of initial responses on June 17, 2026, the Court finds these motions moot with respect to compelling initial responses.

Sanctions

The Court finds sanctions are warranted in this instance and that neither Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor nor counsel acted with substantive justification in failing to timely serve responses and imposition of the sanctions would not be unjust. (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.320; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404.)

However, the Court finds the reasonable and appropriate amount of monetary sanctions on this motion to be less than requested. Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions in the amount of $470 total against Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, consisting of one total hour for both motions at the rate of $350 and $120 in filing fees.

The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Sanctions are due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 22, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054079	In the Matter of O'Dell, Lewis Arlin	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued. Documents in order
VPR054013	In the Matter of Guerrero, Aurelio Acuna	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Previous issues remain
VPR054166	In the Matter of John J Maguire	Petition to Compel Accounting	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051521	In the Matter of Kevin M. Engelsgaard	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053103	In the Matter of Otter, Barbara	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Proposed Order:  statutory compensation to be ordered does not reflect statutory compensation requested in Petition
VPR053638	In the Matter of Hellwig Family Revocable Trust	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Notice of Settlement filed
VPR054115	In the Matter of Emerick, Ralph Raymond	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration not filed
VPR054056	In the Matter of Singh Hayer, Simvir	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051993	In the Matter of Mcdonald, Lola	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Bond not posted; letters not issued. Inventory & Appraisal, Accounting and Care Plan remain outstanding

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 16, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054150	In the Matter of Smith, Carolyn Rae	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Original will not lodged in case. Improper Notice of Hearing served, rather than Notice of Petition to Administer, DE-121.
PPR053976	In the Matter of Lemus Orozco, Yamilet	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing of appointment hearing with copy of the Petition required to be served
PPR048739	In the Matter of Luna, Guadalupe	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR053492	In the Matter of Broome, Justin Bryton	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  July  21, 2026  - July 23, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053852	IMO L.R.S.	Status Conference           Need Proof of Deposit to be filed
7/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053080	IMO K.J.M	Need Inventory & Appraisal FINAL to be filed Petition needs Verification, Probate Code §1021 Notice of Hearing needs to be filed, Probate Code §1460
7/22/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR053969	IMO C.G.V.	Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives named in the Petition for Appointment (Grandparents) were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1510, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Appointment DECLARATION of attendance of Guardianship Orientation needs to be filed
7/22/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR050768	IMO A.A.	Review Hearing
7/22/26 10:00 AM	Department 01	VPR053085	IMO M.C.	Contested Hearing
7/23/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR052053	IMO N.C.	Need Notice of Hearing to be filed with proof of service on relatives named in the Petition for TERMINATION (minors, parents, paternal & maternal grandparents) indicating they were served with15 calendar days notice, as required by Probate Code §1460