Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, August 27, 2026, are:

Re:                Becerra. Kevin vs. Pacific Distributing, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU293519

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Continued Hearing re: Final Distribution of Settlement Fund

Tentative Ruling: At the prior hearing, the Court noted the declaration from the settlement administrator indicating that the uncashed funds would be sent to the State Controller around July 30, 2026. The settlement administrator has provided a further declaration indicating that a total of 4 settlement checks, totaling $5,868.43, remain uncashed and that these funds, on July 21, 2026, were distributed to the California State Controller’s Office - Unclaimed Property Fund. No appearances are necessary.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Salado-Gomez, Reyes vs. The Gary and Donna De Graaf Family Trust

Case No.:     VCU297485

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:       Hearing re: Final Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: On August 17, 2026, the parties submitted a joint stipulation to continue this hearing until after February 17, 2027, the check cashing deadline. Therefore, the Court continues this hearing to March 18, 2027; 8:30 am; D1. If a declaration as to distribution is filed no later than five (5) court days prior to this hearing, no appearance will be necessary.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Synn, Susan vs. Qualfon Data Services Group, LLC

Case No.:   VCU328123

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion through enforcement of the delegation clause and to stay the matter pending resolution of the arbitration. Case Management Conference is continued to February 25, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Qualfon Data Services Group, Inc., Davianique Owens, Patsy Wagner and Terrence Vaughn (“Defendants”) for discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in interactive process, wrongful termination, retaliation, failure to pay minimum wage, failure to provide meal and rest breaks, failure to provide accurate wage statements, for waiting time penalties and for failure to timely inspect personnel file.

Defendants move to compel arbitration of these claims based upon an electronically executed “Dispute Resolution Agreement.”

Plaintiff does not appear to dispute electronically executing the Agreement, but does challenge the delegation clause as unconscionable.

Further, the Court notes Plaintiff does not challenge the FAA’s application to the Agreement.

Facts – Delegation Clause

The Agreement states:

“Additionally, except as this Agreement otherwise provides the Arbitrator, and not any court, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the validity, applicability, enforceability, unconscionability or waiver of this Agreement, including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”

Authority and Analysis – Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to this Court’s procedure when faced with a delegation clause:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, Plaintiff makes a specific challenge to the delegation clause. As such, the Court examines the delegation clause and Plaintiff’s challenge thereto regarding unconscionability.  

“There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the clause must be clear and unmistakable. [citation omitted] Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 242.)

Clear and Unmistakable

“The requirement that the language of the delegation clause be clear is straightforward. The law presumes that a delegation to an arbitrator of enforceability  issues is ineffective absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended such a delegation.” (Id.)

In Tiri, the “clause states unambiguously that ‘[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have the exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Agreement . …’” (Id.)

The language here is strikingly similar and therefore the Court finds the first element met.

Defenses – Unconscionability

The Malone court examined procedural and substantive unconscionability related to the delegation clause alone:

“The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability. [Citations.] Both procedural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability must be shown, but ‘they need not be present in the same degree’ and are evaluated on ‘“a sliding scale.”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ [Citation omitted.] ‘Where there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.’ [Citation omitted.]” (Id. at 1561.)

Procedural Unconscionability – Delegation Clause

As to procedural unconscionability, Malone noted this element focuses on “…the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power. [Citation omitted]” (Id.)

 “‘“Oppression occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.”’ [Citation.]” (Citation omitted) When the contract is a contract of adhesion imposed and drafted by the party with superior bargaining power, the adhesive nature of the contract is “evidence of some degree of procedural unconscionability.” (Citation omitted) However, the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Citation omitted)” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that they were required to complete a series of documents within a short period of time to complete the onboarding process, that no one explained the Agreement, that no one informed Plaintiff of the jury trial waiver or the right to consult with an attorney, that no negotiation of the terms took place and that no meaningful review took place.

Where a contract of adhesion includes the unequal bargaining power of contracting parties, with the weaker party’s inability to negotiate, this may indicate procedural unconscionability in the form of oppression. (See Thompson v. Toll Dublin, LLC (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1372.) “The term ‘adhesion contract’ refers to standardized contract forms offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract. [Citations.] The distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that the weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms. [Citations.]” (Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345, 356.) 

The fact that an arbitration agreement is mandatory for employment may be a factor in determining that it is procedurally unconscionable. (See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, 393; Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 114-115.)

However, “a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Therefore, the Court finds some degree of procedural unconscionability as to the delegation clause contained in the Agreement.

Substantive Unconscionability – Delegation Clause

“Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement's actual terms and to assessments of whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. [Citations.] A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”’ [Citation.]” (citation omitted)” (Malone, supra, 226 Cal. App. 4^th at 1561)

Malone concluded that a substantively unconscionable delegation clause has three components: “(1) a delegation clause is outside the reasonable expectation of the parties; (2) delegation clauses are not bilateral; and (3) the arbitrator has a self-interest in finding the agreement arbitrable—both so that the arbitrator can be compensated for arbitrating the dispute on the merits, and so that the arbitrator will be considered for further arbitration assignments.” (Id. at 1563-1564.)

The first element “standing alone, is not sufficient to render the clause unconscionable.” (Id. at 1564)

As to the second element, while the Agreement at issue does name unconscionability as an issue the arbitrator shall have exclusive authority over, it delegates the authority to “resolve any issue relating to the…enforceability…of this Agreement.” While this differs from the language of the delegation clause in Malone, the Court does not find it substantively unconscionable under
Murphy v. Check 'N Go of California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 138.

In Murphy, the arbitration agreement stated the arbitrator would decide “Covered claims includ[ing] ‘any assertion by you or us that this Agreement is substantively or procedurally unconscionable…’” (Id. at 145.) Here, the Agreement’s delegation clause more widely delegates any issue of enforceability, and includes unconscionability.

As such, the Court does not find the second element present here, as the delegation clause does not exclusively single out unconscionability to be determined by the arbitrator.

The third element is preempted by the application of the FAA, which is not challenged by Plaintiff. (Malone, supra, 226 Cal. App. 4^th at 1565-1570.)

Further, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s substantive unconscionability challenge centers on terms not related to the delegation clause, such as discovery, mutuality, and judicial review. These are arguments as to the unconscionability of the Agreement as a whole, as opposed to those specifically directed at the delegation clause. In other words, Plaintiff states Plaintiff is specifically challenging the delegation clause as unconscionability, but fails to set forth an argument regarding why the delegation clause itself is substantively unconscionable under Malone.

Therefore, the Court here concludes, as did the court in Malone the following:

“The delegation clause is not inherently unfair—it is not unilateral; it does not provide for a biased decision maker. Moreover, the clause is clear and unmistakable, and it is not hidden in fine print in a prolix form. We are simply concerned with a clause which may have been outside the reasonable expectations of the party signing a contract of adhesion. This is not overly harsh or so one sided as to shock the conscience. The delegation clause is not unconscionable.” (Id. at 1570-1571.)

Therefore, the Court will enforce the delegation clause and compel arbitration to “…permit the arbitrator to resolve [Plaintiff’s] challenges to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a whole.” (Id. at 1571.)

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:    VCU324716 (Consolidated – Lead)

(Consolidated with Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC vs. Prosperity Farms, LLC et al., PCU325122)

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Approve Procedures for Sale of Real Property

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion. 

Receiver Focus Management Group (Focus) seeks court approval of sale procedures for the sale of Tulare 22, the approximately 1,500 acre pistachio ranch that is the most significant asset in this receivership action. 

If approved, the proposed procedures will result in sale of Tulare 22 (plus the ranch’s 2026 pistachio crop) for $18,227,615 to purchaser, Jay Gill, subject to overbids at a further scheduled hearing for overbids and sale confirmation. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5 permits a receiver, pursuant to court order, to sell real property upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9 [of the Code of Civil Procedure].” 

A. Primary request

In the motion, Focus states it requests entry of a proposed order (which has been submitted with the motion) “by which the Court would, among other things, “(i) approve the Purchase Agreement between the Receiver and the current lead-bidder, Jay Gill … ; (ii) set a further hearing (the ‘Sale Confirmation Hearing’) for October 1, 2026 [a date Focus has already reserved], at which the Court will allow overbids and confirm the sale of Tulare-22 to the prospective overbidder whose qualification package satisfies the requirements detailed in the proposed order … and who submits the highest and best offer for Tulare-22; (iii) approve procedures for the Receiver to give notice of the proposed sale and the Sale Confirmation Hearing; and (iv) approve procedures for qualifying bidders and allowing overbids at the Sale Confirmation Hearing.”

The court notes there is no objection to the proposed sale procedures (except as noted and addressed below). 

The court further notes the following:

1. The purchase agreement reflects a proposed purchase price reached through a competitive bidding process. 

Pearson Realty Inc. (Pearson) broker Sullivan Grosz describes marketing efforts intended to “maximize exposure,” including listing on numerous platforms such as “the Pearson website, MLS, … Land.com, Lands of America, Acres.com and Crexi,” and direct marketing through “distributed email marketing campaigns” and “phone calls … and/or … in person meetings with more than 1,000 industry contacts,” which, according to Grosz, “generat[ed] significant interest.”  According to Grosz, Pearson heard from “more than two dozen brokers and prospective buyers expressing interest in the property, resulting in several competing offers and multiple higher offers being submitted during the sale process.”  In total, Pearson received eight offers, of which bidder Jay Gill’s was the highest at $18,227,615, with the other bids ranging as low as $7,000,000.

According to Juanita Schwartzkopf, senior managing director of Focus, marketing of the property commenced June 4, 2026.  According to both Schwartzkopf and Grosz, the last of the eight offers was received June 27, 2026, and, after that, Gill, who had submitted an earlier lower offer, submitted a revised offer at the $18,227,615 amount. 

According to Schwartzkopf, “[a]fter analyzing the offers, including the purchase prices, treatment of the pistachio crop, deposit amounts, contingencies, due diligence periods, and other key terms, we [Focus] determined that the revised offer submitted by the Lead Bidder [Jay Gill] provides the highest expected recovery for the Receivership Estate.” 

2. The proposed sale procedures involve a facially reasonable overbid process

The proposed agreement reflects, on an “Addendum 1,” that sale of the property is “subject to overbids”; “Buyer and Seller acknowledge that (i) the approval of the sale will be subject to the rights of other interested parties to submit overbids at the approval hearing; and (ii) the Court in the Case shall have the power, in its sole discretion, to cancel the transaction contemplated by the Purchase Documents at any time.”

The court notes the agreement provisions regarding a “Breakup Fee” and a price floor for any initial overbid, while somewhat narrowing the possibility of the receivership receiving a higher bid, are not inherently objectionable.  The “Breakup Fee” appears to reflect a negotiated agreement reached through arm’s length discussions in a marketing process that involved multiple bidders, and the receiver’s explanation for the initial overbid floor appears reasonable, and, importantly, there is no objection to that aspect of the agreement. 

The other proposed overbid and sale confirmation hearing procedures, regarding bid qualification requirements and bid evaluation appear reasonable. 

Further, the court finds it reasonable and appropriate to hold a hearing to receive overbids and to confirm sale at the requested hearing date of October 1, 2026, which Focus has already reserved. 

The court further finds the proposed form of notice of sale submitted with the moving papers appears to conform to the requirements set forth in article 6 of chapter 3 of division 2 of title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. The parties have been kept informed regarding Focus’s analysis of bids for Tulare 22 and have expressed no objection to proposed terms of any proposed bid

According to Schwartzkopf, “[a]fter analyzing the offers, including the purchase prices, treatment of the pistachio crop, deposit amounts, contingencies, due diligence periods, and other key terms, we [Focus] determined that the revised offer submitted by the Lead Bidder [Jay Gill] provides the highest expected recovery for the Receivership Estate.”  Schwartzkopf states that Focus “consulted Plaintiff Conterra Agricultural Capital, LLC and Defendants Michael Graham and Cynthia Graham regarding” its analyses of the bid offers, and “did not receive objections from either of them.”

Focus prepared memorandums regarding the offers received reflecting its analysis, which are attached as Exhibit A to Schwartzkopf’s declaration.  The memoranda attached to Schwartzkopf’s declaration reflect that they were addressed to, amongst others, Conterra and the Grahams. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the proposed sale procedures described in the motion and in the proposed order are reasonable and, there being no objection (except as addressed below), the court grants the motion as to that specific relief requested.

B. Additional “propos[als]”

1. Proposed distribution

Focus additionally “proposes” distribution of the Tulare 22 sale proceeds “in the following order of priority: [¶] a. First, to pay all costs of sale … ; [¶] b. Second, to pay all real property taxes and assessments … ; [¶] c. Third, to pay all outstanding fees, costs, and expenses of the Receivership Estate, including the fees and costs of the Receiver, its agents, and its counsel, to the extent approved or subject to approval by this Court; [¶] d. Fourth, to pay a portion of the remainder of the proceeds to Conterra in an amount not to exceed the total outstanding balance of the Loan, with the specific amount to be discussed between Conterra and the Receiver in light of the anticipated funding needs of the Receivership Estate for the expected duration of the Receivership after the closing of the sale; [and] [¶] e. Fifth, any remaining proceeds shall be held by the Receiver in trust in an interest-bearing account pending further order of the Court.”  Focus states that, “[a]t some point after the close of escrow, and when all other feasible functions of the Receiver under the Appointment Order have been fully administered, the Receiver intends to file a motion for approval of its Final Account and Report,” and “[t]here, … will make further recommendations … regarding the final disposition of remaining proceeds and the resolution of any outstanding creditor priority disputes.”

As Focus indicates, paragraph 10 of the order appointing Focus directs that “[a]fter Receiver pays its operating costs from the proceeds generated from the Receivership Assets according to the Operating Budget, Receiver shall make distributions of funds to Conterra and other creditors based on the nature and priority of their claims,” and paragraph 10 states further that “[t]he Receiver in its discretion may move the Court for an order authorizing proposed distributions.”  (Order Appointing Rec’vr, filed Nov. 21, 2025, in the now consolidated PCU325122 case.)

The court declines to entertain this “propos[al]” as a specific request for any separate order beyond what paragraph 10 of the order appointing Focus already provides.  Given Focus’s statement to the effect that it will move at some later date for orders regarding “final disposition of remaining proceeds” as part of a later request for approval of a final account and report and, further, that neither Focus’s motion, nor proposed order, specifically refers to relief regarding distribution of sale proceeds, there appears to be no sound basis for any additional order regarding distribution of sale proceeds.  

2. Sale free and clear of liens, encumbrances, claims and interests

Additionally still, “the Receiver proposes that the sale of Tulare-22 be free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims, and interests, including the lien of Conterra under the Deed of Trust recorded August 24, 2018 as Instrument No. 2018-0046837 of Official Records (as assigned to Conterra by Instrument No. 2021-0063300); the lis pendens recorded by Conterra on September 23, 2025 as Instrument No. 2025-0047191 of Official Records; the lis pendens recorded by Compeer Financial, ACA/FLCA/PCA on August 19, 2025 as Instrument No. 2025-0039993 of Official Records; the Certificate of Lien for Delinquent Groundwater Extraction Fees recorded March 19, 2026 as Instrument No. 2026-0012801 of Official Records, to the extent the same has not been released by the time of the closing; the Receiver’s own liens; and any other liens or encumbrances of record as identified in the preliminary title report [attached as Exhibit B to the declaration of I. Keller submitted concurrently in support of Focus’s motion].”

The court again notes the absence of any specific reference to requested orders approving sale “free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims, and interests” in either the motion or proposed order. 

It is perhaps the case that the purchase and sale agreement with Mr. Gill, attached as Exhibit B to Ms. Schwartzkopf’s declaration in support of Focus’s motion, includes terms indicating the sale is to be “free and clear of all liens, encumbrances, claims, and interests,” but the moving papers do not clearly state as much and the court was unable to locate such provisions in its own review of the agreement.  In any event, the court assumes the proposed sale procedures will result in sale of Tulare 22 free and clear of liens but does not discern that it is requested to make any orders beyond approval of the purchase and sale agreement as indicated in Focus’s motion and proposed order.  The court makes no order, here, beyond approval of the purchase and sale agreement. 

C. The Graham’s limited objection and reservation of rights

The court recognizes the great significance of the fact that all indications here are that the proposed sale procedures will result, effectively, in a short sale of the property, likely tens of millions of dollars less than the probable amount outstanding on the underlying more than $32 million loan obligation giving rise to this receivership action, plus amounts likely to be claimed payable for, inter alia, costs of sale, taxes and assessments, and the receiver’s claimed fees, costs and expenses.

Of great concern to the Grahams, as they’ve stated in the course of these proceedings, is that Conterra’s underlying complaint includes a cause of action for entry of a deficiency judgment “[u]pon sale of the Real Property Collateral … as to Prosperity Farms and the Grahams, should any such deficiency exist” (the court recognizes, here, the Grahams have made no concessions as to the availability of this relief against them). 

The court further notes the Grahams, for their part—and they are the only parties to have filed any response to Focus’s motion at all—have submitted only a “limited objection and reservation of rights.”  In it, they express no direct qualms with the proposed sale procedures but do imply the possibility that more could be had from a sale of Tulare 22 with Tulare 20, which is an issue they raised in their prior motion for instructions.

The Grahams claimed to have received an email from counsel for CA Farms, LLC, which, in substance, states that “[t]he subject Deed of Trust includes 313 acres that are not included in the proposed sale,” and that the significance of this is that, without those 313 acres, “groundwater [would be] the only source for irrigation of the subject property.”  The email indicated, per the Grahams, “[t]he 313 acres presently provides additional sources of water for the subject property,” having “first priority water use of 5 miles of canals pulled from the White River along the northern border of the 313 omitted acres” and “is a recharge basin that collects and stores storm water as well as the delivery origination point for water purchased through the White River.”  Further, the email adds, per the Grahams, “[a]s you [the Grahams] know, there are appraisals valuing the property to be sold that include the 313 acres water source for 70 million,” and “the difference between 70 million and the present sales prices sought to be approved is the removal of the water rich 313 acres from the present sale that is the subject of the August 27th hearing.”

The Grahams then state (a) they do not endorse or reject the factual assertion advanced by CA Farms, LLC; but (b) “raise it for the attention of the Court and the Receiver,” highlighting that “the Receiver is duty-bound to investigate all relevant facts which could affect the value or marketability of the property, including water rights” and that “the Grahams previously moved for an order requiring the sale of Tulare 20 and Tulare 22 together, one of the reasons being the additional water supply would generate a higher price per acre in a combined listing.”

The court recalls that the Grahams previously moved to instruct the receiver to sell Tulare 22 and Tulare 20 together, and that the Grahams represented in a supporting declaration, albeit on information and belief, “that there is a supplemental water source from the White River that Tulare 22 has direct access to, but Tulare 20 does not.” “On information and belief,” the Grahams asserted, “Tulare 20 can access that White River water source because of the integrated water infrastructure” and “this constitutes a second source of surface water which increases the value of both properties.”

The court notes, as a threshold matter, that it is obvious the reference to the “313 acres” assertedly made by CA Farms’ counsel’s must be a reference to Tulare 20, and it might be too obvious to acknowledge, but for the cryptic reference to “[t]he subject Deed of Trust” that “includes [the] 313 acres.” 

The court notes this reference for a couple of reasons.

First, it does not appear “[t]he subject Deed of Trust” refers to the deed of trust that was recorded in connection with the underlying $32,823,750 loan assigned to Conterra in this case. 

As reflected in the grant deed by which Prosperity Farms, LLC purported to transfer Tulare 20 to Prosperity Farms Ranch 20, LLC, Tulare 20 is comprised of APNs 333-270-002, -003, -004, -012, -013, and -014.  (See Ex. X of Conterra’s Index of Exhibits in support of its prior motion for appointment of receiver, filed Sept. 16, 2025 in consolidated PCU325122 (Conterra’s Exhibits).)  The APNs in the deed of trust that was recorded in connection with the underlying $32,823,750 loan in this case, however, were 333-010-004; 333-170-001, -003, -017, -019; and 333-270-001.  (See Ex. D, Conterra’s Exhibits.)

Second, it could be, and is perhaps likely, that “[t]he subject Deed of Trust” refers to the same deed of trust referenced by the Grahams in their cross-complaint filed in this action on February 18, 2026, in which the Grahams allege, in substance, that Ron Cook transferred title of Tulare 20 to Prosperity Farms Ranch 20 without the Grahams participation or consent, and that Cook, through Corporate America Lending (CAL), subsequently “recorded a Deed of Trust against the Tulare 20 showing a loan for $2,500,000.00,” which “loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent.”

If that is true, though, reference to this deed of trust in the context of the email described by the Grahams in their limited opposition is curious.  As it happens, as far as the court is aware, CA Farms’s counsel is also counsel for Cook and CAL, and it would appear unusual for him to point out, to the Grahams of all people, assuming the representations about the email are accurate, that by selling Tulare 22 without Tulare 20, the receivership estate will receive substantially less—less than a third—of what it could realize if Tulare 20 were part of the sale, particularly as the failure to include Tulare 20 is, based on the allegations made in this case, significantly a consequence of the disputed matter of the transfer of Tulare 20 from Prosperity Farms to Property Farms Ranch 20 and its subsequent encumbrance by a disputed $2.5 million deed of trust, all allegedly through wrongful acts on the part of Cook.

In any event, all that the Grahams request, here, is “that the order granting the Motion, and any order confirming a sale of Tulare-22, carry forward, in its exact terms, paragraph 26 of the Appointment Order (‘Reservation of Rights and Defenses’) which provides in relevant part:

Nothing in this Order shall be deemed or construed as a waiver, admission, or acknowledgment by the Grahams of any factual dispute, legal issue, or defense that may be raised in connection with their opposition to Conterra claims, including without limitation any claims asserting the Grahams’ personal liability under the promissory note at issue in this action. Except as to the appointment and authority of the Receiver, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this Order shall not have any preclusive effect, including claims preclusion or issue preclusion, on the Grahams’ defenses to personal liability or any other claims or defenses asserted by them in this action. To the extent any provision of this Order is or may be interpreted as inconsistent with the rights, reservations, and protections set forth in the foregoing paragraph (the ‘Non-Waiver and No Findings Provision’), the Non-Waiver and No-Findings Provision shall control and prevail over such inconsistent provision.”

The court is not entirely certain what to make of this request, except it can determine that there is no good reason for the court to accommodate it.  There is no reason to restate the subject provision in “the order granting the Motion[] and any order confirming a sale of Tulare-22.”  The order is stated; it need not be restated so as to “carry [it] forward.”

The court does note that it appears, based on the concerns the Grahams expressed in their prior motion for instructions, that they, here, seek assurances that they are not—by declining to oppose the sale of Tulare 22 without Tulare 20, or in some other way commencing litigation regarding the sale of Tulare 22 without Tulare 20—waiving any rights or defenses, and not admitting or acknowledging anything, “that may be raised in connection with their opposition to Conterra claims, including without limitation any claims asserting the Grahams’ personal liability under the promissory note at issue in this action.”

The court, however, is in no position to provide such assurances, certainly not in the abstract manner they are sought here.  Indeed, the court is not even certain that the purpose of the Grahams’ request is the assurances indicated—it just presumes that is likely because it is the most plausible seeming explanation for the Grahams’ request.  Ultimately, though, if such assurances are what the Grahams seek, the court cannot give them because it is for the Grahams to decide if, when and how they litigate matters in their own interests, and this court is left only to determine matters if and when they are put before it for determination. 

The court notes the Grahams additionally request that, “[i]f the Court is not inclined to adopt the requested modification, the Grahams request that the order reflect that it is entered over their limited objection and that all parties’ rights, claims, and defenses are preserved.”  This appears to be another angle at receiving the assurances the court suspects are at the heart of their primary request. 

The court will recognize that, in granting the receiver’s motion as herein provided, it does so over the Grahams’ standing objection to any rejection of their request that any order granting the receiver’s motion “carry forward, in its exact terms, paragraph 26 of the Appointment Order (‘Reservation of Rights and Defenses’).”  This court’s order on the receiver’s motion, to be clear, is intended to have no bearing on any “parties’ rights, claims, and defenses” except those framed by the receiver’s motion requesting approval of sale procedures, and neither confirms nor disclaims whether any other such “rights, claims, and defenses” are preserved. 

There being no direct objection, however, to the proposed sale procedures, and Focus having shown that the proposed sale procedures are reasonable, the court finds that the motion should be, and it therefore is, granted. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Cruz. et al., v. Monrovia Nursery Company

Case No.:   VCU304732

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Amend Complaint to Add Class Representatives

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order Plaintiff to file the proposed amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing; to require counsel to appear at this hearing as to the setting of a deadline to file the motion for class certification pursuant to California Rule of Court, rule 3.764(b); Counsel may appear in any manner.

Facts

In this class action matter, filed initially by Plaintiffs Cruz and Korey, Defendant has settled with a number of class representatives resulting in the addition of new class representatives and multiple amended complaints, only to be followed by further rounds of settling with these newly named class representatives. As it stands, the current class representatives are Eliseo Ureno, Serapio Castellanos and Jaime Martinez.

Plaintiffs now bring this motion to amend the complaint to add class representatives, noting that Defendant, via counsel, indicates that Plaintiffs Serapio Castellanos and Jaime Martinez have settled their claims and are no longer suitable as class representatives. The Court will not take on this issue on Plaintiff’s motion.

Plaintiffs seek to add Liliana Raya Torres as class representative.

In opposition, Defendant argues Plaintiff has delayed this amendment, and prosecution of this case, that Defendant has suffered prejudice and that no class certification hearing has been set.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, subsection (a) is complied with via the attached redlined proposed amended complaint and description in the motion of the proposed changes. Additionally, the declaration of counsel complies with subsection (b). The effect of the amendment is to name new representative plaintiffs. The amendment is necessary because Defendants indicate that some of the current class representatives have settled their claims and have terminated their relationship with counsel.

Additionally, seeking leave on the basis noted above appears proper under Pirjada v. Sup. Ct. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1074:

“By the time the motion was filed, the court had already chosen other means to protect the absent class members—it gave Westrup Klick leave to amend the complaint after using informal means to identify potential replacement  class representatives” (Id. at 1087.)

Even where a plaintiff has been dilatory in bringing the motion, the Court should not deny the motion unless the opposing party can show prejudice. (Kittredge Sports Company v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048.)

Prejudice exists where amendment would: (1) cause a delay of trial; (2) increase preparation costs; (3) change the focus of the complaint; or (4) increase discovery burdens. (Magpali, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Additional discovery costs may support a claim for prejudice. (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739 [“Prejudice exists where the proposed amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens.”].)

Here, there is no current trial date, there is no increase to preparation costs, there is no change to the focus of the complaint and there is no discussion of increased discovery burdens.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion. The Court orders the proposed amended complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

However, the Court will hear argument as to establishing a deadline for filing the motion for class certification. (California Rule of Court, rule 3.764(b).) Defendant indicates it has produced policies and procedures, documents showing employee practices, and wage statements/personnel files.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Asman, Bruce E vs. Lisitsyn, Maxim Leo

Case No.:   VCU332655

Date:           August 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order Defendants to file the proposed answer no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. Case Management Conference is continued to November 17, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiffs sue Defendants Maxim Leo Lisitsyn, Melson Realty, Inc., Alma Rosa Jimenez and Bloom Group, Inc. for negligence and misrepresentation.

Relevant here, on May 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed proofs of service as to Defendants Jiminez and Melson Realty.

The proof as to Jimenez indicates substitute service of the summons and complaint took place at 1220 W Main St. Visalia, CA at “9:21” on March 27, 2026 and that the documents were left with “Angie Zavala office manager.” The documents were thereafter mailed. Attached to the proof is a statement by Matti Hopper “under penalty of perjury” which states three prior attempts at “2:30”, at “9:20” and at “12:00pm” on different days in March.

The proof as to Melson Realty is substantially the same.

On June 24, 2026, default was entered as to Defendants Jimenez and Melson Realty.

On July 7, 2026, Defendants Jimenez and Melson Realty filed this motion for relief from entry of default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In support, Defendants provide the declaration of counsel who states:

“2… Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint on May 19, 2026.

3. Defendants’ counsel immediately and timely prepared an Answer for filing. However, due to a calendaring and administrative oversight, the Answer was not timely filed.” (Declaration of Barney ¶¶2, 3.)

Defendant attached a proposed answer as Exhibit A to the declaration of counsel.

In opposition, Plaintiffs challenge the calendaring error excuse provided, noting that Defendants’ counsel had been in contact with Plaintiffs prior to entry of default, that the parties discussed resolution of the case, and that Defendants waited an additional 13 days after entry of default to file this motion.

Authority and Analysis

Generally, under California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the court may grant discretionary relief to a party from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding that was entered against the party due to excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect on the part of the party. (Id.)

However, also under California Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), the court must grant relief when an attorney for the party seeking relief submits a sworn affidavit attesting that his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect caused the judgment to be entered against the party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473(b); Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438 [explaining difference between mandatory and discretionary relief under section 473, subd. (b)].)

As to this mandatory relief provision, Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) states, in relevant part, the following:

“…Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b))

Here, the motion is timely as it is made within six months of entry of default.

Counsel for Defendant has submitted a sworn declaration attesting, generally, to failing to file a timely responsive pleading due to a calendaring and administrative oversight. “Relief is mandatory when a complying affidavit is filed, even if the attorney's neglect was inexcusable.” (SJP Limited Partnership v. City of Los Angeles (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 511, 516-517; Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 225.)

“‘The only limitation is when the court finds [that] the default [or dismissal] was not in fact the attorney's fault, for example when the attorney is simply covering up for the client…’ (Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 816, 821.)” (Todd v. Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)

Motions brought under section 473 involve “an assessment of credibility by the trial court.” (Behm v. Clear View Techs. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1, 15.) In Behm, the court upheld the trial court’s determination that an attorney’s affidavit of fault lacked credibility based on “contradictions and discrepancies” between the attorney’s affidavit and his “earlier representations to the court.” (Id.) This included “different excuses” than those that had been provided earlier in the litigation for the same conduct. (Id.) The court concluded that the attorney had “forfeited his credibility when in his subsequent affidavit, he attempted ‘to change the facts and blame himself.’” (Id. at 16.) Thus, the court had not erred in finding the affidavit “incredible” and denying mandatory relief under § 473(b). (Id.)

Behm does not appear to be analogous here, as the Court does not find any such contradictions that would warrant denial. Defendants’ counsel could have both failed to properly calendar the response date and engaged in discussions as to resolution of the case prior to default, and during the period Defendants had to respond to the complaint.

“Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) Where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and no prejudice to the opposing party will result from setting aside the default and letting the case go to trial on the merits, “very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.” (Id.)

Next, subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” Here, this requirement is met through Exhibit A.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion. Defendants are ordered to file the proposed answer no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 26, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054190	In the Matter of Medina, Jose Luis	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 2d(2):  amount of bond omitted
VPR053497	In the Matter of Chavez, Lily Mendez	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053305	In the Matter of Prine, Audrey R.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition paragraph 12; 14 Statutory Computation:  loss on sale of $165,000 does not reflect loss on sale of $168,000 in Schedule A. 2. Extraordinary Fees Request:  must be accompanied by a statement of the facts specifying the amount and hourly rate for each category as required in CRC, rule 7.702 and 7.703
VPR053501	In the Matter of Martinez, Raymond Carl	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR048986	In the Matter of Hurtado, Samuel Martinez	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054128	In the Matter of Cardona, Olivia M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order. Court investigation not completed
VPR054125	In the Matter of White, Kristophor Gary	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 20, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	The copy of the Will is not attached to the petition; the attachment appears to be a Trust. Petition concerning Trust administration/internal affairs has not been filed.
PPR054184	In the Matter of Arroyo-Rico, Gabriela	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Terminate Conservatorship Hearing	Appearance Required	Matter appears to be in order
PPR054054	In the Matter of Northam, Rita	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Termination petition filed. Appointment not necessary

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 26, 2026 - August 27, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054189	In the Matter of L.V.C.	Appoint Temporary Guardian- no issues to address
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054178	In the Matter of L.A.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice to be addressed for MOTHER and Maternal grandmother. Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance has not been filed DOJ Background record check needs to be completed
8/26/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053596	In the Matter of A.A.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice to be addressed for FATHERS Marquez & Chavez
8/27/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053941	In the Matter of A.A.C.	Declaration of Guardianship Orientation attendance has not been filed DOJ Background record check needs to be completed
8/27/26 11:00 AM	Department 19	PPR054287	In the Matter of K.I.R.F.	Appoint Temporary Guardian