Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, September 22, 2026, are:

Re: Requejo, Christine Leanne vs. Valley Health Team, Inc.

Case No.: VCU291366

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Hearing re: Final Compliance re: Distribution of Settlement Fund

Tentative Ruling: On September, 2026, the settlement administrator, through its case manager, filed a declaration indicating that the check cashing deadline was October 7, 2026, that fifty-one (51) checks, totaling $56,352.67 remain uncashed and the these checks will be sent to the cy pres recipient California State Controller’s Office – Unclaimed Property. Therefore, the Court directs the settlement administrator to remit the uncashed funds to the State Controller pursuant to the settlement agreement.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Hernandez, David vs. Mitchell Lewis & Staver CO.

Case No.: VCU307083

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as modified herein; to set the hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for April 6, 2027, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on September 22, 2026. The Court finds and rules as follows:

On August 27, 2026, the settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On February 4, 2026, the administrator received a mailing list of 52 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On February 24, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 52 members. Four (4) notices were returned and updated addresses for two (2) were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, two (2) notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until April 27, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 52 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.)

The Court calculates that the net settlement amount of $151,066.11 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $6,257.56, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $3.13, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $2,694.42.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133. This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert. The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $285,000 or $95,000. Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 129 at rates ranging from $1,000 per hour to $675 per hour, resulting a base lodestar of $98,700. (Declaration of Gray ¶26.)

The Court, however, will not award $1,000 per hour on these motions. The Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court will reduce Mr. Lavi's rate to $950 per hour, resulting in an adjusted total base lodestar of $97,200.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $23,933.89. (Declaration of Gray ¶41.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $4,890.00.

The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable.

The settlement agreement designates the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $285,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$95,000.00
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$23,933.89
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$4,890.00
Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$10,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$151,066.11

Therefore, the Court sets the hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for April 6, 2027, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

Re: De Leon, Elizabeth vs. Visalia Citrus Packing Group Inc.

Case No.: VCU308372

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as modified herein; to set the hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for April 6, 2027, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

Facts and Analysis

On August 28, 2026, the settlement administrator Phoenix Settlement Administrators, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On May 28, 2026, the administrator received a mailing list of 53 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On June 11, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 53 members. Zero (0) notices were returned.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until August 10, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 53 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

A net settlement amount of $138,787.43 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $6,396.90, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $292.43, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $2,960.85.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $285,000 or $92,400.

The Court notes 97 hours were indicated as incurred at the preliminary approval motion and that the Court adjusted the rates to $950 to $350 per hour. The Court also awarded 1.5 times the adjusted base lodestar and therefore previously approved $72,075 in fees.

Counsel indicates 110 hours incurred, which appears reasonable to the Court. The Court also notes that most of the work done in that case was billed by three attorneys with less than five years’ experience. The rates approved here are consistent with the rates charged by far more experienced attorneys locally.

However, counsel again asserts the hourly rates that the Court did not previously approve at the motion for preliminary approval. The Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total
Joshua D. Boxer	$1,150	$950	14.3	$13,585
Sara Tosdal	$925	$700	2.6	$1,820
Clare Moran	$650	$450	43.3	$19,485
Joyce P. Lee	$500	$350	21.3	$7,455
Matthew D. Scammahorn	$500	$350	29.1	$5,705
Adjusted Base Lodestar:	$52,530

Therefore, to award the $92,400 in fees request, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.76. As indicated previously, the Court has reviewed the declarations of counsel in support of what is now an additional .26 multiplier, but, in its discretion, rules that the additional .5 awarded adequately takes into account the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented. (See In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1052 quoting Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819, 833) Despite any agreement by the parties to the contrary, the Court has an independent responsibility to review the attorney fee provision of the settlement agreement and award an amount that it determines to be reasonable. (Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 128.)

Therefore, the Court will preliminarily approve 1.5 times the adjusted lodestar of $52,520, or $78,795.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $36,417.57. (Declaration of Boxer ¶45)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees, as adjusted, and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $6,000. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable.

The settlement agreement designates distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $285,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$78,795.00
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$36,417.57
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,000.00
Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$20,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$138,787.43

Therefore, the Court sets the hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for April 6, 2027, 8:30 am. Dept. 2.

Re: David, Ramil Bungcayao vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.: VCU323083

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion re: Determination of Civil Penalties

Tentative Ruling: To award a $57,000 penalty to Plaintiff

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant for:

1) Civil Code section 1793.2(d)

2) Civil Code section 1793.2(b)

3) Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3)

4) Civil Code section 1793.1(a) (Breach of Express Warranty)

5) Civil Code sections 1791.1 and 1794 (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability)

The complaint seeks a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(c) as to the first cause of action involving Plaintiff’s purchase of a new 2024 Honda Ridgeline VIN 5FPYK3F41RB030221(“Subject Vehicle”). By this motion, plaintiff seeks a civil penalty of $57,000, one times the agreed restitution amount.

Plaintiff indicates that the Subject Vehicle was purchased new on September 23, 2024 and that, on November 4, 2024, at 537 miles, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Clawson Honda because blue smoke came out of the exhaust under both hot and cold conditions. Plaintiff indicates that the repair record indicates the dealer contacted the “Honda Tech Line” and thereafter removed and inspected the spark plugs at the Tech Line’s direction. Further, that Plaintiff was instructed by the dealer to continue driving because the engine was new. The invoice indicates the Subject Vehicle was ready December 9, 2024.

On June 16, 2025, at 8,239 miles, Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to Visalia Honda for blue smoke from the tailpipe. Plaintiff indicates that the Tech Line report identified this matter as a repeat visit, that Honda became directly involved in the diagnosis, the dealer found serious internal engine damage including a bent valve, and Honda authorized replacement of the short block under warranty. The Subject Vehicle remained at the dealership until August 6, 2025.

Plaintiff filed this matter July 7, 2025, while the Subject Vehicle was at the dealer for repair.

Plaintiff took the deposition of Defendant’s expert witness on June 22, 2026 who confirms that the Subject Vehicle was initially at the dealer in November 2024 for more than 30 days for the blue smoke condition and that the dealership did not repair the condition at that time, having recommended driving the car for 5,000 miles. (Deposition of Newallis 106:16-25, 107:1-18.) Further, that Newallis testified the car was presented twice for the blue smoke issue. (Deposition of Newallis 106:9-13.)

Additionally, Plaintiff took the deposition of Defendant’s corporate designee on June 25, 2026 who testified that as of July 7, 2025, when the suit was served, the Subject Vehicle was being repaired for warranty work, that after being served with the complaint, Defendant did not offer to repurchase the Subject Vehicle until Defendant’s counsel served the repurchase offer during a break in this deposition. (Deposition of Pacheco 72-73.)

Defendant, in opposition, submits the declaration of Pachecho stating that the November 4, 2024 event did not generate a “Techline Report” and that a Techline Report was first generated June 18, 2025. (Declaration of Pachecho ¶¶6, 7.) Further, that there was only one warranty claim for the Subject Vehicle in the amount of $7,984.93 and the claim was processed on August 28, 2025. (Declaration of Pacheco ¶11.)

This matter settled July 2, 2026, for $57,000, but left open the issue of whether a penalty, if any, should be assessed under Civil Code section 1794(c) as to a willful failure to comply with Song Beverly’s requirement to repurchase the Subject Vehicle based on the two events identified above.

Plaintiff seeks a penalty equal to $57,000.

Authority and Analysis

Here, Plaintiff expressly argues that Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2) is the basis for the liability here and permits a penalty for willful violation thereof under section 1794(c).

If a manufacturer or its representative cannot service or repair the vehicle "to conform to the applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall either" promptly replace the new motor vehicle or make restitution. (Civ. Code, § 1793.2(d)(2).) A "nonconformity" means a nonconformity which "substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the new motor vehicle to the buyer or lessee." (Civ. Code, § 1793.22(e)(1).)

"If the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the judgment may include, in addition to the amounts recovered under subdivision (a), a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages." (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)

The Court starts with the issue of “reasonable number of repair opportunities” and the rebuttable presumption under Civil Code section 1793.22.

Section 1793.22(b) states:

“(b) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been made to conform a new motor vehicle to the applicable express warranties if, within 18 months from delivery to the buyer or 18,000 miles on the odometer of the vehicle, whichever occurs first, one or more of the following occurs:

…

(3) The vehicle is out of service by reason of repair of nonconformities by the manufacturer or its agents for a cumulative total of more than 30 calendar days since delivery of the vehicle to the buyer. The 30-day limit shall be extended only if repairs cannot be performed due to conditions beyond the control of the manufacturer or its agents. The buyer shall be required to directly notify the manufacturer pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) only if the manufacturer has clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the buyer, with the warranty or the owner’s manual, the provisions of this section and that of subdivision (d) of Section 1793.2, including the requirement that the buyer must notify the manufacturer directly pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2). The notification, if required, shall be sent to the address, if any, specified clearly and conspicuously by the manufacturer in the warranty or owner’s manual. This presumption shall be a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, and it may be asserted by the buyer in any civil action, including an action in small claims court, or other formal or informal proceeding.”

Here, the Vehicle, during November 2024 and June 2025, was less than 18 months from delivery and less than 18,000 miles. Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle twice for the same blue smoke issue and each presentation lasted more than 30 days both independently and cumulatively.

The law does not require more than this by Plaintiff. Oregel v. American IsuzuMotors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103-1104 notes “[T]he only affirmative step the Act imposes on consumers is to ‘permit[] the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle.’ Whether or not the manufacturer’s agents choose to take advantage of the opportunity, or are unable despite that opportunity to isolate and make an effort to repair the problem, are matters for which the consumer is not responsible.”

Defendant argues that the first presentation did not result in a “Techline Report” and that the Court should find only a single presentation under the Song Beverly Act has occurred. However, this would appear to impose some requirement outside the Plaintiff’s control as to how a manufacturer or dealer labels or categorizes a repair. Plaintiff’s vehicle emitted blue smoke, and Plaintiff took the Subject Vehicle to an authorized dealer November 4, 2024. The blue smoke issue occurred again and Plaintiff took the Subject Vehicle for service June 16, 2025.

Both of these presentations above lasted more than 30 days independently and therefore meet the cumulative 30-day requirement under (b)(3).

Defendant argues that the lawsuit was filed before the conclusion of the second presentation and therefore Plaintiff cannot establish two presentations. However, the 30 days had already elapsed via the first presentation.

As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has established via the rebuttable presumption under section 1793.22(b)(3).

Defendant did not offer to repurchase the Vehicle until June 25, 2026.

Having established the presumption and finding Defendant has not rebutted it, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently established a violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2).

As such, the Court examines whether the Defendant’s failure to promptly replace or buy back the Subject Vehicle was willful in nature.

Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104 notes:

“The proper standard, as explained by the court in Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 174, 185 is that: ‘…a violation is not willful if the defendant's failure to replace or refund was the result of a good faith and reasonable belief the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present. This might be the case, for example, if the manufacturer reasonably believed the product did conform to the warranty, or a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been made, or the buyer desired further repair rather than replacement or refund. [¶] Our interpretation of section 1794(c) is consistent with the general policy against imposing forfeitures or penalties against parties for their good faith, reasonable actions. Unlike a standard requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant actually knew of its obligation to refund or replace, which would allow manufacturers to escape the penalty by deliberately remaining ignorant of the facts, the interpretation we espouse will not vitiate the intended deterrent effect of the penalty. And unlike a simple equation of willfulness with volition, which would render 'willful' virtually all cases of refusal to replace or refund, our interpretation preserves the Act's distinction between willful and nonwillful violations.’ (Original italics.)”

Kwan further notes “We agree a manufacturer who refused a refund or replacement on the ground a reasonable number of repair attempts had not been made, without making any effort to gather the available information on repair history, might well be deemed to have acted willfully. A decision made without the use of reasonably available information germane to that decision is not a reasonable, good faith decision.” (Kwan, supra, 23 Cal. App. 4th at 186.)

Here, the Court has found a reasonable number of attempts had occurred via the presumption established above at the time the lawsuit was filed. Further, the repair was completed after the filing of the lawsuit in the amount of $8,000 and at that point a Techline Report had been generated indicating a repeat visit. That repair too lasted over 30 days. Therefore, by August 6, 2026, Defendant would appear to have all information necessary to decide whether or not to offer a buyback. While Defendant argues that only a single Techline Report had been generated and therefore Defendant concluded no reasonable number of repair attempts had been made, the Court notes the content of the Techline Report indicating a repeat visit, the length of time the Vehicle was at the dealer and that no repurchase offer occurred until approximately 10 months later. The Court does not find the date of the repurchase offer barred under Evidence Code section 1152 and overrules Defendant’s objection thereto. In other words, Defendant had reasonably available information germane to the decision to offer repurchase, but did not act despite Plaintiff’s establishing of a reasonable number of attempts by both the length of time the Vehicle was at the dealer for service and number of repair attempts.

Therefore, the Court will impose the penalty in the amount of $57,000 pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(c).

Re: Garcia-Leon, Karen P. vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Case No.: VCU319821

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion to Strike Costs

Tentative Ruling: To deny the unopposed motion

Facts

Plaintiff, on June 29, 2026, filed their memorandum of costs on MC-10, seeking to recover $6,142.17 as follows:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Defendant?
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$665.00	No
2. Jury Fees	$150.00	No
4. Deposition costs	$531.25	Yes
5. Service of Process	$163.00	No
8. Witness Fees	$4,294.67	Yes
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$142.75	No
16. Other	$195.00	No
Total	$6,142.17

On July 15, 2026, Defendant AMH filed its motion to tax or strike costs, as set forth in additional detail below.

No opposition to the motion appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Strike or Tax Costs

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2) as to specific categories identified above in the chart and discussed in greater detail below.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount).

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.) On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Id.) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id.)

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.)

However, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) enables the prevailing "buyer" in a Song-Beverly matter to be "…allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses…” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d), emphasis added.) Courts have interpreted Section 1794's "expenses" provision to include "out-of-pocket expenses beyond the costs identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450, 457 [citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, disapproved on other grounds].)

4. Deposition Costs

To start, the Court considers deposition costs as to Plaintiff’s deposition within the costs and expenses contemplated by Civil Code section 1794(d).

Additionally, California Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(3) expressly states that costs are allowable for: “taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(3)) (emphasis added.) “A prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable cost of taking depositions unless it appears that the taking of the depositions was unnecessary.” (Ceranski v. Muensch (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 751, 755). “Travel expenses to attend depositions” are also recoverable. (Code. Civ. Proc. §§ 1033.5(a)(3)(A)-(B).) “Determination of whether a cost is reasonable is within the trial court's discretion.” (Thon v. Thompson (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks recovery for costs of the copy of the transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition, which is expressly provided as a recoverable cost above.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to the deposition costs.

8. Expert Witness Fees

Here, Plaintiff seeks expert witness fees consisting of “Document intake and Review, Vehicle Inspection, Travel Expenses, Expert” incurred April 23, 2026 and “Deposition Preparation” incurred May 8, 2026.

While under section 1033.5 fees paid to expert witnesses are generally not recoverable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b)(1): “The following items are not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law: Fees of experts not ordered by the court.” (See Sanchez v. Bay Shores Medical Group (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 946, 950. [“In the absence of an order of the trial court appointing an expert witness, the fees of an expert witness are not recoverable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.”]

However, Civil Code section 1794(d) expands the recovery of expenses and costs by a prevailing Plaintiff and appears to authorize such fees by law.

In Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138 (disapproved by Rodriguez v. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 on other grounds), the court considered expert fees recoverable because such fees are covered under "costs and expenses" in section 1794(d). The court noted that section 1033.5(b)(1) expressly excludes expert fees “…except when expressly authorized by law,” but that “cost and expenses” included “…out-of-pocket expenses [including] filing fees, expert witness fees, marshall’s fees, etc…” (Id. at 138.)

Therefore, the Court will deny the motion to strike as to this category.

Summary

Therefore, the Court awards $6,142.17 in costs as follows.

Re: Lal, Chaman vs. Singh, Avtar

Case No.: VCU321658

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Motion for Order Directing Notice of Buy Out Right

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

On May 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint for partition of (1) commercial property at 814 E. Date Ave (“Gas Station Property”) and (2) multi-family property located at 770-778 E. Date Ave (“The Multi-Family Property”.)(Complaint ¶1.)

On June 27, 2025, Defendant filed a cross-complaint seeking partition by sale of the same property, dissolution of partnership and quiet title.

On January 6, 2026, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to appoint an appraiser to determine the fair market value of the properties pursuant to Partition of Real Property Act (“PRPA”), Code of Civil Procedure §§ 874.311, et seq. and the Court appointed Jake Hower.

Further, Plaintiff requested that the Court set a hearing on valuation 60 days from the date of appointment of the appraiser for the hearing on valuation and providing notice to the parties of the value pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 874.316(g). The Court st that hearing for March 3, 2026.

On April 27, 2026, the verified appraisals for the properties at issue were filed with this Court.

On April 29, 2026, Cross-Complainant dismissed the first cause of action for partition for sale in the cross-complaint.

On July 7, 2026, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to adopt the values set forth in the appraisal as follows: The Multi-Family Property was valued at $400,000, and the Gas Station Property was valued at $2,850,000 inclusive of the property, the business enterprise, furniture, fixtures, and equipment, but not the business inventory.

On August 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to for an order directing notice of buyout right pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 874.317(a) sent to Plaintiff.

In opposition, Defendant again argues that Defendant is not a co-tenant requesting a partition by sale based on the dismissal of that cause of action in the cross-complaint and that a sale by auction is the proper method of proceeding in this matter.

Authority and Analysis

"If any cotenant requested partition by sale, the court shall, after the determination of value under §874.316, send notice to the parties that any cotenant except a cotenant that requested partition by sale may buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale." (Code Civ. Proc. §874.317(a).)

"Not later than 45 days after the notice is sent under subdivision (a), any cotenant except a cotenant that requested partition by sale may give notice to the court that it elects to buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale." (Code Civ. Proc. §874.317(b).)

"If the court sends notice to the parties under paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (d), the court shall set a date, not sooner than 60 days after the date the notice was sent, by which electing cotenants shall pay their apportioned price into the court." (Code Civ. Proc. §874.317(e).)

"If the court does not order partition in kind under subdivision (a), the court shall order partition by sale pursuant to Section 874.320 or, if no cotenant requested partition by sale, the court shall dismiss the action." (Code Civ. Proc §874.318(b).)

Plaintiff notes that subdivision (a) has only two requirements: that a cotenant request partition by sale and that the Court determine the value under Code of Civil Procedure section 874.316. Plaintiff further argues that both conditions have been met here.

It does not appear in dispute that the second condition has been met, whereby the Court confirmed the value of the properties pursuant to appraisals under section 874.316.

As to the first, Plaintiff argues that Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s filing of the cross-complaint containing the cause of action for partition by sale is sufficient to meet the definition of “requested” under section 874.317(a). Dismissal of this cause of action, Plaintiff argues, does not change whether partition by sale was requested. Additionally, Plaintiff notes the cross-complaint’s prayer still seeks relief via sale to a third party and appointment of a receiver. The Court agrees that the plain language of subsection (a) does not require that a party prevail on a cause of action for partition by sale, maintain such a cause of action or do anything except what has occurred here: requested sale by partition.

Additionally, the Court does not find that Plaintiff here has requested partition by sale in the complaint, which therefore does not foreclose on Plaintiff’s right to purchase pursuant to section 874.317(a). Rather, Plaintiff’s complaint requests a judicial determination of the appropriate manner of partition.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and the Court will send the notice required by Code of Civil Procedure section 874.317(a) as to each Property.

Re: Dowling, Nicole vs. Leyva, Marycruz

Case No.: VCU335752

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: (1) Demurrer; (2) Ex Parte Application to Strike Demurrer

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To overrule the demurrer to the first, second and third causes of action; to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action for rescission; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to this cause of action only; to sustain the demurrer to the fifth through fifteenth causes of action without leave to amend;

(2) No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes this hearing off calendar.

(1) Demurrer

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Leyva for 1. Intentional Misrepresentation / Fraudulent Inducement 2. Promissory Fraud 3. Fraudulent Suppression / Concealment 4. Relief Based on Rescission and Restitution — Civil Code §§ 1689, 1692 5. Breach of Statutory Duty to Maintain Tenantable Premises — Civil Code §§ 1941, 1941.1 6. Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 7. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment — Civil Code § 1927 8. Violation of Civil Code § 1940.2 9. Retaliation — Civil Code § 1942.5 10. Interference With Tenant’s Use and Occupancy — Civil Code § 789.3(b) 11. Violation of Civil Code § 1954 12. Negligence 13. Negligence Per Se — Evidence Code § 669 14. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 15. Declaratory Relief.

The Court notes here the first three causes of action appear to allege events occurring from 2020 to April 10 or 11, 2025. Plaintiff alleges Defendant fraudulently procured and misused a “residential landlord tenant relationship” and that “Defendant knew Plaintiff intended to disengage from Defendant and knew Plaintiff did not wish to be rushed into a residential lease in Defendant’s county.” (Complaint ¶13, 14.)

Plaintiff further alleges “…from approximately October 2024 through April 2025, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that Defendant would provide financial and logistical assistance concerning housing and relocation” as to first month’s rent and a security deposit as well as rental applications, moving logistics and related expenses. (Complaint ¶¶29, 30, 31.) These representations were made by “…oral communications, text communications, and/or written communications during the period from approximately October 2024 through April 2025.” (Complaint ¶32.)

Further, that “Plaintiff reasonably relied upon Defendant’s representations by delaying independent housing decisions, expending time and resources on housing options discussed with Defendant, communicating logistical and personal information to Defendant, reserving time for moving-related tasks, and continuing temporary lodging arrangements.” (Complaint ¶34.)

“Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendant intended to use the appearance of assistance to monitor Plaintiff, obtain information about Plaintiff’s plans, delay Plaintiff’s independent relocation, restrict Plaintiff’s options, and redirect Plaintiff into housing selected or controlled by Defendant.” (Complaint ¶37.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges “repeatedly changed the terms and nature of the promised assistance” as the parties failed to agree on which property to rent. (Complaint ¶¶38-48.)

Further, that Defendant obtained Plaintiffs “passport, birth certificate, Social Security documentation, and other sensitive identifying documents.” (Complaint ¶50.)

Thereafter, Defendant, instead of offering rental assistance, offered to put a down payment on a property which “materially changed the arrangement from assistance with Plaintiff’s independent housing search to Defendant’s acquisition of property selected or controlled by Defendant.” (Complaint ¶¶56-58.)

Around “mid-March 2025, Defendant had already pursued, selected, or substantially committed to acquiring a condominium in a location Defendant knew Plaintiff would not voluntarily choose.” (Complaint ¶63.)

Thereafter, “From approximately March 10, 2025 through April 09, 2025, Defendant intentionally failed to disclose material facts concerning the property Defendant intended to acquire and use as Plaintiff’s housing.” (Complaint ¶65.)

The fourth through fifteenth causes of action appear to relate to events involving an alleged tenancy from April 10 or 11, 2025 or April 29, 2025 execution of a lease through the termination of the tenancy in September 2025.

Defendant moved into the property and executed the lease documents, “under circumstances created by Defendant’s prior course of conduct, including concealment, promissory fraud, economic pressure, withheld information, shifting conditions, and induced reliance.” (Complaint ¶¶80-97.)

Authority and Analysis

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220. To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

First, Second and Third Causes of Action

Defendants central argument is that these causes of action are being actively litigated in Case No. VCU334821. However, the Court’s review of its demurrer ruling in that matter indicates events and causes of action alleged regarding the renting of the property at issue, as opposed to alleged acts that occurred prior thereto.

The Court is presented with no other argument as to these causes of action.

The Court, as such, overrules the demurrer

Fourth Cause of Action

This cause of action is for rescission of the residential lease.

NMSBPCSLDHB v. County of Fresno (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-960 states:

"Section 1688 provides that 'A contract is extinguished by its rescission.' ' "[A] party to a contract cannot rescind at his pleasure, but only for some one or more of the causes enumerated in section 1689 of the Civil Code." ' [Citation.] The term 'rescission' is not defined in the Civil Code. 'Rescission' means to 'restore the parties to their former position.' [Citations.] 'Rescission' is a 'retroactive termination' of a contract, as compared to 'cancellation,' which is a 'prospective termination.' [Citation.] 'The consequence of rescission is not only the termination of further liability, but also the restoration of the parties to their former positions by requiring each to return whatever consideration has been received.' [Citations.]" (Footnote 2 omitted.)

Here, Defendant argues on demurrer “This cause of action mentions a lease or contract, no contract is attached to the complaint, and no coherent cause of action is stated.”

The Court recognizes that a that a claim for breach of a written contract must be pled in one of three ways: 1) Attach a copy of the agreement, 2) set forth the material terms verbatim or 3) plead the legal effect of the agreement rather than its precise language. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Insurance Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.)

The Court will sustain the demurrer here for failure to state sufficient facts as to the legal effect of the lease with respect to the consideration at issue. As pled, the complaint fails to indicate how rescission would return Plaintiff to Plaintiff’s position prior to execution of the lease with respect to return of consideration.

The Court will sustain the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint addressing the rescission cause of action only.

Fifth through Fourteenth Causes of Action

As noted above, these causes of action relate to the landlord tenant relationship

"Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them." (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.) This doctrine precludes the relitigation of legal claims where: "(1) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; (2) the present action is on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding; and (3) the parties in the present action or parties in privity with them were parties to the prior proceeding." (Id.) "The res judicata effect of an unlawful detainer proceeding is narrow, but is not nonexistent. Generally speaking, an unlawful detainer judgment has limited res judicata force because it typically follows a summary proceeding focused only on deciding a party's right to immediate possession of property. But when litigants to an unlawful detainer proceeding fully try other issues besides the right of possession, the unlawful detainer judgment is conclusive as to those other litigated issues. [Citations.]" (Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1365, 1371.)

"The burden of proving that the requirements for application of res judicata have been met is upon the party seeking to assert it as a bar or estoppel." (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257.)

As to unlawful detainer matters, unlawful detainer actions are summary in character and ordinarily only claims bearing directly upon the right to immediate possession are cognizable, and cross-complaints and affirmative defenses, legal or equitable, are permitted only if they would prelude removal of a tenant from the premises if successful. (Id. at 255.) Therefore, “a judgment in unlawful detainer usually has very limited res judicata effect and will not prevent one who is dispossessed from bringing a subsequent action to resolve questions of title (citations), or to adjudicate other legal and equitable claims between the parties. (citations)” (Id.) “The approach courts take to applying collateral estoppel in this [unlawful detainer] setting is broadly consistent with that taken to the collateral estoppel effect given other forms of summary, informal or specialized adjudication. As a general matter in such cases, collateral estoppel will only apply if the party to be bound agreed expressly or impliedly to submit an issue to prior adjudication [citation omitted] and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate [citation omitted] under circumstances affording due process protections [citation omitted].” (Ayala v. Dawson (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1319, 1327.)

The Court notes that it is immaterial that judgment in the unlawful detainer proceedings was entered in the form of default judgment. (Martin v. Gen. Fin. Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 438, 443 ["A judgment by default is as conclusive as to the issues tendered by the complaint as if it had been rendered after answer filed and trial had on allegations denied by the answer"]; Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.(2010) 50 Cal.4th 860, 871 ["[A] judgment of default in a civil proceeding is res judicata as to all issues aptly pleaded in the complaint and defendant is estopped from denying in a subsequent action any allegations contained in the former complaint"].)

Here, the unlawful detainer judgment was entered November 5, 2025.

“An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1049.) California law is settled that a judgment is not final for purpose of res judicata or collateral estoppel “during the pendency of and until the resolution of the appeal." (Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 954 n.11; Sandoval v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 932, 936-937.)

Under California Rule of Court, rule 8.822, the time to appeal a limited civil case is either 30 days after service of notice of entry of judgment or judgment by either the clerk or a party or 90 days after entry of judgment. (California Rule of Court, rule 8.822(a).)

Here, 90 days have elapsed and the judgment is final.

The causes of action for breach of landlord’s statutory duties, breach of habitability and quiet enjoyment, retaliation and interference, negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress arise from the same conduct surrounding the unlawful detainer matter. California follows the “primary right theory,” which provides that “the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.” The primary right is to be distinguished from the legal theory or remedy sought because “even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681-682.) “Numerous cases hold that when there is only one primary right an adverse judgment in the first suit is a bar even though the second suit is based on a different theory.” (Id. at 682.)

California permits the introduction of “equitable” and “legal” defenses whenever such defenses, if proven, would have preserved possession in the tenant. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 634, FN. 19.) Such defenses include retaliatory eviction, habitability, and quiet enjoyment. (Schweiger v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 507, 513-517; Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616; (Pierce v. Nash (1954) 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 612.)

The causes of action further relate to the notices preceding the unlawful detainer matter, the execution of the writ of possession, access to the property and other matters essential to the unlawful detainer judgment.

Finally, the complaint’s allegations support privity between the parties, that Defendants filed the unlawful detainer matter against Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fifth through fourteenth causes of action on the basis of res judicata without leave to amend.

Fifteenth Cause of Action – Declaratory Relief

In order to properly state a cause of action for declaratory relief, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, a plaintiff must set forth facts showing the existence of an actual controversy between the parties relating to their respective legal rights and duties, and request that these rights and duties be adjudged. (Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 29, 40.)

The elements of declaratory relief are “‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Plaintiff’s] rights or obligations.... [Citation.]’” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582.) “The broad discretionary power of the trial court to deny declaratory relief may be invoked by general demurrer.” (General of America Ins. Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 471.)

“ ‘Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest. If there is a controversy that calls for a declaration of rights, it is no objection that past wrongs are also to be redressed; but there is no basis for declaratory relief where only past wrongs are involved. Hence, where there is an accrued cause of action for an actual breach of contract or other wrongful act, declaratory relief may be denied.’ [Citation.]” (Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.) (emphasis added.)

Here, the fifteenth cause of action seeks declaratory relief as to “past wrongs” involving the eviction process.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fifteenth cause of action without leave to amend.

Re: First Technology Federal Credit Union vs. Aguilera Flores, Victor

Case No.: VCL331615

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 22 admitted.

Facts

On or about May 26, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant Victor Aguilera Flores. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer.

As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 22 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 22 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

Re: SIERRA VIEW LOCAL HEALTH CARE DISTRICT vs. BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA D/B/A ANTHEM BLUE CROSS, a California corporation et al

Case No.: PCU333076

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: (1) Sierra View’s Motion to Seal (2) Anthem’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion; (2) To deny the motion

(1) Sierra View’s Motion to Seal

Facts

Plaintiff seeks an an order permitting it to file under seal (1) portions of its Opposition to Defendant Blue Cross of California d/b/a Anthem Blue Cross’s (“Anthem”) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Trial Court Proceedings; (2) the Hospital Services Agreement (the “Anthem Contract”) between Sierra View and Anthem, in its entirety, which is attached to Exhibit A to the Declaration of Lizette Razon in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Razon Decl.”); and (3) the Letter of Acknowledgement (the “LOA”) between Sierra View and Defendant Imperial Health Plan of California (“Imperial”)

Plaintiff indicates that the parties to the Anthem Contract and LOA expressly designate the documents as confidential and that disclose of the three documents would cause significant competitive harm to the parties by revealing sensitive pricing terms and coverage requirements to competitors, payors, and the public at large.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendants do not oppose this motion to seal.

Authority and Analysis

California law authorizes the sealing of court records containing confidential information. (NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1222, n. 46.) Orders to seal records in a civil proceeding implicate the First Amendment’s right of public access. (Id. at 1212.) “Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c); In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1079.)

“A party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing.” (Cal. Rules Court, Rule 2.551. (b)(1).)

“ ‘In delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential. [Citation.] Broad allegations of harm, bereft of specific examples or articulated reasoning, are insufficient.” (Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1282.) The factual findings requires to seal records require the court to expressly find that (1) there exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) the overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) a substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) no less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(1)-(5).)

Here, the Court finds a sufficient overriding interest as to the parties’ pricing terms and coverage requirements as to sealing the record to prevent a competitor from obtaining an advantage over the parties and that this interest would be prejudiced absent sealing of the records. Further, the proposed sealing is narrowly tailored to these three documents and no less restrictive means would accomplish the interest.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

(2) Anthem’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Blue Cross of California dba Anthem Blue Cross and Imperial Health Plan of California for breach of contract, declaratory relief and injunctive relief.

Defendant Anthem seeks to compel arbitration of these claims and stay this matter pending arbitration.

The Court notes here that Defendant’s reply raised the issue that this filing was a petition to compel arbitration as opposed to a motion to compel arbitration, affecting Plaintiff’s response period. The Court takes the position that while petition to compel arbitration and motion to compel arbitration are substantively the same, a petition is typically filed when no action had yet been commenced. (See Code of Civil Procedure § 1290 ["A proceeding under this title in the courts of this State is commenced by filing a petition..."]) Here, the action had already been commenced via the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint, and the Court, therefore treats this as a motion to compel arbitration. In any event, the Court has provided additional time and permitted additional briefing to address any prejudice based on the timing of the filing of Plaintiff’s opposition.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant Anthem provides the declaration of the Legal Specialist of its ultimate parent company who indicates that on April 1, 2006, Plaintiff executed a Hospital Services Agreement (the “Anthem Contract”) with Defendant Anthem. (Declaration of King ¶¶2, 3, 4 – Ex. A.)

Defendant Anthem indicates the Anthem Contract contains a section entitled “Dispute Resolution.” (Declaration of King ¶5 – Ex. A.)

Plaintiff does not dispute the existence of this agreement, that it contains the dispute resolution term or that it is otherwise enforceable.

Authority and Analysis - Agreement to Arbitrate

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement. (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.) “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)

Here, this burden is met through attachment of Exhibit A containing the Dispute Resolution term.

There is not dispute as to the formation of the agreement.

Facts – Scope of the Agreement

The Anthem Contract contains the following, entitled “Dispute Resolution”:

“Any problem or dispute arising under this Agreement and/or concerning the terms of this Agreement that is not satisfactorily resolved under Section 13.01 shall be arbitrated. The arbitration shall be initiated by either party making a written demand for arbitration on the other party. Arbitration shall be conducted by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under the Commercial Rules of the AAA. The arbitration shall also be subject to California Code of Civil Procedure, Title Nine, Section 1280, et seq., unless otherwise mutually agreed. The parties agree that the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as to each of them, except to the extent that California and Federal law provide for the review of arbitration proceedings. BLUE CROSS waives any right to pursue, on a class basis, any such problem or dispute against HOSPITAL, and HOSPITAL waives any right to pursue, on a class basis, any such problem or dispute against BLUE CROSS. Issues as to whether malpractice was committed by a physician shall not be subject to arbitration by the AAA unless' otherwise agreed in writing by the parties and the AAA.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Anthem Contract’s Dispute Resolution term broadly covers claims which include the claims at issue here. Plaintiff sues for breach of contract, which is necessarily a problem or dispute arising under the Agreement and/or concerning its terms. The declaratory and injunctive relief claims likewise derive from alleged duties under the Agreement.

Therefore, the Court finds the Dispute Resolution term encompasses the claims in this matter.

Facts - Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)

The Parties do, however, dispute the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) with respect to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against Defendant Imperial.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges, as against Defendant Anthem, breach of the 2006 Anthem Contract “…to which Sierra View agreed to provide health care services to members of Anthem’s Medicare Advantage plan (“Anthem MA Members”) in exchange for a discounted payment pursuant to an agreed-upon rate.” (Complaint ¶9.) Further, that the Anthem Contract “…requires Anthem to pay Sierra View for services provided to Anthem’s MA Members within thirty (30) working days from receipt of claims submitted by Sierra View, unless Anthem contests the claim, in which case it was required to provide Sierra View with notice of the contest within thirty (30) working days from receipt of the claim.” (Complaint ¶10.)

As against Defendant Imperial, Plaintiff alleges “On December 1, 2019, Sierra View entered into a Letter of Acknowledgement (“LOA”) with Imperial pursuant to which Sierra View agrees to provide health care services to members of Imperial’s Medicare Advantage plan (“Imperial MA Members”) in exchange for discounted payment pursuant to an agreed-upon rate. The LOA does not contain an arbitration provision.” (Complaint ¶12.) Further, that the LOA required Imperial to process all clean claims submitted by Sierra View within 45 calendar days of submission. (Complaint ¶13.)

Plaintiff alleges further that Anthem delegated financial responsibility for hospital services received by certain Anthem MA Members to Imperial (“Delegated Members”). (Complaint ¶15.)

Plaintiff alleges breaches of both the Anthem Contract and LOA, whereby, “..despite providing services for which [Plaintiff] is entitled to reimbursement under both the Contract and the LOA, and submitting timely and clean claims for such services to Imperial, both Imperial and Anthem refuse to process the claims and/or pay Sierra View for its services.” (Complaint ¶17.)

Further, Plaintiff alleges:

“Anthem also delegated utilization management review for certain services to Imperial. Under this arrangement, Imperial would review requests for authorization from Sierra View and, if approved, provide Sierra View with an authorization number that it could use to then bill Anthem for the claim. On information and belief, these claims were the financial responsibility of Anthem; however, Anthem would deny the claim for lack of authorization unless the claim included an authorization number issued by Imperial.” (Complaint ¶27.)

Plaintiff alleges additionally that:

“Imperial refused to review and process requests for authorization from Sierra View for services for which Anthem was financially responsible but for which Imperial had been delegation responsibility for utilization management. These requests sought authorization for services that included, but were not limited to, inpatient services for stabilized patients who received emergency care and services in Sierra View’s emergency department and other urgently needed services. In each instance, even though Imperial ignored its obligation to review and process the request for authorization, Sierra View provided care to avoid harm to the patient and to meet its own legal obligations. In certain instances, when Sierra View submitted the claim for payment, Anthem denied the claim for lack of authorization.” (Complaint ¶28.)

As such, Plaintiff alleges breach of the LOA as against Defendant Imperial, alleging “Imperial is refusing to pay Sierra View because of a dispute between itself and Anthem regarding the division of financial responsibility between those entities.” (Complaint ¶38.)

As to Defendant Anthem, Plaintiff alleges breach via failure to timely pay claims submitted by Plaintiff and that “Anthem attempted to, but ultimately failed to, properly delegate financial responsibility for some, or all, of the Delegated Members to Imperial. Thus, these Delegated Members remained the financial responsibility of Anthem.” (Complaint ¶¶41, 42.)

Authority and Analysis - Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) states:

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

…

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.”

“ ‘Section 1281.2(c) addresses the peculiar situation that arises when a controversy also affects claims by or against other parties not bound by the arbitration agreement. The California provision giving the court discretion not to enforce the arbitration agreement under such circumstances … avoid[s] potential inconsistency in outcome as well as duplication of effort … .’ ” (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 393.) Therefore, subsection (c) allows the court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement where a party to the arbitration is also a party to a pending court action with a third party arising out of the same transaction and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings.

Under Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 230, 247 “[a]s used in the statute, a ‘third party’ is one who is neither bound by nor entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement.”

As such, the issue is whether Defendant Imperial, a non-signatory to the Anthem Contract containing the arbitration term, is a third party to the Anthem Contract.

Generally, "one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to be bound by it or invoke it." (Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759, 763.) However, there exceptions to this general rule that a nonsignatory to an agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate or cannot invoke an agreement to arbitrate, without being a party to the arbitration agreement. (Id. at 765.) “[T]here are six theories by which a nonsignatory may be bound to arbitrate: (a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary.” (Young Seok Suh v. Superior Court (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1513.)

Defendant Anthem argues that Defendant Imperial would, under equitable estoppel, have standing to enforce the Dispute Resolution term in the Anthem Contract, is therefore not a third party to the Anthem Contract and therefore no application of subdivision (c) is applicable.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel allows for a non-signatory party to compel arbitration “‘when the causes of action against the nonsignatory are “intimately founded in and intertwined” with the underlying contract obligations.’” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237)

In support, Defendant Anthem cites to Boucher v. All. Title Co. (2005) 127 Cal. App. 4th 262, Rowe v. Exline (2007) 153 Cal. App. 4th 1276, and Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1399.

The opposition argues that Boucher and Laswell did not involve the existence of the second and third agreements (the LOA and the delegation agreement) which supported claims, at least as to the LOA, independent from the Anthem Contract.

Additionally, the opposition argues Rowe involved agency and alter ego of non-signatory individuals, issues not alleged or present in this matter, where the alleged alter egos of a signatory corporation attempted to avoid arbitration where the claims involved breach of contract.

Here, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims against Defendants Anthem and Imperial arise from two separate contracts, the Anthem Contract containing the arbitration clause and the LOA between Plaintiff and Imperial. Additionally, Plaintiff’s theory appears to be that Anthem has improperly delegated its payment responsibility to Imperial under a third, and separate, agreement involving delegation.

“The question is not whether the actions are related, but whether the action against a nonsignatory to the arbitration agreement is rooted in the contract containing the arbitration agreement. To be sure, there are common questions of law and fact in both actions, including, perhaps, interpretation of the policy agreements. But commonality of issues is a far cry from claims grounded in, and ‘inextricably intertwined with,’ the arbitration agreement.” (DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1357.)

While it is true that Plaintiff’s claims against Imperial are related to the Anthem Contract, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s claims are wholly dependent or inextricably intertwined with the Anthem Contract. In other words, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s claims against Imperial are rooted in the Anthem Contract, as opposed to the LOA. “‘This requirement comports with, and indeed derives from, the very purposes of the doctrine: to prevent a party from using the terms or obligations of an agreement as the basis for his claims against a nonsignatory, while at the same time refusing to arbitrate with the nonsignatory under another clause of that same agreement.’ [citation omitted]” (Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 715.) Here, Plaintiff does not appear to be using the terms of the Anthem Contract as a basis for its claims against Imperial.

As such, the Court finds the conditions of section 1281.2(c) have been met. Plaintiff is a party to the Anthem Contract. Imperial is a third party sued by Plaintiff arising out of a series of related transactions. There is a possibility of inconsistent rulings.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(d)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(d) provides four options when it determines that a party to an arbitration agreement is also a party to litigation in a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party under section 1281.2(c):

“The court (1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the outcome of the court action or special proceeding.”

"What the trial court chooses to do in this situation is a matter of its discretion, guided largely by the extent to which the possibility of inconsistent rulings may be avoided." (Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 679, 692-693.)

Here, there is a possibility of conflicting rulings should Plaintiff’s clams against Anthem proceed in arbitration either at the same time as Plaintiff’s claims against Imperial or before Plaintiff’s claims against Imperial can be adjudicated if stayed. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims should be adjudicated together, including liability determinations as against Imperial and Anthem, if any, under the alleged delegation agreement between Imperial and Anthem. As such, the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to enforce the agreement to arbitrate between Plaintiff and Anthem. Therefore, the Court denies the motion to compel arbitration.

Re: LUCINDA TERRELL and Estate of JACK TERRELL, by and through its successor in interest et al vs. FERREIRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. et al

Case No.: PCU334768

Date: September 22 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Defendant Ferreira Power West, LLC’s Motions for Protective Orders as to (1) Special Interrogatories and (2) Requests for Production; Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (3) Special Interrogatories and (4) Requests for Production

Tentative Ruling:

(1) and (2): To grant the motion in part and enter a protective order that limits any response to Defendant FPW only and reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence as to Defendant Lee’s negligence;

(3) To grant the motion in part as to No. 16 and order a further response no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion; to deny the request for sanctions;

(4) To grant the motion in part as to Nos. 9 and 12 and order a further response no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing; to deny the remainder of the motion to deny the request for sanctions;

Facts Common to (1), (2), (3) and (4)

This is a vehicle accident case. On February 9, 2026, Decedent Jack Terrell was driving on Highway 190 with his wife, Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell, and was engaged in a head-on collision with Defendant Carter Lee, who was traveling in the opposite direction. Decedent Jack Terrell was killed.

Plaintiff commenced suit on May 8, 2026, with a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim and a negligence claim. The complaint names Defendant Lee as well as Defendants Ferreira Construction Company, Inc., Ferreira Power West LLC, and Ferreira Coastal Construction Company, Inc.

On August 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed a dismissal of this action as to Defendants Ferreira Construction Company, Inc. and Ferreira Coastal Construction Company, Inc.

As such, Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful death and negligence are asserted against Defendant Lee and Defendant Ferreira Power West LLC (“FPW”).

Specifically, the complaint alleges “Defendant Lee was operating the subject vehicle with the express or implied authority and permission” of Defendant FPW, as an agent or employee of Defendant FPW, and “within the course and scope of his agency or employment…” with Defendant FPW. (Complaint ¶13.) Further, that Defendant FPW “…knew or should have known that Defendant Lee was unfit to operate the subject vehicle and was therefore negligent in hiring, retaining, training, and entrusting the subject vehicle to Defendant Lee.” (Complaint ¶13.)

Further that Defendants “…failed to operate their vehicle in a safe or reasonable manner by failing to maintain his lane, operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the road, unsafe lane change, and failure to exercise reasonable care.” (Complaint ¶17.)

On June 11, 2026, Plaintiff propounded written discovery via mail to FPW.

On July 8, 2026, Defendant FPW met and conferred prior to filing these motions for protective orders.

On July 24, 2026, Defendant FPW filed motions for protective orders. Defendant seeks an order that it need not answer Special Interrogatories Nos. 3, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 49, 50, 56 and 62 and Request for Production of Documents numbers 3, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 33, 34, 42, and 43.

On August 25, 2026, Plaintiff filed motions to compel further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 48, 49, 50, 56, 59, 62, 64, and 88.

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to compel further responses to Requests for Production Nos. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, and 34.

Defendant FPW, in its motion for protective order, argues that under Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, evidence of an employer’s alleged negligence in hiring, retaining, or supervising an employee is irrelevant where the employer has admitted that the employee was acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the incident. Further, that FPW does not dispute that Defendant Lee was acting within the course and scope of employment with FPW.

In opposition to the protective order motions, Plaintiff argues that Diaz does not cut off discovery into these matters, that the requests are limited, via dismissal of the other Defendants, to Defendant FPW and that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause necessary to enter a full protective order.

On reply to the oppositions, FPW notes the production of 1. Carter Lee’s Time card from January 20, 2026 to January 24, 2026; 2. Carter Lee’s Time Card from January 26, 2026 to January 30, 2026; 3. Carter Lee’s Time Card from February 2, 2026 to February 6, 2026; 4. New Hire Training Outline; 5. Safety Training; 6. Vehicle Safety Policy Consent; 7. Smith Driving training1; 8. Fleet Mobile Phone Use Agreement; 9. Fleet Vehicle Agreement; 10. Carter Lee’s motor vehicle record; 11. FMCSA drug and alcohol; 12. Employee information; 13. OSHA safety and health card; 14. First Aid card; and 15. Carter Lee Employment application.

Further, that FPW provided amended verified responses on August 18, 2026 and provided an amended response to Request for Production of Documents numbers 3, 14, and 17.

(1), (2), (3) and (4) - Authority and Analysis

(1) and (2) Protective Order

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020(a):

“(a) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”

Application of Diaz v. Carcamo

In Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4^th, the California Supreme Court stated “an employer's admission of vicarious liability for an employee's negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment.” (Id. at 1161.) Further, that an employer could be held liable for negligent driving either under vicarious liability or via negligent entrustment of the vehicle to the employee, but not both. (Id. at 1151-1152.) As such, evidence proving a negligent entrustment theory is rendered irrelevant via the vicarious liability admission. (Id. at 1159.)

"If, as here, all of a plaintiff's causes of action depend on a contention than an employee's negligent driving in the scope of employment was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and if the defendant-employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee's negligent driving, then that offer will 'remove[ ] from the case' the issue of the employer's liability for any damage caused by its employee's negligent driving, leaving 'no material' to which negligent entrustment evidence can be relevant." (Id. at 1157-1158.) "[A]n employer's admission of vicarious liability for an employee's negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment." (Id. at 1161.)

However, the Court recognizes that admissibility is not the standard on discovery matters. "Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with [the discovery statutes], any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action…." (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012-1013.) "For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it 'might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement….' [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at 1013.)

Therefore, under the circumstances of Diaz, such evidence of negligent entrustment may be inadmissible at trial, discovery of such evidence is not necessarily barred when reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nevertheless, the Court evaluates whether, in light of the holding of Diaz, evidence regarding negligent entrustment, training or supervision is relevant to the vicarious liability claim and might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.

Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiffs maintain a negligence claim against Defendant Lee and requested information is within the scope of potential discovery and may prove relevant to Plaintiff's negligence claim.

Therefore, the Court will make a blanket order that limiting any such responses to FPW only and limiting the responses to those related to Defendant Lee’s negligence.

The Court will apply the protective order, and the reasoning, to the Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production at issue in the motions to compel further responses below.

(3) Special Interrogatories

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Notice of the motion must be provided within 45 days of service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the parties have agreed in writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) The moving party must demonstrate a “reasonable and good faith attempt” at an informal resolution of each issue presented. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2030.300, subd. (b)(1).)

The Court finds Nos. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, and 34 are covered by the reasoning set forth above as to the protective order and would not reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to Defendant Lee’s negligence or Lee’s actions on the date of the incident. These interrogatories center on Defendant FPW’s policies and procedures

By contrast, No. 16, seeking technology in the Subject Truck used by Defendant Lee may reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with respect to Defendant Lee’s negligence or lack thereof. As such, the Court will order a further response to No. 16 no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing.

(4) Requests for Production

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.” If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)

The Court denies the motion as to Nos. 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 33, and 34 for the same reasons as above, finding responses thereto are not reasonable calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in light of Diaz and Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against Defendant Lee.

However, as to 9 and 12, the Court will order a further response, narrowed as follows:

No. 9: Any documents identifying individuals who were witnesses to the incident on February 9, 2026, including contact information.

No. 12: All logs maintained by Defendant Lee during the operation of the subject truck on the day of the incident

Responses are due no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing.

Sanctions

The Court will deny the request for sanctions here based on mixed results of the motion. (Mattco Valley Forge v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1437.)

Re: MENDOZA, JOSE vs. LONG, WILLIAM B. et al

Case No.: PCU330357

Date: September 22, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA Nos. 19 and 20

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and compel further responses no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing; to impose sanctions against Defendant Three Cat, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $585, due no later than thirty days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this Unruh Act and Civil Code section 54.1 matter, Plaintiff sues, amongst others, Defendant Three Cat Express, Inc.

On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff served written discovery upon Defendant Three Cat Express, Inc., including Requests for Admissions, Set One.

On June 29, 2026, Defendant served responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission, Set One.

The parties met and conferred and Defendant, on or about July 24 2026, served supplemental responses to Nos. 19 and 20.

Plaintiff continued to meet and confer on or about July 31, 2026 as to further supplemental responses to Nos. 19 and 20. However, further meet and confer correspondence did not lead to further supplemental responses to Nos. 19 and 20.

This motion to compel further responses to Nos. 19 and 20 followed. Plaintiff further seeks sanctions in the amount of $2,860.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 requires:

(a) Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) Each answer shall:

(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.

(2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.

(3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.

A party may move for an order compelling further response to a request for admission or request for production of documents if the demanding party deems that responses are incomplete, evasive, or contain meritless objections. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the discovery. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

RFA No. 19

RFA No. 19 states:

“Admit that currently, the parking stall at the SUBJECT PROPERTY does not have a marked and reserved access aisle adjacent to the stall for use by persons with disabilities.”

Defendant’s supplemental response states:

Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This request assumes facts, seeks expert opinion testimony, and seeks a legal conclusion from Responding Party. This request seeks an admission regarding facts that are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This request seeks Responding Party to admit the truth or falsity of hearsay; and is an incomplete hypothetical. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Responding Party responds as follows: Admit in part”

Plaintiff argues this response as to “admit in part” is insufficient because it fails to identify the portion of the response that is admitted and the portion that is denied.

The Court agrees that the response must identify what portion of the request is admitted and which part is denied.

RFA No. 20

RFA No. 20 states:

“Admit that currently, the mandated pole or wall mounted signage that displays the International Symbol of Accessibility does not exist at the SUBJECT PROPERTY.”

Defendant’s supplemental responses states:

“Objection. This request is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. This request assumes facts, seeks expert opinion testimony, and seeks a legal conclusion from Responding Party. This request seeks an admission regarding facts that are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This request seeks Responding Party to admit the truth or falsity of hearsay; and is an incomplete hypothetical. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Responding Party responds as follows: Admit in part.”

Under the same reasoning above, the Court agrees that the response must identify what portion of the request is admitted and which part is denied.

Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 is a general statute authorizing the Court to impose discovery sanctions for “misuse of the discovery process,” which includes (without limitation) a variety of conduct such as: making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; and unsuccessfully and without substantial justification making or opposing a motion to compel or limit discovery. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010.)

The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make it unjust to impose sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290(d).)

Here, Plaintiff seeks $2,860 in sanctions at the rate of $400 per hour consisting of 3 hours of meet and confer time, 2 hours drafting the motion and 2 hours anticipated for review of the opposition and reply. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks a $60 filing fee.

To start, the Court sets the hourly rate at $350. The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)

The Court will deduct, in total, the meet and confer time of 3 hours and permit 1.5 hours on this motion in total, plus the $60 filing fee. As such, the Court will order sanctions against Defendant Three Cat, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $585, due no later than thirty days from the date of this hearing.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 21, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054262	In the Matter of Contreras, Salvador Martinez	Letters of Administration	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054234	In the Matter of Lloyd, Linda	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 2d(2) and 3d: Amount of Bond ordered shall be no less than $200,000 - Prob C § 8482(a). 2. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 4. Proof of Publication not filed; proposed publication, the Porterville Recorder, may not be proper
VPR054270	In the Matter of Grim, Steven	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054232	In the Matter of Ambriz, Daniel Jr	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 14 heirs omitted: names of all surviving and deceased heirs—other siblings and issues of deceased siblings, including the dates of deaths, ages and mailing addresses. DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR053249	In the Matter of Perkins, Alvin Barney	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053211	In the Matter of Collins, Melody Rose	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR043355	In the Matter of The Nikole McCuen Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR046212	In the Matter of Abraham Sanchez Jr Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

Probate calendar for September 17, 2026

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: regarding any surviving registered domestic partner. Publication Improper, filed 4/14/26: Published once, not in accordance with Probate C § 8120.
PPR054263	In the Matter of Kennedy, Donald	Letters of Administration		MATTER APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER
PPR054242	In the Matter of Moreno, Irene	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Court to review proposed amendments to the petition
PPR054240	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Roberto	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	In a Petition to Determine Succession to Real Property, all persons who are succeeding to the property must be listed as petitioners. Probate Code §13151.
PPR053526	In the Matter of Moreno, Judi Arlene	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Amended Petition has not been filed, Notice to relative remains outstanding

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054048	In the Matter of Cahuis Guess, Amelia Rose	Move Away Hearing- no issues to address
9/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	Appoint Guardian- no issues to address

Hearing Date & Time

Department Number

Case Number

Case Name

Comments

9/21/26 8:30 AM

Department 02

VPR053969

In the Matter of C.G.V.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511- GRANDPARENTS

Declaration of Guardianship Orientation Attendance needs to be filed

9/21/26 1:30 PM

Department 19

PPR053451

In the Matter of I.S.L.

NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating FATHER, MATERNAL GRANDFATHER & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS were served (15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1510) with a copy of the Notice of Hearing for this termination hearing

Hearing Date & Time

Department Number

Case Number

Case Name

Comments

9/22/26 8:30 AM

Department 01

VPR053854

In the Matter of J.S.

APPEARANCE REQUIRED- review re OTHER state establishment of guardianship- there have been no filings by the petitioners

9/22/26 8:30 AM

Department 02

VPR051168

In the Matter of J.I.R.

Notice of Hearing (form GC-020) must be filed. Pursuant to California Probate Code §1460, at least 15 calendar days’ notice is required for any hearing on a petition to terminate a guardianship, the Notice of Hearing must be served on relatives as identified in §1510(c) - GUARDIAN, MOTHER, MATERNAL GRANDFATHER, & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS.

NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship

Judicial Branch of California

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings

Probate Examiner Recommendations

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

Scam Text Messages — Traffic School Fines:

Tentative Rulings

Current Tentative Rulings

Visalia Division

South County Justice Center

Probate Guardianship cases scheduled in Visalia Division and South County Justice Center

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia