Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, April 21, 2026, are:

Re:                Gonzalez, Arnulfo et al vs. ABLP Properties Visalia, LLC et al

Case No.:   VCU284145

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Reopen Case

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes this hearing off calendar. The Court notes this matter has been dismissed and the Court has previously denied a motion to reconsider the dismissal and reopen the case on December 30, 2025.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Hudson & Keyse LLC vs. Mora, Sylvia

Case No.:   TCL116560

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Review Hearing

Tentative Ruling: To hold the hearing and inquire as to the status of the sale and any efforts to obtain a loan to repay the debt. It appears the judgment debtor is now deceased and there is no probate proceeding for her estate pending at this time.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Foos, Gerald et al vs. Ball, Dale et al

Case No.:   VCU297765

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Escamilla-Carter, Grace vs. Lozano, Martha

Case No.:   VCU318134

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Entry of Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny this motion; The court cannot determine if the motion was served but does not find grounds to grant it regardless of service.  

Facts and Analysis

The Court heard this matter as a court trial on January 5, 2026. The Court made findings on the record and signed a judgment in favor of plaintiff on February 9. 2026 finding defendant had converted assets belonging to plaintiff. Neither party requested a statement of decision at the time of trial.

Defendant filed this motion for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 on the grounds that “the Minute of Order dated January 5, 2026 does not provide the Judges transcript of the proceedings during the bench trail held on January 5, 2026 in department 2” and that “The defendant was not notified that a court reporter would not be present to record [sic] a official record of the proceedings of the bench [sic] trail where the testimony of plaintiff, Grace Escamilla-Carter, and witnesses, Irene Escamilla, Angela Jo Nunez, Albert Villegas and Virgina Villegas where obtained.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 provides:

“(a) After a party has completed his presentation of evidence in a trial by the court, the other party, without waiving his right to offer evidence in support of his defense or in rebuttal in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a judgment. The court as trier of the facts shall weigh the evidence and may render a judgment in favor of the moving party, in which case the court shall make a statement of decision as provided in Sections 632 and 634, or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. The court may consider all evidence received, provided, however, that the party against whom the motion for judgment has been made shall have had an opportunity to present additional evidence to rebut evidence received during the presentation of evidence deemed by the presenting party to have been adverse to him, and to rehabilitate the testimony of a witness whose credibility has been attacked by the moving party. Such motion may also be made and granted as to any cross-complaint.

(b) If it appears that the evidence presented supports the granting of the motion as to some but not all the issues involved in the action, the court shall grant the motion as to those issues and the action shall proceed as to the issues remaining. Despite the granting of such a motion, no final judgment shall be entered prior to the termination of the action, but the final judgment in such action shall, in addition to any matters determined in the trial, award judgment as determined by the motion herein provided for.

(c) If the motion is granted, unless the court in its order for judgment otherwise specifies, such judgment operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”

Here, the failure to hire a court reporter and obtain a transcript is not a proper ground under section 631.8, which is a motion for nonsuit as to a  failure of Plaintiff to sustain the burden of proof.  Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

Further, the motion appears to request a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632. Under subsection (a), “The request must be made within 10 days after the court announces a tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours over more than one day in which event the request must be made prior to the submission of the matter for decision.” Here, trial was concluded in one calendar day on January 5, 2026 and therefore, the motion is untimely, having been filed February 23, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 First National Bank of Omaha vs. Underwood, Serena Renee

Case No.:   VCL328857

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Vacate Entry of Default

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order the proposed responsive pleading filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Serena Renee Underwood for breach of contract.

On December 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting that personal service occurred as to Defendant on December 20, 2025 at 1:52 pm at 1259 Chestnut Ln, Dinuba, CA 93618-6606 and that “I delivered the documents to Serena Renee Underwood with identity confirmed by subject stating their name. The individual accepted service with direct delivery. The individual appeared to be a gray-haired Hispanic female contact 55-65 years of age, 5'6"-5'8" tall and weighing 140-160 lbs.” The proof is executed by a registered California process server.

On February 6, 2026, default was entered.

On February 11, 2026, the Court denied entry of default judgment in the amount of $10,287.33.

On February 25, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for relief from entry of default pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). In support, Defendant states:

“On or about February 11, 2025 a contract was entered into for debt consolidation assistance with Pacific Debt Relief, referred as (PDR) with agreed monthly payments of $481.00 starting on February 21, 2025. (PDR) was given authorization to contact the companies that I am indebted to for payment agreements. Changes were transpiring at the government agency I was employed under and I was working towards establishing a plan to effectively address my finances in the event I was terminated by the agency due to Reduction in Force notice. On or about, March 10, 2025, I emailed my bills for all approved credit card companies I currently had debt with except I had three companies that did not qualify. All communications for and from (PDR/BLP) will be located in (Exhibit C) On or about July 2, 2025 I was placed on Administrative leave until September 30, 2025 as part of the Deferred Resignation Agreement 2.0 with the Voluntary Early Retirement Application. On or about July 9, 2025 received documents concerning a settlement agreement for one of the credit card companies but it was not with First National Bank of Omaha. On or about October 8, 2025, J emailed current billing statements for all companies | was indebted to (PDR) and again on or about October 20, 2025. On November 24, 2025 at 13:12 p.m., I submitted a letter I received from an attorney concerning legal action from First National Bank of Omaha to (PDR). On or about, December 20, 2025 I emailed a copy of the Summons and all associated court documents to (PDR) for this case in question. On or about December 30, 2025 I received an email from the legal department associated with (PDR) called Better Life Plans, hereon referred to (BLP) requesting clarification on the correct account number associated with First National Bank of Omaha. I responded with the information I located in my documents to (BLP) on or about January 6, 2026. On or about January 6, 2026 I received a letter from Huron Law Group advising me that they were no longer able to represent me in this case. On or about January 6, 2026 I emailed a copy of the letter to (PDR). I have contacted PDR by telephone and have not received any further information mostly I believe due to my inability to make the $481.00 in monthly payments because I am not receiving income from my retirement benefits nor am I able to earn enough income from new employment with the United States Postal Service. All supporting documents relating to the dates for training, proof of employment and earnings from the United States Postal Service will be located in (Exhibit D). I realized I was not getting any assistance from PDR and I was not on the schedule to work, I had to try to do this on my own because could not afford any legal counsel to assist me on this matter, hence, on or about February 2, 2026, I came to the Visalia Courthouse in Tulare Courthouse to pick up Answer to Contract: Civil Complaint. On or about February 11, 2026 to file my Answer to Contract: Civil Complaint and was notified that a Default was filed and could not file my papers. My Answer to Contract: Civil Complaint is located in (Exhibit A)”

The Court’s review of Exhibit B indicates an email to Plaintiff’s counsel on February 6, 2026, the date of entry of default in this matter.

Further, the Court’s review of Exhibit C indicates an email to Pacific Debt by Defendant and response by Huron Law Group on January 6, 2026 indicating that Huron would not represent Defendant and that Defendant would need to respond to the lawsuit.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may relieve a party or counsel from a judgment, dismissal, order or other proceeding taken against the party resulting from mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  The application for relief must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order or proceeding was taken.  (Id.)  

“Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

“Surprise” is defined as “some condition or situation in which a party to a cause is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.” (Miller v. Lee (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 10, 16.)

Further, “excusable neglect” has been defined as “neglect that might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances.” (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.App.3d 427, 435.)

“Finally, as for inadvertence or neglect, ‘[t]o warrant relief under section 473 a litigant's neglect must have been such as might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly inexcusable it does not justify relief.’ ” (Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206.)” (Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 215, 230.)

Here, the Court notes that Defendant diligently sought representation through the debt relief agency who notified Defendant on January 6, 2026 it declined to represent Plaintiff in this matter. Default was entered approximately one month later.

Further, Defendant indicates efforts on February 6, 2026, at 10:01 pm via email to contact counsel for Plaintiff, after entry of default, which presumably was entered during the business hours of this Court ending at 5:00 pm.

This is a close call for the Court. The Court notes that during the 30-day period between the denial letter from Huron and the entry of default, she came to the Court on February 2, 2026, a day off from work for her, to obtain the proposed answer form, but did not attempt to file it until February 11, 2026. There are periods of diligence and lapses thereof. “… [T]he law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations].’” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.). Under this principle, the Court finds sufficient excuse for failing to file a responsive pleading prior to the deadline.

Next, subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” Here, Exhibit A complies with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders Defendant to file the proposed answer with this Court no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Duenas, Jorge G. Alvarado vs. Vejar, Roberto Barron

Case No.:   VCU287641

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Amend Judgment to Add Alter Ego re: Andres Celaya

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

The underlying suit arises from an alleged September 2020 auto accident in Tulare County resulting in the deaths of plaintiff’s wife, Elizabeth Montes Lopez Paola, and two young children, Jorge Arafat Alvarado Montes and Dorian Santino Alvarado Montes.

In the initial complaint filed July 2, 2021, Plaintiff sued Roberto Barron Vejar, the alleged driver of the vehicle involved in the accident; Adelmira Sanchez, who allegedly owned and entrusted the vehicle to Vejar; and fictitiously named “Doe” defendants “1 to 50.” 

On August 31, 2022, Plaintiff amended his complaint to add Celaya Farm Labor, Inc. as a defendant. 

On January 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default as to CFL. Over eight months after entry of default, on September 29, 2023, Plaintiff sought entry of default judgment. 

On October 6, 2023, this Court entered an “order for default judgment” adjudging and ordering Plaintiff to recover $1,500,000 from CFL.

At some point, CFL filed bankruptcy and on June 22, 2024, the bankruptcy court issues a notice of filing of report of no distribution and an order fixing a deadline to object thereto.

Plaintiff’s counsel took the deposition of Maria Cabrebra, CFL’s person most knowledgeable, on June 09, 2025. The deposition testimony of Cabrebra indicated that Andres Celaya did not have an individual employment contract for himself, received a salary from CFL of $124,800, personally signed his own checks, had no set work schedule. (Declaration of Rodriguez – Ex. H – Deposition of Cabrebra.)

Additionally, Plaintiff’s counsel, on June 10, 2025, took the deposition of Andres Celaya. Plaintiff notes that this testimony indicates Celaya was the owner and founder of CFL, held the positions of CEO, Secretary, CFO and agent for service of process, conduct no meetings, recorded no minutes, that CFL conducted business at property personally owned by Celaya, that there was no rental agreement between CFL and Celaya, that CFL paid for internet, electricity, water and gas used on this property, that CFL paid for insurance on the property, used CFL funds for personal purchases including clothing, food and fuel for a personal vehicle, and permitted his late wife to use a CFL debit card for personal use. (Declaration of Rodriguez – Ex. G – Deposition of Celaya.)

In opposition, Defendant first argues that the deposition testimony excerpts provided by Plaintiff and summarized above do not encompass the full context of the deposition or the operation of CFL. However, the Court notes here that the full deposition transcript is not provided to the Court by Defendant. Further, Defendant argues that CFL was operated informally, that no prong of the alter ego test has been satisfied, that no fraud or perpetration of an inequitable act has occurred and that post-judgment insolvency does not constitute an inequitable result.

Further, Celaya provides a declaration that states “I formed Celaya Farm Labor, Inc. as a legitimate business enterprise” and that “…[CFL] maintained workers' compensation insurance, paid its employees, and operated continuously as a going concern for approximately eight years.” (Declaration of Celaya ¶2.) Additionally, that “[CFL] was incorporated in good faith to conduct lawful business. I did not form the corporation to avoid any obligation, to evade any creditor, or in anticipation of this or any other lawsuit.” (Declaration of Celaya ¶3.) Further “I did not cause the corporation to file for bankruptcy in order to defeat this judgment or to shield my personal assets. Celaya Farm Labor, Inc. ceased operations because it could no longer function as a business following the entry of the judgment and the loss of its ability to obtain bonding and insurance necessary to operate as a licensed farm labor contractor.” (Declaration of Celaya ¶5.) Further, “I did not personally receive or transfer any significant assets from Celaya Farm Labor, Inc. in anticipation of this lawsuit or in response to the entry of judgment. I did not cause the corporation to make distributions or transfers to myself or to family members for the purpose of rendering the judgment uncollectible.” (Declaration of Celaya ¶6.)

As to the maintenance of corporate formalities, Celaya states “I understand that my business practices were informal and that I did not always maintain strict separation between my own finances and those of the corporation. I operated as a working man running a family business. My late wife Emma, who passed away in 2021, handled most of the paperwork and administrative functions of the business. When she died, many of the operational functions that she performed fell to me. I did my best to continue operating the business, but I am not a sophisticated businessman and I did not have legal or accounting counsel advising me on corporate formalities.” (Declaration of Celaya ¶8.)

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides:

“When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.)

It "has been long recognized" that Code of Civil Procedure section187 provides the Court with authority to "amend a judgment to add a nonparty alter ego as a judgment debtor," and thereby make the additional judgment debtor liable upon the judgment. (Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1106.)

Amending a judgment, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 187, in order to add an alter ego of an original judgment debtor is an equitable procedure based upon the theory that the Court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant. (McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome Owners Assn. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746, 752.)

To prevail on the motion, the judgment creditor must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: “(1) the parties to be added as judgment debtors had control of the underlying litigation and were virtually represented in that proceeding; (2) there is such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the entity and the owners no longer exist; and (3) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of the entity alone.” (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 815-816.)

The decision to grant or deny the motion lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal if there is a legal basis for the decision and substantial evidence supports the same. (Id. at 815)

In determining whether there is a sufficient unity of interest and ownership, the Court considers factors, including “the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342.) Inadequate capitalization of the original judgment debtor is another factor. (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 811-812 [reciting "long list" of inexhaustive factors:

"`[1] [c]ommingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses . . .; [2] the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own . . .; [3] the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same . . .; [4] the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation . . .; the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the separate entities . . .; [5] the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the two entities; identification of the directors and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and management; sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family . . .; [6] the use of the same office or business location; the employment of the same employees and/or attorney . . .; [7] the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization . . .; [8] the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation . . .; [9] the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of personal business activities . . .; [10] the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among  related entities . . .; [11] the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity . . .; [12] the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another . . .; [13] the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions . . .; [14] and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity.' . . .”]

No single factor governs—courts must consider all of the circumstances of the case in determining whether it would be equitable to impose alter ego liability. (Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at 1342.) An inequitable result is shown as a matter of law where the judgment debtor is insolvent due to the actions of an alter ego; proof of wrongful intent is not required. (See, Toho-Towa, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [inequitable to allow alter ego to shift liability to separate entity where judgment creditor originally negotiated contract with alter ego and alter ego structured financial operations to ensure entity would have no funds to pay debts].)

However, alter ego "is an extreme remedy, sparingly used." (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 539.) "The standards for the application of alter ego principles are high, and the imposition of [alter ego] liability...is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously." (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 306.)

Still, "[t]he greatest liberality is to be encouraged" in allowing judgments to be amended to add the "real defendant," or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, "in order to see that justice is done." (Carr v. Barnabey's Hotel Corp. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 14, 20)

Code of Civil Procedure section 187 contemplates amending a judgment pursuant to a noticed motion. (Wells Fargo, v. Weinberg (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1, 9.) The Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to amend a judgment but may rule on the motion based solely on declarations and other written evidence. (Id.)

First, it appears conceded that Celaya had control of the underlying litigation and was virtually represented in the default proceeding, given Celaya’s simultaneous positions at CFL, his appearance at the default hearing and his declaration in this matter.

Second, that there exists a unity of interest as to CFL and Celaya. Celaya’s declaration admits a failure to follow corporate formalities, does not dispute the commingling of funds, the lack of reimbursement to the corporation, and the use of business property for personal and business pursuits. He admits that CFL did not maintain strict separation. Further, there is no evidence presented of maintenance of the corporate formalities prior to the passing of Celaya’s wife in 2021 with respect to meetings, agendas, minutes, votes or other corporate formalities. The intention of Celaya to operate a corporation gives way to the manner in which the corporation was actually operated, as established in the both the deposition and declaration in opposition to this motion.

Further, the Court finds that CFL’s failure to satisfy the judgment constitutes the inequity required to find alter ego. CFL’s bankruptcy filings confirm CLF’s inability to satisfy the judgment. The Court notes there need not be an intent to commit fraud or intent for an inequitable result to occur, just that the inequitable result does occur. “The trial court erred in requiring Relentless to prove that the Fultons acted with wrongful intent. The law does not require such proof. Relentless was required to prove that the Fultons' acts caused an “ ‘ “inequitable result.” ’ ” (Relentless Air Racing, LLC v. Airborne Turbine Ltd. Partnership (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 811, 816.) “As long as Airborne is the sole judgment debtor, it is highly unlikely it will ever have assets with which to satisfy the judgment. Given the trial court's finding that the Fultons, Airborne, ATI, and Paradise are one and the same, it would be inequitable as a matter of law to preclude Relentless from collecting its judgment by treating Airborne as a separate entity.” (Id.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Dubose, Thomas vs. Gomes, Kimberly

Case No.:   VCU325823

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer to the first and second causes of action without leave to amend; to order Defendant to answer the complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

The complaint in this matter was initially filed September 16, 2025.

The Court previously granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings to the first cause of action for breach of oral pooling agreement and second cause of action breach of implied pooling agreement with leave to amend on the basis of the statute of limitations as to oral agreements. The Court denied the motion as to the third cause of action for fraud and fourth cause of action for conversion.

On February 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging these same causes of action.

Relevant to this demurrer, the operative amended complaint alleges, as to the first cause of action, the following:

“4. In September 2017, Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in a marriage ceremony in Dinuba, Tulare County, California wherein they exchanged marital vows and executed marriage certificate. Following said marriage ceremony, Defendant advised Plaintiff that Defendant had filed the executed marriage certificate with the County Clerk of Tulare County. Thereafter, from September 17, 2017 through May 18, 2023 Defendant continuously advised Plaintiff that they were in fact married and held herself out to the general public as Plaintiff's Wife.

5. On or about September 17, 2017, in the City of Woodlake, County of Tulare, State of California, while they were living with each other, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an oral agreement by the terms of which they agreed to treat as joint property the earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith, which resulted from all personal service, skill, effort, and work that each of them, thereafter, individually or jointly, performed, expended, or contributed during their relationship and while they lived with each other. The parties agreed that in the event of a termination of their relationship, each would account to the other for all property treated as joint property under the agreement and divide it equally between them.

6. Thereafter, from approximately September 17, 2017, to May 18, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant continued to live together, accumulating as joint property earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith, which resulted from all personal service, skill, effort, and| work that each of them, individually and jointly, had performed, expended, or contributed during the time they lived with each other. On or about May 18, 2023, Plaintiff and Defendant ceased to live with each other.” (FAC ¶¶4-6)

The joint property alleged to have been acquired pursuant to the oral agreement consists of real and personal property, as well as ownership of various business entities. (FAC ¶10.)

Further, that “On or about August 14, 2023, Plaintiff first learned that Defendant had in fact not filed the executed marriage certificate and she alleged that they were not in fact married.” (FAC ¶8.)

Additionally that “Plaintiff has requested Defendant to account for and divide equally all the joint property hereinabove described, both known and unknown to Plaintiff, but Defendant failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to account for any of the joint property, or to divide any portion of the joint property in Defendant's control and possession with Plaintiff equally, or at all.” (FAC ¶13.)

As to the second cause of action, Plaintiff realleges these prior allegations and adds that “Defendant understood that Plaintiff would perform, expend, or contribute such skills, efforts labors, and earnings on the condition that Defendant would combine his skill, efforts, labor and! earnings with those of Plaintiff and would share any property acquired as a result of those skills, efforts, labor and earnings with Plaintiff.” (FAC ¶¶16, 17.)

Defendant demurrers to the first and second causes of action on the basis of the statute of limitations and argues that the elimination of the date of the refusal to equally divide the property (pled as May 18, 2023 in paragraph 10 of the initial complaint) constitutes a sham pleading in an attempt to avoid application of the statute of limitations.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues on or about August 14, 2023, Plaintiff first learned that Defendant had in fact not filed in the executed marriage certificate and she knew that they were not in fact married and that on June 13, 2025 the Court in VFL298412 “issued a ruling that the parties were not married and ultimately initiated the breach of the pooling agreement.” (Opposition 3:18-23.) Therefore, Plaintiff argues that “Here, there is no precise date on when the breach occurred. The breach is alleged to have occurred on June 13, 2025, when it was determined that Plaintiff was not a putative spouse. However, the breach could have also occurred when one party refused to perform pursuant to the Marvin agreement.” (Opposition 5:20-23.)

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Breach of Oral Contract and Implied Contract – Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations based on a contract not in writing, that is oral or implied-in-fact contract, is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 339(1); Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1206 [section 339(1) "applies not only to actions for breach of oral or implied contracts. …"].)

Further, the applicable limitations period for a particular cause of action "runs from the moment a claim accrues." (Arey v. Cannon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.) "A cause of action accrues when it is complete with all of its elements—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation. This is the 'last element' accrual rule; ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from 'the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.'" (Id.)

To state a cause of action for breach of contract, Plaintiff must be able to establish "(1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, as with the initial complaint, Plaintiff alleges the contracts were formed September 17, 2017 (FAC ¶5), that Plaintiff performed fully (Complaint ¶14).

However, the amended complaint does not state, in contrast to the initial complaint, the date that Defendant refused to account for and divide equally the property at issue. (FAC ¶13; Complaint ¶10.)

The Court’s prior ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings found the breach was alleged to have occurred May 18, 2023, when the refusal to divide the property pursuant to the alleged agreement occurred. The Court finds that neither the initial complaint nor the amended complaint pleads that the agreement was breached upon separation of the parties.

Cochran v Cochran (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1124 cited and quoted by Plaintiff in opposition to this motion, cuts against Plaintiff’s position, and confirms the Court’s as stated above: "We hold instead that a Marvin agreement is breached when the party charged with a duty to perform refuses to do so.”

As such, the Court examines the sham pleading doctrine as to the removal of the date of the refusal in paragraph 13 of the amended complaint in comparison to paragraph 10 of the initial complaint.

Under the sham pleading doctrine, "[a] plaintiff may not avoid a demurrer by pleading facts or positions in an amended complaint that contradict facts pleaded in the original complaint, or by suppressing facts which prove the pleaded facts false." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corporation (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 877-878.) Therefore, where an amended complaint omits harmful allegations without explanation, the Court may take judicial notice of the prior pleadings and disregard any inconsistent allegations in the amended pleading. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 751)  The sham pleading doctrine can be invoked when the newly alleged facts contradict or substantively alter the prior allegations. (See Owens v. Kings Supermarket (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 379.)

The pleadings in Owens differed when the plaintiff alleged that the slip and fall occurred on a street adjacent to the supermarket initial complaint and then alleged that the slip and fall occurred on the defendant's premises rather than on the street in a subsequent complaint. (Id. at 384.) The court found that the purpose of this change was to avoid a demurrer on a premises liability theory. (Id.) Therefore, absent a satisfactory explanation for the change, the court properly disregarded the sham pleadings. (Id.)

As to the application of this doctrine, the court in Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, 425-426 notes:

“‘Allegations in the original pleading that rendered it vulnerable to demurrer or other attack cannot simply be omitted without explanation in the amended pleading. The policy against sham pleadings requires the pleader to explain satisfactorily any such omission.’ (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2005) ¶ 6.708, p. 6-142.1.)”

Further, the Deveny court cited to Colapinto v. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal. App. 3d 147, 151, noting “If a party files an amended complaint and attempts to avoid the defects of the original complaint by either omitting facts which made the previous complaint defective or by adding facts inconsistent with those of previous pleadings, the court may take judicial notice of prior pleadings and may disregard any inconsistent allegations.” (Id.)

Here, the Court expressly found that paragraph 10 of the initial complaint, stating the date of the refusal of May 18, 2023, constituted the date of the breach and that a claim for breach of oral agreement began accruing at that time. Noting that the initial complaint in this matter was filed September 16, 2025, the Court expressly ruled the first two causes of action were filed beyond the applicable two-year statute of limitations period.

There is no explanation as to the omission of the date as to the alleged refusal to divide and account for the property pursuant to the alleged oral agreement.

As such, the Court applies the sham pleading doctrine, notes the attempt to avoid a similar ruling on demurrer and treats the breach date as May 18, 2023 as pled in the initial complaint. The Court, therefore, sustains the demurer on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Without Leave to Amend

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Plaintiff has not demonstrated, in light of the Court’s application of the sham pleading doctrine, how amendment would cure this defect. Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

The Court orders Defendant to answer the amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Renteria, Iris vs. Land O'Lakes, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU315751

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and strike the costs in full

Facts

On March 6, 2026, Defendant filed notice of entry of judgment of dismissal after sustaining Defendant’s demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend.

Thereafter, on March 11, 2026, Defendant filed a memorandum of costs on
MC-010 seeking $1,969.36 as follows:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Defendant?
11. Court reporter fees	$306.60	Yes
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$1,662.76	Yes
Total	$1,969.36

The Court notes no worksheet or other documentation explaining or supporting these costs attached to the memorandum.

On March 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed a timely motion to tax costs, arguing the costs are not recoverable as a matter of law: “Specifically, Defendant cannot recover the amount claimed for court reporter fees because the transcripts were not ordered by the Court and transcripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court are not allowable as costs absent express statutory authorization. Defendant likewise cannot recover the amount claimed for electronic filing because fees for electronic filing or service are recoverable only where the court requires or orders electronic filing or service, and Tulare County does not mandate e-filing in this matter.”

In opposition, Defendant appears to concede the striking of the court reporter fees. However, Defendant argues that the electronic filing and service fees are recoverable under section 1033.5 as to items not expressly prohibited or allowable where properly incurred.

Authority and Analysis

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2) as to specific categories identified above in the chart and discussed in greater detail below.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal_App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266).

11. Court Reporter Fees

Plaintiff seeks to strike all the costs in the category, noting that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b)(5) expressly provides that “transcripts of court proceedings not ordered by the court” are “not allowable as costs, except when expressly authorized by law.”

Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration indicates these are for fees were incurred for transcripts of an April 9, 2025 hearing in the federal district court on Defendant’s Motion to Change Venue, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (Dakak Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. B.) However, the district court did not order transcripts for that hearing. (Dakak Decl. ¶ 4.)

As noted above, there appears to be no argument against striking these costs.

As no court ordered the transcripts for these hearings, these costs appear to be properly struck in full. The Court, therefore, grants the motion to strike the costs as to Category No. 11

14. Electronic Fees

Likewise, Plaintiff seeks to strike all costs sought here, arguing that Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(14) permits recovery of fees for electronic filing or service only “if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents” and that Tulare County does not mandate electronic filing or service.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not met the burden in opposing these costs in arguing they are not reasonable or necessary.

The Court views 1033.5(a)(14) as precluding recovery for these types of costs if not required or ordered by this Court.

The Court does not view these costs as valid on their face given the prohibition under section 1033.5(a)(14) because 1033.5(c)(4) states “(4) Items not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.” Here, the item of electronic filing and service is mentioned in this section under (a)(14). This subsection explicitly states electronic filing fees are only recoverable if they are court-ordered.

As noted above, "[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a 'proper objection' to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation]” (Nelson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at 131.)

The Court agrees and will strike the fees as well.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Gonzalez, Antonio vs. Sierra View Local Health Care District

Case No.:   VCU325894

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant Adventist Health System/West dba Adventist Health and Defendant Adventist Health Tulare’s Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint as to the Second Cause of Action for Elder Abuse/Neglect

Tentative Ruling: To overrule the demurrer; to order Defendant Adventist and System to answer the second amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

The Court previously sustained two demurrers to the second cause of action for elder abuse or neglect. The Court found that the allegations as to the care and treatment of Decedent sounded in professional negligence and did not establish a custodial relationship, in part based upon the time period at demurring Defendants’ facility.

The second amended complaint alleges, as to this second cause of action, the following.

“Prior to the events leading to his death, [Decedent] Mr. Gonzalez was an elderly man with significant and well-documented medical vulnerabilities, including advanced dementia. He was largely non-verbal and completely dependent on others for his safety and all activities of daily living, including mobility, hygiene, and nutrition...” (SAC ¶27.)

Further, that in in June 2022, Decedent’s health “began a steep decline” as around mid-June 2022, Decedent underwent surgery for a fractured femur and, afterwards, had severe mobility impairments and increased his dependency on nursing for assistance with his activities of daily living, and contracted COVID-19. (SAC ¶28.)

Further that by July 2022, Plaintiff alleges that Decedent was a known high-risk patient for developing pressure ulcers because he was assessed as "Bedfast" with "Very Limited" mobility, his Braden Scale scores were consistently low and he required "Total Dependent" or "Maximum Assistance" for nearly all functions, including transfers, turning, and toileting, and was at times placed in physical restraints. (SAC ¶29.)

Decedent was admitted to Defendant Adventist’s and Defendant System’s facility, Adventist Health Tulare.” (SAC ¶30.) Plaintiff further alleges that “At the time of his admission, Mr. Gonzalez was entirely bedbound, non-verbal, and suffered from known dysphagia (difficulty swallowing), which placed him at an extreme and well-understood risk for aspiration. He was completely reliant on the facility's staff for his activities of daily living.” (SAC ¶30.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Adventist and Defendant System knew they needed to implement plans to prevent and respond to aspiration and choking incidents. To Plaintiff’s knowledge and belief, Defendants Adventist and Defendant System failed to do so.” (SAC ¶30.)

Plaintiff alleges further that “Defendant Adventist's and Defendant System’s managing agents, including but not limited to their Administrator, Jason Wells, and Director of Nursing, Heather Van Housen, were delegated the administrative authority and responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the hospital, Adventist Health Tulare, including the hiring, oversight, and training of nursing staff to ensure they provided care in compliance with facility, federal, and state standards.” (SAC ¶8.)

Further, that:

“On or about September 19, 2024, staff at Adventist Health Tulare subjected the frail and defenseless Mr. Gonzalez to numerous, traumatic, and unsuccessful attempts to insert an IV line. From the onset of Adventist Health Tulare nursing staff’s attempts to start the IV line, Mr. Gonzalez started gagging. The gagging was quickly followed by vomiting. To Plaintiff’s knowledge and belief, Mr. Gonzalez vomited several times. Instead of stopping to ensure that Mr. Gonzalez’s airways were clear of vomit, nursing staff continued their actions. Further, Adventist Health Tulare nursing staff continued their actions even though Mr. Gonzalez’s gagging and vomiting showed a pattern that demonstrated that it was caused by their actions. Because staff failed to protect his airway, a basic and critical precaution for a patient with known dysphagia, he aspirated the vomit into his lungs. This aspiration event was a direct result of Adventist's neglect and immediately caused a ‘code blue’ medical emergency and acute respiratory failure. Mr. Gonzalez was intubated and, from that point forward, was rendered permanently dependent on a mechanical ventilator to breathe.” (SAC ¶31.)

Additionally, that “Further, while Adventist Health Tulare Nursing staff continued to subject Mr. Gonzalez to numerous and traumatic IV line insertion procedure, Mr. Gonzalez showed signs of discomfort and distress.” (SAC ¶32.)

Plaintiff alleges further:

“After the aspiration event, Mr. Gonzalez developed an irregular heartbeat (afib). On several occasions, Plaintiff noticed that Mr. Gonzalez’s vitals would spike and set off alarms, but Defendant Adventist’s and Defendant System’s nursing staff failed to respond to the alarms in a timely manner. On several of these occasions, Plaintiff estimates that nursing staff would take approximately 2 hours before providing any sort of treatment or medication. Further, throughout his stay at Adventist Health Tulare, Defendant Adventist and Defendant System’s nursing staff failed to reposition Mr. Gonzalez at least once every two hours per standard nursing protocol. Defendant Adventist and Defendant System’s failure to reposition Mr. Gonzalez contributed to skin breakdown and the development of pressure ulcers.” (SAC ¶33.)

Following this, Decedent was transferred to Defendant Central Valley’s facility, Central Valley Specialty Hospital, for long-term ventilator management and in November 2024, was transferred to Defendant Sierra View Medical Center. (SAC ¶¶34, 35.)

Plaintiff further alleges:

“The continuous and compounding acts of neglect by Defendant Adventist, Defendant Central valley, and Defendant Sierra View, starting with the aspiration event on September 19, 2024, and continuing through the development of pneumonia and severe dehydration, constituted an abandonment of a vulnerable elder and a conscious disregard for his life, rights, and safety. As a direct and proximate result of this inexcusable chain of neglect, Mr. Gonzalez endured five months of unrelenting pain, distress, and irreversible decline. His injuries, including ventilator-dependent respiratory failure, pneumonia, and complications from dehydration, led directly to his wrongful death on February 18, 2025.” (SAC ¶34 at 15:6-16.)

Plaintiff alleges further:

“While Decedent Antonio Gonzalez was under each of the Defendants' care, Defendants, and each of them, knew that Mr. Gonzalez was an elder in a severely compromised physical and mental state. As a result of Mr. Gonzalez's advanced dementia, non-verbal status, immobility, and other comorbidities, he required close supervision, constant monitoring, and specialized medical attention to ensure his health, safety, and well-being while at each Defendant’s respective facility.” (SAC ¶35 at 15:18-24)

Plaintiff further alleges Decedent was entirely and totally dependent upon the Defendants for all his activities of daily living including, but not limited to, “nutrition and hydration, dietary planning for dysphagia, skin care and prevention of pressure ulcers, hygiene, infection control and prevention, toileting, and all mobility, including turning and repositioning in bed.” (SAC ¶¶36, 37.) Further that “Defendant Adventist’ and Defendant System’s abuse caused Mr. Gonzalez to experience an aspiration event, which lead to cardiac issue that Mr. Gonzalez did not have prior to entering Adventist Health Tulare.” (SAC ¶38.)

Additionally, that “…pressure ulcers developed and worsened while at each Defendant’s respective facility. Further to Plaintiff’s knowledge and belief each Defendant failed to turn and reposition Mr. Gonzalez per standard nursing protocol. For example, Plaintiff had to ask Defendant Adventist’s and Defendant System’s nursing staff to turn or reposition her husband.” (SAC ¶38.)

Defendants Adventist and System demurrer to the second cause of action for elder abuse or neglect for failure to state sufficient facts, arguing that  the length of the stay and medical treatment received do not arise to elder neglect or abuse.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the elder neglect is separate from the professional negligence via the allegations that these Defendants failed to regularly turn and reposition Mr. Gonzalez, who was completely immobile during his time with these Defendants, which resulted in bedsores and pressure injuries. Plaintiff argues these are fundamental custodial duties as to elders in the care of Defendants.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Second Cause of Action – Elder Abuse and Neglect

A cause of action under the Elder Abuse Act must be alleged with particularity.    (See Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)   Acts that constitute mere professional negligence do not constitute elder abuse: “To recover the enhanced remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act from a health care provider, a plaintiff must prove more than simple or even gross negligence in the provider's care or custody of the elder.”  (See Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 405.)  “‘[T]he legislature intended the Elder Abuse Act to sanction only egregious acts of misconduct distinct from professional negligence….” (Covenant Care, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.4th at 784.) “In order to obtain the remedies available in section 15657, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that defendant is guilty of something more than negligence; he or she must show reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. The latter three categories involve ‘intentional,’ ‘willful,’ or ‘conscious’ wrongdoing of a ‘despicable’ or "injurious" nature.”  (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 31-32.)   

Abuse is defined as “[p]hysical abuse, neglect, financial abuse, abandonment, isolation, abduction, or other treatment with resulting physical harm or pain or mental suffering” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.07(a)) or “[t]he deprivation by a care custodian of goods or services that are necessary to avoid physical harm or mental suffering” (Welf. & Inst. Code §15610.07(b))

As to neglect, “The plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration, hygiene or medical care [citations]; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs [citations]; and (3) denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness) [citations].” (Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at 406-407.)

In sustaining the demurrers to the initial and amended complaint, the Court focused on the relatively short period of time Decedent was admitted to the Demurring Defendants’ facility and the event of attempting to insert an IV line and resulting issues sustained by Decedent. The Court noted that the first amended complaint added allegations that as of September 19, 2024, Decedent was “entirely bedbound, non-verbal, and suffered from known dysphagia (difficulty swallowing), which placed him at an extreme and well-understood risk for aspiration. He was completely reliant on the facility's staff for his activities of daily living” and that “Defendant Adventist and Defendant System knew they needed to implement plans to prevent and respond to aspiration and choking incidents. To Plaintiff’s knowledge and belief, Defendants Adventist and Defendant System failed to do so.” (FAC ¶30)

Here, the second amended complaint realleges these statements and the Court notes further allegations as to failure to turn or reposition Decedent, resulting in bed sores. (SAC ¶38.)

Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 34 notes, in comparing MICRA and elder abuse or neglect, the following:

“[N]eglect within the meaning of former section 15610.57 appears to cover an area of misconduct distinct from 'professional negligence' in section 15657.2: "neglect" as defined in former section 15610.57 and used in section 15657 does not refer to the performance of medical services in a manner inferior to '"the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing'" (citation), but rather to the failure of those responsible for attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults, regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial obligations. It is instructive that the statutory definition quoted above gives as an example of 'neglect' not negligence in the undertaking of medical services but the more fundamental '[f]ailure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs.' (Citation.)”

Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148 states:

“Beyond the assertion that defendants treated Mrs. Cox at outpatient 'clinics' operated by defendants, plaintiffs offer no other explanation for why defendants' intermittent, outpatient medical treatment forged a caretaking or custodial relationship between Mrs. Cox and defendants. No allegations in the complaint support an inference that Mrs. Cox relied on defendants in any way distinct from an able-bodied and fully competent adult's reliance on the advice and care of his or her medical providers. Accordingly, we hold that defendants lacked the needed caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent. [¶] Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse Act unless the defendant health care provider has a caretaking or custodial relationship with the elder or dependent adult. Here, plaintiffs rely solely on defendants' allegedly substandard provision of medical treatment, on an outpatient basis, to an elder. But without more, such an allegation does not support the conclusion that neglect occurred under the Elder Abuse Act. To elide the distinction between neglect under the Act and objectionable conduct triggering conventional tort remedies—even in the absence of a care or custody relationship—risks undermining the Act's central premise." (Id. at 165.)

In further support of the demurrer, demurring Defendants cite to Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal. App. 5th 382, 405 which requires the Court to determine the existence of a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship on a case-by-case basis. In Oroville, in-home nursing care for a wound was not considered custodial care because the defendants did not assume a significant responsibility for attending to the party's basic needs, because "unlike a basic need an able-bodied and fully competent adult would be capable of managing without assistance, such as eating, taking medicine, or using the restroom, decedent's wound care required competent professional medical attention." (Id.) The Court finds Oroville distinguishable here with respect to in patient hospitalization as opposed to in-home care.

Here, the Court’s opinion is that the alleged issues regarding the IV insertion sound in medical malpractice as opposed to the overall custodial or caretaking relationship.

However, the Court recognizes that separate allegations that Decedent was completely dependent on these moving Defendants for not only the IV insertion (and other medical treatment) but also for basic needs and care, including failure to implement turning, repositioning and monitoring measures while receiving in patient care and that such allegations have been found to constitute a custodial neglect even where professional medical staff is involved and conducts other acts that sound in professional negligence. (See Country Villa Claremont Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 426, 435; Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley, LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406.) Neglect includes, in relevant part,"[f]ailure to provide medical care for physical and mental health needs. . ." and "failure to protect from health and safety hazards." (Welf. And Inst. Code §15610.57(b)(1)-(2).)

The court in Kruthanooch v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (2022) 83 Cal. App. 5th 1109 noted, citing Winn, that there was no evidence of a custodial relationship as there was "no substantial evidence that, at the time he presented at [the hospital], Kruthanooch sought or required ongoing assistance with eating, drinking, toileting, or any other basic needs." (Id. at 1129.) Moreover, "[a]t the time that Kruthanooch was injured, he had been at [the hospital’s] facility between two and three hours. Kruthanooch was discharged on July 28, only two days after he presented for care." (Id.) Thus, "the evidence demonstrate[d] that the relationship was of a limited duration and [hospital’s] attention to Kruthanooch's basic needs was incidental to the circumscribed medical care it provided.” (Id. at 1128.)

However, the patient in Kruthanooch was not, as here, alleged to be “totally dependent…for all his activities of daily living including, but not limited to, nutrition and hydration, dietary planning for dysphagia, skin care and prevention of pressure ulcers, hygiene, infection control and prevention, toileting, and all mobility, including turning and repositioning in bed.” (SAC ¶37.) The Court cannot say that alleged failures to turn Decedent, as well as these other allegations, are incident to the treatment regarding the placement of the IV and other medical treatment provided.

Therefore, the Court finds sufficient allegations as to the second cause of action and overrules the demurrer.

The Court, therefore, orders Defendants Adventist and System to answer the second amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Esparza, Aurelio et al vs. Farmers Casualty Insurance Company

Case No.:   PCU322296

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion. 

Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company (erroneously sued as “Farmers Casualty Insurance Company) moves for summary judgment against the complaint of Aurelio and Roselis Esparza on statute of limitations grounds.

Plaintiffs have not timely filed any opposition.

Background

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges they purchased a homeowner’s policy from defendant, insuring residential property at 56 N. F St., in Porterville; that the property suffered a covered loss on or about April 13, 2024; that plaintiffs “timely reported the loss to Defendant[] and made a claim on the Policy”; and that “Defendant[] informed Plaintiffs in writing of Defendant[’s] coverage determination on September 3, 2024,” which was that “[s]ince the replacement cost amount of [the claimed] covered damage [was] less than [plaintiffs’] deductible, [defendant was] not able to issue a payment … [which conclusion was] based on [an] estimate [defendant] prepared” and “included … with [the] letter.”

Defendant submits a declaration of Megan Buchanan, an employee claims adjuster who handled plaintiffs’ claim.  Buchanan states: “On or about August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs, through their counsel, filed a claim with Defendant for alleged damage [to the subject property] which Plaintiffs claimed occurred on the ‘date of loss’ of April 13, 2024”; that she “called Plaintiffs’ counsel for an inspection of the property and scheduled the inspection”; that “[t]he inspection took place on September 3, 2024,” and “[s]hortly thereafter, and based upon the facts uncovered during that inspection, [she] determined that only a small portion of the roof damage claimed by Plaintiffs was due to a covered peril of wind and rain”; and that “on September 3, 2024, [she] sent a letter to Plaintiffs, in care of their counsel, indicating that Defendant had partially accepted the claim for the portion of the roof damage that was in fact caused by wind and rain, but also informing Plaintiffs that no payment was due as the amount of covered damages was lower than Plaintiffs’ deductible under their policy.”

Buchanan’s declaration includes what is represented to be a “true and correct copy” of her September 3, 2024 letter.  In it, Buchanan directed plaintiffs to various provisions of their policy that formed “the basis for [defendant’s] decision.”  The letter also specifically referred plaintiffs to a provision of the policy containing a one-year limitations period for suit on the policy. 

Buchanan’s declaration additionally includes what is represented to be a “[a] true and correct copy of Defendant’s homeowners insurance policy,” which, under “Section I – Property Conditions”; subsection 12, entitled “Suit Against Us,” states, in part:  “Suit on or arising out of the Section I - Property Coverage of this policy must be brought within one year after inception of the loss or damage.”

Buchanan’s September 3, 2024 letter to the plaintiffs quoted this provision expressly.  The letter further stated, inter alia, that defendant “may deny a claim based on the applicable California statute of limitations” and that defendant had “completed the adjustment of [plaintiffs’] loss and [was] closing [their] claim.”

Plaintiffs allege, and Buchanan’s declaration confirms, that plaintiffs subsequently sought reconsideration of defendant’s coverage determination and that defendant ultimately refused to change their determination. 

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 10, 2025, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and tortious bad faith, each based on defendant’s denial of alleged “full coverage for Plaintiffs’ claim under the Policy, and/or by failing to provide all of the payments and other benefits due to Plaintiffs under the terms of the Policy.”

Analysis

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)  “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  (Id., subd. (c).) 

One way a defendant may show the causes of action pled in a complaint have no merit is to show a complete defense to them (id., subds. (p)(2); (o)(2)), for example, as here, based on the applicable statute of limitations. 

Validity of Limitations Period

Limitations period provisions in insurance policies, such as presented here, have “long been recognized as valid in California. As is stated in Fageol T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 748, 753 [117 P.2d 669], of a policy provision requesting action to be commenced within 12 months after the happening of the loss: ‘Such a covenant shortening the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance contract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. One year was not an unfair period of limitation. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]”  (C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1064 [211 Cal.Rptr. 765].)

The court finds, accordingly, that the plaintiffs’ policy included a valid one-year limitations period. 

Commencement of Limitations Period

Pursuant to the policy terms, the limitations period at issue commenced to run “after inception of the loss or damage.”  Our courts have concluded “ ‘inception of the loss’ should be determined by reference to reasonable discovery of the loss,” so that “[t]he insured's suit on the policy will be deemed timely if it is filed within one year after ‘inception of the loss,’ defined as that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has been triggered.”  (Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 686-687 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230].)

Here, plaintiffs’ complaint includes no express allegations concerning delayed discovery of the alleged covered loss.  They do allege that “[u]pon notice or discovery of the loss, Plaintiffs timely reported the loss to Defendants and made a claim on the Policy,” which impliedly could be read to support an inference that the time when they “timely reported the loss”—which, according to Buchanan, was “[o]n or about August 22, 2024”—was shortly after they were on “notice” of or had “discover[ed]” the loss, but the complaint, the court notes, ultimately does not state at all the specific date when plaintiffs had “notice” of or “discover[ed]” the loss. 

Plaintiffs’ other allegations, though, more directly support that there was no delayed discovery.  Plaintiffs allege “the subject date of loss” was “on or about 04-13-2024, when the Property suffered damage as the result of a sudden occurrence that is a covered peril under the Policy” (italics added), which “sudden occurrence” they describe, “[m]ore specifically,” as being that “the roof of the home on the Property was damaged due to wind and rain, which allowed rainwater to seep through the roof and into the interior of the home causing further damage to the Property.”  Plaintiffs, having alleged that they damage to the property resulted from a “sudden occurrence” indicate that they had immediate knowledge of the loss, since they could not otherwise know that the “occurrence” of it was “sudden.”

Taking these allegations as a whole, the court does not find that the complaint, which frames the issues on summary judgment, frames delayed discovery of the covered loss on some date after April 13, 2024, as a factual matter to which defendant’s motion must respond.  (See Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 640 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 31] [“On a motion for summary judgment, the issues are framed by the pleadings since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond.”].)

Accordingly, for the purposes of this motion, the court takes it as effectively framed in the complaint (and therefore established by defendant’s reference to its allegations) that the applicable statute of limitations in this case commenced to run on April 13, 2024.

Tolling

“The statute is tolled from the time the insured gives notice of the claim to the insurance company until ‘the time the insurer formally denies the claim in writing.’ ” (Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 604 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 548], citing Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 678 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230] (Prudential-LMI).)

Defendant makes an unrefuted prima facie showing based on Buchanan’s declaration sufficient to establish that plaintiffs gave notice of their claim to defendant on August 22, 2024.   Buchanan’s declaration, coupled with plaintiffs’ own allegations in their complaint, further sufficiently establishes that defendant formally denied plaintiffs’ claim in writing on September 3, 2024. 

Taken together, these unrefuted submitted facts establish that the one-year period applicable to plaintiffs’ claims was tolled from August 22, 2024, to September 3, 2024. 

Accordingly, based on the whole of the above unrefuted facts and evidence, the court finds defendant makes a sufficient prima facie showing that the one-year limitations period commenced running on April 13, 2024; that notice of the claim was given to defendant on August 22, 2024, 131 days later, which commenced a tolling of the one-year period; that defendant formally denied plaintiffs’ claim in writing on September 3, 2025, which resulted in the tolling period ending; that plaintiffs commenced suit on June 10, 2025, 280 days after the end of the tolling period, which 280 period, combined with the 131 days that had elapsed between the “inception of the loss” and when plaintiffs gave notice of their claim, was a total of 411 days; and, thus, that suit was commenced far greater than “one year after inception of the loss or damage,” after accounting for the aforementioned tolling period. 

Additionally, the court finds that none of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their subsequent reconsideration request(s) frame any issue regarding a possible extension of their time to commence suit resulting from such requests and/or defendant’s alleged responses.  Plaintiffs clearly alleged that “Defendants refused to change their prior coverage determination” without qualification. 

“Once a claim has been made, the carrier has pursued its investigation, and the claim has been denied, the policies behind allowing equitable tolling have been fulfilled.”  (Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 546].)  Requests for reconsideration cause no extension of the time to commence suit where the insurer’s denial is unequivocal and the insurer does not agree to reopen the claim.  (See ibid., discussing distinguishable circumstances in Prudential-LMI and Walker v. American Bankers Ins. (1992) 108 Nev. 533 [836 P.2d 59].) “The justifications for equitable tolling are absent, once the carrier has initially denied the claim. The policies supporting the shortened limitation period are then fully applicable, and no reason for further tolling exists.”  (Id., at p. 142.)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that defendant makes a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment on both causes of action of plaintiffs’ complaint.  (See Velasquez v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] [“A bad faith action based on denial of a claim in the underlying policy is an action on the policy.”].)

Once a defendant meets its burden to show that an action has no merit based on a complete defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact as to the defense.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff, in meeting such burden, must “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”  (Ibid.)  Plaintiffs, having failed to submit any opposition, necessarily fail to do so here.

Accordingly, the court finds that the motion for summary judgment must be, and therefore is, granted. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Fresno Landscape Services, Inc. vs. Gonzalez Jimenez, Gilberto et al

Case No.:   PCU331724

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Petition Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Civil Code 9408, 9410, 9412

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter to July 21, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19 pursuant to the stipulation filed with this Court.  

Facts

Petitioner is Fresno Landscape Services who seeks declaratory relief pursuant to Civil Code sections 9408, 9410, 9412 as to Respondent Gilberto Gonzalez Jimenez, an employee of Petitioner as a laborer on various projects at issue and Respondent City of Porterville, who awarded a public works contract to S & B Sons, Inc., which subcontracted landscape work to Petitioner.

Petitioner’s verified petition states it paid Respondent Jimenez for 688 hours of work at rates ranging between $32.01 and $36.42 for  total of $23,740.88, including proper withholdings, for the period of May 2024 to September 2024. (Petition ¶9.)

However, Respondent Jimenez, on January 7, 2025, filed a stop payment notice, claiming $47,056.37 remained unpaid. (Petition ¶10.)

On February 14, 2025, Petitioner's CEO Jonathan Enrique Silva executed an  Affidavit in Opposition pursuant to Civil Code section 9406, demonstrating all wages had been paid in full, and served the same on Respondents City of Porterville and Jimenez. (Petition ¶12.) On June 9, 2025, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Affidavit detailing the discrepancies between Jimenez's claims and actual payments documented in certified payroll records maintained in compliance with Labor Code sections 1720 et seq. (Petition ¶13.)

On June 11, 2025, Jimenez filed a counter affidavit pursuant to Civil Code section 9406, maintaining the claim. (Petition ¶14.)

Respondent City of Porterville, pursuant to the stop notice and counter affidavit, continues the withhold funds from S&B Sons, Inc. (Petition ¶15.)

Therefore, on February 20, 2026, Petitioner filed this petition.

On April 14, 2026, the Petitioner and Respondent Jimenez filed a joint stipulation to continue the case management conferencing hearing in light of negotiation and a possible mediation.  

The Court will sign the order on stipulation and continue this matter to July 21, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              In the Matter of OREY, MICHAEL PAUL

Case No.:     PCU331903

Date:           April 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Petition Open a Superior Cour File for the Purpose of Establishing Jurisdiction Over Underinsured Motorist Arbitration Matter

Tentative Ruling: To grant the petition. Petitioner indicates that the underlying dispute is currently in arbitration and that this petition has been filed to obtain a case number, open a file and obtain the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(f)(1) and Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 921-926.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division