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Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430.  The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, November 19, 2026, are:

Re:                Sanchez, Pedro vs. Beneventos Cleaning & Restoration Service, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU310618

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the final compliance hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for July 1, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on November 19, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On October 27, 2026, the settlement administrator, Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On April 16, 2026, the administrator  received a mailing list of 123 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On April 30, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 153 members. Three (3) notices were returned and updated addresses for all three (3) were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, zero (0) notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until June 29, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Additionally, as to the remailed notices, members had until July 13, 2026.  Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 123 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $66,590.74 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $1,099.61, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $9.16, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $541.39.

in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $162,500 or $54,166.66. . Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 102.1 hours on this case, at rates ranging between 950 and $600 per hour, providing a base lodestar of $73,797.50. (Declaration of Hyun ¶¶24.)

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $15,252.60. (Declaration of Hyun ¶27.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $6,490.00. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved representative payments of $5,000.00 each and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $162,500.00 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:

$54,166.66

Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:

$15,252.60

Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Sanchez:

$5,000.00

Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Meza:

$5,000.00

Approved Settlement Administrator Costs

$6,490.00

Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)

$10,000.00

Approved Net Settlement Amount

$66,590.74

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiffs on October 27, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for July 1, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Vidal, Jose Ruiz vs. Faria Land and Cattle Company LLC

Case No.:   VCU310614

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Hearing re: Final Compliance with Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with the distribution of the settlement by the settlement administrator. The Court, therefore, continues this hearing to December 17, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Carr, Deja vs. Doe, John

Case No.:   VCU319505

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendants Brian C. Chance and Estate of Nathan Chance’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Facts

The Amended Complaint identifies the “Estate of Nathan Chance / Brian C. Chance” as the “owner and landlord” of the property at 2746 N. Canary Dr., Visalia. (UMF No. 6.)

Against these moving Defendants, Plaintiff asserts the Third Cause of Action for negligence/premises liability (alleging the “Landlord” failed to abate his tenants’ conduct), the Sixth Cause of Action for fraud (alleging the decedent obtained a reverse mortgage by falsely representing the property was his sole residence and then rented it illegally), and the Seventh Cause of Action for unjust enrichment/constructive trust (seeking an interest in the property). (UMF No. 8.)

Each of Plaintiff’s claims rests on alleged pre-death conduct of the Decedent Nathan Chance. (UMF No. 9.)

The estate of Nathan Hugo Chance, Jr. is being administered in the Superior Court of California, County of Tulare, in Estate of Nathan Hugo Chance, Jr., Case No. VPR053278. (UMF No. 1.)

On May 28, 2025, the Court issued Letters of Administration appointing Christina C. Bowlin and Brian C. Chance as co-administrators of the estate.  (UMF No. 2.)

On October 8, 2025, the co-administrators served Plaintiff Deja Carr by mail with a Notice of Administration to Creditors (Form DE-157) and a blank Creditor’s Claim form (Form DE 172). (UMF No. 3.) The Notice expressly advised Plaintiff that she “must FILE CLAIM with the court clerk… AND mail or deliver a copy to the personal representative” before the last to occur of (a) four months after May 28, 2025, the date Letters first issued, or (b) 60 days after October 8, 2025, the date the Notice was mailed. (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff’s deadline to file a claim with the Estate was December 7, 2025. (UMF No. 5.)

Plaintiff never filed a creditor’s claim with the Estate. (UMF No. 10.) Plaintiff has never petitioned the probate court for leave to file a late claim. (UMF No. 11.)

On these facts, Defendants seek summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication of each of the three causes of action.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

A notice of non-opposition by Defendants was filed on November 10, 2026.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.)  “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).) 

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Probate Code Claim Requirements as to Claims against Estate

“An action may not be commenced against a decedent’s personal representative on a cause of action against the decedent unless a claim is first filed as provided in this part and the claim is rejected in whole or in part.” (Prob. Code, § 9351.)

“A properly filed claim in the probate proceeding is crucial for another reason as well. A timely filed claim is a condition precedent to filing an action against a decedent's estate.” (Dobler v. Arluk Medical Ctr. Indus. Group (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 530, 536.) 

A claim not filed "…in the manner and within the time provided in this part ... is barred." (Prob. Code § 9002)

A potential creditor must file a claim in the probate matter before the later of "…[f]our months after the date letters are first issued to a general personal representative" or "[s]ixty days after the date notice of administration is ... mailed or personally delivered to the creditor." (Prob. Code § 9100.)

As noted above, the letters were issued May 28, 2025 and the Notice was served on Plaintiff October 8, 2025. Plaintiff has failed to file a creditor’s claim no later than December 7, 2025, 60 days from October 8, 2025.

The Court agrees that the filing of the lawsuit, or amended complaint, cannot substitute as a creditor’s claim under Probate Code section 9351 that requires the claim be filed and rejected prior to commencement of the lawsuit.

Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment as requested.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Cojo Ranch Limited Partnership vs. Pacheco, Adriana

Case No.:   VCU316766

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication; (2) Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses and Deem Admissions Admitted as to Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough; (3) Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses and Deem Admissions Admitted as to Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc.

Tentative Ruling:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Plaintiff and cross-defendant Cojo Ranch Limited Partnership (Plaintiff) moves for summary adjudication in its favor on the first, third, and fourth causes of action of its complaint, and the sixth cause of action of defendants and cross-complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa (Defendants) cross-complaint. 

The first cause of action of Plaintiff’s complaint and the sixth cause of action of Defendants’ cross-complaint present competing quiet title claims.  At issue, is the true boundary between Defendants’ property to the north and Plaintiff’s property to the south. 

Defendants purchased the northern property from its former owner, Schwin, and a grant deed for the transfer was recorded June 25, 2021.  At the time, an east-west fence, that had been erected “[a]t an unknown distant time in the past,” was located at what Plaintiff maintains is the northern border of its property and what it maintains is the southern border of Defendants’ property.  

Defendants maintain their realtor had represented to them that the boundaries between the parties’ properties was farther south than the above-noted fence line.  Defendants later, relying on representations their realtor, as well as Schwin, made to them, constructed a fence farther south of the above-noted fence line, and, additionally, constructed certain improvements in the newly bounded area, such as animal pens. 

Plaintiffs seek to quiet title essentially at the old fence line, based on a survey completed by surveyor they hired, Neil Zerlang.  Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is for trespass and their fourth cause of action is for nuisance.  Each claim is based on the defendants’ alleged encroachment on their property and construction of the newly constructed, further south fence.

A. Background

Defendants’ property is located directly north of the Plaintiff’s property. The legal boundary between Plaintiff's Property and Defendants' property is not visually ascertainable by reference to any natural formation. However, at some point, a fence was erected. The fence runs from east to west and prevents any northward travel from Plaintiff's Property onto Defendants' property. 

After Defendants' acquisition of Defendants' property in 2021, Defendants claimed that the true boundary between Plaintiff's Property and Defendants' property was approximately 250 feet south of this fenceline. The defendants’ claim is based on representations by Sandra Lee McDonough, the Defendant’s real estate agent. (Declaration of Ariana Pacheco, ¶ 5.) While showing the Defendants’ their property, Sandra Lee McDonough took the Defendants to the original fenceline and told them that the property line extended 250 feet south of the fenceline.

Consequently, the Defendants constructed a new fence approximately 250 feet to the south of the existing fenceline.

Upon discovery of the new fence, Plaintiff made demands upon Defendants to remove it so the Plaintiff’s cattle could continue to access the Disputed Property. Defendants refused to remove the new fence. Plaintiffs, through counsel, renewed their demand and the Defendants refused. The Plaintiff filed this action.

B. The Defendants’ Request for Continuance

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subd. (h) states, in pertinent part:

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just….” 

A continuance under Civil Procedure Code section 437c, subd. (h) is “virtually mandated upon a good faith showing by affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.” (Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 398 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Center (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532 (“When a party makes a good faith showing by affidavit demonstrating that a continuance is necessary to obtain essential facts to oppose a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must grant the continuance request.”).)

The court in Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, set forth the required elements of an affidavit in support of a request for continuance, holding that “A declaration in support of a request for a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h) must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts.” (Cooksey at 254, citations, internal quotations omitted.) It is recognized that where an appropriate declaration meeting these requirements is submitted, then denial of the motion or grant of the continuance is mandatory.  (Dee v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 30, 34-35.)

1. The Facts to be Obtained are Essential to Opposing the Motion

Defendants Pacheco/Villa have subpoenaed the County of Tulare to obtain deeds going back prior to 1960 to understand how the properties involved in this lawsuit were transferred through the years, County Assessor documents and the opportunity to take depositions themselves to obtain information prior to this motion for summary adjudication moving forward. Defendants plan to depose Neil Zerlang and “party witnesses.”

Of additional note, defendant Ariana Pacheco asserts: “I plan to retain an expert of my own who is a California-licensed Professional Land Surveyor to locate the disputed line, explain how the legal descriptions in both deeds relate to the disputed strip of land, evaluate the methodology of the prior surveyors, and prepare a survey map. This will provide valuable evidence toward the factual resolution.”

2. There is Reason to Believe Such Facts May Exist

Defendants do not present facts demonstrating that there is reason to believe specific facts exist that would contradict Plaintiff’s showing as to the location of the disputed boundary. 

Consequently, the Court does not know what facts the defense wishes to obtain nor whether they are essential to oppose the motion.  (See Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 251 [“We hold that the trial court's denial of appellant's request for a continuance under section 437c, subdivision (h) was not an abuse of discretion because appellant failed to make a good faith showing as to what facts essential to oppose summary judgment may have existed and why such facts could not have been discovered sooner.”])

3. The Reasons Why Additional Time is Needed to Obtain These Facts

There is no justification provided for why the Defendants have not obtained the deeds going back prior to 1960, prior to this date, nor do they establish what facts the Defendants expect to ascertain from these documents. The defendants claim they wish to depose Neil Zerlang and others, but they do not state the facts they expect to obtain from these depositions.   Defendants further do not explain why they have not, in the course of this litigation, secured a surveyor and only seek to retain a surveyor, who they evidently have not yet identified, now. 

The defendants’ only reason given for why additional time is needed to obtain these facts is that the operative pleadings have been added and amended, the parties have begun discovery, engaged in mediation, and explored settlement possibilities. Defendants asserts that, through initial discovery and mediation discussions, significant facts were discovered which require additional discovery. Defendants additionally assert depositions that the Plaintiff scheduled were taken off calendar and they claim they need time, now, to conduct those depositions themselves.  

These facts only demonstrate the defendants lack of due diligence, and do not establish a reason for why additional time is needed to obtain facts that are not identified by the Defendants.

The Court additionally notes that this motion was originally scheduled to be heard on September 24, 2026, but the parties stipulated to a continuance, which gave Defendants additional time to secure the information they now claim they need additional time to pursue.  There is no reason given for why the discovery the Defendants wish to obtain was not obtained during the additional time provided.  

The court does not find a continuance warranted in these circumstances. 

C. Summary Judgment Standard

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party can show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and, if not, to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure § 437c, subdivision (c) "requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the moving party must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "A cause of action 'cannot be established' if the undisputed facts presented by the defendant prove the contrary of the plaintiff's allegations as a matter of law." (Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1597.) Courts "liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party." (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) Once the moving party has met that burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc, § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-163.)

D.  Analysis

1. First Cause of Action and Sixth Cause of Action in the Cross-Complaint – Quite Title

The elements of quiet title are: (1) Plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the land; and (2) Defendant claims an interest therein adverse to Plaintiff. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 740.)  The ownership of the disputed strip of land, here, as noted, revolves around the correct boundary line.

“Under California law, the location of a disputed boundary line is proven by retracing, as nearly as possible based upon existing evidence, the footsteps of the original surveyor whose survey fixed the boundaries.” (Bloxham v. Saldigner (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 729, 736.) "The location of the monuments placed in connection with the original survey is of 'primary importance.'" (Id. at p. 742.) “[T]he boundaries of an official survey cannot be questioned because such a survey does not ascertain boundaries but creates them.” (Fripp v. Walters (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 656, 662.)

 “Given the difficulties of fixing the boundaries anew according to the old surveys, the trial court properly recognized a line that has served for many years as the practical boundary.” (Hannah v. Pogue (1944) 23 Cal. 2d 849, 857.)

  1. The Plaintiff’s Initial Showing

The Plaintiff offers a report created by Neil Zerlang, a professional land surveyor, to establish the original boundary lines. The Plaintiff also offers a survey report conducted by Katrina Olsen, a California Licensed Land Surveyor. Katrina Olsen was retained by the Defendants’ title insurer. The Court uses the reports of Neil Zerlang and Katrina Olsen to establish “the footsteps of the original surveyor whose survey fixed the boundaries.”

The court begins with Neil Zerlang’s report. He considered the following documents:

  • Legal research was performed to obtain and verify the grant deeds of the subject properties (Pacheco and Guthrie). No inconsistencies in the legal descriptions of the documents were encountered.
  • Legal research was conducted to obtain all historical and record survey information pertinent to the survey of the subject parcels, Copies of original Government Township Plats, original Government Township Survey Notes and previously recorded surveys were obtained and reviewed in depth.
  • Aerial photography of the potential survey area was obtained and carefully reviewed. Approximately 36 man-hours were spent on reconnaissance aid the searching for original government section corners and quainter corners along the North line of Section 1, and the North line of the entire 24S/29B Township as well as adjacent areas.
  • Survey data was collected to found monumentation and topographical features including fence lines, roadway and terrain.
  • High-definition aerial imagery of the area of possible encroachment was obtained.
  • The assistance of the Tulare County Sherriff's Department was called upon during the field survey due to the aggressive nature of dogs and residents located on APN 325-150-003 (Pacheco).

Neil Zerlang then made the following observations:

  • Only two (2) section or quartertones were discovered along the entire length of the North line of the 24S/29B Township — these being the Northeast corner of Section 1 (a 3/4 inch iron pipe — no tag or reference, extending 10 inches above the ground) and the Northwest corner of Section 6 (a Tulare County monument, perpetuated by corner ties).
  • Fence lines and fence intersections were found to be located at expected positions and intervals and were generally straight and true to line.
  • Calls in the original Government Survey Notes to terrain generally fit anticipated corner locations. However, no terrain call was conclusive to re-establish the location of a corner.
  • Calls in the original Government Survey Notes to bearing trees were not conclusive in any instance for the re-establishment of a corner.
  • Mounds, pits, stakes or charcoal were not discernable at corner locations as referenced in the Government Survey Notes.
  • The overall distance of the North line of the 24S/29B Township as shown on the Government Plat and contained in the Government Notes (481.6 chains = 31,786 feet) significantly differed from the measured ground distance between the found monuments (31,036.30 feet). This fact raised questions as to the probable East-West position of the corners in question.
  • Found monuments lying North and South of the North line of the 24S/29B Township, generally confirmed the North-South location of the fence line along said North line and fit, where appropriate, record distances.
  • No monuments were set as part of this survey.
  • Due to the lack of substantial or discernable monumentation, no additional attempt to re-establish section lines or property lines was endeavored.

Neil Zerlang then concluded:

  • It is the conclusion and opinion of this surveyor, that the present location of the existing fence lines serve to best represent and monument the accurate, historical position of original government surveyed lines. There is no evidence to suggest any alternate position. The present position of the fence lines have been accepted as true for the past 100 or more years.
  • It is also the conclusion and opinion of this Surveyor, that the re-establishment and movement of the fence line between APN 344-080-008 (Guthrie) and APN 325-150-003 (Pacheco), to a position located 250 feet to 350 feet South of its original position, is undocumented and improper, and represents an encroachment by APN 325-150-003 (Pacheco) onto APN 344-080-088 (Guthrie).

Katrina Olsen also conducted a survey report and relied upon:

  • Mapping, dimensions, and calculated area of the Insured Property as described in the Defendants Grant Deed
  • Mapping, dimensions, and calculated area for any encroachments resulting from either the Plaintiff’s property or the Defendants’ property
  • Mapping, dimensions, and calculated area of any overlaps or gaps resulting from the legal descriptions of the Defendants’ property or the Plaintiff’s property
  • Federal General Land Office plates/notes, Tulare County Surveys/Ties, Road Records, other Historical Documents, Deeds, Imagery, and Field Data.

Katrina Olsen made the following observations:

  • The Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ deeds refer to two different Sections and Townships. She did not observe patent ambiguities between the two legal descriptions. They describe separate identifiable land. There are no overlaps or gaps (gores) along the common township line. The line common to both descriptions was originally surveyed in 1859 by the General Land Office (GLO).

Katrina Olsen concluded:

  • In this matter, the alignment and continuity of the existing fencelines, together with the limited available perpetuation evidence in the vicinity, provides sufficient evidence within the current scope to compile the boundary depiction shown on Exhibit "A." A proportional solution based on distant control was considered; however, under the present scope and with the evidence available, it was not adopted as the primary basis for Exhibit "A."
  1. Defendant’s Showing

The defendants do not offer any evidence other than their declarations and documents relating to the purchase of their property. They did not attach a competing report. Rather in their opposition, they simply attacked the report made by Neil Zerlang and Katrina Olsen.

The defendants claim that Zerlang’s report and recorded survey leave unresolved whether the disputed strip lies within the property described in the Plaintiff’s deed. The defendants also attacked the methodology that Zerlang used because he did not find two section or quarter corners along the entire six-mile north township line. He also did not recover or set a monument at the northwest corner of Section 1. They further point out a discrepancy that Zerlang acknowledges between the township line and the distance between the two recovered monuments. In other words, “The survey’s own stated limitations leave unresolved whether the disputed strip lies within the property described in Cojo Ranch’s deed.” (Defendant’s opposition, page 7, line 16-17.)

Regarding Katrina Olsen’s survey, the defendants claim that:

The Olsen survey from February 2026 also admits that no original General Land Office (GLO) physical monuments were found for the Southwest, South Quarter, or Southeast corners of Section 36. Under the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Manual of Surveying Instructions (which governs PLSS land in California), when a corner is legally "lost," it must typically be re-established using mathematical proportionment from the nearest known, uncorrupted corners. This surveyor explicitly rejected a proportional solution from distant control in favor of local fence lines. But the fence line holds no legal weight, and a strict mathematical breakdown of the township line must be used instead, which would certainly shift the boundaries west and would likely shift the boundary north or south.

They also assert:

Most significantly in the Olsen survey, the survey admits that Road 28, which is supposed to be a boundary for the Pacheco/Villa property, has changed locations over time. The report indicates that the County’s records only go back to 1954, and that nothing prior was examined to discern whether the eastern boundary of the property was supposed to be different.

  1. Evaluation of the Parties’ Respective Showings

The Court finds both the Zerlang and Olsen reports establish a prima facie showing that the boundary line between the two properties is located where the original fence was located and the Defendants are encroaching on the Plaintiff’s property. The Court further concludes, as reasoned in Hannah that this line has been the “recognized…line that has served for many years as the practical boundary.” According to Zerlang, the historical fence line has been accepted as the property line between the parcels for over 100 years.

The original fence was there when the defendants purchased their property in 2021. The defendants have not offered any evidence to demonstrate that the boundary line was ever 250 feet south of where the original fence line is located. The Defendants’ attacks on Zerlang and Olsen are unsupported and fail to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue. 

The fact the defendants were sold a 4.4-acre piece of land does not entitle them to move the boundary line. Defendants present evidence tending to support, if any claim, solely a claim against either or both the seller of their property and their realtor.

Accordingly, the Court grants summary adjudication in the Plaintiff’s favor on its quiet title cause of action and against Defendants on their quiet title cause of action.

2. Third and Fourth Causes of Action – Trespass & Nuisance

The court does not find Plaintiff makes a sufficient showing on its trespass and nuisance claims to establish entitlement to summary adjudication. 

Bound up in these determinations is that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on these claims and the court does not find Plaintiff makes a sufficient prima facie showing either as to the precise amount of its compensatory damages or to punitive damages and, for this reason, denies summary adjudication on the third and fourth causes of action.

(2) Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses and Deem Admissions Admitted as to Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough and (3) Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses and Deem Admissions Admitted as to Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc.

(2) To grant the motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted upon the payment of an additional $120 in filing fees; Responses are due, and admissions are admitted, no later than thirty (30) days after payment of the additional $120 filing fees and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to impose sanctions of $530 as against Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to order Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa to give notice.

(3) To grant the motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted upon the payment of an additional $120 in filing fees; Responses are due, and admissions are admitted, no later than thirty (30) days after payment of the additional $120 filing fees and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to impose sanctions of $530 as against Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc. and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to order Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa to give notice.

Facts Common to (2) and (3)

Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa served Form Interrogatories, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Admissions, Set One on June 30, 2026 as against Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough and Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc.

As of the date of filing these motions on August 26, 2026, no responses have been provided by either Defendant/Cross-Defendant.

As such, Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa move to compel initial responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One and to deem admissions admitted as to Defendant/Cross-Defendants Sandra Lee McDonough and Modern Broker, Inc.

Further, Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa seek sanctions against Defendant/Cross-Defendants Sandra Lee McDonough and Modern Broker, Inc., and counsel of record, in the amount of $3,575 for each motion.

Authority and Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes two (2) motion fees have been submitted to this Court, but that six (6) motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $240.

(2)

Form and Special Interrogatories

Based on Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa shall give notice.

Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant/Cross-Defendant Sandra Lee McDonough has failed to serve a timely response and Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa have moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 14 of Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s First Set of Requests for Admission as to Sandra Lee McDonough shall be deemed admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee indicated above. 

(3)

Form and Special Interrogatories

Based on Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc.’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc. provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa shall give notice.

Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant/Cross-Defendant Modern Broker, Inc. has failed to serve a timely response and Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa have moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 14 of Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa’s First Set of Requests for Admission as to Modern Broker, Inc. shall be deemed admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee indicated above. 

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions) and 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories), Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa seek sanctions of $3,575, consisting of 6.5 total hours at $550 per hour.

The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time. As such, the Court will permit two hours total as to each Defendant/Cross-Defendant as to all three motions.

Further, “[t]he reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citation omitted]. “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.) The Court will set the hourly rate at $350 per hour.

Finally, as the Court is ordering the further payment of filing fees, the Court will award $180 in filing fees as against each Defendant/Cross-Defendant.

Therefore, the Court awards sanctions in favor of Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa as follows:

  • $880 as against Defendant/Cross-Defendants Sandra Lee McDonough and counsel of record, jointly and severally; and
  • $880 as against Defendant/Cross-Defendants Modern Broker, Inc. and counsel of record, jointly and severally.

Sanctions are due within thirty (30) days after payment of the additional $240 total of additional filing fees and service of the notice of this ruling for these motions. Defendants/Cross-Complainants Ariana Pacheco and Diane Villa shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                American Express National Bank vs. Smith, Charles

Case No.:   VCL298470

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Enforce Settlement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant for breach of contract and money lent in the amount of $15,829.93

Defendant was served with the summons and complaint, but did not file an answer.

On November 10, 2023, the parties entered into a stipulation to resolve this matter. Defendant acknowledged being obligated to Plaintiff for the principal amount of $15,829.93 and costs.

However, the stipulation noted that the principal amount would be deemed satisfied upon monthly payments totaling $11,650 as follow: The sum of $485 due on or before the 25th day of every month, commencing with October 25, 2023.

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credits.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. However, the Court notes that this matter has not been dismissed and the Court has not lost jurisdiction over the parties and this matter.

Plaintiff notes that Defendant made payments of $5,820.00, but has failed to make further payments.

As such, Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $10,277.38, consisting of $15,529.93 less credits of $5,820.00, plus $567.45 in costs.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 CAL Packing & Storage, LP, dba Bravante Produce, a limited partnership vs. Heavenly Citrus, Inc. et al

Case No.:   VCU338230

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Application for  Writ of Attachment against Defendant Rodriguez

Tentative Ruling: To deny the application without prejudice

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Heavenly Citrus, Inc. and Daniel Rodriguez for breach of contract, open book account, account stated, common counts, conversion and fraud.

On September 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for right to attach order and writ of attachment after hearing as to Defendant Heavenly Citrus. On September 18, 2026, a TRO and order for issuance of writ of attachment was granted as to Defendant Heavenly Citrus in the amount of $30,585.00 upon filing of the undertaking of $10,000.00. On October 2, 2026, the writ of attachment was issued as against Defendant Heavenly Citrus as to “All property Defendant, Heavenly Citrus, Inc., a corporation, for which a method of levy is provided by law, including but not limited to bank accounts, accounts receivable, equipment, inventory, and other corporate property subject to attachment pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 487.010(a), located in Tulare County, California.”

On September 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed an application for right to attach order and writ of attachment after hearing as to Defendant Rodriguez. The application notes Defendant Rodriguez is a natural person, residing in California and that attachment is sought under Code of Civil Procedure section 483.010. Further, that Plaintiffs claim or claims arise out of conduct by the defendant who is a natural person of a trade, business, or profession and the claim or claims are not based on the sale or lease of property, a license to use property, the furnishing of services, or the loan of money where any of the foregoing was used by the defendant primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Plaintiff states the amount to be secured by attachment is $46,185.00.

Plaintiff seeks attachment as to the following property:

“Defendant Daniel A. Rodriguez's nonexempt right, title, and interest in the following real property:

(1) Real property commonly known as 8507 Road 256, Terra Bella, California 93270, Tulare County, APN 320-250-052-000; and

(2) Real property commonly known as 1642 7th Place, Delano, California 93215, Kern County, California, APN to be confirmed from current assessor/title records.”

Plaintiff further seeks entry of a temporary protective order.

In support of the application, Plaintiff provides the declaration of counsel who indicates 8507 Road 256, Terra Bella, California 93270 is a business location identifying Defendant Rodriguez as the owner. (Declaration of Bal ¶¶2, 3, 4.) Further, that 1642 7th Place, Delano, California 93215 is a residential property owned by Defendant Rodriguez. (Declaration of Bal ¶¶5, 6.)

Further, Plaintiff provides the declaration of its vice president of sales, who states “On or about May 29, 2026, Rodriguez requested that Bravante provide 270 cartons of fancy 72-count navel oranges. Rodriguez provided the delivery location as Heavenly Citrus, Inc., 8507 Road 256, Terra Bella, California 93270, and provided purchase order number HC667. Bravante accepted the order. The order was placed for Heavenly Citrus, and the resulting invoice and shipping documentation identify Heavenly Citrus as the customer and/or recipient of the product.” (Declaration of Steele ¶5.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff shipped $30,585 worth of cartons and bins. (Declaration of Steele ¶¶6-9.) Further, Defendants have retained 60 bins, which Plaintiff estimates a value of $15,600. (Declaration of Steele ¶¶13-14.)

The Court notes Defendants filed an opposition to the ex parte application, but that no other opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Attachment is a prejudgment remedy providing for the seizure of one or more of the defendant’s assets to aid in the collection of a money demand pending the outcome of the trial of the action.  (Whitehouse v. Six Corporation (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 527, 533.)  The Plaintiff has the burden of proof, and the Court is not required to accept as true any affidavit even if it is undisputed.  (Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 271, 273.)

Notice and Opposition

The plaintiff may apply for a right to attach order by noticing a hearing for the order and serving the defendant with summons and complaint, notice of the application, and supporting papers any time after filing the complaint.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.010.) Notice of the application must be given pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, sixteen court days before the hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.010)   The notice of the application and the application may be made on Judicial Council forms (Forms AT-105, 115).  The application must be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.030. )

A defendant who opposes issuance of the order must file and serve a notice of opposition and supporting affidavit as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 484.060 not later than five court days prior to the date set for hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc. §484.050(e).)  The notice of opposition may be made on a Judicial Council form (Form AT-155). 

The plaintiff may file and serve a reply two court days prior to the date set for the hearing.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 484.060(c).)

Here, Plaintiff has provided proper notice pursuant to the above utilizing the judicial counsel forms.

The opposition filed September 16, 2026, argues the ex parte application failed to request an order against Defendant Rodriguez, that the claims against Heavenly had not been established as having a probable validity of success, and that the amount to attach is not readily ascertainable.

Issuance of the Writ

The court may issue a right to attach order (Form AT-120) if the plaintiff shows all of the following: (1) the claim on which the attachment is based is one on which an attachment may be issued (Code Civ. Proc. §484.090(a)(1)); (2) the plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim (Code Civ. Proc §484.090(a)(2)); (3) attachment is sought for no purpose other than the recovery on the subject claim (Code Civ. Proc §484.090(a)(3); and (4) the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero. (Code Civ. Proc §484.090(a)(4)).

A writ of attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500).  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010(a).)  Here, this action is for a claim for money exceeding the $500 amount based on invoices billed Defendant Heavenly.

If the action is against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued only on a commercial claim which arises out of the defendant’s conduct of a trade, business, or profession.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 483.010(c).) Here, the invoices relate to purchases by Defendant Heavenly on a commercial basis.

Next, a claim has “probable validity” where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will recover on that claim.  (Code Civ. Proc §481.190.)  In determining this issue, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties. (Kemp Bros. Construction, Inc. v. Titan Electric Corp. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1484.)  The court does not determine whether the claim is actually valid; that determination will be made at trial and is not affected by the decision on the application for the order. ( Code Civ. Proc. §484.050(b).)

Here, as to Defendant Rodriguez, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Rodriguez was the individual who communicated and negotiated directly with Steel concerning available product, quantities, prices, delivery arrangements, payment, and the reusable harvest bins. Further, that Defendant Rodriguez personally undertook the obligation upon which Bravante relied in releasing its property, as Rodriguez personally told Steele that the empty bins could be returned the following day at approximately noon. Finally, that Defendant Rodriguez personally undertook responsibility for payment of the commercial transactions.

The Court notes the unverified complaint states that Defendant Heavenly is the alter ego of Defendant Rodriguez based a number of allegations. However, the Court notes the declarations fail to support most of these allegations. The invoices, on their face, indicate orders with Defendant Heavenly and no evidence has been presented that Defendant Rodriguez personally guaranteed these debts.

As to alter ego, in determining whether there is a sufficient unity of interest and ownership, the Court considers factors, including “the commingling of funds and assets of the two entities, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, disregard of corporate formalities, identical directors and officers, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1342.) Inadequate capitalization of the original judgment debtor is another factor. (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 811-812 [reciting "long list" of inexhaustive factors:

"`[1] [c]ommingling of funds and other assets, failure to segregate funds of the separate entities, and the unauthorized diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than corporate uses . . .; [2] the treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own . . .; [3] the failure to obtain authority to issue stock or to subscribe to or issue the same . . .; [4] the holding out by an individual that he is personally liable for the debts of the corporation . . .; the failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate records, and the confusion of the records of the separate entities . . .; [5] the identical equitable ownership in the two entities; the identification of the equitable owners thereof with the domination and control of the two entities; identification of the directors and officers of the two entities in the responsible supervision and management; sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the members of a family . . .; [6] the use of the same office or business location; the employment of the same employees and/or attorney . . .; [7] the failure to adequately capitalize a corporation; the total absence of corporate assets, and undercapitalization . . .; [8] the use of a corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture or the business of an individual or another corporation . . .; [9] the concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of the responsible ownership, management and financial interest, or concealment of personal business activities . . .; [10] the disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among  related entities . . .; [11] the use of the corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another person or entity . . .; [12] the diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors, or the manipulation of assets and liabilities between entities so as to concentrate the assets in one and the liabilities in another . . .; [13] the contracting with another with intent to avoid performance by use of a corporate entity as a shield against personal liability, or the use of a corporation as a subterfuge of illegal transactions . . .; [14] and the formation and use of a corporation to transfer to it the existing liability of another person or entity.' . . .]”

No single factor governs—courts must consider all of the circumstances of the case in determining whether it would be equitable to impose alter ego liability. (Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at 1342.) An inequitable result is shown as a matter of law where the judgment debtor is insolvent due to the actions of an alter ego; proof of wrongful intent is not required. (See, Toho-Towa, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 [inequitable to allow alter ego to shift liability to separate entity where judgment creditor originally negotiated contract with alter ego and alter ego structured financial operations to ensure entity would have no funds to pay debts].)

However, alter ego "is an extreme remedy, sparingly used." (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 539.) "The standards for the application of alter ego principles are high, and the imposition of [alter ego] liability...is to be exercised reluctantly and cautiously." (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 306.)  Still, "[t]he greatest liberality is to be encouraged" in allowing judgments to be amended to add the "real defendant," or alter ego of the original judgment debtor, "in order to see that justice is done." (Carr v. Barnabey's Hotel Corp. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 14, 20)

Here, the Court cannot find alter ego has been proven as to a reasonable probability based on the declarations before the Court.

Plaintiff has not provided legal authority that would permit the Court to find a probable validity of the claims in the complaint as against Defendant Rodriguez. That Defendant Rodriguez agreed to return bins “personally” would not appear to be sufficient. The corporation cannot speak for itself and must speak through its representative, here Defendant Rodriguez.

Therefore, the Court denies the application as to Defendant Rodriguez.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Cuevas, Martin vs. Chavez, Rosalio

Case No.:   VCU326631 

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Dismiss

Tentative Ruling: The motion is granted; this action is dismissed. 

Defendant Rosalio Chavez moves to dismiss this action on the ground that the purported plaintiff, Martin Cuevas, died prior to the time of its filing. 

All indications in the record and the evidence submitted by Chavez support that Cuevas, indeed, had died prior to the filing of this action, and it is clear, in any event, that the attorneys who commenced this suit lacked authority to commence this suit on Cuevas behalf, and, for these reasons, the action should be, and is, dismissed pursuant to this court’s inherent authority to prevent abuse of the judicial process. 

“A court has inherent power, upon a sufficient factual showing, to dismiss an action ‘ “shown to be sham, fictitious or without merit in order to prevent abuse of the judicial process.” ’ [Citation.]” (Flores v. Georgeson (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 881, 887 [119 Cal.Rptr.3d 808] (Flores); see Kinney v. Clark (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 724, 740 [219 Cal.Rptr.3d 247] [citing with approval].)

This action was purportedly commenced by a complaint filed October 6, 2025. Attorneys Thanos Simoudis and Dario Gomez, of the Culver Legal, LLP (Culver Legal) law firm, were listed in the caption as attorneys for Martin Cuevas.

Another attorney of the Culver Legal firm, Michael Huynh, later advised the court that Cuevas had died, which advisement was provided at a February 3, 2026 case management conference (CMC).

Defendant Chavez’s counsel, Lisa Beatty, states she was later provided, in February 2026, a copy of Martin Cuevas’s death certificate, which copy lists Cuevas’s date of death as November 29, 2024, which was prior to date the complaint purporting to commence this action was filed on October 6, 2025.  A copy of this death certificate, attorney Beatty avers, is attached to Beatty’s declaration.

Attorneys Simoudis and Huynh of the Culver Legal firm, representing that they were “Plaintiff’s Attorney,” later submitted a motion “for substitution” of Cuevas’s spouse “in place of” Cuevas, which this court had denied. 

In a supporting declaration, attorney Huynh stated that, after the complaint was filed, and after defendant Chavez answered the complaint, and “[a]fter receiving discovery requests from [Chavez], Culver Legal, LLP, began reaching out to [Cuevas] at [the] phone number and email address [he had] provided … .”  Attorney Huynh then stated that “[i]n early January, one of the case managers who was helping manage [Cuevas’s] file sent a letter to his home, to which his wife, Leticia Huerta Ortiz, responded to by calling [the Culver Legal firm’s] office” at which time “she notified [the] office that [Cuevas] passed away on November 29, 2024.”

The foregoing reflects that the attorneys purporting to act on behalf of Cuevas as counsel in submitting the complaint believed, based on evidently reliable credible information, that Cuevas, on whose behalf they purported to act in filing the complaint on October 6, 2025, had previously died 311 days prior, on November 29, 2024.

On these facts, it is clear that this action is without merit.  Even if there were a factual question that remained as to whether Cuevas is, in fact, deceased, or as to when, if he is, that occurred—and there is only evidence before the court that he is, in fact, deceased, and that he died before the commencement of this action—there is no question that this is not an action to which Cuevas can be properly deemed a party given that the attorneys who purported to commence this action on his behalf are informed and believe that he died prior to the date they filed the complaint that commenced this action. 

Assuming that the attorneys who purported to act for Cuevas are correctly informed that Cuevas died on November 29, 2024—and there is nothing in the record of this case to suggest they are mistaken—it necessarily follows that they did not have authority to commence this suit on Cuevas’s behalf because the death of a client terminates the authority of his attorney to act on his behalf. (Herring v. Peterson (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 608, 612 [172 Cal.Rptr. 240]; Smith v. Bear Valley etc. Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 590, 601 [160 P.2d 1]; Swartfager v. Wells (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 522, 528 [128 P.2d 128]; Deiter v. Kiser (1910) 158 Cal. 259, 262 [110 P. 921].)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that it may, and properly should, exercise its inherent authority “to dismiss an action ‘ “shown to be sham, fictitious or without merit in order to prevent abuse of the judicial process” ’ ” (Flores, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 887) and dismiss this action.

Accordingly, the motion is granted and this action is dismissed.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Carranza Mendoza, Jose Luis vs. Installed Building Products, LLC

Case No.:   VCU329775

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendants’ Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Adam E. Primm

Tentative Ruling: To grant the application

Facts and Analysis

The Court’s file indicates that timely and proper notice was given to all parties affected by attorney Adam E. Primm’s application to appear pro hac vice for Defendants.

The Court finds that attorney Primm meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(a) to submit applications to appear pro hac vice before this Court, and that the contents of this application of attorney Primm indicates that association with California counsel Rachel Chatman of Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP, and as such meets the statutory requirements of California Rule of Court 9.40(c) and (d). The Court’s file for this matter further indicates that that the applicable fees that must be paid to the State Bar of California under Rule 9.40(e) to support the application for admission pro hac vice have been tendered to the State Bar.

The Court further notes that attorney Primm’s application meets the statutory requirements under California Rule of Court 9.40(d) for pro hac vice applications and that attorney Primm’s two (2) prior appearances before the courts in this state are not sufficiently numerous to warrant denial of the present application under California Rule of Court 9.40(b).

Based on the foregoing, the application of attorney Primm to appear as counsel pro hac vice for Defendants in this action is granted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Ramirez Lopez, Sergio vs. Gold Star Cattle Company, LLC

Case No.:   VCU317388

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval of June 10, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Background Facts

The Court continued this matter and ordered the filing of a supplemental declaration as to the lodestar and presently incurred costs. On November 5, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a supplemental declaration addressing these issues.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33% of the gross settlement fund of $242,760.00 or $80,920.00 and costs not to exceed $25,000.00 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel indicates that the firm has spent 120.9 hours on this case, at a rate of $850 per hour, providing a total base lodestar of $102,765. (Supplemental Declaration of Solouki ¶7.)

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of $21,112.78 (Supplemental Declaration of Solouki ¶13.) The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $25,000.00.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $242,760.00 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33%):

$80,920.00

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):

$25,000.00

Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :

$5,000.00

Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs

$7,950.00

Preliminarily Approved Total PAGA Payment:

$14,000.00

Proposed Net Settlement Amount

$109,890.00

The Court sets the motion for final approval of June 10, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jr Valencia, Jose Elias et al vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE

Case No.:   PCU325203

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena as to (1) Global Estimates, LLC and (2) Prime Restoration CA, LLC and for Sanctions

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To grant the motion as to Nos. 1 through 19, 21-23, 25-29, 32-42  and order compliance no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling; to order  Defendant to give notice;

(2 ) To grant the motion and order compliance no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling; to impose sanctions of $410 against Prime, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this ruling; to order  Defendant to give notice.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this breach of contract and bad faith denial insurance matter, Defendant Allstate, on or about July 8, 2026 issued deposition subpoenas to Global Estimates, LLC and Prime Restoration CA, LLC.

Both subpoenas were personally served and both specified the date of production for August 6, 2026.

Counsel for Defendant states, as to both Global and Prime, that the “documentation [requested by the subpoena] is relevant to the claim and defenses of the parties to this action.” (Declaration of Madhok ¶7)

As to Global, it provided a remote repair estimate for the alleged damage at the property and submitted its invoices in the amount of $70,626.86 for the roof claim and $29,377.17 for the plumbing claim to Allstate for payment. Defendant denied the claims.

As to Prime, it served as a mitigation vendor to perform extensive interior mitigation at Plaintiffs' property and submitted an invoice for $21,709.24 to Allstate for payment. Defendant denied this claim.

On September 17, 2026, over a month after the date specified for production, Global produced documents in response to the Subpoena. On September 22, 2026, Defendant’s counsel sent a letter to Global explaining why the production was incomplete. Global has not responded or provided further production.

Prime has not produced any documents or served any written objections in response to the Subpoena. Defendant seeks sanctions in the amount of $860 as to prime.

On October 5, 2026, Defendant filed these motions to compel compliance with the subpoenas.

No oppositions appear filed.

Authority and Analysis Common to (1) and (2)

“In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. ‘[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [‘discovery is not limited to admissible evidence’].) … Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 377.) This means that ‘disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.’ (Id. at p. 378.)” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 permits “the court, upon motion reasonably made by” “[a] party” (amongst others), to “make an order quashing [a] subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).) “In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Id.)

“A deposition subpoena that commands only the production of business records for copying shall designate the business records to be produced either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item, and shall specify the form in which any electronically stored information is to be produced, if a particular form is desired." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.410(a).)

Here, the subpoenas seek only the production of records.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, subdivision (b), requires that a motion to compel a deponent's production be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration and be brought no later than 60 days after completion of the record of the deposition." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480(b).) A nonparty must comply or not comply with the subpoena on the date specified for production, and if the subpoenaing party is not satisfied with the nonparty's compliance, the subpoenaing party must meet and confer with the nonparty and, if necessary, file any motion to compel within the statutory period. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1033-1034.) The meet and confer process is part of the statutory period and does not extend the deadline for filing a motion to compel. (Id.)

Here, the completion of the record of the deposition occurred August 6, 2026, when no documents were produced on that date. Therefore, 60 days from August 6, 2026 is October 5, 2026. As such, these motions were timely filed.

Additionally, Defendant has provided meet and confer letters dated September 10, 2026 inquiring as to the failure to produce or incomplete production on August 6, 2026 in satisfaction of the meet and confer requirements.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1346 provides "[a] written notice and all moving papers supporting a motion" ... "to compel production of a document or tangible thing from a nonparty deponent must be personally served on the nonparty deponent unless the nonparty deponent agrees to accept service by mail or electronic service at an address or electronic service address specified on the deposition record."

Here, Defendant personally served the subpoenas in satisfaction of the Rules of Court.

(1) Global Subpoena

Defendant argues the production by Global was late, incomplete and non-responsive to a number of the 45 categories sought by the subpoena. Defendant notes these requests include “communications regarding the invoice for the claim at issue, photographs in native format with associated metadata, documents relating to payments and billing, agreements and additional correspondence with [Plaintiff’s counsel], and other materials bearing on the nature and extent of the claimed damages.”

The Court has reviewed the separate statement, noting no responses to Nos. 1 through 19, 21-23, 25-29, 32-42, and incomplete production as to Nos. 44-45.

Nos. 20, 24, 30-31 and 43 do not appear in the separate statement and do not appear at issue.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and compels compliance no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling as to Nos. 1 through 19, 21-23, 25-29, 32-42 . Defendant is ordered to give notice.

(2) Prime Subpoena

As Prime has failed to respond to the subpoena, the Court grants the motion and compels compliance no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

Sanctions

"[I]n making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive." (Code of Civil Procedure § 1987.2(a).)

Here, Defendant seeks sanctions of $860, based on 2 hours at the rate of $400 per hour plus the $60 filing fee.

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.) The Court will reduce the hourly rate to $350 per hour.

Further, the Court will permit 1 hour on this motion, plus the filing fee.

Therefore, the Court orders sanctions of $410 in favor of Defendant against Prime, due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling. Defendant is ordered to give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Washington, Anthony vs. Ramirez, Osvaldo Gonzalez et al

Case No.:   PCU319484

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s (1) Motion to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories, Set One as to Defendant Statewide Contracting of America, (2) Special Interrogatories, Set One as to Defendant Statewide Contracting of America and (3) Requests for Production, Set One as to Defendant Statewide Contracting of America; (4) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted, Set One, as to Defendant Statewide Contracting of America; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To find the motions moot by the service of responses; to impose sanctions of $740 against Defendant Statewide, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts Common to (1) through (4)

In this matter, Plaintiff, on June 30, 2026, Plaintiff served (1) Form Interrogatories, (2) Special Interrogatories, (3) Requests for Production and (4) Requests for Admission, as to Defendant Statewide Contracting of America, LLC.

Plaintiff agreed to extend Defendant’s deadline to respond to discovery to August 27, 2026. However, no responses were received.

On October 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed these motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted. Plaintiff further seeks sanctions of $810 for each motion.

On November 5, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition indicating that verified responses were served November 3, 2026 and therefore these motions are moot. Defendant has attached the responses.

Authority and Analysis Common to (1) through (4)

The Court agrees that, as to motions to compel initial responses, the service of such verified initial responses renders the motions moot.

As to the motion to deem admissions, section 2033.280 states, in relevant part:

(b) The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).

(c) The court shall make this order, unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220. It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.”

The Court’s review of the responses to the requests for admissions reveals substantial compliance and therefore the motion to deem admissions admitted also appears moot.

Sanctions

Under California Rule of Court, rule 3.1348(a) entitled “Sanctions despite no opposition” the sanctions issue remains unresolved:

“The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed.

(See also Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 407 [“Nothing in the text of section 2030.290 suggests that section 2030.290 ceases to apply merely because a party serves a tardy response.”]

As such, the Court will issue sanctions, jointly and severally, against Defendant Statewide and its counsel of record.

Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $810 per motion, consisting of 3 hours at the rate of $250 plus a $60 filing fee.

The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses or deem admissions admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

The Court will award one half hour for each motion at the rate of $250 plus the $240 for 4 filing fees. As such, the Court imposes sanctions of $740 against Defendant Statewide, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rivas, Richard M. vs. Brunelli, Billy

Case No.:   PCU331860

Date:           November 19, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Defendant Warren’s Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer to the first and second causes of action; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint; to overrule the demurrer to the third cause of action.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Billy Brunelli and Does 1 to 50, inclusive, alleging such Does were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment, for negligence, premises liability and dog bite pursuant to Civil Code section 3342.

As to negligence, Plaintiff alleges

“Richard M. Rivas (hereinafter "Plaintiff) was viciously attacked and injured by a dog under the ownership, or supervision, possession or management or custody or control of Billy Brunelli ("Defendant") The attack occurred near Defendant's residence at 11863 Road 200, Porterville, California 93257 (hereinafter "Subject Property").

On December 17, 2024, Plaintiff was at or on the Subject Property. Defendant's dog suddenly rushed out from the Subject Property, unleashed and without supervision. Defendant's dog attacked Plaintiff on his leg.

…

Defendant had a duty to take reasonable measures to manage or control their dangerous dog from running out from their property and to avoid foreseeable hazards and danger to others. Defendants breached that duty by failing to take reasonable control, taking reasonable measures to control their dangerous dog.

…

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants were informed and knew, had actual knowledge, or should have known that the subject dog was highly aggressive, had a vicious nature, disposition, and propensity, and was excessively dangerous. Permitting the subject dog to be unrestrained, without control and/or handled by an individual that was incapable of controlling the subject dog in the vicinity of their residence, created a substantial risk and high probability of injury or death to members of the public, and Defendants knew of the significant risk of the very kind of attack that took place in this case. Defendants knew, had actual knowledge, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the subject dog constituted a dangerous condition and posed an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff.

…

Presumption of Negligence Per Se: Defendant violated law Cal. Civ. Code section 3342, and the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiff's injuries and harm. The violation was not excused.”

As to the cause of action under Civil Code section 3342, Plaintiff alleges strict liability and negligence per se against Defendant Brunelli and Does 1 to 50.  Plaintiff here alleges “Defendants who owned, kept, or controlled the dog are responsible for the harm that the dog caused to Plaintiff, no matter how carefully they guard or restrain the dog.”

As to premises liability, Plaintiff alleges “Plaintiff was lawfully on the property located at 11863 Road 200, Porterville, California 93257 when Defendant’s dog suddenly and viciously attacked and bit Plaintiff without provocation. Defendant failed to restrain or control the dog, resulting in serious bodily injuries and damages to Plaintiff” and that Defendants “…negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises” and Defendants “willfully failed to warn or restrain a dangerous dog known to have bitten or attacked others previously.”

On September 11, 2026, Doe 1 was substituted for Deven Warren.

On October 15, 2026, Defendant Warren demurred to the complaint. Defendant argues a failure to allege sufficient facts as to Warren as to each cause of action. Defendant contends that the only specific facts involve Defendant Brunelli and that the collective allegations as to “Defendants” are insufficient as to all causes of action.

Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that Defendant attempts to utilize a trial proof standard on demurrer and that the allegations are sufficient as to the former Doe Defendant now substituted as Defendant Warren.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1226.)

Negligence

The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury. "Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of harm." (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises, LLC (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 32, 37.)

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges these elements as against Defendant Brunelli stating “a dog under the ownership, or supervision, possession or management or custody or control of Billy Brunelli ("Defendant") The attack occurred near Defendant's residence at 11863 Road 200, Porterville, California 93257 (hereinafter "Subject Property"). On December 17, 2024, Plaintiff was at or on the Subject Property. Defendant's dog suddenly rushed out from the Subject Property, unleashed and without supervision. Defendant's dog attacked Plaintiff on his leg.” Further, that “Defendant had a duty to take reasonable measures to manage or control their dangerous dog from running out from their property and to avoid foreseeable hazards and danger to others.” Further that “Presumption of Negligence Per Se: Defendant violated law Cal. Civ. Code section 3342, and the violation was a substantial factor in bringing about Plaintiff's injuries and harm. The violation was not excused.”

However, these allegations do not include the Doe Defendants specifically and do not appear to reference “Defendants” collectively. Rather, the allegations against “Defendants” in the remaining paragraphs more generally allege the elements of negligence as to breach, knowledge, proximate cause and damages.

Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a duty owed by Defendant Warren with respect to these allegations.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Dog Bite – Strict Liability

Civil Code section 3342(a) provides in relevant part as follows: "The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness."

Buffington v. Nicholson (1942) 78 Cal.App.2d 37, 42 notes that, in construing a prior, but substantively identical version of section 3342, the court noted " '[a] statute imposing liability on the "owner" of a dog without regard to knowledge of his vicious nature does not apply to one merely harboring or keeping a dog not owned by him, and, to render him liable, previous knowledge of the dog's vicious nature must appear.'"

Accordingly, as to strict liability under Section 3342(a), any claim under this section must be brought against the owner of the subject dog.

Here, again, the complaint alleges Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s dog severely bit him and that Defendant are responsible for causing his injuries on December 17, 2024.” This appears limited to Defendant Brunelli, though the Court recognizes the Doe Defendants are generally included in the first paragraph of the allegation. The complaint, however, does not allege Defendant Warren is the owner of the dog, which appears necessary for strict liability.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to this cause of action with leave to amend.

Premises Liability

The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages." (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998, citation omitted.)

Here, by contrast, the L-2 allegation notes “The defendants who negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises were (names): Billy Brunelli [¶] Does 1 to 50” as to the first count. This, therefore, does allege that Defendants, including the former Doe Defendant, now Defendant Warren, “…negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises.”

Further, that “Defendant Billy Brunelli willfully failed to warn or restrain a dangerous dog known to have bitten or attacked others previously” which includes Does 1 through 50 having the same knowledge.

The Court notes there is no duty of care owed to a third party if the landlord lacks “…actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities, and the ability to control or prevent the harm." (Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1369)

The reasoning for this is stated in Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514 as follows: 

“…a landlord is under no duty to inspect the premises for the purpose of discovering the existence of a tenant's dangerous animal; only when the landlord has actual knowledge of the animal, coupled with the right to have it removed from the premises, does a duty of care arise.”

The Uccello court recognized that where “either at or after the time possession is given to the tenant the landlord retains or acquires a recognizable degree of control over the dangerous condition with a concomitant right and power to obviate the condition and prevent the injury. In these situations, the law imposes on the landlord a duty to use ordinary care to eliminate the condition with resulting liability for injuries caused by his failure so to act.” (Id. at 511.) “To permit a landlord in such a situation to sit idly by in the face of the known danger to others must be deemed to be socially and legally unacceptable.” (Id. at 512.)

Here, there is a sufficient allegation that Defendant Warren “negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises” and that Defendant Warren did so with respect to a “dangerous dog known to have bitten or attacked others previously.”

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer to the third cause of action.

Summary

The Court sustains the demurer to the first two causes of action with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint as to these causes of action. The Court overrules the demurrer to the third cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared November 18, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number

Case Name

Type

Status

Comments

VPR054397

In the Matter of McNamara, Sylvia

Letters of Administration

Appearance Required

Waiver of Bond not filed by all heirs, Prob C § 8481(a)(2)

VPR054368

In the Matter of Contreras, Salvador Martinez

Letters of Administration

Appearance Required

Documents in order

VPR054365

In the Matter of Avila, Francisco Sr.

Probate Will/Issue Letters

Appearance Required

1. Petition Item 2d omitted: re bond amount or bond waiver.

2. Petition Item 3b: decedent is a citizen of a foreign country—notice shall be given to a recognized diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country, Prob C § 8113.

3. Petition Item 3c omitted: address of decedent's residence at time of death. 

4. Petition 3e(3) selected: bond waivers not attached.

5. Petition Item 5a (3) or (4); (7) or (8); Item 5b omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner, issue of a predeceased child, or a stepchild or foster child or children who would have been adopted.

6. Original will not lodged 

VPR054354

In the Matter of Wilder, Wilma F.

Probate Will/Issue Letters

Appearance Required

Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number not filed (DE-147S), TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4)

VPR054362

In the Matter of Lemke, Reynetta Ann

Spousal Property Hearing

Appearance Required

1. Petition Attachment 7 omitted: the facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the property is property passing to the surviving spouse necessary to establish the community property claim, Prob C § 13651(a)(3),(4).

2. Proposed Order: legal description of the real property and applicable selections omitted.

3. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C § 13655

VPR054357

In the Matter of the Victor Thomas Meleo Living Trust

Petition to Confirm Trust Asset

Recommended for Approval

VPR053434

In the Matter of Wanda Ritchie Revocable Trust

Instruction Hearing

Appearance Required

Notice of Hearing, page 3 - POS: list of all parties served by mail omitted

VPR052781

In the Matter of Simpson, Robert J.

Final Distribution Hearing

Appearance Required

Petition: there is a loss of $102,280 from sale of decedent’s partnership interest: corrected fee base is $4,562,708.4; corrected statutory fee is $58,627.08, Prob C § 10810(b)

VPR053919

In the Matter of Covian, Luis Carlos

Final Distribution Hearing

Recommended for Approval

VPR054211

In the Matter of Smith, Belinda J.

Appoint Successor Conservator

Appearance Required

Live Scan, orientation and investigation not completed

VPR054204

In the Matter of Beltran Sanchez, Omar

Appoint Conservator

Appearance Required

Investigation not completed; Notice of Hearing not served on all parties within the second degree

PROBATE ADMINISTRATION 

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday,  November 12, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number

Case Name

Type

Status

Comments

PPR054392

In the Matter of Shishido, Graycie Noriko

Letters of Administration

Appearance required

Orders and Letters (DE-150/DE-140) not lodged.

Pursuant to Probate Code §8571, notwithstanding a waiver of bond, the court in its discretion may require the nonresident of California personal representative to give a bond.

PPR054386

In the Matter of Serrato, Mario

Determine Succession to Primary Residence

Appearance required

A written settlement agreement/consents not filed for the buyout provision.

Continued jurisdiction to enforce is beyond the scope of a summary administration.

PPR054377

In the Matter of Ramos Bedolla, Fernando Angel

Appoint Temporary Conservator

Appearance required

Matter appears to be in order

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

PROBATE GUARDIANSHIP 

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time

Department Number

Case Number

Case Name

Comments

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 01

VPR054307

 In the Matter of H.A.B.B.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for adult household member

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 09

VPR054241

In the Matter of S.L.P.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

Required to be completed - Attendance of Guardianship Orientation and Declaration of Attendance needs to be filed

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 09

VPR054216

In the Matter of D.M.M.P.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian

11/19/26 9:00 AM

Department 09

VPR054228

In the Matter of K.O.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian

Required to be completed - Attendance of Guardianship Orientation and Declaration of Attendance needs to be filed

11/19/26 9:00 AM

Department 09

VPR054221

In the Matter of J.I.Z.D.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

11/19/26 10:00 AM

Department 09

VPR054265

In the Matter of B.M.

AMENDED FILINGS REQUESTED -

CONFIDENTIAL GUARDIAN SCREENING FORM IS INCOMPLETE

ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, FORM GC-210(CA) IS INCOMPLETE

ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, UCCJEA IS INCOMPLETE

ATTACHMENT TO THE PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT, ICWA-010(A) IS INCOMPLETE

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 19

PPR054174

In the Matter of R.E.S.

NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person.

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 19

PPR054048

In the Matter of A.R.C.G

Review Hearing -   Guardian has not filed proof with the court that they have commenced guardianship proceedings in the Statue of Florida.

11/19/26 8:30 AM

Department 19

PPR047872

In the Matter of R.E.S.

No procedural issues to address