Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, October 5, 2026, are:

Re:                Pritchett, Demetria Christine vs. Family Healthcare Network, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU290948

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the final compliance hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for May 10, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiffs’ motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on October 5, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On September 11, 2026, the settlement administrator ILYM Group, Inc., through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On April 2, 2026, the administrator  received a mailing list of 2,448 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On May 22, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 2,448 members. 160 notices were returned and updated addresses for 139 were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, 21 notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until July 21, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions.

One additional potential class member’s information was provided on August 14, 2026 and the notice packet was mailed thereto on August 14, 2026. The Court notes that the sixty day period as to this potential member has not expired. However, in light of the lack of requests for exclusions and objections noted below, even if this class member objected or requested exclusion, a singular event would not impact the Court’s final approval of the settlement.

Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 2,449 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $1,242,676 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $896.08, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $5.57 and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $507.42.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Counsel seeks, as to attorneys’ fees, the amount of $483,000 preliminarily approved by this Court. Counsel additionally seeks costs in the amount of $36,000, the amount the Court preliminarily approved.

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $17,250. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved representative payments of $5,000 each to the three Plaintiffs.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $1,838,926 are therefore approved as follows:      

Approved Attorney Fees (1.5 multiplier):	$483,000
Approved Attorney Costs:	$36,000
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Pritchett:	$5,000
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Rojas:	$5,000
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Baker:	$5,000
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$17,250
Approved PAGA payment to the LWDA	$45,000
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$1,242,676

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiffs on September 11, 2026.

The Court sets the final compliance hearing as to distribution of the settlement fund for May 10, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Villanueva Penaloza, Jesus Miguel vs. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU331440

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To find this motion moot via the stipulation filed with this Court and order entered on September 15, 2026.

The Court notes that Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion, but the Court finds the stipulation anticipates the filing of a new, narrowed motion.

The stipulation appears to obviate the prior motion to compel arbitration filed on September 8, 2026. The stipulation further indicates a future motion may be filed with respect to the application of the agreement, if any, limited to the sole issue of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim. The stipulation states “…WBE may file a Motion to Compel Arbitration…” and “…WBE retains all its rights and abilities to file a future Motion…”

As such, the Court takes this hearing off calendar via the stipulation.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Oldridge, Phillip vs. Greenpower Motor Company Inc.

Case No.:    VCU287280

Date:            October 5, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

Facts

On June 30, 2026, Defendants’ Counsel David L. Jordan and firm of Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendants Greenpower Motor Company, Inc., Fraser Atkinson and Brendan Riley. Defendants’ Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Defendants’ Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail and electronic mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, indicates that Defendants have informed Counsel that they would be terminating its services with immediate effect, but that Defendants have failed to substitute in new counsel. This is sufficient for the Court as to Counsel’s attempt to obtain a substitution of counsel.  

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail and email on June 30, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Defendants’ addresses was confirmed by examination of the Secretary of State’s website and via email.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Defendants’ Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendants Greenpower Motor Company, Inc., Fraser Atkinson and Brendan Riley. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court.  This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Defendants Greenpower Motor Company, Inc., Fraser Atkinson and Brendan Riley.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Perez, Victoria vs. Bhandal Hospitality Corporation

Case No.:   VCU335037

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Defendant’s Demurrer; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To find the demurrer and motion moot by the stipulation to permit the filing of a first amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mejorado, Frank S vs. Spruce Holdings, LLC

Case No.:   VCU329295

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Background Facts

Plaintiffs in this matter are Frank S Mejorado (“Decedent”), by and through his Successor-in-Interest, Jessica V Orozco and Jessica V Orozco, individually.

Decedent Mejorado by and through his successor brings causes of action for elder abuse, violation of resident’s rights and negligence against Defendant Spruce.

Plaintiff Orozco, individually, brings a cause of action for wrongful death.

Plaintiffs allege that Decedent Mejorado, an elder, died May 1, 2025 while a resident at Defendant Spruce’s facility and under the care and custody of Defendant.

Defendant, on July 6, 2026, filed this motion to compel arbitration of these claims and stay this matter pending arbitration.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of counsel who submits a California Standard Admission Agreement for Skilled Nursing Facilities and Intermediate Care Facilities, including the California Arbitration Agreement beginning at page 67 (“Agreement”), between Frank S. Mejorado and Visalia Post Acute (formerly Redwood Springs Healthcare Center) dated February 13, 2022. (Declaration of Gray ¶2 – Ex. A.)

The Court notes the package of documents appears signed, in handwriting, by Plaintiff Orozco as Decedent’s representative, including the six page Agreement.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue first that the Agreement fails to identify the named Defendant and therefore Defendant cannot compel arbitration absent some evidence of a connection between Defendant and Redwood Springs Healthcare Center. Plaintiffs argues further the Agreement cannot apply, as a matter of law, to the second cause of action for Health and Safety Code Section 1430(b). Further, that, as to the wrongful death claim, Plaintiff Orozco cannot be bound by the Agreement. Further, that the Agreement is not authenticated properly by counsel for Defendant. Finally, that the Agreement fails to comply with 42 CFR 483.70 and is unenforceable for that reason.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, then, the Court finds counsel’s attachment of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the signature of the Decedent sufficient to meet this first step under Gamboa. (See also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219: “as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.”)

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, the declaration in Gamboa would be insufficient on a handwritten signature issue where there is no denial as to the authenticity of the signature:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

Here, Plaintiff Orozco does not dispute that the Agreement was signed by her and does not dispute her handwriting is on the Agreement. Plaintiff Orozco emphasizes she signed as Decedent’s “Legal/Representative/Agent” and not on behalf of herself or individual claims she made. 

As to Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Agreement is unenforceable by Defendant, as Defendant is not named in the Agreement, the Court notes Defendant, in reply, submits the declaration of counsel who indicates that “Redwood Springs Healthcare Center is the fictitious business name of Spruce Holdings LLC with an address of 1925 E. Houston Ave, Visalia CA. This name expired in 2025” and that “Visalia Post Acute” is the fictitious business name of Spruce Holdings LLC with an address of 1925 E. Houston Ave, Visalia, CA 93292. (Reply Declaration of Gray ¶¶3, 4.) Further that Redwood Springs Healthcare Center and Visalia Post Acute are fictitious business names of the legal entity Spruce Holdings, LLC and operate the same skilled nursing facility located at the same address. (Reply Declaration of Gray ¶5.)

The Court notes that the moving party may submit additional evidence in reply as to issues of the validity and application of the agreement to arbitrate. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060. [finding “the trial court abused its discretion” in striking supplemental declaration as untimely].) Further, the court in Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 171, noted the following:

“In sum, once Gamboa produced evidence challenging the authenticity of the purported arbitration agreement, the Clinic was required to rebut the challenge by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the agreement was valid. The Clinic did not have to authenticate Gamboa's signature on the arbitration agreement. The Clinic could have met its burden in other ways, including a declaration from the Clinic's custodian of records. But proferring no admissible evidence was insufficient.”

Therefore, the Court finds sufficient evidence on reply that Redwood Springs, the entity named in the Agreement, is a fictious business name of the named Defendant in this matter and that an agreement to arbitrate has been formed.  

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states:

“This Arbitration Agreement is executed by and between Redwood Springs Healthcare Center (“Facility”) and FRANK MEJORADO (Name of Resident or Resident’s representative/agent) either for him/herself or as the Legal Representative and/or Agent for FRANK MEJORADO (collectively, “Resident”) in conjunction with the Resident’s admission to the Facility and relating to the provision of nursing facility services by Facility to Resident.”

Further that:

“The parties to this Arbitration Agreement acknowledge and agree that the Admission Agreement and this Arbitration Agreement evidence a transaction in interstate commerce governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16.”

The Agreement states, at 1.1, the following:

“It is also understood that any and all other disputes, controversies, demands or claims that relate or arise out of the provision of services or health care or any failure to provide services or health care by Facility, the admission agreement and/or this Agreement, the validity, interpretation, construction, performance and enforcement thereof, including, without limitation, claims that allege: breach of contract; unpaid nursing home charges; fraud; deceptive trade practices; misrepresentation; negligence; gross negligence; Health and Safety Code section 1430 claims; violations of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, the Unfair Competition Act, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act; and/or any right granted to Resident by law or by the admission agreement will be determined by submission to arbitration and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings.”

Further, the Agreement, at 2.2 states:

“Consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, this arbitration agreement binds the parties hereto, including the heirs, representatives, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of such parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to any services (medical or otherwise) or goods provided by the Facility or the admission agreement.”

The Court notes Plaintiff Orozco’s signature on the Agreement is as Resident’s “Legal/Representative/Agent (if any).”

Further, the signature block containing Plaintiff Orozco’s signature following section 5.4 states

“By virtue of Resident’s consent, instruction and/or durable power of attorney, I hereby certify that I am authorized to act as Resident’s agent in executing and delivering of this arbitration agreement. I acknowledge that the Facility is relying on this representation. I also acknowledge that pursuant to the terms of this agreement, any claims that I may assert in my personal capacity that arise out of or relate to any the provision of or failure to provide services (medical or otherwise) or goods by the Facility to the Resident or the admission agreement are governed by this arbitration agreement.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

There appears to be no dispute that the scope of the Agreement covers the elder abuse and negligence claims brought as survival causes of action.

However, Plaintiff disputes that the second cause of action for violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1430(b) and fourth cause of action for wrongful death cannot be compelled to arbitration.

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application and Health and Safety Code Section 1430(b)

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Here, the Agreement acknowledges both that it “evidences a transaction in interstate commerce governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16.”

Plaintiff focuses on the section stating “California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings.” However, the sections noted above appear to apply the FAA’s procedural and substantive rules to interpretation of this Agreement.

Applying the FAA, the District Court in Valley View Health Care, Inc. v. Chapman (E.D.Cal. 2014) 992 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1040 noted the following:

“Section 1430(b) empowers SNF patients to sue for violation of the Patient's Bill of Rights but voids an agreement to waive such a civil lawsuit…

…

Section 1430(b)'s last sentence effectively "prohibits outright arbitration" of Patient Bill of Rights claims and as a "conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." [citation omitted] Section 1430(b)'s last sentence violates and is preempted by the FAA as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of FAA purposes.”

The Court, having found the FAA applies, finds the second cause of action within the scope of the Agreement and that it may be compelled to arbitration.

Authority and Analysis – Wrongful Death

Here, Plaintiff Orozco argues that she never signed the Agreement as an individual and therefore the wrongful death claim asserted by her individually cannot be compelled to arbitration.

However, this ignores the language of the Agreement that states

“I also acknowledge that pursuant to the terms of this agreement, any claims that I may assert in my personal capacity that arise out of or relate to any the provision of or failure to provide services (medical or otherwise) or goods by the Facility to the Resident or the admission agreement are governed by this arbitration agreement.”

and

“Consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, this arbitration agreement binds the parties hereto, including the heirs, representatives, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns of such parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to any services (medical or otherwise) or goods provided by the Facility or the admission agreement.”

The Court finds, therefore, Defendant has established that the Agreement applies to Plaintiff Orozco’s individual claim for wrongful death, as the Agreement first required that Plaintiff Orozco certify she was authorized to act as the Resident’s agent and thereafter acknowledged that claims asserted in her personal capacity were subject to the Agreement. While the Agreement does not expressly call out wrongful death claims, the reference to “claims that I may assert in my personal capacity” is sufficient.

As such, the Court finds the wrongful death claim arbitrable.

Authority and Analysis - Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)

The Court finds no application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c) here as there it finds there are no third party claims at issue, under the analysis above.

Facts and Analysis - 42 CFR § 483.70

42 C.F.R. § 483.70(m)(2)(i) states:

“(2) The facility must ensure that:

(i) The agreement is explained to the resident and his or her representative in a form and manner that he or she understands, including in a language the resident and his or her representative understands;”

Plaintiff here argues that Decedent’s native and primary language was Spanish and the declaration attached the Agreement executed by Cindy Carter Stevens indicates that the Agreement was explained and presented in English.

However, the Declaration states that the Agreement was explained to “1…Frank Mejorado (Resident’s name) and/or Jessico Orozco (Resident’s Agent).” Further, that “2. I spoke to him or her or them in English. If English was not his or her or their native language the Agreement was explained to him or her or them in English (language) by Cindy Carter Stevens (the person who spoke to the Resident and/or Agent in his or her or their preferred language.)”

As such, the declaration reflects compliance with 42 C.F.R. § 483.70, as to presentation in English to Plaintiff Orozco, who does not contend English was not a language she understands.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mejia, Miguel vs. Zepeda, Ismael

Case No.:   VCU335271

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Entry of Default Interlocutory Judgment re: Partition and Appointment of Referee

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this verified complaint for partition of real property, Plaintiff sues Defendants Ismael Zepeda and Norma Mejia regarding 13875 Avenue 232, Tulare, CA 93274, Assessor's Parcel Number 195-140-020-000 (the "Property").

Plaintiff alleges a 50% interest as a joint tenant and that Defendants each have a 25% interest as joint tenants.

On June 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed proofs of personal service as to each Defendant.

On July 20, 2026, Plaintiff requested default as to each Defendant and default was entered.

On August 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of recording of pendency of action as to the Property.

On September 4, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for a default interlocutory judgment and for appointment of a referee. Plaintiff proposes Matthew L. Taylor, Esq for appointment as referee with an estimated cost of $14,000 and who has provided a separate declaration in support of the appointment.

Authority and Analysis

The law states that “[a]t the trial, the court shall determine whether the plaintiff has the right to partition.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.710(a).) If the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition, the court shall make an interlocutory judgment that determines the interests of the parties in the property and orders the partition of the property. (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.720(a).)

The Civil Procedure Code specifically states that this determination can be made “at trial.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.810.) It appears that the Court may also make this determination in the other ways that determinations underlying a judgment are normally made – such as by motion for summary judgment. (See LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 484 [reversing denial of summary judgment and ordering trial court to grant plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication on partition cause of action.].)

This statutory scheme envisions that an interlocutory judgment of partition shall not be entered until after the court determines the interests of the parties in the property and that plaintiffs are entitled to partition. (Code Civ. Proc. § 872.720(a); see also Summers v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 138, 143-144 [court cannot order partition sale prior to resolving the parties’ respective ownership interest in property].)

The court in Finney v. Gomez (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 527, 532, however, appears to permit the entry of the interlocutory judgment after obtaining entry of default. Therefore, the correct sequence of events appears to be the following: entry of default, interlocutory judgment ordering partition, partition by kind or by sale, default prove up hearing to determine entry of judgment for a specific dollar amount based upon the parties interest the property and any set off or expense amounts. (Id. at 532-533.)

In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to partition as of right pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 872.710(b) based on the concurrent interests of the parties as undivided owners. (See LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493.) Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated 50% ownership and that the Defendants, collectively, hold the other 50% ownership, as joint tenants.

Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to partition as a co-owner and that no waiver of such right has occurred.

Code of Civil Procedure section 873.010 states, “the court shall appoint a referee to divide or sell the property as ordered by the court.” Additionally, Code of Civil Procedure section 873.510 states that “[t]he referee appointed by the court to make a sale of the property shall sell the property in the manner and following the procedures provided in this chapter.” Here, the Court finds the declaration of the proposed referee sufficient to order appointment.

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and will sign the proposed default interlocutory judgment and appoint Matthew L. Taylor, Esq as the referee.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 E.W. Merritt Farms vs. Pixley Irrigation District

Case No.:    VCU332714 

Date:           October 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Demurrer & (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: (1) To sustain the demurrer, without leave, as to the third declaratory relief cause of action and, in all other respects, to overrule it; and (2) to grant the motion to strike paragraphs 141 through 145 and paragraphs 182 through 183 with leave to amend; to grant the motion to strike paragraphs 146 through 155 of the petition without leave to amend; and, in all other respects, to deny the motion.  Merritt shall have 10 days from notice of this ruling to file an amended pleading with allegations curing the defects in paragraphs 141 through 145 and paragraphs 182 through 183 as provided herein.  

Introduction

Pixley Irrigation District, the Pixley Irrigation Board of Directors, and Pixley Irrigation District Groundwater Sustainability Agency (the District) demurrer to the four causes of action asserted in E.W. Merritt Farms’s amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint (petition). 

Separately, the District moves to strike portions of the petition. 

DEMURRER

I. Background

Merritt’s petition challenges certain fees the District adopted, imposed and collected to fund its groundwater management activities under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA).  More specifically, Merritt challenges the District’s imposition of “Base Fee[s], Transitional Use Fee[s], and Exceedance Fee[s]” (SGMA Fees).  Merritt’s challenges the fees on several grounds. 

Merritt alleges it paid the disputed SGMA Fees under protest and it seeks, amongst several other forms of relief, a refund of the amounts paid.  When, in September 2024, Merritt “remitted full payment … for [its] June 2024 SGMA Fees,” it advised its “payment of the Transitional Use Fee was being made under protest,” and it requested a refund.  Then, in January 2025, after the District rejected Merritt’s initial refund request, Merritt “remitted payment … for all outstanding balances allegedly due under the SGMA Fees and requested a [full] refund of the … amount paid under protest.”

Later, “in February 2025,” Merritt requested various records from the District under the Public Records Act (PRA) and none of the records the District produced “indicated [that] the District had,” “prior to imposing [SGMA Fees on Pixley landowners],” “held a majority protest hearing in accordance with Proposition 218 or prepared a nexus study demonstrating [that] the amount of the SGMA Fees did not exceed the reasonable cost of the services being provided.”  “Additionally,” the records “did not include any resolutions or ordinances documenting the District adoption of the SGMA Fees.”

Then, “[b]efore the District … completed its response to the PRA Request,” “[i]n March 2025,” the District noticed a May 8, 2025 public hearing “to consider a proposed ‘groundwater extraction fee … intended to fund various [groundwater sustainability projects, under SGMA]’ ” (Merritt refers to these fees as the “2025 SGMA Fees”).  The District provided, in the notice, a link to a “ ‘Pixley Irrigation District Proposition 218 Fee Study for SGMA Implementation Actions’ (‘Fee Study’).”  The notice also “advised that ‘[a]ny property owner may submit a written protest to the proposed fee.’ ” 

Merritt alleges “[t]he 2025 SGMA Fees bore a striking resemblance to the original SGMA Fees,” consisting, per the linked fee study, of “ ‘Base,’ ” “ ‘Transitional,’ ” and “ ‘Exceedance’ ” fees.  And yet, while the fee study indicated that the District, in adopting the 2025 SGMA Fees and for “future fees,” had “elected to utilize [authority under SGMA, specifically, Water Code section 10730.2, which requires compliance with Proposition 218],” the study indicated, with respect to “the original SGMA Fees,” that they had been “ ‘adopted under general authorities available to Irrigation Districts,’ ” and, therefore, adoption of those prior fees was “somehow beyond the reach of Proposition 218’s constitutional mandates.”

Merritt’s first cause of action seeks a writ of mandate and indicates, in its caption, that it is targeted at the District’s “Original SGMA Fees”—which are those SGMA Fees the District had imposed prior to the 2025 SGMA Fees and that Merritt allegedly paid under protest.  Merritt seeks a writ ordering the District to cease collecting “the SGMA Fees”; to vacate prior actions enforcing “the SGMA Fees”; to “comply with all applicable law” before taking any further action to collect “the SGMA Fees”; and, as noted, to refund the fees Merritt paid under protest. 

Merritt’s first cause of action asserts the Original SGMA Fees were adopted, imposed, and/or collected (A) in violation of Proposition 218; (B) in violation of Proposition 26; (C) in violation of Merritt’s federal and state constitutional rights; and (D) in violation of SGMA (specifically, Water Code section 10730). 

Merritt’s second cause of action also seeks a writ of mandate and is targeted at the District’s 2025 SGMA Fees.  In the second cause of action, Merritt seeks a writ ordering the District to cease collecting “the 2025 SGMA Fees”; to vacate prior actions enforcing “the 2025 SGMA Fees”; to “vacate the Fee Study”; to “comply with all applicable law” before taking any further action to collect “the 2025 SGMA Fees”; and, again, to refund the fees Merritt paid under protest. 

Similar to its first cause of action, Merritt’s second cause of action asserts the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted, imposed and/or collected (A) in violation of Proposition 218; (B) in violation of Proposition 26; and (C) in violation of Merritt’s federal and state constitutional rights (but not in violation of SGMA). 

Merritt’s claim that the SGMA Fees at issue in both its first and second cause of action were adopted in violation of its federal and state constitutional rights are based on allegations that adoption, imposition and/or collection of the fees constituted an unconstitutional taking and violated Merritt’s constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection. 

Merritt’s third cause of action, for declaratory relief, and fourth cause of action, for injunctive relief, are each derivative of their first two causes of action.  Merritt’s prayer for relief under the third cause of action, spanning two full pages by itself, indicates it seeks a judicial declaration affirming its position on the issues necessary to support its writ claims and affirming its entitlement to the relief it seeks under those claims.  Merritt additionally alleges, under its third cause of action, though, a “controversy exists” with respect to several billing and payment issues. Merritt then prays, in its fourth cause of action, for an order enjoining the District from “assessing, imposing, and/or collecting” future SGMA fees until the District has “complied with their obligations under the law.”

II. First Cause of Action – Original SGMA Fees

The District challenges Merritt’s first cause of action on statute of limitations grounds. 

The District contends the first cause of action is subject to Water Code section 10726.6, subdivision (c), which states:  “Any judicial action or proceeding to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul the ordinance or resolution imposing a new, or increasing an existing, fee imposed pursuant to Section 10730, 10730.2, or 10730.4 shall be commenced within 180 days following the adoption of the ordinance or resolution.”

Not in dispute is that Merritt targets the Original SGMA Fees imposed by the District between 2021 and 2024.  Also not in dispute is that the District imposed the Original SGMA Fees under Policy 4 in its 2020 Rules and Operating Policies, which were adopted by the District’s board on February 13, 2020, as reflected in board approved minutes of that date, of which the District requests judicial notice without objection.

Also not in dispute is that Merritt’s first cause of action is framed in the petition, at least in part, as a challenge under Water Code section 10726.6, subdivision (d), to the District’s assessment, imposition and collection of fees ostensibly adopted pursuant to Water Code section 10730, subdivision (a). 

Water Code section 10730(a) permits a groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) to impose fees on “on groundwater extraction or other regulated activity, to fund the costs of a groundwater sustainability program … .”

Under Water Code section 10726.6(d) “[a]ny person may pay a fee imposed pursuant to Section 10730, 10730.2, or 10730.4 under protest and bring an action against the governing body in the superior court to recover any money that the governing body refuses to refund.”

It is additionally clear that the 180-day limitations period under Water Code section 10726.6(c) applies to “a fee refund action under section 10726.6(d),” just as it does to “any action challenging a groundwater fee ordinance.” (Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 605, 632 [318 Cal.Rptr.3d 180] (Mojave Pistachios).)

Based on Mojave Pistachios, though, it may be more accurate to say that, in all but the rarest of circumstances, a person who seeks to challenge a groundwater fee imposed under SGMA is required to proceed as provided under subdivision (d) of section 10726.6 (pay first, seek refund later), and that such actions, like any other action challenging “a fee imposed pursuant to Section 10730, 10730.2, or 10730.4” (Wat. Code, § 10726.6, subd. (c)), are subject to the 180-day limitations period provided under section 10726.6(c).  (See id., at pp. 630-631 [concluding “section 10726.6(d) of SGMA requires a person who seeks to challenge a groundwater fee imposed under SGMA to first pay the fee before bringing an action for a refund … [and] … the fact that section 10726.6(d) uses the words ‘may pay … under protest’ does not make compliance optional.]; but cf. id., at p. 633 [recognizing “rigid application” of “pay first” rule could allow a GSA “to impose unreasonable fees,” but declining “to resolve the slippery issue of determining when, if ever, a fee or tax would be so extraordinarily high that the ‘pay first’ rule should not apply.])

That said, however, the Third District, in the very recent case of Garst v. Tehama County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. (2026) 121 Cal.App.5th 507 [345 Cal.Rptr.3d 886] (Garst) did “not read the appellate court’s statement in Mojave Pistachios … that section 10726.6(c) ‘is the statute of limitations applicable to any action challenging a groundwater fee ordinance, including a fee refund action under section 10726.6(d),” to mean the statute of limitations applies ‘to any facial challenge to a groundwater fee.’ ” (Id., at p. 625, Third District’s boldface.)

In Garst, a landowner challenged the validity of a groundwater well registration charge adopted by a county flood control and water conservation district, which was imposed on every parcel of land in the county regardless of whether the property used groundwater or had a groundwater well.  (Id., at p. 515.)  The district asserted, based on its reference to Water Code section 10730(a) in its resolution adopting the well registration charge (id., at pp. 517-518, 523), that the charge was adopted under section 10730(a), and that the landowner’s challenge was time barred according to section 10726.6(c) because the landowner filed suit more than 180 days after the district adopted the resolution imposing the well registration charge (id., at p. 522).

The court observed that, in asserting an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, “[t]he defendant bears the initial burden of proving [that] the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” (Id., at p. 523, citations omitted.) The court found the district’s statement in its own resolution adopting the well registration charge did not establish that the charge had been adopted under section 10730(a).  (Ibid.) 

The court then concluded, based on its review of SGMA, that the district “exceeded the scope of its statutory authority under section 10730(a) by imposing the well registration charge on all landowners within the County” (original italics) because “a groundwater fee adopted under section 10730(a) pertains to properties with groundwater extraction facilities, unless the de minimis extractor exemption applies.” (Id., at pp. 523-524.)  Accordingly, the court concluded, “[t]he statute of limitations under section 10726.6(c) … [did] not apply.” (Id., at p. 524.) 

The district attempted to rely on Mojave Pistachios, but the Third District found “[n]othing in that case relieve[d] the District of the burden to prove the charge was adopted pursuant to section 10730(a).” (Id., at p. 525, italics added.)

Additionally notable, the district had raised the point, which this court has considered here, that if the district was required to “prove the well registration charge was imposed under section 10730(a) to invoke the statute of limitations under section 10726.6(c), it would effectively require ‘the District to win on the merits before the statute of limitations applies.’ ” (Ibid.)  Responding to this, however, the Third District disagreed, explaining that the district “merely need[ed] to show that it adopted a groundwater fee in accordance with its delegated statutory authority and followed the prescribed procedures. [Citations.]” (Ibid.)  “Such a requirement,” the court determined, “does not render the 180-day limitation meaningless or allow a petitioner to circumvent the statute of limitations simply by alleging a fee violates section 10730(a), as the District contends,” rather, “[t]he requirement merely places the burden of proof where it lies—with the defendant asserting an affirmative defense.” (Id., at p. 526.)  The court then stated: “A petitioner’s allegation that a local government violated section 10730(a) does not allow a petitioner to circumvent section 10726.6(c), if it applies.” (Ibid.)

The District, here, cites Garst for the last statement quoted above, apparently suggesting that it can be read to mean that, where, as here, a petition alleges a GSA adopted a groundwater extraction fee in violation of section 10730, the claim of violation is necessarily, by virtue of that allegation, subject to section 10726.6(c) and its 180-day limitations period.  Read properly in context, however, it is clear what this statement actually means is that a petitioner’s allegation, alone, that a GSA violated 10730(a) is not sufficient to circumvent application of the 180-day limitations period under section 10726.6(c), where it is otherwise established that the challenged fee was “imposed pursuant to Section 10730, 10730.2, or 10730.4.” (§ 10726.6, subd. (c).)  Garst unequivocally and clearly held, however, that it is ultimately the defendant’s burden to establish its affirmative defense based on the section 10726.6(c) statute of limitations. 

In the context of a demurrer, what this means is that the defendant satisfies its burden that section 10726.6(c) applies if it shows the allegations of the complaint or facts subject to judicial notice establish the applicability of that section.  (Czajkowski v. Haskell & White, LLP (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 166, 174 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 522].)  More specifically, demurrer is proper if the defendant shows that allegations or facts subject to judicial notice establish that the defendant adopted the challenged groundwater fee “in accordance with its delegated statutory authority and followed the prescribed procedures. [Citations.]” (Garst, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 525.) The court finds that the District does not show that here. 

Contrary to the District’s contention, Merritt’s allegations do not “admit that the Original SGMA Fees were adopted pursuant to Water Code section 10730,” rather, they identify various requirements for the adoption of a fee under section 10730 that are set out in that section and then allege that “the District failed to satisfy [those requirements].” Merritt’s petition specifically flags requirements under Water Code section 10730(b) that a GSA must “hold at least one public meeting” prior to imposing a fee under section 10730(a), give notice of the time and place of the meeting, and “make available to the public [the] data upon which the proposed fee is based” “[a]t least 20 days prior to the meeting.” (Id., subds. (b)(1)-(3).)  Additionally, Merritt flags the requirement under 10730(c) that “[a]ny action by a groundwater sustainability agency to impose or increase a fee shall be taken only by ordinance or resolution.” (§ 10730, subd. (c).)

Relatedly, Merritt alleges “[o]n information and belief,” amongst its voluminous “Background” allegations, that the District “did not conduct a majority protest or other election procedure prior to adopting or imposing the SGMA Fees”; “failed to give landowners advance notice of the amount of, and basis for, the SGMA Fees prior to their adoption”; and “did not adopt a written resolution or ordinance in approving the SGMA Fees.”

The court additionally notes that Merritt alleges it submitted, in February 2025, a Public Records Act (PRA) request to the District seeking, inter alia, “all resolutions, ordinances, or other documents constituting the official acts of the District with respect to the SGMA Fees” and “all documents relied upon by the District in taking any official action to adopt, amend, or implement those fees”; that “the District produced a small handful of documents in response”; and that “[n]one of the responsive documents indicated the District had held a majority protest hearing in accordance with Proposition 218” and they “did not include any resolutions or ordinances documenting the District's adoption of the SGMA Fees, their purpose, or the legal basis for their adoption.”

Amongst Merritt’s several claims in the first cause of action, the court notes, is also a claim that “The District Adopted, Imposed, and/or Collected the SGMA Fees in Violation of Proposition 218” and, further, the court observes, certain requirements under Proposition 218 described in the petition are similar to requirements imposed under the later adopted Water Code section 10730, as set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of that section.  (See Cal. Const, art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a) & (b); cf. Wat. Code, § 10730, subd. (b).) (The court notes Proposition 218, an initiative measure, effected the addition of Article III D to the California Constitution on November 5, 1996.)

It is inferable here that, in some respects, some of the above-described allegations were intended to support violations of similar, but distinct, requirements under Proposition 218 and possibly also Water Code section 10730.2, on the one hand, and, on the other, Water Code section 10730.  Water Code section 10730.2, the court notes, makes fees imposed under that section, “to fund the cost of groundwater management,” expressly subject to the requirements of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Proposition 218. (Id., subd. (c).)

More specifically, it appears the indicated allegations intend to frame that: (A) The District failed to follow requirements of holding “a public hearing” under Proposition 218 and/or Water Code section 10730.2 (Cal. Const, art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a); Wat. Code, § 10730.2, subd. (c)) and also similarly failed to hold a “public meeting” under Water Code section 10730; and (b) that the District failed to provide “notice” of either, as required, on the one hand, under Proposition 218 (Cal. Const, art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a))—and, by express incorporation of Proposition 218 requirements, Water Code section 10730.2 (id., subd. (c)—and, on the other, under Water Code section 10730 (id., subd. (b)).

The court does not mean to suggest that these are all the same requirements—they are not—and while Merritt’s allegations are, in some respects, confusing, the court does find, ultimately, that it can clearly be discerned that they refute, rather than support, that the District adopted the Original SGMA Fees “in accordance with its delegated statutory authority and followed the prescribed procedures” of Water Code section 10730 in adopting the Original SGMA Fees. (Garst, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 525, citation omitted.) 

The District attempts to distinguish Garst as a case involving a “defect in the groundwater fee [that] was substantive and specific, since [in Garst] the district imposed the fee on every parcel, regardless of whether the property possessed a groundwater extraction facility.”   Garst, however, did not describe its determination as limited in the way the District suggests.  The dispositive determination was, clearly, that the district had “exceeded the scope of its delegated authority under section 10730(a),” such that “its act of adopting the well registration charge pursuant to that statute [was] void.” (Garst, supra, 121 Cal.App.5th at p. 524.)

Here, Merritt alleges that the District exceeded its statutory authority under SGMA, and none of its other allegations concede otherwise.  Additionally, though not addressed in the District’s arguments directed at the first cause of action, Merritt alleges that the District adopted the Original SGMA Fees in violation of provisions of the California Constitution added by Proposition 218 and Proposition 26 and in violation of Merritt’s federal and state constitutional rights. 

Finally, the court finds the documents of which the District requests judicial notice do not establish that it complied with its statutory authority under SGMA.  The District cites, without further explanation, two exhibits attached to its request consisting of the following:  (A) The District’s groundwater sustainability plan (GSP) adopted January 21, 2020 and its board Resolution No. 2020-1-1 reflecting adoption of its January 2020 GSP; and (B) the District’s February 2020 Rules and Operating Policies and its “board approved minutes” reflecting adoption of the February 2020 Rules and Operating Policies on February 13, 2020, which included “Policy 4,” pursuant to which the District began imposing and collecting SGMA Fees from landowners in January 2021.

These documents do not self-evidently establish the District’s compliance with the requirements of Water Code section 10730 and the District does not meet its burden to show that they do. 

Based on the foregoing, the court finds the District fails to establish that Water Code section 10726.6(c) applies, and the demurrer, therefore, is overruled to the first cause of action on the ground presented. 

II. Second Cause of Action – 2025 SGMA Fees 

The District demurrers to Merritt’s second cause of action based on arguments targeted at each of the several components of that cause of action.  In effect, the District presents a substantive merits challenge to the second cause of action based on a facts of which it requests judicial notice. 

Again, Merritt’s second cause of action asserts the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted, imposed and/or collected (A) in violation of Proposition 218; (B) in violation of Proposition 26; and (C) in violation of Merritt’s federal and state constitutional rights. 

The District’s demurrer fails to establish, as a matter of law, that the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted in conformity with Proposition 218 as to Proposition 218’s proportionality requirement, and, for that reason, its demurrer must be overruled to the second cause of action.  Incident to this determination, the court need not and does not reach, in ruling on the demurrer, the District’s arguments concerning the claims in the second cause of action that the 2025 SGMA Fees were imposed in violation of Proposition 26, or Merritt’s federal and state constitutional rights, though it does note that those claims, in significant part, derive from Merritt’s proportionality contentions in its Proposition 218 claim, and that the District’s arguments concerning those other claims are largely the same as its arguments concerning Merritt’s Proposition 218 claims. 

A. Relevant Allegations re: Proposition 218 Proportionality Requirements

Subdivision (b) of section 6 of Proposition 218 includes the following substantive requirements, amongst others, that an agency must meet when imposing new or increased fees or charges:  “(1) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not exceed the funds required to provide the property related service. [¶] (2) Revenues derived from the fee or charge shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which the fee or charge was imposed. [¶] (3) The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel or person as an incident of property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.” (Cal. Const., art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (b).)

Merritt alleges that, in several respects, the District lacks “substantial evidence” of its compliance with these requirements, or, stated another way, cannot meet its burden to show its compliance with these requirements, with respect to its adoption, imposition and collection of the 2025 SGMA Fees. 

      i. Flawed Methodology for Calculating Groundwater Extractions

Merritt’s principal complaint about the SGMA Fees, covered at length and at multiple points in its petition, is that the District, according to Merritt, uses a flawed methodology for determining groundwater extractions that disproportionately imposes SGMA Fees on water-efficient farmers like Merritt, as compared to the measure of such fees imposed on other, less efficient, flood-irrigating District landowners.    This complaint is chiefly featured amongst Merritt’s several claims concerning the lack of substantial evidence supporting the District’s compliance with the requirements of section 6(b) of Proposition 218. 

Merritt alleges the District’s methodology relies on evapotranspiration estimates to determine how much groundwater landowners use, rather than “metered extractions,” despite that “meters are widely accepted as the gold standard for accurate measurement of groundwater extractions.”  This is a particular problem, according to Merritt, incident to the particular hydrologic conditions that obtain within the District and other areas of the Tule Subbasin over which the District has partial jurisdiction with several other GSAs. 

According to Merritt, the Subbasin “contains several aquifers … , including, as pertinent [to this litigation], (i) [an] ‘Upper Aquifer,’ … , and (ii) [a] ‘Lower Aquifer,’ ” which “are separated by a layer of very low-permeability Corcoran Clay, which severely impedes the movement of water between the two aquifers.” Incident to this Corcoran Clay layer, Merritt maintains, “water pumped from the Lower Aquifer does not return there for many years, if at all, after being applied to the land,” and “[i]nstead, the Corcoran Clay layer traps water in the Upper Aquifer, severely impeding the Lower Aquifer’s ability to recharge.”

Merritt asserts that, given this hydrologic context, the District’s evapotranspiration-based methodology essentially over-credits the recharge effects of “highly inefficient irrigation practices, such as flood irrigation,” which, Merritt alleges, are relied upon by “[m]any other … landowners in the District” and under-credits Merritt’s “investments to optimize its irrigation practices,” specifically its having installed “drip irrigation for all its permanent crops.”  This occurs because, despite that “landowners relying on inefficient irrigation practices are exclusively responsible for the costs associated with … unnecessary overdraft [from the Lower Aquifer], the District spreads those costs evenly across all landowners, including landowners like [Merritt] who [has] made substantial investments to maximize efficiency and [to] avoid causing unnecessary harm to the region’s groundwater resources.” According to Merritt, then, incident to the District’s failure to utilize the alleged “gold standard” metered extraction method, inefficient practices, like the flood irrigation practices of its neighbors, are incentivized, while its own efficient drip-irrigation practices are punished. 

Merritt alleges, amongst other things, that “the 2025 SGMA Fees net consumption calculation is not based on substantial evidence, creates perverse incentives, and disproportionately burdens landowners that use efficient irrigation practices.”  By “net consumption calculation,” Merritt clearly refers to the District’s use of its evapotranspiration methodology for determining groundwater extractions, which, in turn, is based, Merritt alleges, on determinations reflected in the Fee Study for the 2025 SGMA Fees that water used for “over-irrigation” (i.e., flood irrigation) “is returned to the subbasin” where it “assists in the maintenance of overall groundwater levels and avoidance of undesirable results.”

From the foregoing, it can be derived that Merritt contends “the 2025 SGMA Fees net consumption calculation is not based on substantial evidence, creates perverse incentives, and disproportionately burdens landowners that use efficient irrigation practices” because, incident to the hydrologic conditions that obtain in the Subbasin (according to Merritt), “over-irrigation”/flood irrigation does not “assist[] in the maintenance of overall groundwater levels and avoidance of undesirable results.”

Merritt’s petition elsewhere recounts that the District has had two versions of its GSP determined insufficient on review by the Department of Water Resources (DWR), and the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) has now designated the Subbasin as a “probationary basin.”  Notable, here, “[t]he probationary designation under Water Code section 10735.2, subdivision (a)(3) is authorized when ‘the [DWR], in consultation with the [SWRCB], determines that a groundwater [plan] is inadequate or that the groundwater sustainability program is not being implemented in a manner that will likely achieve the sustainability goal.”  (State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 734, 776 [338 Cal.Rptr.3d 530].)

Merritt emphasizes under its second cause of action that “[t]he primary reason the SWRCB placed the Subbasin on probation is subsidence and landowners cause more subsidence if they use inefficient water use practices (e.g., flood irrigation or ‘over-irrigation’) than if they were to use efficient water use practices (e.g., drip or micro irrigation),” and it alleges “[t]his is because the vast majority of groundwater in the District is drawn from the Lower Aquifer and applied to land overlying the Corcoran Clay layer.”

Based on Merritt’s contention that, “[c]ontrary to what the Fee Study asserts, there is no substantial evidence to support its conclusion that ‘over-irrigation ... assists in the maintenance of overall groundwater levels and avoidance of undesirable results,’ ” it further alleges there is not “substantial evidence to support the District's conclusion that the 2025 SGMA Fees do not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcels upon which it will be imposed.” 

“By calculating the fees on a fundamentally flawed net consumption basis (rather than a gross extraction basis),” Merritt alleges, “the fees fail to account for the impact ‘over-irrigation’ has on subsidence.”

On this basis, Merritt alleges “the District cannot meet its burden of showing the 2025 SGMA Fees do not exceed the reasonable cost of the service being provided,” effectively framing a violation of section 6, subdivision (b)(1), of Proposition 218.

      ii. 5% Annual Inflation Adjustment

Merritt additionally and separately alleges that, without “explanation or justification,” the Fee Study “includes a 5% annual inflation adjustment,” which, it alleges, is “nearly double the average annual rate of inflation over the last 25 years”).  Merritt relatedly alleges, as a separate basis of its assertion that “the District cannot meet its burden of showing the 2025 SGMA Fees do not exceed the reasonable cost of the service being provided,” that “[t]here is no substantial evidence justifying an annual adjustment in this [5%] amount and it is entirely unnecessary.”

      iii. Land fallowing and water purchase components of 2025 SGMA Fees

Merritt additionally alleges that the 2025 SGMA Fees include “land fallowing and water purchase components” intended to raise funds for a projected $2.75 million in costs associated with a “[l]and fallowing and water purchase program” identified in the Fee Study and the District’s GSP. 

Merritt alleges that “the District cannot meet its burden of showing the land fallowing and water purchase components of the 2025 SGMA Fees do not exceed the reasonable cost of the service being provided” both because the Fee Study “contains no explanation whatsoever as to how the ‘$2.75 million’ figure was calculated nor how much of that amount represents costs of ‘land fallowing’ versus costs of ‘water purchase[s]’” and because “the District does not need a fallowing program, as there are multiple external grants and other programs from which the District could obtain any needed funds.”

Later in the petition, Merritt additionally asserts “costs associated with water purchase programs are not ‘actually used by, or immediately available to’ landowners because the District lacks a reliable surface water supply,” which the Fee Study acknowledges, and that the District, accordingly, cannot meet its burden to show that the water purchase program component of the 2025 SGMA Fees “are ‘actually used by, or immediately available to’ District landowners.”

      iv. Well Mitigation Component

Merritt alleges the 2025 SGMA Fees include a “Well Mitigation Fee,” despite that the District has already established a fund for well mitigation,” and, accordingly, that “the District cannot meet its burden of showing the well mitigation component of the 2025 SGMA Fees does not exceed the reasonable cost of the service being provided.”

      v. Friant-Kern Canal Fix Component

Lastly, Merritt alleges the 2025 SGMA Fees include components “associated with the cost of repaying a loan for the [Friant-Kern Canal] Fix project,” which loan “concludes in 2031.”  Merritt alleges that, notwithstanding that the loan “concludes in 2031,” “[t]he Base Fee, the Transitional Fee, and the Exceedance Fee all ‘will remain in perpetuity,’ ” according to the Fee Study.

Merritt alleges “[t]he District cannot meet its burden of showing” that the component of the 2025 SGMA Fees associated with the Friant-Kern Canal Fix project loan “are imposed for ‘services’ that are ‘actually used by or immediately available to’ the landowners subject to them” for two reasons: (1) “First,” because “repayment of a preexisting loan does not constitute a ‘service’ within the meaning of Proposition 218”; and (2) “[s]econd,” because “any ‘service’ that could be provided by repayment of the [Friant-Kern Canal] Fix project loan will not be actually used by, or immediately available to District landowners in perpetuity because the loan concludes in 2031.”

B. Standards re: Proposition 218

“Before Proposition 218 was passed, courts reviewed quasi-legislative acts of local governmental agencies,” such as, here, with the imposition of groundwater extraction fees under SGMA, “under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431, 443 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 312, 187 P.3d 37] (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn.).)  “Because it was recognized that ‘[such quasi-legislative fee imposition activity] takes place as a result of a peculiarly legislative process grounded in the taxing power of the sovereign,” the scope of judicial review of such actions was “quite narrow.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)   Under this prior standard of review, courts presumed such fee-imposition activity was valid, “and a plaintiff challenging it had to show that the record before the legislative body ‘clearly’ did not support the underlying determinations of benefit and proportionality.” (Id., at p. 444.)

“The drafters of Proposition 218 specifically targeted this deferential standard of review for change. Article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f), provides: ‘In any legal action contesting the validity of any assessment, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate that the property or properties in question receive a special benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and that the amount of any contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits conferred on the property or properties in question.’” (Ibid.)

“[T]owards this end, [Proposition 218] was intended to make it ‘more difficult for an assessment to be validated in a court proceeding’ … [a]nd … to stay true to the proposition’s intent, courts must apply their independent judgment when determining whether an agency has met the burdens assigned to it by section 4, subdivision (f) of the initiative (art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (f))—a substantially less deferential standard than [the standard applied by courts before Proposition 218].”  (Hill RHF Housing Partners, L.P. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 12 Cal.5th 458, 487 [287 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 500 P.3d 294], citing Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc., supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 431, 445, 446, 448 & 450, in line citations omitted.)

Accordingly, courts are to “construe article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f)—the ‘burden … to demonstrate’ provision—liberally in light of the proposition's other provisions, and … should exercise their independent judgment in reviewing local agency decisions that have determined whether benefits are special and whether assessments are proportional to special benefits within the meaning of Proposition 218. [Citation.]” (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 448.)

The District concedes that such standards apply, here, and that it has the burden to demonstrate compliance with Proposition 218 with respect to its adoption and imposition of the 2025 SGMA Fees, which, in summary, means that the District concedes it has the burden in this litigation, inter alia, to establish the 2025 SGMA Fees do not “exceed the reasonable costs to the District of conferring the benefit or providing the service for which they were imposed.”

C. The District fails to make the requisite showing on demurrer

The District’s burden to establish that the 2025 SGMA Fees do not “exceed the reasonable costs to the District of conferring the benefit or providing the service for which they were imposed” means, in the context of a demurrer, that it is the District’s burden to show Merritt’s allegations, accepted as true, do not establish this, or that facts subject to judicial notice would require the court to make this independent determination. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58].)

The District solely seeks to demonstrate that facts subject to judicial notice contradict the allegations of the petition, and the source of such facts it submits is principally the Fee Study for the 2025 SGMA Fees.  This showing, however, is insufficient on demurrer because—given the court must initially accept Merritt’s allegations as true—the Fee Study does not conclusively establish contradictory facts that would require this court to determine, in its independent judgment (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 448), that the 2025 SGMA Fees do not run afoul of the proportionality requirements of Proposition 218 as a matter of law. 

The District relies significantly on a statement in the Fee Study that the District “determined to utilize [a net consumption] approach [to measuring groundwater extraction] because groundwater that is returned to the subbasin [through over-irrigation/flood irrigation] remains available for eventual use, and assists in the maintenance of overall groundwater levels and avoidance of undesirable results.” 

The statement that “groundwater that is returned to the subbasin [through over-irrigation/flood irrigation] remains available for eventual use, and assists in the maintenance of overall groundwater levels and avoidance of undesirable results,” however, is merely a conclusion.  And, while there is a somewhat intuitive logic to the fundamental premise of that conclusion—that water applied to lands that is not lost to evaporation, or retained in the soil, eventually makes its way down, by force of gravity, to underground aquifers where it provides some recharge effect—nothing in the cited portions of the Fee Study conclusively resolves the issue Merritt raises in the petition: that the District miscalculates recharge effects from over-irrigation incident to its failure to account for the hydrologic consequences of the Corcoran Clay layer. 

Merritt alleges, and the Fee Study does not conclusively refute, that “the vast majority of groundwater in the District is drawn from the Lower Aquifer and applied to land overlying the Corcoran Clay layer,” and therefore, “water applied by ‘over-irrigation’ cannot return to the Lower Aquifer from which it is drawn, resulting in subsidence, lowering of groundwater levels, and loss of groundwater storage.”

The Fee Study, as far as the portions cited by the District go anyway, does not refute this, and rather, merely concludes that the “negative impacts of lowering groundwater levels and reduction of overall groundwater storage that is caused by ongoing overdraft within the GSA’s portion of the subbasin … are not negatively affected by return flows.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, however, the negative impacts of jumping out of an airplane without a parachute are not negatively affected by wearing a hat, but that doesn’t make hat wearing a particularly useful safety measure for skydiving.  

At the pleading stage, the court “accept[s] as true all material facts properly pleaded” by Merritt.  (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126 [119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171], internal quotation marks omitted.)  And if the facts alleged establish a cause of action, it becomes the burden of the defendant to show contradicting facts of which the court may take judicial notice.  Here, nothing in the quoted Fee Study statements would require this court to conclude, in its independent judgment, that the 2025 SGMA Fees do not impose disproportionate costs of water service on parcels that use efficient water practices, such as drip irrigation, as Merritt alleges. 

The District assumes that because the Fee Study “explained the rationale for the net consumption metric” it necessarily established the proportionality of the 2025 SGMA Fees.  At issue, according to the standards in evaluating a Proposition 218 challenge, however, is not merely whether the agency identified a “rationale” for the challenged agency action.  Rather, the court must evaluate, when a constitutional challenge is framed by the pleadings, whether the evidence supporting the agency’s action is fundamentally sound.  Again, courts are to “construe article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f)—the ‘burden … to demonstrate’ provision—liberally in light of the proposition's other provisions, and … should exercise their independent judgment in reviewing local agency decisions that have determined … whether assessments are proportional to special benefits within the meaning of Proposition 218. [Citation.]” (Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 448.) 

The court additionally notes that, regarding Merritt’s contentions that the 2025 SGMA Fees exceeded the proportional cost of service incident to the 5% inflation adjustment and the inclusion of land fallowing, water purchase, and well mitigation cost components, the District contends these allegations are insufficient because they merely reflect that “Merritt disagrees with whether the costs are necessary.”  Merritt’s disagreement, however, is grounded in its contention, unaddressed by the District on demurrer, that, as a result of these cost components, the 2025 SGMA Fees imposed constitutionally impermissible disproportionate costs relative to services and the District lacked substantial evidence for concluding otherwise. 

Nothing in Merritt’s own allegations, or the facts of which the District requests judicial notice, establish that the 5% inflation adjustment, as compared to the alleged “average annual rate of inflation over the last 25 years,” or the land fallowing, water purchase, and well mitigation cost components of the 2025 SGMA Fees did not impose disproportionate cost burdens on District landowners like Merritt.  The Fee Study includes only the District’s own representations that it collected the fees to cover the costs of the programs it deemed necessary to mitigate overdraft.  These facts do not dispositive establish that the 2025 SGMA Fees were proportionate as required by Proposition 218.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer to the second cause of action must be, and it therefore is, overruled. 

Third Cause of Action – Derivative Declaratory Relief Claim

As noted above, Merritt’s third declaratory relief cause of action is mostly derivative of its first and second causes of action.  For that reason, specifically, demurrer is appropriate to the extent the cause of action is derivative.  “ ‘It is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.’ [Citation.] Declaratory relief also cannot be joined with a writ of mandate reviewing an administrative determination. [Citation.]” (City of Pasadena v. Cohen (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1466-1467 [176 Cal.Rptr.3d 729].)

Additionally, however, Merritt alleges “a clear and actual controversy exists between Petitioner and the District regarding the lawfulness of various policies and practices (or lack thereof) in connection with the District's imposition, collection, and enforcement of the original SGMA Fees and the 2025 SGMA Fees, including, without limitation,” 11 listed items, that Merritt alleges “either individually or [in] some combination …, are unlawful and in violation Petitioner's rights under applicable law, including without limitation Proposition 218, Proposition 26, article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, article I, section 7 of the California Constitution, and/or the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.”

In opposing the demurrer, Merritt asserts that “the District’s billing and collection practices lack transparency and consistency, leaving landowners unable to ascertain what they are being charged and whether they should lodge a challenge” and that its declaratory relief challenge “seeks forward-looking declarations about ongoing billing and collection practices.”  Merritt contends “the Petition specifically identifies each of the alleged policies or practices that are challenged” and “specifically alleges the District ‘maintain[s] its policies and practices (or lack thereof) are lawful and do not violate Petitioner’s rights.’”

It is not self-evident, however, how the listed items, which the District accurately describes as a “a ‘kitchen sink’ collection of theoretical complaints about fee billing and collection issues,” rise to the level of infringements of constitutional magnitude, and Merritt makes no effort, beyond its conclusory assertion indicated above, to allege how they do. 

It is not enough for Merrit to merely list allegations suggesting that the District, for example, improperly applies payments to oldest outstanding fees first, fails to maintain written policies and clear explanations for fee charges, and fails to promptly cash checks, and then assert that such items, or some combination of them, violates “applicable law” “including without limitation” one constitutional provision “and/or” some other one.  The use of the “and/or” connector here, with a list that includes multiple different constitutional rights and any “applicable law,” is clearly indicative of the fact that Merritt has no clear claim of “controversy” and simply invites this court to intuit one on its own. 

The court exercises its discretion, in these circumstances, to refuse declaratory relief based on its determination that such relief is neither necessary nor proper given the controversy alleged.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061; see Coruccini v. Lambert (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 486, 489 [248 P.2d 457].)  The court further finds the demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend given Merritt’s allegations, and its arguments in opposing demurrer, suggest its only purpose with the third cause of action is to increase the scope, and attendant burden on the District, of the litigation, and not to secure a necessary judicial declaration on a matter of “actual controversy” bearing on prospective rights.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060; Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931 [62 Cal.Rptr. 654].)

Fourth Cause of Action – Request for Injunctive Relief

The court overrules the demurrer to Merritt’s fourth, derivative cause of action for injunctive relief.   It is true that injunctive relief is a remedy and not a cause of action, but the request for relief presented ultimately derives from allegations that have been determined sufficient to survive demurrer in the first and second causes of action seeking writ relief, and injunctive relief is available on those claims.  (See HNHPC, Inc. v. Department of Cannabis Control (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 60, 73 [311 Cal.Rptr.3d 771].)

MOTION TO STRIKE

The District moves to strike several portions of the petition “to narrow this case to legally viable claims and eliminate defective theories of liability that improperly expand the pleadings.”

The District’s motion to strike essentially presents the same arguments addressed to Merritt’s second cause of action in its demurrer, and, in that respect, it is another attempt to litigate the substantive merits of the second cause of action, albeit on a piecemeal basis. 

With a motion to strike, “[t]he court may, upon a motion … , or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: [¶] (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [¶] (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436; see also, Code Civ. Proc., § 435.) 

And, while “a party may not demur to a portion of a cause of action [citation], … in appropriate circumstances a substantive defect which appears on the face of a complaint, but involves only a portion of a cause of action, may be the subject of a motion to strike.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1681 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 169].)

Notwithstanding the differences in what may be reached on a motion to strike versus a demurrer, however, where the District’s arguments fail to impugn the substantive merits of Merritt’s claims, they fail on motion to strike just the same as they do on demurrer. 

Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike as to Merritt’s allegations in support of its proportionality claims (Pet’n., ¶¶ 156-161); its related claims concerning the 5% annual inflate rate (Pet’n., ¶¶ 162-163), land fallowing and water purchase program and well mitigation cost components (Pet’n., ¶¶ 164-169), and the component of the fees earmarked for the Friant-Kern Canal Fix loan (Pet’n., ¶¶ 170-174).

Identification of Parcels Subject to the Fee & Notice

Beyond the above-noted portions, the motion to strike additionally targets Merritt’s allegations in its second cause of action that the District violated Proposition 218 because “neither the [District’s] Notice nor [its] Fee Study identifies ‘the parcels upon which [the] fee or charge is proposed for imposition’ ” (citing Proposition 218, § 6) and that the District’s Notice “was not reasonably calculated to apprise affected landowners of the basis upon which the 2025 SGMA Fees were calculated, the requirements for submitting a protest, or how protests would be counted.”

   1. Identification of Parcels

Section 6 of Proposition 218, requires “[t]he parcels upon which a fee or charge is proposed for imposition shall be identified” and “written notice by mail of the proposed fee or charge to the record owner of each identified parcel upon which the fee or charge is proposed for imposition, the amount of the fee or charge proposed to be imposed upon each, the basis upon which the amount of the proposed fee or charge was calculated, the reason for the fee or charge, together with the date, time, and location of a public hearing on the proposed fee or charge.” (Id., at subd. (a)(1).)

Section 6 then requires “a public hearing upon the proposed fee or charge,” with notice of the hearing mailed “to the record owners of each identified parcel upon which the fee or charge is proposed for imposition.”  (Id., at subd. (a)(2).)

Merritt alleges that the District failed to comply with section 6(a)(1) because its notice of the May 8, 2025 on the 2025 SGMA Fees (Notice) and the Fee Study linked in the Notice, did not, themselves, identify the parcels upon which the 2025 SGMA Fees were proposed for imposition.  This, as the District points out, though, is not a requirement imposed by section 6(a)(1). 

Merritt responds by presenting a string cite of cases that do not support a requirement under section 6(a)(1) that the notice required under section 6 must include a list of identified parcels upon which the proposed fees is to be imposed, or that the information regarding the fee that must be provided in the notice must include a list of identified parcels.  Merritt cites:  “Richmond v. Shasta Community Services Dist. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 409, 428 … ; Paland v. Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. Bd. of Directors (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371 … ; Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. v. Board of Supervisors of Mendocino County (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 195, 202.”

These string-cited cases principally support what can be determined, without aid of reference to them, from a plain reading of section 6(a)(1): “The parcels upon which a fee or charge is proposed for imposition shall be identified.”  Beyond this, the additional insight from these cases is merely a logical determination that section 6 of article XIII D requires agencies to identify affected parcels in advance of imposing an assessment or a fee for purposes of providing notice and conducting the required voter approval procedures.  (Richmond v. Shasta Community Services Dist., supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 418–419, 427–428; Paland v. Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. Bd. of Directors, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1370; Brooktrails Township Community Services Dist. v. Board of Supervisors of Mendocino County, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 202.)

The court does also note, here, however, that, at the public hearing required by section 6(a)(2) of Proposition 218, “the agency shall consider all protests against the proposed fee or charge,” and “[i]f written protests against the proposed fee or charge are presented by a majority of owners of the identified parcels, the agency shall not impose the fee or charge.”

Relatedly, the court notes Merritt alleges that, despite that the Fee Study indicates that the 2025 SGMA Fees “will be imposed on all parcels in the District … [that] extract and/or consume groundwater” (original emphasis), “the District did not offer any substantial evidence that all parcels in the District actually do extract and consume groundwater” (emphasis added) and it contends “[c]ounting such parcels for purposes of determining a majority protest was both unlawful and unfair.”

The District does not address these allegations regarding implied majority protest hearing infirmities, either in its motion or on demurrer.  The court, though, also notes that Merritt does not anywhere expressly allege that the District actually counted any parcels that do not extract and consume groundwater “for purposes of determining a majority protest” under section 6(a)(2), and so there is not so much an assertion of impropriety, as an implied suggestion that there could have been such impropriety.  Ultimately, Merritt merely alleges it submitted a “Comment Letter” ahead of the May 8, 2025 public hearing objecting to the 2025 SGMA Fees and that “[n]umerous other District landowners also objected … at the May 8 public hearing.”

The court ultimately finds as follows:  If the District, as alleged, failed to include a list of affected parcels in its fee notice for the 2025 SGMA Fees, that would establish nothing.  Separately, though, a plausible claim of violation of Proposition 218 would be presented if the District had counted parcels not affected by the proposed fees for the purposes of determining whether “written protests against the proposed fee … [were] presented by a majority of owners of … identified parcels [‘upon which [the] fee … [was] proposed for imposition’]” (Proposition 218, § 6(a)(1) & (2)).

Against that backdrop, the court here grants the motion to strike as to paragraphs 141 through 145 concerning the District’s identification of parcels in the Notice and Fee Study, but with leave to amend, as there appears to be a reasonable possibility of cure by amendment to clearly assert a procedural Proposition 218 violation based on impropriety in the counting of protest votes from owners of parcels upon which the 2025 SGMA fees were proposed for imposition, by the District’s having improperly counted the votes of unaffected parcels.  If this is Merritt’s contention, however, it will need to come out and allege as much expressly. 

The court’s ruling is, however, only that a reasonable possibility of cure appears from the petition as currently pled.  The court’s assessment should not be read as a blanket invitation.  This is to say, Merritt either is, or is not, at this point, able to present the indicated apparent claim based on allegations that have evidentiary support or are likely to have such support, based on information and belief, after reasonable opportunity for investigation and discovery (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b)) and should only amend to assert the indicated apparent claim if it is. 

   2. Notice 

Merritt additionally alleges the Notice was, itself, deficient in several substantive respects, which, in effect, ultimately amount to Merritt being obtuse about clear statements contained in the Notice concerning the counting of protest votes. 

The District contends in its motion to strike (also on demurrer, though the court declined to reach the unnecessary point there) that the notice, as reflected in the copy of which its requests judicial notice, included all components required under section 6(a)(1).  The court agrees. 

Merritt’s response to this is that “no authority is provided for these contentions except citations to the California Constitution” (emphasis added)—as though citation to clear language in the California Constitution was somehow, alone, inherently suspect. 

Beyond this Merritt merely persists in being obtuse about the statements in the Notice concerning submission of protests, and it presents its purported confusion as a basis for determining some impropriety in it. 

As Merritt puts it:

“The Notice states: ‘Any property owner may submit a written protest to the proposed fee; provided, however, that only one protest will be counted per identified parcel. Any written protest must: 1) state that the identified property owner is in opposition to the proposed water rate increases; 2) provide the location of the identified parcel (by assessor’s parcel number or street address); and 3) include the name and signature of the property owner submitting the protest.’  The Notice’s statement that ‘only one protest will be counted per identified parcel’ suggests a single written protest is permitted to identify multiple parcels and that each ‘identified parcel’ will be counted as a separate protest. However, the Notice then states that ‘[a]ny written protest must . . . provide the location of the identified parcel (by assessor’s parcel number or street address).’ The use of singular nouns suggests a single written protest was not permitted to identify multiple parcels, and that instead landowners who own multiple parcels must submit separate, written protests for each parcel owned, rather than identifying all parcels owned on a single written protest.” (Emphasis omitted.)

The court agrees with the District, however, that “[t]here is nothing vague about the statement in the Notice that ‘only one protest will be counted per identified parcel,’” and, further and more importantly, that the “[t]he Notice contains each requirement as set forth in section 6(a)(1) of article XIII D of the California Constitution.”

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the motion to strike may properly be granted, without leave, as to paragraphs 146 through 155 of the petition.

Proposition 26 Claims

The District additionally moves to strike Merritts allegations, at paragraphs 175-178 (and heading B for those allegations, on page 32) in support of its claim that the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted, imposed and collected in violation of Proposition 26.

Merritts allegations in support of its claim that the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted, imposed and collected in violation of Proposition 26 can be summarized simply as follows: (a) Because, as set forth in Merritt’s allegations of Proposition 218 violations, the 2025 SGMA Fees “exceed the reasonable costs to the District of conferring the benefit or providing the service for which they were imposed,” the 2025 SGMA Fees “constitute a ‘tax’ within the meaning of Proposition 26; and (b) notwithstanding that the 2025 SGMA Fees constituted a “tax” within the meaning of Proposition 26, they “were not approved by the electorate before being imposed, increased, and/or extended in accordance with the requirements of Proposition 26.”

Proposition 26, like Proposition 218, was a measure passed by California voters with the purpose of limiting the authority of state and local agencies to impose taxes without voter approval.  (Humphreville v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 115, 122 [272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 258].)  Proposition 26’s approach was that it significantly “expanded the definition of ‘taxes’ requiring voter approval to include a ‘levy, charge, or exaction of any kind,’ [while exempting] certain categories of exactions from its reach, including certain charges imposed for specific government benefits, privileges, services, or products provided directly to the payor. (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(1) & (2).)” (City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1191, 1209 [226 Cal.Rptr.3d 51, 406 P.3d 733].) Proposition 26 also specifically excludes from its reach, “[a]ssessments and property-related fees imposed in accordance with the provisions of Article XIII D.” (Emphasis added.) (Art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e)(7).) 

The key distinction in “taxes” subject to the voter approval requirements of article XIII C, at section 2, of the California Constitution, and other charges not deemed taxes subject to those approval requirements, inheres in the “the relationship between the charge imposed and [the] benefit or cost related to the payor.” (Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara (2017) 3 Cal.5th 248, 261 [219 Cal.Rptr.3d 859, 397 P.3d 210].)  Where the charge provides a special benefit to the properties assessed, it has been concluded that the assessed property owners should pay for the special benefit, but when the charge exceeds the cost of (i.e., is disproportionate in relation to) the benefit, the exaction is a tax.  (Ibid.)  “If [an] agency were allowed to impose charges in excess of [i.e., disproportionate in relation to] the special benefit received by the payor or the cost associated with the payor’s activities, the imposition of fees would become a vehicle for generating revenue independent of the purpose of the fees. Therefore, to the extent charges exceed the rationale underlying the charges, they are taxes.” (Ibid.)  This distinction is reflected in Proposition 26, “which exempt[s] from its expansive definition of tax (1) charges imposed for a specific benefit or privilege which do not exceed its reasonable cost, (2) charges for a specific government service or product provided which do not exceed its reasonable cost, and (3) charges for reasonable regulatory costs related to specified regulatory activities.” (Id., at p. 262, citing Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (e).)

In effect then, Merritt alleges that, because the 2025 SGMA Fees were disproportionate to “the reasonable costs to the District of conferring the benefit or providing the service for which they were imposed” (for the same reasons alleged in support of Merritt’s claimed Proposition 218 violations) the fees constituted a tax, subject to the voter approval requirements of Proposition 26, and, despite that they did, the District did not comply with Proposition 26’s voter approval requirements. 

The District does not attempt to challenge that the 2025 SGMA Fees were approved in accordance with the voter approval requirements of Proposition 26, and, rather, solely attacks Merritt’s underlying Proposition 218 violation contentions—that the 2025 SGMA Fees “exceed the reasonable costs to the District of conferring the benefit or providing the service for which they were imposed.”

Notably, the same standards applicable to Proposition 218 have been held applicable to challenges based on Proposition 26, “[s]ince Propositions 218 and 26 have the same underlying purpose, i.e., to ‘limit government's power to exact revenue and … curtail the deference that had been traditionally accorded legislative enactments on fees, assessments and charges’ [citation].”  (City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 110, 118-119 [294 Cal.Rptr.3d 491].)  Similar to article XIII D, section 6(b)(5), article XIII C, section 1 provides: “The local government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a levy, charge, or other exaction is not a tax, that the amount is no more than necessary to cover the reasonable costs of the governmental activity, and that the manner in which those costs are allocated to a payor bear a fair or reasonable relationship to the payor’s burdens on, or benefits received from, the governmental activity.”

Accordingly, for the same reasons the court overruled the demurrer to the second cause of action and denied the motion to strike Merritt’s allegations in support of its Proposition 218 claim, the court denies the motion to strike as to Merritt’s allegations in support of its Proposition 26 claim.  The District’s motion to strike, like its demurrer, purports to challenge this claim by showing that facts subject to judicial notice effectively refute conclusively Merritt’s proportionality contentions, but that showing, as has been noted above, is insufficient. 

Takings and Equal Protection Claims

The District additionally moves to strike Merritts allegations, at paragraphs 179-118 and at paragraphs 184-186 (and heading C for those allegations, on page 33), in support of Merritt’s claims that the 2025 SGMA Fees constituted an unconstitutional taking and were adopted, imposed and collected in violation of its constitutional rights to equal protection. 

Like Merritt’s Proposition 26 claim, its takings and equal protection claims derive from its proportionality claim asserted as a basis of the District’s alleged violation of the substantive requirements of Proposition 218.

In support of its takings claim, Merritt alleges “[t]he 2025 SGMA Fees amount to an unconstitutional taking because (i) the 2025 SGMA Fees lack a sufficient nexus to Petitioner's use of Transitional Water; and (ii) there is no rough proportionality between the scope or amount of the 2025 SGMA Fees and the actual impact of Petitioner's Transitional Water use.” 

In support of its equal protection claim, Merritt alleges “[t]he District has violated Petitioner's equal protection rights by, among other things, imposing fees that unlawfully and disproportionately burden Petitioner and other similarly situated landowners that use efficient irrigation methods.”

The District’s arguments are the same as those made against Merritt’s substantive Proposition 218 claims and, again for that same reason, similarly fail.  Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied as to Merritt’s allegations in support of its takings and equal protection claims. 

Procedural Due Process Claim

The District lastly moves to strike paragraphs 182-183 of the petition in support of Merritt’s procedural due process claim under its second cause of action. 

Merritt alleges, here, “[t]he District has violated Petitioner's right to procedural fairness and due process by imposing and enforcing, and continuing to impose and enforce, the 2025 SGMA Fees on Petitioner without providing any meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the fees' basis, amount, and imposition.”

Given the absence of a claim, as in the first cause of action, that the 2025 SGMA Fees were adopted in violation of SGMA (specifically, Water Code section 10730 and/or 10732.2), the only possible construal of these allegations is that they are based on the same allegations Merritt makes concerning the District’s identification of parcels subject to the 2025 SGMA Fees, and Notice, as procedurally required under Proposition 218. 

Based on the court’s determinations in evaluating those procedural Proposition 218 allegations above, the court grants the motion to strike as to Merritt’s procedural due process claim allegations, with limited leave to amend to clearly assert a procedural due process violation based on impropriety in the counting of protest votes from owners of parcels upon which the 2025 SGMA fees were proposed for imposition, by the District’s having improperly counted the votes of unaffected parcels.  Of course, if Merritt can successfully do so, it will only succeed in presenting an essentially duplicative contention, but at least the contention will not be both duplicative and improper. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 5, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054276	In the Matter of Cutbirth, Jerry Edward	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054274	In the Matter of Garza, Irene Marie	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval
VPR054271	In the Matter of Gonzalez, Celestina M.	Letters of Administration	Approval Conditional	Revised proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054318	In the Matter of West, Cheryl Annette	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 7 omitted: if proceedings for the administration of decedent have commenced. 2. Petition Item 9a, (1) or (2); (3) or (4); (7) or (8), and 9b omitted: any surviving spouse, registered domestic partner, issue of a predeceased child or stepchild. 3. Petition Item 11(2),(3) omitted: Decedent’s interest in real property and facts showing that the real property was decedent’s primary residence in California, Prob C § 13152(a). 4. Petition Item 13: Petitioners’ claim in interest to the property is not based on intestate succession under Probate Code § 6402(a); 5. Petition not signed by all successors; Prob C §13006, 13151. 6. Notice of Hearing not served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C § 13153. 7. DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR054280	In the Matter of Tinney, Sandra Gale	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Item 9a(2), (a) or (b) omitted: spouse deceased or decedent divorced/never married
VPR054273	In the Matter of Ramirez, Isaac Pablo	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054272	In the Matter of Vasquez, Elizabeth Clara	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Need Clarification: Party who is named in caption, “Attorney for”, is not a named petitioner nor signed the petition; however, Party signed the Inventory and Appraisal
VPR054282	In the Matter of Prins, Johannes	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 2d omitted: bond amount or waiver
VPR054282	In the Matter of Prins, Johannes	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 7: the facts upon which the petitioner bases the allegation that the property is property passing to the surviving spouse necessary to establish the community property or quasi-community property claim omitted, Prob C § 13651(a)(3),(4)
VPR054275	In the Matter of Woolley, Kent Alan	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054119	In the Matter of Ramirez, Rosenda	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Revised proposed order to be submitted, appointing general conservatorship of the person

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/5/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054359	In the Matter of E.J.W.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). Service on Father Mr. Addison & Mother Mrs. Wiliams are required Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/6/2026 14:00	Department 09	VPR054113	In the Matter of Madera, Shanylle	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511 on all grandparents
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 02	VPR054358	In the Matter of Johnson, River Lynn	TEMP- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), parents to be personally served 5 court day’s notice prior to hearing
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR052277	In the Matter of Bennett, Zoey Lynn	NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 calendar days before hearing
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR053711	In the Matter of Allende, Jorge Jr	No issues to address
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR047286	In the Matter of Clevenger, Brea Marie	Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. The children may be of Native American ancestry, notice of termination proceedings must be given to the children’s tribe per ICWA NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054192	In the Matter of Venegas, Analise Rose et al	No issues to address
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054155	In the Matter of Hernandez, Julian Carlos et al	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, SERVICE to be completed on paternal grandfather DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian and household member
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of Aviles, Irie A	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of Mendoza, Nolberto	Temporary guardianship for N.M. has terminated by operation of law as ward has reached the age of 18. NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice required by maternal grandparents DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of Mendoza, Paulette	household member is required to complete the DOJ background record check NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, by mail on the maternal grandparents and siblings 15 days prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054321	In the Matter of Pena, Rose Marie	Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for father Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054320	In the Matter of Rosales, Amelia Jade	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). MOTHER to be personally served 5 court days prior to hearing Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	No issues to address – notice to mother to be discussed at hearing