Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings & Probate Examiner Recommendations

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, April 16, 2026, are:

Re: Espinoza, Lidia vs. Baca, Agustin Ceballos

Case No.: VCU294386

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Hearing re: Final Distribution of Settlement Fund

Tentative Ruling: The settlement administrator previously indicated all unclaimed property from this settlement would be distributed to the State in April 2026. On April 8, 2026, the settlement administrator filed a declaration indicating on April 2, 2026, the settlement administrator remitted all uncashed funds, totaling $38,210.44, to the State Controller, which represents the entirety of the remaining uncashed funds. Therefore, the distribution of the settlement fund is complete. No appearances are required.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re: Alba Bustamente, Estefani Carolina vs. Kaweah Delta Health Care, Inc

Case No.: VCU316413

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Kaweah’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

On December 26, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Tulare Superior Court (the "Complaint"). The Complaint alleged the following causes of action: ( 1) Medical Malpractice - Professional Negligence; (2) Medical Battery; (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (4) Survival Action; (5) Failure to Provide Medical Translation; (6) Vicarious Liability; (7) Negligent Hiring Supervision Retention; (8) Violation of Patient's Bill of Rights; and (9) Wrongful Death. (UMF No. 1.) On March 6, 2025, this Court sustained Defendant's Demurrer as to Plaintiffs Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Failure to Provide Medical Translation, and Violation of Patient's Bill of Rights causes of action. (UMF No. 2.)

On September 6, 2024, Ms. Bustamante was admitted to Kaweah for induction of labor with a diagnosis of gestational hypertension. (UMF No. 3.) Plaintiffs dispute that Ms. Bustamante knew she was being induced, that she would receive Pitocin or that she consented to induction of labor. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 3.)

Upon arrival, Ms. Bustamante received and signed Kaweah' s Conditions of Admissions ("COA"). The COA was provided to Ms. Bustamante in Spanish. (UMF No. 4.) Here, Plaintiffs dispute this fact establishes that the COA is binding on Plaintiffs. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 4.)

Page 2 of the COA states:

“Physicians Are Independent Medical Practitioners:

As physicians and surgeons providing care to you, including the anesthesiologists, pathologists, audiologist, emergency room physicians, physician's assistants, pediatric hospitalists, internal medicating hospitalists, and ICU hospitalists and other are not employees or agents of the District. They have been granted the privilege of using the District for the care and treatment of their patients. They are independent practitioners. You understand that you are under the care and supervision of your attending physician. The District and its nursing staff are responsible for carrying out your physician's instructions. Your physician is responsible for obtaining your informed consent, when required, to medical and surgical treatment, special diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, or hospital services provided to you under your physician's general and special instructions. You will receive a separate bill from your physicians for their services.”

On September 6, 2024, at or around 7:04 p.m. Martin was delivered via emergency cesarian section. Dr. Betre performed the surgery. During the surgery, it was discovered that Ms. Bustamante had suffered from a complete uterine rupture. (UMF No. 6.)

The Complaint alleges that Kaweah is vicariously liable for the harm caused by the wrongful conduct of Dr. Betre due to the fact he was an agent, employee, or otherwise controlled by Kaweah. (UMF No. 7.) Plaintiff adds that the complaint alleges various Doe Defendants committed other acts against Plaintiffs and that Kaweah is responsible under vicarious liability theories. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 7.)

Dr. Betre was not, and has never been, an agent, employee or otherwise controlled by Kaweah. (UMF No. 8.) Plaintiffs dispute that Plaintiffs understood this agency or employment relationship under the circumstances of Plaintiff’s admission including “excruciating” 9/10 pain, vaginal bleeding, grave concern for her baby, and a quick review of the COA. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 8.)

Dr. Betre was an independent contractor. (UMF No. 9.) Plaintiffs dispute that Plaintiffs understood this agency or employment relationship under the circumstances of Plaintiff’s admission including “excruciating” 9/10 pain, vaginal bleeding, grave concern for her baby, and a quick review of the COA. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 9.)

Plaintiffs' medical battery claim is based on Dr. Bertre's failure to obtain consent before performing various procedures on Ms. Bustamente. (UMF No. 10.) Here, Plaintiffs dispute this fact, arguing that the medical battery claims are also based on Kaweah’s nurses acts. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 10.)

Kaweah's nursing, non-physician, and non-midlevel staff did not have a duty to obtain informed consent for Ms. Bustamente's induction of labor. (UMF No. 11.) Plaintiffs dispute this fact, arguing that consent was not obtained, that consent is a defense to battery as Defendants’ employee-nurses Alford and Prince administration of Pitocin and induced labor without consent. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 11.)

Kaweah is a government entity. (UMF No. 12.)

Authority and Analysis

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence. (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.) The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.” (Ibid.) The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.” (Ibid.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

Vicarious Liability, Ostensible Agency and Independent Contractor Status

The theory of ostensible agency is a legal doctrine that would create vicarious liability as to Defendant Betre if he did not expressly provide notice that Defendant Dr. Duncan, amongst others, were not agents or employees Kaweah.

“It is well established in California that a hospital may be liable for the negligence of physicians on the staff, unless the hospital has clearly notified the patient that the treating physicians are not hospital employees and there is no reason to believe the patient was unable to understand or act on the information. This rule is founded on the theory of ostensible agency.” (Wicks v. Antelope Valley Healthcare Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 866, 882.)

"Ostensible agency is when 'the principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him.'" (Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc. (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 748, 781 (quoting Civ. Code, § 2300).) It is a theory of vicarious liability that has developed because, as stated by the court in Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1453, and quoting a New York court:

“‘The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes, as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of “hospital facilities” expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.’ (Bing v. Thunig (N.Y. 1957) 2 N.Y.2d 656)”

The Meija court continued: “In light of this modern reality, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions employed ostensible or apparent agency to impose liability on hospitals for the negligence of independent contractor physicians.” The imposition of liability vicariously due to the modern relationship between hospitals, doctors, nurses and other health care professionals, however does not promote the use of ostensible agency as sought by Plaintiffs.

In Meija, the plaintiff presented to the emergency department where an ER physician, based on an x-ray report by the radiologist, discharged the plaintiff. (Id. at 1451.) It was later determined the plaintiff’s neck was broken and the plaintiff was paralyzed. (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter sued the hospital, who successfully moved for nonsuit. (Id.) The court, after examining ostensible agency in California and elsewhere, concluded that ostensible agency can be inferred “from the mere fact that the plaintiff sought treatment at the hospital without being informed that the doctors were independent contractors.” (Id. at 1457)

The Mejia court further explained that hospitals are generally deemed to have held themselves out as the provider of services unless they gave the patient contrary notice, and the patient is generally presumed to have looked to the hospital for care unless he or she was treated by his or her personal physician. (Id. at 1453.) The court held that the elements required for the doctrine of ostensible are: “(1) conduct by the hospital that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician was an agent of the hospital, and (2) reliance on that apparent agency relationship by the plaintiff.” (Id.)

The first element is satisfied when a hospital holds itself out as a provider of care, which it is deemed to do unless it gives the patient contrary notice. (Id. at 1454.) The second element of reliance is satisfied when the plaintiff looks to the hospital for services, rather than to the individual physician and reliance is generally presumed absent evidence that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the physician was not the hospital's agent. (Id.)

Additionally, the Court notes questions of ostensible agency is a question for the trier of fact unless the evidence conclusively establishes that the patient knew or should have known that the treating physician was not an agent of the hospital. (Id. at 1457.)

In Meija, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated she sought treatment at the hospital and the evidence did not conclusively indicate “that the patient should have known that the treating physician was not the hospital's agent” and therefore the issue of ostensible agency must be left to the trier of fact. (Id. at 1458.)

The issue of a conditions of admissions form in the context of ostensible agency was examined in Wicks, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 882.

In Wicks, the plaintiff had been in the emergency room for a little over an hour, signed and initialed an admission form stating “All physicians and surgeons providing services to me, including the radiologist, pathologist, emergency physician, anesthesiologist, and others, are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. … [T]hey have been granted the privilege of using the hospital for the care and treatment of their patients, but they are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. They are independent practitioners.” (Id. at 883.) The court, in finding no ostensible agency, concluded that “Mr. Wicks signed a straightforward notice, with no obtuse legalese, telling him the staff physicians were independent contractors and not employees or agents.” (Id.)

Wicks distinguished Meija, noting there that “ the hospital did not give the patient any notice that its staff physicians were independent contractors, and the patient had no reason to know they were not agents of the hospital.” (Id.)

The Wicks court also examined Whitlow v. Rideout Memorial Hospital (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 631. As summarized by Wicks, in Whitlow, “the patient was in no condition to understand the admission form she signed in the emergency room stating that all physicians furnishing services to her were independent contractors and not employees or agents of the hospital. Her son declared his mother was ‘crying in horrible pain’ when the hospital's registration processor told her to sign and initial the form, she was nauseous and unable to read it, and the processor did not explain the contents of the form or read it to her. (Whitlow, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 633–634.)” (Id. at 884)

The decedent in Whitlow was incapable of understanding what was contained in the form. (Whitlow, supra, 237 Cal.App.4^th at 634.) Therefore, finding that the decedent had been forced to signed the admissions form including the disclaimer, concluded that “when a woman, writhing in pain and vomiting as a result of the worst headache she had had in her life, signed a boilerplate admissions form disclaiming the agency of the emergency room physician who treated her” the hospital was not absolved of liability. (Id. at 637, 640.) “[A] signature on an admissions form conclusively constitutes notice to a patient seeking care in an emergency room that the treating physician, whom she did not choose and did not know, is not an agent of the hospital” (Id. at 641.)

Here, the facts of this case, as presented in the opposition to this motion for summary adjudication and declaration of Plaintiff Ms. Bustamante appear more similar to Whitlow than Wicks. In this matter, Plaintiff Ms. Bustamante states she went to Kaweah’s emergency room in severe pain, bleeding and worrying about her baby, that she was handed forms in Spanish, that she signed the documents in the state described above and was only concerned about getting medical help, that she had not slept and was in distress. (Declaration of Ms. Bustamante ¶¶5-11.)

In the Court’s view, this is sufficient to establish ostensible agency under Whitlow.

As such, the Court denies summary adjudication as to vicarious liability and medical battery issues.

As to the negligent hiring, supervision and retention theory, the Court’s understanding of this cause of action, from the complaint and opposition to this motion, is that Plaintiffs seek recovery on a vicarious liability theory as under Government Code section 815.2 for the acts of Nurses Alford and Prince, in addition to Dr. Betre and therefore deny summary adjudication for the same reasons as above.

Moreover, the Court notes, that although summary adjudication is expressly sought here, there is no separation of the issues of ostensible agency, battery and negligent hiring in either the notice or separate statement. Subdivision (b) of rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of Court states, in pertinent part, that, “[i]f summary adjudication is sought …, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Emphasis added.) Absent some separation of these theories, the Court treats them as a single issue for purposes of summary adjudication. As the Court has denied summary adjudication regarding ostensible agency, the Court denies summary adjudication of the entire, combined single issue stated in the separate statement and notice.

Re: Smithson, Roger vs. Kaweah Delta District Hospital et al

Case No.: VCU313258

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Defendant Dr. Ahdoot’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

On October 31, 2023, shortly after 4:00 p.m., Plaintiff Roger Leroy Smithson presented to the emergency department at Kaweah Health Medical Center, where he was evaluated by Physician Assistant Kelsey Hazama for reported stroke-like symptoms. (UMF No. 1.) Emergency department records document that Mr. Smithson complained of left-sided facial palsy and slurred speech with onset upon awakening on October 29, 2023. (UMF No. 2.)

A stroke evaluation was initiated, and a non-contrast computed tomography (CT) scan of the brain, a computed tomography angiography (CTA) of the brain and head, and a CT scan of the cervical spine were ordered to assess for evidence of hemorrhagic stroke, ischemic stroke, mass lesion, or vertebral fracture or dislocation. (UMF No. 3)

The CT of the brain/head, CTA of the brain/head, and CT of the cervical spine were performed at approximately 7:37 p.m. on October 31, 2023, and were interpreted by radiologist Dr. Ahdoot. (UMF No. 4.)

The indication for the imaging studies was documented as "headache." (UMF No. 5.)

Dr. Ahdoot interpreted the CT of the brain/head as demonstrating a dense right middle cerebral artery (MCA) sign with a moderate to large geographic area of acute to subacute infarction in the right MCA distribution, and the CTA of the brain/head as demonstrating an occlusion of the right internal carotid artery. (UMF No. 6.)

No evidence of hemorrhagic transformation or acute intracranial hemorrhage was identified, and there was no midline shift or hydrocephalus. (UMF No. 7.)

Dr. Ahdoot documented that he communicated the imaging findings to PA Hazama. (UMF No. 8.) The emergency department record further reflects a notation by PA Hazama that at 8:02 p.m. she was paged by Dr. Ahdoot and informed of the right internal carotid artery occlusion. (UMF No. 9.)

The available medical records do not document any further involvement by Dr. Ahdoot in the clinical management or treatment of Mr. Smithson beyond the interpretation of the imaging studies and communication of the radiologic findings described above. (UMF No. 10.)

Thereafter, Defendant provides the expert opinion of Arthur C. Duberg, M.D. that Defendant did not breach the standard of care in this matter, as discussed in greater detail below. (UMF Nos. 11 – 22.)

Further, that it is documented that on physical examination in the emergency department, Plaintiff had mild left-sided facial droop and a National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (NIHSS) score of 1, which is indicative of a minor stroke. (UMF No. 23.) The emergency room documentation reflects that at about 7:07 p.m., the Plaintiff had a syncopal episode in the waiting room while going from a sitting to standing position. (UMF No. 24.) The emergency room documentation reflects that at 8:43 p.m. the Plaintiff was evaluated at bedside and had an NIH score of 16, which is indicative of a moderate stroke. (UMF No. 25.)

Thereafter, Defendant provides the expert opinion of Nerses Sanossian, M.D., F.A.H.A., F.A.A.N that, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, Defendant did not cause the injuries complained of in this matter, as discussed in greater detail below. (UMF Nos. 26 – 41.)

Therefore, Defendant seeks summary adjudication of the standard of care and causation issues as related to the medical malpractice cause of action and, if granted, that the derivative cause of action for loss of consortium must fail as a matter of law.

Authority and Analysis

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(f)(1).) If a party seeks summary adjudication as an alternative to a request for summary judgment, the request must be clearly made in the notice of the motion. (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1544.) “[A] party may move for summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action, affirmative defense, or issue of duty pursuant to” subdivision (t). (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(t).)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).)

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.)

Medical Malpractice

In a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's negligence. [citations.]” (Galvez v. Frields (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1420.)

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.” (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.) The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts. (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony. (Id.)

Defendants’ Expert – Standard of Care

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Dr. Duberg, a board certified radiologist with a subspeciality in neuroradiology who indicates sufficient education and experience in the field of radiology. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶¶1-2.) Dr. Duberg indicates retention by Defendant’s counsel to review the lawsuit and provide an expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment and care provided by Defendant Dr. Ahdoot as to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶3.) Dr. Duberg indicates familiarity with the degree of skill ordinarily possessed by radiologists in the care and treatment of patients such as Plaintiff, awareness that the standard of care requires that medical health providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar or like circumstances, and awareness that the failure to both have the requisite skill and knowledge or the failure to exercise that skill or knowledge is a violation of the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶2.)

The Court finds Dr. Duberg qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Duberg indicates review of various medical records and imaging studies and provides a timeline of events that form the opinion. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶4, 5.)

Dr. Duberg opines Dr. Ahdoot met the standard of care in this matter in all aspects because a radiologist's role is limited to diagnostic interpretation of imaging studies and communication of urgent or clinically significant findings to the clinical team and does not include the radiologist's participation in patient clinical management, treatment decisions, stroke treatment protocol eligibility or activation, or patient transfer decisions, which are the responsibility of the treating clinicians. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶¶6(a), (f).) Further, that Dr. Ahdoot correctly interpreted the imaging studies and timely communicated overtly concerning and emergent findings to the patient's treating clinicians. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶6(f).) This is because, in Dr. Duberg’s opinion, the non-contrast CT of the brain demonstrated a very prominent hyperdense right middle cerebral artery sign indicative of thrombus in the right middle cerebral artery, as well as hypodensity in the right frontal temporal lobe consistent with a non-hemorrhagic ischemic stroke, that these findings were visible from the imaging and that Dr. Adhoot’s interpretation was correct. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶6(b).) Further, Dr. Duberg opines the CT angiography of the head and neck demonstrated a right internal carotid artery occlusion extending to the base of the brain, with definitive radiographic abnormalities consistent with an ischemic stroke process, findings consistent with Dr. Ahdoot’s interpretation. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶6(c).) Further, that Dr. Ahdoot timely communicated the findings within the standard of care and that the inclusion of an Alberta Stroke Program Early CT Score (ASPECTS) in a radiology imaging report is not required by the applicable standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Duberg ¶6(e).)

The Court finds Defendant has carried the initial burden as to the standard of care and breach thereof.

Plaintiffs’ Expert – Standard of Care

“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.” (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff submits the declaration of Dr. Jonathan Marehbian, a board certified and practicing neurologist who routinely evaluates and treats stroke or suspected stroke patients, reviews and interprets imaging and consults with interventional neuroradiologists to determine whether clot retrieval is available and whether the risks of such a procedure outweigh the benefits thereof. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶¶1-5.)

Dr. Marehbian indicates familiarity with the relevant standard of care, has been retained by Plaintiff’s counsel and has reviewed the medical records of Plaintiff from Kaweah’s urgent care, Kaweah’s medical center, imaging as to Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff and Jenifer Smithson, copies of text messages, the declarations in support of and in opposition to this motion for summary judgment, and written stroke and emergency protocols of Kaweah. (Declaration of Dr. Marehbian ¶¶6-7.) The Court finds Dr. Marehbian qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Marehbian provides a chronological summary of relevant events, noting that “Imaging was reviewed by Radiologist, Rohen Ahdoot, M.D. ("Dr. Ahdoot"). Dr. Ahdoot reviewed the CT Head and concluded it demonstrated a dense right middle cerebral artery sign, “with Moderate to large geographic area of the right MCA, territorial infarct.” A concurrent CT Angiogram of the Head and the Neck scan identified a "likely acute or non-chronic" total occlusion of the right internal carotid artery. Dr. Rashid was again consulted and recommended a target blood pressure in the 140s or 150s range. An MRI, ECHO with bubble study, and hypercoagulability panel were ordered.” (Declaration of Marehbian ¶8.j.)

Dr. Marehbian’s declaration’s only other reference to radiology is:

“The radiologist's notation of 'likely acute or non-chronic' occlusion and the presence of a dense MCA sign indicated acute thrombus, not chronic disease. There is no documentation that neurology reassessed whether the hypodensity noted on CT represented the full extent of the infarction or whether a clinical-imaging mismatch existed that would warrant intervention. These failures represent a breach in the standard of care.” (Declaration of Marehbian ¶9.l.)

In the Court’s view, this declaration does not indicate a breach of the standard of care as to Defendant Dr. Ahdoot.

Additionally, Plaintiff provides the declaration of Dr. Angelos Konstas, a board certified and practicing interventional and diagnostic neuroradiologist who has experience evaluating and treating stroke or suspected stroke patients, reviewing and interpreting imaging, determining whether clot retrieval and carotid stenting is available and whether such procedures are too risky depending on the circumstances. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶1-5, 8.)

Dr. Konstas indicates retention by Plaintiff’s counsel to render opinions as to breach and causation by Dr. Ahdoot, indicating causation in medical negligence requires more than 50% likelihood. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶6, 7.) The Court finds Dr. Konstas qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Konstas indicates review of the medical records of Plaintiff from Kaweah’s urgent care, Kaweah’s medical center, imaging as to Plaintiff, the depositions of Plaintiff and Jenifer Smithson, copies of text messages, the declarations in support of and in opposition to this motion for summary judgment, and written stroke and emergency protocols of Kaweah. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶9.) Further, Dr. Konstas provides a chronological summary of relevant events and opines that Dr. Ahdoot’s characterization of the October 31, 2023 CT as demonstrating “moderate to large infarct” which would necessarily preclude proceeding with a thrombectomy, as the risks would outweigh the benefits of such a procedure, was in error because the imaging reflected an area of damages less than one-third the right MCA territory. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.f.) Dr. Konstas indicates that standard of care for a thrombectomy is generally that thrombectomy is indicated where there is damage up to one-third of the MCA territory and two-thirds of the territory remains to be "saved" by intervention. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.f.)

Additionally, “the areas of damage as reflected in CT scan were not significant areas of the right MCA and ICA. The internal capsule, basal ganglia and motor cortex remained intact, confirming that the potential benefits of a thrombectomy fully outweighed the potential harm caused by the procedure. Unfortunately, because no action was taken, the occlusion went untreated and the MRI performed on November 2, 2023, now reflected massive damage to the previous "penumbra" and massive permanent brain damage all due to the failure to timely revascularize the MCA and the ICA.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.g.)

As to Defendant Dr. Ahdoot’s expert Dr. Sanossian, Dr. Konstas opines that Dr. Sanossian’s opinions and estimates support Dr. Konstas’s conclusion this was not a moderate to large territory stroke, noting that “To characterize the infarct volume as moderate or large, is to imply that it exceeds this one-third threshold, which it unequivocally does not. This low percentage of damaged tissue shown in the CT confirms there was significant salvageable tissue remaining, and time was of the essence in pursuing endovascular treatment. Dr. Ahdoot's mischaracterization of tissue damage was repeated verbatim in the medical records and was one of the articulated reasons for not pursing endovascular evaluation and treatment.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.i.)

Further, Dr. Konstas notes that Dr. Sanossian’s opinion fails to address “that the tissue shown to be damaged in the October 31st CT scan was not in the eloquent areas of the brain, i.e., the internal capsule, basal ganglia and motor cortex were all intact. This was further clinical support for pursuing immediate evaluation from a neurointerventionalist and endovascular treatment” and that “that when Mr. Smithson came into the ED, he was evaluated on the NIHSS scale at "1." This score, reflecting very minimal neurological symptoms and a favorable prognosis, was consistent with the fact that Mr. Smithson had been driving for two days, had gone to work, and was fully ambulatory during that time. It was after Mr. Smithson's collapsed in the ED, signaling a new major thromboembolic event in the cerebral artery, that he was then evaluated at a "16." That score was not the result of the progression of a prior event as is argued, but was the result of a new event that happened in the ED. That new event required immediate analysis and evaluation by a neurointerventionalist.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶10.j., k.)

Further, as to Defendant Dr. Ahdoot’s other expert Dr. Duberg, Dr. Konstas opines that Dr. Duberg fails to render an opinion as to Dr. Ahdoot’s characterization of the CT as reflecting a moderate to large geographical area was accurate. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.l.) Further that, while a radiologist is not responsible for clinical decision making, Dr. Konstas opines that clinical decisions based upon erroneous characterizations of findings on an imaging study lead to errors in that decision-making, which occurred in this matter. (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.l.)

Based on the opinions and declarations of Plaintiff’s qualified expert Dr. Konstas, the Court finds Plaintiff has met the burden in opposing summary adjudication as to the issue of the standard of care because Plaintiff has come forward with conflicting expert evidence. (Munro, supra, 215 Cal.3d at 984-985.) Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication as to Issue No. 1.

Causation

In order to establish that defendant’s negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4^th 1487, 1498.) “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. [Citations.] That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical ‘possibility’ needs little discussion. There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.” (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Expert

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.)

Here, Defendant provides the declaration of Dr. Sanossian, a licensed physician in the State of California, specializing in Neurology, Vascular Neurology, Neurocritical Care and Neuroimaging and who is board certified in neurology and vascular neurology. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶1.) Dr. Sanossian indicates retention by Defendant’s counsel to review the lawsuit and provide an expert opinion as to causation as it relates to the care and treatment rendered by Dr. Ahdoot. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶¶1, 3.) Dr. Sanossian indicates knowledge that to establish negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that a defendant physician’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the alleged harm. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶2.)

The Court finds Dr. Sanossian qualified to offer opinions as to causation in this matter.

Dr. Sanossian indicates review of various medical records and imaging studies and provides a timeline of events that inform the opinion. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶¶4, 5.)

Dr. Sanossian opines no act or omission related to the interpretation of the imaging studies or communication of the findings thereof was a substantial factor in the harm alleged by Plaintiff. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶¶6, 7.)

Dr. Sanossian indicates that the neurological injury and infarction visible on the imaging studies had already occurred prior to Dr. Ahdoot’s involvement, and no neuro-intervention available at the time the Plaintiff presented to the emergency department at Kaweah Health Medical Center would have altered the Plaintiff’s outcome, and therefore, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the Plaintiff’s stroke and resulting brain infarction had occurred outside any accepted neuro-intervention window by the time the imaging studies were performed on October 31, 2023. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶¶6(a)-(c).) Further, that the neuro-intervention window was not “reset” by Plaintiff’s apparent syncopal episode in the emergency department on October 31, 2023. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶6(d).) Further that Plaintiff was not a candidate for mechanical thrombectomy or other neuro-interventional therapy on October 31, 2023 and that the estimate infarct volume was appropriately characterized by Dr. Ahdoot. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶¶6(d), I.) Finally, that in Dr. Sanossian’s opinion Plaintiff did not meet the DAWN trial inclusion criteria and that Plaintiffs clinical-radiographic profile did not indicate the presence of salvageable penumbral tissue for which thrombectomy would be expected to provide clinical benefit. (Declaration of Dr. Sanossian ¶6(g).)

The Court finds Defendant has met the burden on the issue of causation.

Plaintiff’s Expert

As noted above, Plaintiff must come forward with conflicting expert evidence to defeat summary judgment. (Munro, supra, at 984-985.) Further

“‘[W]hen an expert’s opinion is purely conclusory because unaccompanied by a reasoned explanation connecting the factual predicates to the ultimate conclusion, that opinion has no evidentiary value because an “expert opinion is worth no more than the reasons upon which it rests.’” (Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5^th 146, 155.) However, “the rule [is] that … we liberally construe the declarations for the plaintiff’s experts.” (Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 112, 125–126) Further, that “a reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to a summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment motion or at trial” (Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4^th 173, 189.)

Dr. Konstas states “My opinions related to ASPECTS scores in this case, relate to my overall opinions related to causation.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶10.l.) Further, as to the ASPECTS score, Dr. Konstas states:

“This imaging revealed the “core” of the area (damaged portion) was much smaller than the clinical penumbra, i.e. the undamaged area of the brain at risk of further injury without timely re-vascularization. This represented a core/penumbra mismatch, where the damage was relatively small, but the areas at risk for further damage were large. In evaluating imaging related to stroke patients, an interventional neuroradiologist would evaluate the damaged area of a brain through use of the Alberta Stroke Program Early CT Score (“ASPECTS”) which provides a semi-quantitative method for evaluating the degree of established impact. The higher the ASPECTS score, the better for the patient in that it equates to a larger portion of the brain as undamaged. A brain showing no stroke damage would have an ASPECTS score of “10”. A brain with a total MCA infarction, would have a score of “0.” Here, the CT scan on October 31, 2023 reflected, in my opinion, an ASPECTS score of 7-8, meaning, that the majority of the right MCA territory remained viable but was at risk for injury without prompt revascularization. This erroneous interpretation of the CT scan continued to be repeated, verbatim, within the medical records and used as one of the justifications for not proceeding with a thrombectomy.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶¶10.f)

Dr. Konstas states further “Dr. Ahdoot’s mischaracterization of tissue damage was repeated verbatim in the medical records and was one of the articulated reasons for not pursing endovascular evaluation and treatment.” (Declaration of Dr. Konstas ¶10.i.) This is sufficient, under the standard above, to find mischaracterization caused the injury in this matter.

Therefore, the Court denies summary adjudication as to Issue No. 2 as to causation in favor of Dr. Ahdoot.

Loss of Consortium

Here, the loss of consortium claim is dependent upon adjudication of Issue Nos. 1 and 2. Because the Court has denied adjudication as to Issue Nos. 1 and 2 above, the Court denies summary adjudication as to Issue No. 3.

Re: Contreras, Gabriela vs. ACMPC California 6, LLC et al

Case No.: VCU290391

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion and CMC to May 14, 2026; D1; 8:30 am as to the lodestar amount; to order a supplemental declaration as to information to calculate the lodestar.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $196,403.33)

The gross settlement amount is $386,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 118 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $1,664.44 per member.

The Class Members consist of all current and former nonexempt employees of Defendant ACM Human Resources, LLC who were assigned to work at Defendant ACMPC California 6, LLC (doing business as TreeSource Citrus Nursery) (ACM Human Resources, LLC and ACMPC California 6, LLC collectively “ACMPC” or “Defendants”) in California during the Class Period from February 8, 2018 through November 15, 2025.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) failure to pay minimum, regular, and overtime wages; (2) Failure to pay split shift premium wages; (3) Failure to pay reporting time pay; (4) Failure to provide meal periods; (5) Failure to provide rest periods; (6) Failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (7) Failure to timely pay wages due at separation; (8) Violations of the unfair competition law; (9) Violations of PAGA.

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Khoury ¶¶ 38 – 60.) Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. The total estimated realistic recovery is $670,075.12 and therefore recovery of $386,000 is approximately 58% of this estimate. (Declaration of Khoury ¶37.)

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after acceptance of a mediator’s proposal.

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $386,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$128,666.67
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$35,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$7,500.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,850.00
Proposed Total PAGA Payment:	$11,580.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$196,403.33

2. Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions. Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable. It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3. Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Gabriela Contreras as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $7,500.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $386,000 or $128,666.67 and costs not to exceed $35,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court does, however, approve the proposed 50% split in fees between counsel and finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

Additionally, the Court approves costs not to exceed $35,000 based on the presently incurred costs of $29,580.09. (Declaration of Khoury ¶25.)

5. Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves IYLM Group as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court and the attached Declaration of Mullins. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $6,850.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Anderson indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Khoury ¶70 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.) To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 118 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendants. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendants during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval and CMC to May 14, 2026; D1; 8:30 am and orders a supplemental declaration as to information to calculate the current lodestar.

Re: Coleman, Miyah vs. David J. Smith, DDS

Case No.: VCU317736

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion

Facts

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on January 31, 2025, alleging a sole cause of action for professional negligence against Defendants for a procedure performed by Dr. Smith to extract two of Plaintiffs impacted wisdom teeth. (UMF No. 1.) Plaintiff contends Dr. Smith was negligent in fracturing her jaw during the impacted tooth extraction, failing to recognize the fracture and advise Plaintiff of the same, and failing to obtain Plaintiffs informed consent. (UMF No. 2.)

On November 21, 2023, Plaintiff signed an Informed Consent Form for Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery ("Consent Form") for the procedure at issue. (UMF No. 3.) As part of the Consent Form, Plaintiff initialed a paragraph that specifically listed a jaw fracture as a possible, although rare, known complication. (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff watched a video regarding possible complications of surgery for impacted wisdom teeth, including a fracture of the jawbone, which she signed and explicitly checked the box stating she understood. (UMF No. 5.)

On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff underwent a procedure performed by Dr. Smith to remove her lower left and lower right third molars. Plaintiff’s procedure was unremarkable, and no complications were noted. (UMF No. 6.)

On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Smith and complained of pain. After an examination, Dr. Smith advised that everything looked fine and to continue to take the prescribed antibiotics. (UMF No. 7.)

On or around February 27, 2024, Plaintiff presented to Dr. Coelho, where it was discovered she had sustained a jaw fracture. (UMF No. 8.)

Thereafter, Defendants submit the declaration of Dr. Peter A. Krakowiak, D.M.D who opines that Defendants met the standard of care and otherwise did not, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, cause the injuries alleged in the complaint. (UMF Nos. 9-11.)

No opposition to this motion has been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Medical Malpractice

Applicable Standard of Care

Defendants’ Expert – Standard of Care

In support of the motion, Defendant submits the declaration of Dr. Krakowiak. The Court’s review of Dr. Krakowiak’s declaration and CV indicate sufficient education and experience in the field in oral and maxillofacial surgery including board certification and current full time employment as a surgeon. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶1, 2.)

Dr. Krakowiak indicates he has been retained by Defendants’ counsel to provide expert opinion as to the standard of care applicable to the treatment and care provided by Defendants as to Plaintiff’s tooth extraction. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶3.) Dr. Krakowiak indicates familiarity with the degree of skill ordinarily possessed individuals extracting a tooth, an awareness that the standard of care requires that medical health providers exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar or like circumstances, and awareness that the failure to both have the requisite skill and knowledge or the failure to exercise that skill or knowledge is a violation of the standard of care. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶3, 4.)

The Court finds Dr. Krakowiak qualified to offer opinions on the standard of care in this matter.

Dr. Krakowiak indicates review of the complaint, Plaintiff’s pertinent medical records and responses to discovery requests in this matter and has provided a timeline of events informing the opinions set out in the declaration. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶6, 7.)

Dr. Krakowiak opines that a jaw fracture is a known complication of removal of impacted wisdom teeth, that Plaintiff was informed of this possible complication in writing and in the video prior to the surgery, that the fracture can occur in the absence of negligence and therefore Defendants obtained informed consent within the standard of care and that the fracture did not likely occur during the surgery. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶8-10.)

The Court finds Defendants have carried the initial burden as to the standard of care and breach thereof.

Plaintiff’s Expert – Standard of Care

Here, Plaintiff has failed to submit conflicting expert testimony.

Causation

In order to establish that defendant's negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm. (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498.) “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. [Citations.] That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion. There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action. This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.” (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Expert

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) Dr. Krakowiak further indicates awareness that the legal cause of an injury is a natural and continuing sequence, produces injury or harm, without which, injury not have occurred and that such must be a substantial factor, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, in bringing about the injury or harm. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶5, 12.) Dr. Krakowiak opines that Defendants acts or omissions were not a substantial cause of the harm suffered by Plaintiff to a reasonable degree of medical probability because the fracture was not caused by the tooth extraction. (Declaration of Dr. Krakowiak ¶¶11, 12.)

The Court finds Defendant has met the burden on the issue of causation.

Plaintiff’s Expert

As noted above, Plaintiff must come forward with conflicting expert evidence to defeat summary judgment. (Munro, supra, at 984-985.) Here, Plaintiff has failed to submit conflicting expert testimony.

Because Plaintiff has failed to oppose this motion with expert evidence as to breach of the standard of care and causation, the Court grants the motion.

Re: Sul, Alvin vs. City of Visalia

Case No.: VCU321290

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; the order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of proof of personal service of the order as indicated herein.

Facts

On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Miachel Kahn filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff Alvin Sul. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by certified mail and electronic transmission.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to Plaintiff.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. Further, the declaration indicates that counsel attempted to obtain a substitution by consent prior to making this motion, but that Plaintiff has failed to respond to this request.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on February 20, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff confirmed the physical address and email address indicated on the proof of service.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff’s Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion. If no one requests oral argument, the Court is prepared to sign the order entitled “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel - Civil” that the moving party lodged with the Court. This order will be deemed effective upon the filing with the court of a proof of personal service of the “Order Granting Attorney’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel – Civil” as to Plaintiff.

The Court further directs counsel to attach to the Order an additional notice of the date, time, and Department of this court for any future hearing dates for this case as calendared.

Re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Luna, Esmeralda Hernandez

Case No.: VCL296799

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion to Enter Judgment Pursuant to Settlement Agreement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; upon submission of a proposed order consistent with the ruling below, to enter judgment in the amount of $4,650.91

Facts

The complaint in this matter seeks recovery for subrogation in the amount of $16,389.49.

On February 26, 2024, the parties filed a stipulation for settlement and entry of judgment (“Stipulation”) indicating resolution for a total of $8,000, payable as follows:

(a) The sum of $5,000 shall be paid Defendant’s insurer, Fred Loya Insurance;

(b) The sum of $3,000 shall be paid by Defendant in monthly payments commencing March 15, 2024.

The stipulation further states “Should Defendant…fail to make or cause to made any payment(s), as agreed, she/he will be deemed in default of this agreement, and Plaintiff may immediately caused Judgment to be entered, pursuant to paragraph 4, in the amount of $16,389.49, plus costs of suit, interest form 8/06/2021, and attorney’s fees…”

Further, that:

“It is further stipulated and agreed that, in the event of an uncured default in payments as provided herein, the Judgment shall be entered pursuant to this Stipulation is deemed reasonably related to the breach of this Stipulation and the losses sustained by Plaintiff s as plead in the underlying cause(s) of action and therefore does not amount to an unenforceable penalty, and Defendant(s) voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

The Stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On March 6, 2024, the Court dismissed this matter pursuant to the Stipulation.

On March 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the settlement in this matter as a judgment, indicating that Defendant had made no payments pursuant to the Stipulation. Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $15,259.27, consisting of $16,389.49 in principal, less $5,000 paid by the insurer, plus $1,467.14 in prejudgment interest, $1,888.84 in attorneys’ fees and $513.70 in costs pursuant to the filed memorandum of costs.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states:

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Greentree

The initial issue for the Court is whether the judgment amount of $15,259.27 is an unenforceable penalty in light of the settlement with this Defendant for what is effectively $3,000. The starting point for this issue appears to be Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495.

The Court noted above a term of the stipulation purporting to “voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

However, Civil Code section 1671 renders contractual penalties or forfeitures illegal and unenforceable as against public policy if they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages caused by the breach that triggered them. (Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 970, 976-977); Purcell v. Schweitzer (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 969, 974-975.) In the Court’s view, the public policy expressed in that code section may not be waived or circumvented by language in the settlement agreement, as even an express waiver of the right to appeal or the right to contest a stipulated judgment on any ground will not prevent a party from challenging a penalty or forfeiture included in the stipulated judgment. (Purcell, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at 972, 975; see Sybron Corp. v. Clark Hosp. Supply Corp. (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 896, 902, fn. 3.) The law cannot prevent a party from challenging an illegal term in a contract simply because the party agreed to the illegal term.

In Greentree, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay $45,000 due under the contract. (Id. at 498.) The parties resolved this dispute via stipulation for entry of judgment providing that defendant would pay $20,000 in two installments of $15,000 and $5,000. (Id.) Further, if the defendant defaulted on either installment, the plaintiff would be entitled to have judgment entered for the amount prayed for in the complaint, plus interest, attorney fees and costs, less any amounts already paid. (Id. at 498.) The defendant defaulted on the first payment, and the plaintiff sought entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. (Id.) The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $61,232.50, consisting of the $45,000 prayed for in the complaint, plus $13,912.50 in prejudgment interest, $2,000 in attorney fees, and $320 in costs. (Id.) The defendant argued at the appellate level that the judgment of $61,232.50 for failure to make a $15,000 payment constitutes enforcement of an illegal penalty. (Id. at 498-499.)

The appellate court, agreeing with the defendant, interpreted the stipulation as an unenforceable liquidated damages clause that effectively imposed $61,232.50 in liquidated damages for breach of the defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 as follows:

“Greentree and ESI did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount Greentree had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing Greentree's chances of complete success on the merits of its case—the record contains only the complaint, the answer, and the stipulation. In the stipulation, ‘[e]ach party disclaims any admission of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or violation of law.’ The lack of a guarantee of success at trial may explain, at least in part, why Greentree was willing to accept in settlement less than half the amount demanded in the complaint.

Also, the $ 61,232.50 amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute for $20,000. ‘[D]amages for the withholding of money are easily determinable—i.e., interest at prevailing rates…’ [citation omitted.] The amount of the judgment, however, was more than triple the amount for which the parties agreed to settle the case.” (Id. at 499-500.)

The court in Greentree noted that the validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by section 1671, subdivision (b) and that “‘A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671[, subdivision] (b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.’” (Id. at 499.) Damages for failing to pay money are “‘easily determinable’” and are limited to “‘interest at [the] prevailing rate[]’” and (perhaps) “reasonable costs [incurred] in pursuing the payment.” (Id. at 500.)

Last, the court in Greentree concluded that:

“The stipulation does not contain any provision for an award of attorney fees or prejudgment interest, although the judgment included $ 2,000 in attorney fees and $ 13,912.50 in prejudgment interest. The $20,000 settlement sum in the stipulation is unallocated, and may or may not have included Greentree's claimed attorney fees and prejudgment interest. We find no basis for awarding Greentree its attorney fees and prejudgment interest in addition to the stipulated settlement sum. Greentree is entitled to recover its costs in the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032), and postjudgment interest.” (Id. at 502.)

Vitatech International, Inc. v Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796 is also instructional here. In that case, the parties settled before trial for payment of $75,000 although plaintiff was seeking $166,000 in its complaint. Like this case, there was an agreement to “forbear” collection if Defendant paid the lesser sum. Defendant defaulted, and Plaintiff sought and obtained a judgment of over $300,000, including compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.

In that case, plaintiff also argued that it sought damages that were no more than it could have recovered at trial and that all parties expressly accepted the amount that would be paid on default. The appellate court focused on the damages that could have flowed from the breach of the stipulation, not the amount claimed in the complaint:

“We reversed because "[the parties] did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount [the plaintiff] had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing [the plaintiff's] chances of complete success on the merits of its case .... [¶] Also, the ……. amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute…” (Id. at 809)

Here, the Court does not find the principal amount of $16,389.49 claimed by Plaintiff were damages that might flow from breach of the stipulation, but rather the amount Plaintiff claimed in the underlying lawsuit, plus interest and costs. Plaintiff urges the court to order the full amount claimed to be due as it is not in dispute, and was agreed to in the stipulations of the parties. The Court, however, sees the essential question from the cases noted above as to what the relationship is between the stipulated amount and the damages that flow from the breach. The total amount sought is essentially five and a half times the amount owed under the settlement agreement.

The Court, therefore, sets the principal amount at $3,000.

Interest

The next issue is interest, which the Court sets at 7% per year from February 16, 2024 on the unpaid principal amount set above. The Court calculates daily interest of $0.58 for the 673 days and finds prejudgment interest in the amount of $387.21.

Costs and Attorneys’ Fees

Here, the memorandum of costs reflects $2,402.64 in costs, inclusive of $468.70 in filing and motion fees, $45.00 for service of process and $1,888.94 in attorneys’ fees. The attorneys’ fees are calculated using Rule 708, Appendix 8 of this Court’s Local Rules, as to 25% of the first $5,000.00 of principle amount. Here, the Court calculates $750 in fees as to the principal amount established above.

The Court agrees Plaintiff is the prevailing party and entitled to costs. Further, that the Stipulation provides for both costs and attorneys’ fees. Therefore, the Court awards $1,226.70 in fees and costs.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and, upon the lodging of a proposed judgment reflecting the above, will enter judgment in the amount of $4,650.91 consisting of $3,000 in principal plus $387.21 in interest and $1,226.70 in fees and costs.

Re: In the Matter of Buck, Michelle

Case No.: VCU324766

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion to Set Aside Minor’s Compromise

Tentative Ruling: The Court’s file reflects no motion to set aside the minor’s compromise, though an opposition and declaration of Attorney Nelson has been filed in response thereto. The Court, therefore, continues this motion to April 30, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders the motion and supporting documentation filed within 5 days.

Re: California Boring, Inc., A California corporation vs. L.A.B. Backhoe Service, LLC, a California limited liability company et al

Case No.: VCL326153

Date: April 16, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Entry of Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this matter, a notice of settlement was filed January 20, 2026 following the execution of a written settlement agreement on January 14, 2026. This matter was resolved for a total payment of $11,500, with $2,875 due upon execution of the settlement agreement, and $2,875 due on the tenth day of each month for 3 months.

The agreement states “[Defendant] MARK BALDERAMA shall be individually responsible and liable for the Settlement Payment in the event of any such uncured default by the Defendants.”

Further, that “The Superior Court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.”

No payments appear to have been made and Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the settlement agreement as a judgment. Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $11,500.

The matter does not appear to have been dismissed.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states:

Section 664.6 permits the Court to enter a judgment in strict conformance with the terms of a settlement agreement. Further, “if the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.)

Here, the Court finds a sufficient showing of an enforceable settlement, that the matter has not been dismissed and therefore the Court has not lost jurisdiction thereof, and that Plaintiff is entitled to enforce the settlement as a judgment in the amount of $11,500 as requested.

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