Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, September 21, 2026, are:

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Herrera, Steve

Case No.:   VCL315772

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Dismissal and Enter Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this collection matter, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment and settlement indicating that the principal amount was $10,665.60 and that judgment would not be entered if the following payments were made:

(A) $361.60 shall be paid on or before November 24, 2025;

(B) $368.00 shall be paid on or before the 24th of each and every consecutive month commencing on or before December 24, 2025 through and including February 24, 2028; and

(C) $368.00 shall be paid on or before March 24, 2028;

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credits and plus costs.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On February 27, 2026, this matter was dismissed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Plaintiff indicates Defendant has only made payments totaling $729.60.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties despite dismissal and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendants appear to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion in the amount requested of $10,211.00, consisting of the principal amount due of $10,665.60 plus the costs of $275.00 less credits for payments made in the amount of $729.60.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rhodes, Patricia vs. Kaweah Health Medical Center

Case No.:   VCU306460

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Kaweah’s Motion to Determine Good Faith Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint alleged Elder Abuse, Fraud- Misrepresentation, Fraud- Constructive, Nursing Home Abuse, and Wrongful Death against two “chains” of Defendants:

First Chain: Defendants Kaweah Health Skilled Nursing Facility [erroneously sued herein as Kaweah Health Medical Center dba Kaweah Health Skilled Nursing Facility]; Kaweah Delta Health Care, Inc.; Sequoia Regional Cancer Center, LLC; Sequoia Regional Cancer Center Medical Oncology, LLC; TKC Development, LLC; Ka Weah Delta Health Care District Guild [erroneously sued herein as Kaweah Health Care District Guild]; Kaweah Delta Hospital Foundation; and Kaweah Delta Health Care District (collectively, "Kaweah Defendants")

Second Chain: Defendants Kaweah Manor, Inc.; Renew Health Consulting Services, LLC; Sweetwater Care, LLC; Moyle’s Central Valley Health Care, Inc.; Merritt Manor, Inc.; Twin Oaks Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, Inc.; Twin Oaks Assisted Living, Inc.; Porterville Convalescent, Inc.; Magnolia Health, Inc. (collectively, “Chain 2 Defendants”)

The underlying facts are summarized by the Kaweah Defendants as follows:

“On October 16, 2022, Decedent slipped and fell to the floor. American Ambulance brought Decedent to Kaweah Medical Center and on October 17, 2022, Decedent underwent a hemiarthroplasty. On October 22, 2022, Decedent was transferred to Kaweah's Skilled Nursing Facility for post-surgical recovery. On November 23, 2022, Decedent passed away. On or around December 7, 2022, an autopsy was performed on Decedent. The autopsy lists Decedent's cause of death as ‘sepsis (blood infection) due to a large (Stage IV) decubitus ulcer on the lower back area.’”

The Kaweah Defendants have resolved this matter with Plaintiffs for the sum of $950,000 in consideration for dismissal with prejudice of Kaweah Defendants from this action.

Because of the existence of the Chain 2 Defendants, the Kaweah Defendants seek this Court’s determination that this matter was settled between Plaintiffs and the Kaweah Defendants in good faith pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.

No opposition appears filed

Authority and Analysis

California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 states:

Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect:

(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.

(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

(c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves.

(d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1, 1988.

Section 877.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, on noticed motion, “[a]ny party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).)

“[Code of Civil Procedure] Section 877.6 was enacted by the Legislature in 1980 to establish a statutory procedure for determining if a settlement by an alleged joint tortfeasor has been entered into in good faith and to provide a bar to claims of other alleged joint tortfeasors for equitable contribution or partial or comparative indemnity when good faith is shown.”  (IRM Corp. v. Carlson (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 94, 104.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 affords the court with the discretion to determine whether a settlement reached by opposing parties in litigation is in good faith such that it is “within the reasonable degree of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries” based on the facts and circumstances in the particular case. (Tech-Bilt. Inc. v. Woodward-CIyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 488, 499.)

"In moving under section 877.6 for a good faith settlement determination, the moving party must set forth the value of the consideration paid and an evidentiary basis for that valuation, and must demonstrate that the valuation 'was reached in a sufficiently adversarial manner to justify the presumption that a reasonable valuation was reached.'" (Franklin Mint Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4^th 1550, 1558.)

However, the moving party’s initial evidentiary burden depends on whether the good faith of the settlement is being contested. As noted, no party asserts a lack of good faith.

Therefore, if the non-settling defendants do not oppose the motion on the good faith issue, a “barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case, is sufficient.” City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)

There is no precise yardstick for measuring “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors. “Good faith” depends upon what the plaintiffs knew about liability at the time of settlement, not evidence that might be acquired later. (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.) The following factors have been identified to assist in determining good faith:

(a) A rough approximation of plaintiffs' total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability;

(b) The amount paid in settlement;

(c) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if found liable after a trial;

(d) The allocation of the settlement proceeds among plaintiffs;

(e) The settlor's financial condition and insurance policy limits, if any; and

(f) Evidence of any collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct between the settlor and the plaintiffs aimed at making the nonsettling parties pay more than their fair share. (Id. at 499.)

The settling Defendants’ proportionate liability is a critical factor: “The ultimate determinant of good faith is whether the settlement is grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person at the time of settlement would estimate the settlor's liability to be.” (City of Grand Terrace, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at 1262.) The Court must also consider not only the settlor's potential liability to plaintiff, but also its proportionate share of culpability as among all parties alleged to be liable for the same injury. (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Geocon) (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

Here, the settlement sum of $950,000, allocated equally amongst the Plaintiffs. Kaweah sufficiently indicates the settlement is within the ballpark and estimates Kaweah’s potential recovery given Kaweah’s anticipated defenses including the (1) failure to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act, (2) application of the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, and (3) failure to allege alter-ego theory. Further, that Kaweah would produce expert testimony that (1) Kaweah defendants' nursing, resident, non-attending physician, and non-midlevel staff (a) met the standard of care in all aspects of their care and treatment of Decedent, and (b) did not contribute to Decedent's outcome; and (2) throughout the course of Decedent's treatment at KHSNF, the nursing, non-physician, and non-midlevel staff did not act negligently or with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice.

The parties negotiated this settlement at mediation, and there is no evidence of any "collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants."

As such, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Uqdah, Priscilla vs. Friends of Allensworth, a California Public Benefit Corporation

Case No.:   VCU306537 

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motions:   Motions to Set Aside Defaults

Tentative Ruling: The motions to set aside default are granted.

Ann Williams, Emmett Harden, Priscilla Uqdah, and Bernia Walker each separately move, under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), to set aside entry of their defaults on one of the multiple cross-complaints filed in this case. 

Background

This is an action about an alleged wrongful transfer of $70,773.80 from Friends of Allensworth (FOA), and, relatedly, the governance of that entity.  FOA is a California nonprofit that supports the operations of Colonel Allensworth State Historic Park under a contract with the California Department of Parks and Recreation (CDPR). 

In act one of this case’s many chaptered history, Priscilla Uqdah, Bernia Walker and Ann Williams, former members of FOA, transferred $70,773.80 from accounts controlled by Sasha Biscoe, whom they alleged had wrongfully seized control of FOA, to new accounts controlled by them.  This action was commenced when, all the way back in February 2024, Uqdah, Walker and Williams sought to interplead the transferred funds and to have adjudicated the matter of the persons rightfully entitled to govern FOA (and, thus, to receive the transferred funds). 

The interpleader piece of the original action, though ostensibly presenting a straightforward vehicle for prompt resolution of the fundamental disputes at issue, was defeated after multiple rounds of demurrer by CDPR, resulting in a holding from this court that plaintiffs failed to present a circumstance of claims “that … may give rise to double or multiple liability.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 386, subd. (b).) An interesting component of the failed interpleader piece, though, is that it was precipitated by the deposit of $70,773.80 with this court, apparently coming from Ann Williams.  Those funds remain on deposit to this day, but that has not facilitated an easy resolution of the litigation.  Far from it. 

The governance piece of the original action continues, though dismissals initiated by the plaintiffs have stripped several defendants, including all but FOA itself, Biscoe, and Armando Quintero, director of the CDPR.  The current headliner actions driving this litigation, instead, are two cross-complaints.  (There was a third, but it has been dismissed entirely.)

The first of these was filed by CDPR on August 22, 2024.  In CDPR’s cross-action, the state seeks several measures of relief, based on five asserted causes of action, each derived from allegations relating to the $70,773.80 in funds transferred.  Each claim is asserted against Uqdah, Walker and Williams, and, additionally, Emmett Harden, whom CDPR alleges was another member of FOA who participated in what it alleges was the unlawful misappropriation of the $70,773.80 in transferred funds.

Uqdah, Walker and Williams filed answers to CDPR’s cross complaint on September 30, 2024.  At that time, they were represented by the same counsel who assisted them on their underlying complaint, attorney David Schwartz.  Schwartz did not represent Harden, though, and Harden did not respond at the same time his co-cross-defendants did (Schwartz had some representative pre-litigation relationship with Harden relating to FOA, but has not represented Harden at any point in this case) .  Harden did not respond until very recently, on August 25, 2026 (nearly two years later), when, acting in propria persona, Harden filed an answer. 

During a period apparently in the early part of 2025, at least up until April 1st of that year, the parties were engaged in ongoing settlement discussions.  These discussions involved (1) attorney Schwartz, for Uqdah, Walker and Williams (with whom, the court presumes, Harden was aligned); (2) attorney Joseph Isenstadt, of the California Attorney General’s office, for CDPR; and (3) attorney Darryl Reese, who, in January 2025, had just substituted into the case as counsel for Biscoe.  These discussions, though, were not successful.

On April 3, 2025, in response to a proposal by Schwartz to resolve the governance dispute and effectuate return of the $70,773.80 in transferred funds (the precise amount, the court again notes, remains on deposit with the court), attorney Reese sent Schwartz a letter rejecting his proposal.  Additionally, Reese threatened in the letter that, if Schwartz’s clients did not voluntarily dismiss the claims in their complaint (which, by then, consisted only of their claim pertaining to FOA’s governance) Reese would file a cross-complaint, a copy of which was attached to the letter.  The cross-complaint attached to Reese’s letter included essentially the same claims as CDPR’s cross-complaint, but additionally also, two new causes of action—for abuse of process and malicious prosecution—asserted not only against Uqdah, Williams, Walker and Harden, but also against Schwartz.

According to Schwartz, “[a]lthough [he] considered [the causes of action asserted against him—for abuse of process and malicious prosecution] to be unmeritorious to the point of being entirely frivolous, Mr. Reese’s threat to file the Cross-Complaint making [him] a party if [his] clients did not immediately [dismiss their action] placed [him] in [an] immediate conflict of interest … such that [he had] no choice but to withdrawal as … counsel.”  And, Schwartz, indeed, did just that, substituting out as counsel for Uqdah, Williams and Walker on April 17, 2025.

The very next day, April 18, 2025, the threatened cross-complaint was filed, naming Schwartz, Uqdah, Williams, Walker and Harden each as cross-defendants.  This cross-complaint (the Cross-Complaint) is the second of the two headliner-cross-complaints currently driving this case. 

In its caption, attorney Reese was listed as attorney for “[d]efendants Friends of Allensworth, Sasha Biscoe, and Gloria Pierrot-Dyer.”  Given the FOA governance disputes raised in this case, the court notes there is (or was) some dispute as to whether the persons directing Reese to commence suit on behalf of FOA are authorized to do so, but the court can at least discern from the caption that it was ultimately Biscoe’s (and Pierrot-Dyer’s) decision to charge ahead with the cross-complaint on behalf of “Friends of Allensworth.” That said, the court also notes substitution of attorney forms were filed September 5, 2025, indicating Reese no longer represents Biscoe or Pierrot-Dyer.  While this doesn’t mean they don’t purport to act for FOA still, it is not precisely clear who is behind the decisions of cross-plaintiff “Friends of Allensworth” in the litigation at this point.  For ease of reference, though, the court will simply refer to the party(ies) prosecuting the Cross-Complaint as cross-complainant. 

The court next notes that, although Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden answered essentially identical claims in the CDPR cross-complaint (when Uqdah, Walker and Williams were represented by Schwartz), they did not timely answer the Cross-Complaint.  Notably, Uqdah, Walker and Williams did not immediately secure substitute counsel after Schwartz indicated he would have to withdraw incident to his being named as a cross-defendant.

Incident to the failure of Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden to answer, on June 20, 2025, defaults were entered as against all of them, except Uqdah, on request of cross-complainant.  

The Cross-Complaint caught different traction, though, with Schwartz.  On June 27, 2025, Schwartz filed an anti-SLAPP motion.  Facing that motion, cross-complainant immediately agreed to dismiss the Cross-Complaint against Schwartz.

Attorney Reese, though, (or, rather, his “staff,” he later averred) overshot the dismissal.  Instead of dismissing solely Schwartz, his office filed a dismissal of the entire cross-complaint.  Reese explained, later, that it was his “intention,” on his client’s “instruction” “to dismiss only … Schwartz … while proceeding against [Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden],” but while he “specifically instructed [his] staff to prepare and file a Request for Dismissal … identifying only David Schwartz,” “[his] staff prepared and filed [apparently without his review] a complete dismissal of the entire Cross-Complaint … .”

It was some time before Reese realized what his “staff” had done.  Indeed, apparently not realizing that a dismissal had been filed as to the entire Cross-Complaint nearly a month later, cross-complainant filed, on August 11, 2025, a request for entry of default as to Uqdah.  Attorney Reese remained oblivious of the dismissal error until November 21, 2025, when he investigated the matter after Williams had stated, during a case management conference, that she had been told, by the court clerk, that the Cross-Complaint “had been dismissed in its entirety.”

Shortly after Reese “discovered [the] error,” cross-complainant moved to set aside the dismissal of the Cross-Complaint and to “reinstat[e]” the defaults entered against Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden, and to “confirm[] the dismissal as to Cross-Defendant David Schwartz … , consistent with Cross Complainant’s original intent.”  Unsurprisingly, but ironically, cross-complainant invoked the very statutory provision that it objects to the application of here, Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). 

In its April 27, 2026 ruling on the motion, this court set aside the dismissal of the Cross-Complaint and deemed the erroneously filed dismissal to be of “no effect” with respect to the defaults previously entered as to Williams, Harden and Walker on June 20, 2025.  The court, though, struck the default entered as to Uqdah, which had been filed after the erroneously filed dismissal.  The court stated that, if “Friends of Allensworth” intended to proceed as indicated in its motion, it would need to file a new request for dismissal properly identifying its scope (i.e., as to Schwartz only) and a new request for default would need to be filed as to Uqdah.  Cross-complainant thereafter filed a request for dismissal as to Schwartz, and a subsequent request for dismissal as to its abuse of process and malicious prosecution causes of action, and then a subsequent request for entry of default as to Uqdah.  Based on these submissions, Schwartz was dismissed, as were the abuse of process and malicious prosecution causes of action, and Uqdah’s default was entered. 

Following the court’s April 27, 2026 ruling, the parties to the litigation engaged in settlement discussions, which included multiple meetings facilitated through the Attorney General's Charitable Trusts Section and CDPR and the exchange of successive settlement proposals.  These settlement discussions came to an end, though, when attorney Reese, on July 10, 2026, rejected a settlement proposal by Williams and circulated a draft motion to dissolve FOA, which he indicated his client intended to file in the near future. 

Williams, Uqdah, Walker and Harden shortly thereafter filed the instant motions for set aside of their respective defaults.  Williams is now represented by attorney Kevin Little.  Uqdah, Walker and Harden are proceeding in propria persona. 

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b)

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) permits a court “upon any terms as may be just, [to] relieve a party or the party’s legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against the party through the party’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”  “ ‘The general underlying purpose of section 473(b) is to promote the determination of actions on their merits.’ [Citations.]” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 928 [198 Cal.Rptr.3d 239] (Austin).)  Accordingly, “ ‘the provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed … .’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 256 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056].)

An application for relief under section 473(b), “shall,” however, “be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).)  “This six-month time limitation is jurisdictional; [and] the court has no power to grant relief under section 473 once the time has lapsed.” (Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 928, citations omitted.)

“In addition, the moving party bears the burden of establishing a right to relief. Within the context of section 473(b) neglect is excusable if a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances might have made the same error.” (Id., at pp. 928-929, citations omitted.)

Further notable, section 473(b) provides for mandatory set aside of, inter alia, an entry of default when “an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect … , unless the court finds that the default … was not in fact caused by the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.”

Equitable Relief

Additionally notable, “[a]fter six months from entry of default, a trial court may still vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 669, 884 P.2d 126] (Rappleyea).)

Generally, a court may vacate a default on equitable grounds in circumstances of extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake.  (Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadephia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 911 [270 Cal.Rptr.3d 724] (Luxury Asset Lending).) 

ANALYSIS

A. Motions by Williams, Uqdah and Walker

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) strictly provides, as noted above, a six-month time limit for any application for relief under that subdivision, which has been interpreted by our courts as jurisdictional.  (See, e.g., Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 854]; Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.)

On the face of the matter, the motions by Williams, Uqdah and Walker are ostensibly untimely, having not been filed within six months.  The erroneous filing of a dismissal, resulting in the evident dismissal of Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden, in addition to attorney Schwartz, however, presents a very unique circumstance not addressed in any case cited by the parties. 

As Williams notes, in arguments joined by Walker and Harden, any application to set aside entry of default that would have been filed prior to this court’s order setting aside their dismissals on April 27, 2026 would have been a nullity, essentially asking, as William’s phrased it, “this Court to grant relief from nothing.”  Persuasively, Williams argues, a holding by this court that she, Walker and Harden were required to move for set aside of the entry of their defaults prior to the set aside of the erroneous dismissal of the Cross-Complaint would be inconsistent with the codified maxim of jurisprudence that “[t]he law neither does nor requires idle acts.” (Civ. Code, § 3532.)

Cross-complainant emphasizes the language from this court’s ruling that set aside of cross-complainant’s dismissal was to be “of no force or effect with respect to the previously entered defaults.” Williams correctly observes, however, the court’s ruling was not presented with, and did not address, the question presented here, which is whether the six-month time period provided under section 473(b) is properly measured from the date of entry of the defaults against Williams, Walker and Harden.  The court’s ruling that set aside of cross-complainant’s dismissal was to be “of no force or effect with respect to the previously entered defaults” was, ultimately, a response to cross-complainant’s request that the court “reinstat[e]” the defaults as to Williams, Walker and Harden (and Uqdah), which form of relief the court determined was not appropriate by way of application under section 473(b) (or at all).  In other words, the court’s ruling—not worded with an eye to the unanticipated dispute presented here—was merely intended to convey that the court was denying cross-complainant’s request for “reinstat[ement]” of the pre-dismissal defaults. 

The court, in any event, is not limited to section 473(b) in determining whether relief is appropriate, and “ ‘ “may … vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.’ [Citation.]” ’ (Luxury Asset Lending, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.)  The court finds, with respect to the motions by Williams, Walker and Harden, that this case presents circumstances of extrinsic mistake and that equitable relief from default is appropriate.  

“ ‘ “ ‘Extrinsic mistake involves the excusable neglect of a party. [Citation.] When this neglect results in an unjust judgment, without a fair adversary hearing, and the basis for equitable relief is present, this is extrinsic mistake. [Citation.]’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘To set aside a judgment based on … extrinsic mistake, the moving party must satisfy three elements: “First, the defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Secondly, the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Lastly, the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it had been discovered.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 911.)

The California Supreme Court, however, in Rappleyea, supra, described the aforementioned “stringent” three-part test, earlier formulated in Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147-1148 [195 Cal.Rptr. 377] (Stiles), as principally formulated in the context of motions to set aside a judgment.  (Id., at p. 982.)  With respect to a motion to set aside entry of default, however, the “strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments” which underpins the necessity of the three-part test from Stiles, is not directly implicated as the policy’s basis is weaker.  (Ibid.)  Notably, also, though, Rappleyea did not decide whether a much different test “applies to requests for equitable relief when a default judgment has not been entered.” (Ibid.)

The court finds, in any event, that, in the unique circumstances of this case, Williams, Walker and Harden are entitled to equitable relief from entry of default.

Ultimately, the court finds it would be an untenable that a party could, as cross-complainant did here, erroneously file a dismissal of a party after securing entry of that party’s default, and by having filed the erroneous dismissal prior to expiration of the section 473(b) six-month limitations period, effectively obviate the possibility of any motion to set aside entry of default being filed until after expiration of the six-month limitations period. 

Notwithstanding the apparent inadvertence of Reese’s office’s mistake with respect to the erroneously entered dismissal, its effect was to mislead Williams, Walker and Harden to their detriment concerning the pendency of the Cross-Complaint against them and to effectively cut-off their ability to seek relief under section 473(b). 

Williams, Walker and Harden, to be sure, did not promptly move for set aside of their defaults following the court’s April 27, 2026, order, waiting nearly four months after that order was entered, but they submit, and it is not disputed by cross-complainant, that the parties were actively engaged in meaningful settlement efforts during that time until at least July 10, 2026. 

Under these circumstances, the court finds Williams, Walker and Harden’s motions must be granted. 

B. Uqdah’s Motion

Uqdah’s motion presents significantly less complicated circumstances.  There is no dispute that Uqdah moved for set aside of default within six months of entry of her default on July 22, 2026.  The only question presented is whether Uqdah presents circumstances of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

The court finds that she does. 

Uqdah was represented by counsel who had assisted her in answering a nearly identical cross-compliant filed by CDPR and only after cross-complainant filed a nearly duplicate separate action, distinguished only by its inclusion of two claims impleading her litigation counsel, resulted in loss of her attorney, was she left to face the Cross-Complaint without the benefit of counsel.  The court does not here address the merits of the two new claims in the Cross-Complaints that resulted in Uqdah’s loss of counsel, except to note that, when faced with the prospect of having to present a showing of mere minimal merit (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 [124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 52 P.3d 703], cross-complainant immediately shuttered its hard-knuckled approach, both dismissing Schwartz and the two offending claims.  The result of cross-complainant’s action, however, was that Uqdah was ultimately deprived of litigation counsel in a case that had been pending for nearly two years. 

Further, just as with Williams, Walker and Harden, Uqdah was mislead by an erroneously filed dismissal to believe that the entire case had been dismissed against her and that error was not later fully brought to light until this court’s April 27, 2026 order, at which time the erroneously entered prior default as to Uqdah was stricken by this court.  And default was not later entered as to Uqdah until July 22, 2026, following the apparent breakdown of the previous settlement discussions noted above. 

What’s more, the court finds troubling cross-complainant’s excuse for failing to notify Uqdah of its intent to seek default prior to proceeding with seeking its entry.  Cross-complainant acknowledges Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico's FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198 [300 Cal.Rptr.3d 209] (Shapell), which observed an ethical and statutory obligation to advise opposing counsel of an impending default, but purports to distinguish that case on the basis that Uqdah is not, herself, an attorney (notwithstanding cross-complainant’s direct role in vitiating Uqdah’s representation in this action and attorney Reese’s other apparent direct communications with Uqdah during settlement discussions).

Clearly, the concerns expressed in Shapell did not emanate from the circumstance that an attorney was on the receiving end of unprofessional conduct, but, rather, from the fact that an attorney was on the offending end.  The obligation of an attorney to warn opposing counsel of intent to seek default was described as being rooted in Code of Civil Procedure section 583.130, describing the “policy of the state that a plaintiff shall proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action but that all parties shall cooperate in bringing the action to trial or other disposition.”  Shapell’s echoing of the call in Lasalle v. Vogel (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 127 [248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 263] for a return to the professionalism called for under section 583.130 (id., at p. 203) is not something this court can discern any reason for ignoring merely incident to Uqdah’s self-represented status.  Obviously, in other words, that status was not an occasion for attorney Reese to relax his commitment to professionalism standards.

The court finds, based on the foregoing, that Uqdah’s motion must also be granted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                University Credit Union vs. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., et al.

Case No.:   VCU319408

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Withholdings of Earnings

Tentative Ruling: It appears the Judgment Debtor Bruce Sousa has filed for bankruptcy and an automatic stay is now in effect as to this matter. As such, the Court finds the case stayed, including the collection efforts against the Judgment Debtor’s spouse that are the subject of this motion.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                McGrath, Wendy L vs. Johnson, Erin

Case No.:   VCU329518

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Tentative Ruling: (1), (2) and (3): To find the motions moot via the supplemental production; to decline to award sanctions.

Facts Common to (1), (2) and (3)

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Johnson for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On or about April 17, 2026, Plaintiff served Defendant Erin Johnson with Plaintiff's First Set of Requests for Admission, First Set of Special Interrogatories, and First Set of Requests for Production of Documents.

On May 20, 2026, Defendant provided responses to each set of discovery noted above.

On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff sent meet and confer correspondence identifying alleged deficiencies in the responses.

On June 12, 2026, Defendant replied to the meet and confer correspondence, standing by the objections and responses.

On June 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed these motions to compel further as to the following:

• Special Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, and 23;
• Requests for Production Nos. Nos. 6-12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22.
• Requests for Admissions Nos.1-5, 7, 8, 10-14, 16, 18, 19, and 20.

Thereafter, on July 31, 2026, Defendant Johnson served supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One. On September 2, 2026, Johnson served second supplemental responses to Special Interrogatories Nos. 5, 7, 13, and 22.

Additionally, on July 31, 2026, Defendant Johnson served supplemental responses to Requests for Production, Set One and Requests for Admissions, Set One. Additionally, Johnson served second supplemental responses on September 2, 2026.

Defendant’s opposition indicates the supplemental responses served as noted above, and that Defendant seeks sanctions as to opposing these motions.

Plaintiff’s reply and notice filed in response to the opposition to this matter indicates no further responses are sought via these motions.

Therefore, other than the issue of sanctions, these motions appear moot.

Authority and Analysis

Sanctions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 is a general statute authorizing the Court to impose discovery sanctions for “misuse of the discovery process,” which includes (without limitation) a variety of conduct such as:  making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery; making an evasive response to discovery; and unsuccessfully and without substantial justification making or opposing a motion to compel or limit discovery.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.010.)

The Court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make it unjust to impose sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.300(c) 2033.290(d).)

In the Court’s view, the meet and confer process has effectuated the procurement of discovery mostly without the Court’s intervention. While Plaintiff did file these motions, and Defendant opposed them, the parties met and conferred, and two rounds of supplemental responses were provided. The Court, therefore, declines to award sanctions under these circumstances.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                  PNC Bank vs. Golden Star Citrus, inc.

Case No.:   VCU336099

Date:           September 21, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Writ of Possession re: Defendant Golden Star Citrus, Inc.

Tentative Ruling: To deny the writ without prejudice

Facts

The complaint in this matter alleges breach of written agreements, claim and delivery, conversion and account stated against Defendants Golden Star Citrus, Inc. and Michael Joe Chavez.

On July 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for writ of possession as to Defendant Golden Star.

Plaintiff notes that on or about January 15, 2025, Defendant Golden Star entered into a written Lease Agreement ending in account number 183 (“Agreement 183”) with Plaintiff for a lease with purchase option of equipment as to two (2) 2024 Bobcat G25N-7 Bobcats (SN: FGA 14-4550-08221, FGA14-4550-08695) and three (3) 2024 Bobcat GC25S-9 Bobcats (SN: FGA1E-1290-04314, FGA1E-4120-03429, FGA1E-1290-03109) (Declaration of McGinley ¶¶1-5; Ex. 2)

Plaintiff performed all of the terms and conditions of Agreement 183 required to be performed by Plaintiff. (Declaration of McGinley ¶6.)

On or about October 22, 2025, Defendant Golden Star failed to make the payment due on Agreement 183 and Plaintiff has elected, under the terms of Agreement 183, to accelerate the balance due of $132,369.60, plus default interest, and other fees and costs accruing thereunder, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Declaration of McGinley ¶¶7-11.)

Further, that on or about July 22, 2021, Defendant Golden Star entered into a written Lease Agreement ending in account number 166 (“Agreement 166”) with Plaintiff for a lease with purchase option of equipment as to one (1) Doosan G18S-4LP Ult Truck (SN: FOA02-1790-03260) (Declaration of McGinley ¶12- Ex. 3.)

Plaintiff performed all of the terms and conditions of Agreement 166 required to be performed by Plaintiff. (Declaration of McGinley ¶13.)

On or about September 8, 2025, Defendant Golden Star failed to make the payment due on Agreement 166 and Plaintiff has elected, under the terms of Agreement 166, to accelerate the balance due of $18,291.22, plus default interest, and other fees and costs accruing thereunder, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. (Declaration of McGinley ¶¶14-18.)

As part of the terms of Agreements 183 and 166 Defendant Golden Star granted a security interest in the collateral that Plaintiff agreed to finance, including the equipment noted above.

Plaintiff estimates the total fair market value of the collateral is $150,000. (Declaration of McGinley ¶¶21, 28.)

Further that “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the Collateral is in possession or under the control of the Defendants GOLDEN STAR and MICHAEL JOE CHAVEZ, an individual (collectively “Defendants”), and each of them” and “Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Collateral is currently located at:

a. 20373 W. Cajon Ave., Woodlake, CA 93286;

b. 4040 W. Robinwood Ct., Visalia, CA 93291;

c. 20373 Avenue 352, Woodlake, CA 93286; or

d. Such other location known to Defendants.” (Declaration of McGinley ¶¶22, 23.)

On August 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a proof of service as to Defendant Golden Star via substitute service on Defendant Golden Star’s agent for service of process via “Miranda England person in charge Gender: Female Age: 45 Height: 5'7" Weight: 150 Race: white Hair: blonde Other” on August 4, 2026 at 2:00 pm at 20373 W Cajon Ave Woodlake, CA 93286.

However, the Court notes this proof of service lacks a declaration of due diligence as to attempts to personally serve Defendant Golden Star via its agent for service of process.

Authority and Analysis

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 512.010(a).)

Before the hearing on the Writ of Possession, the Defendant must be served with (1) a copy of the summons and complaint; (2) a Notice of Application and Hearing; and (3) a copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 512.030.)

Here, the Court lacks a sufficient proof of service with respect to Defendant Golden Star as to the declaration of diligence required to effectuate substitute service. As such, the Court cannot find the Defendant Golden Star has been served.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010(b), the application must be submitted under oath and include:

(1) A showing of the basis of the plaintiff's claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiff's claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached.

(2) A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention.

(3) A particular description of the property and a statement of its value.

(4) A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there.

(5) A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure.

“The writ will be issued if the court finds that the plaintiff's claim is probably valid and the other requirements for issuing the writ are established.”  (Code Civ. Proc.§ 512.040(b).)  “A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.”  (Code Civ. Proc.§ 511.090.) 

Here, the basis of Plaintiff’s claims appears to be breach of Agreements 166 and 183 and Defendant Golden Star’s default thereunder.

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) 

The declaration of McGinley sufficiently establishes the existence of Agreements 166 and 183, Plaintiff’s performance thereunder, Defendant Golden Star’s breach as to failure to pay and a calculation of damages under each Agreement.

The Court further finds a sufficient showing that the collateral has been wrongly detained by Defendant Golden Star following the breach.

The Court further finds a sufficient showing as to the particular description of the collateral and its estimate value.

Additionally, the Court finds a sufficient showing the collateral was not taken from Plaintiff for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to statute, or seized under execution against Plaintiff.

However, the Court does not find Paragraph 23 of the declaration sufficient as to the probable cause to believe the collateral is located at three locations and “Such other location known to Defendants.” There is no factual basis or personal knowledge presented that the collateral resides in these locations, including a location with a general description as “…other location known to Defendants.”

Last, the Court notes, prior to the issuance of a writ of possession, the Plaintiff must file an undertaking “in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount.”  (Code Civ. Proc.§ 515.010(a).) 

The application, therefore, is denied without prejudice. Plaintiff retains the right to make a subsequent application under Code of Civil Procedure section 512.090 as to the deficiencies identified herein.

 If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 21, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054262	In the Matter of Contreras, Salvador Martinez	Letters of Administration	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR054234	In the Matter of Lloyd, Linda	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 2d(2) and 3d: Amount of Bond ordered shall be no less than $200,000 - Prob C § 8482(a). 2. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 4. Proof of Publication not filed; proposed publication, the Porterville Recorder, may not be proper
VPR054270	In the Matter of Grim, Steven	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054232	In the Matter of Ambriz, Daniel Jr	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 14 heirs omitted: names of all surviving and deceased heirs—other siblings and issues of deceased siblings, including the dates of deaths, ages and mailing addresses. DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR053249	In the Matter of Perkins, Alvin Barney	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053211	In the Matter of Collins, Melody Rose	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR043355	In the Matter of The Nikole McCuen Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR046212	In the Matter of Abraham Sanchez Jr Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 17, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: regarding any surviving registered domestic partner. Publication Improper, filed 4/14/26:  Published once, not in accordance with Probate C § 8120.
PPR054263	In the Matter of Kennedy, Donald	Letters of Administration		MATTER APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER
PPR054242	In the Matter of Moreno, Irene	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Court to review proposed amendments to the petition
PPR054240	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Roberto	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	In a Petition to Determine Succession to Real Property, all persons who are succeeding to the property must be listed as petitioners. Probate Code §13151.
PPR053526	In the Matter of Moreno, Judi Arlene	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Amended Petition has not been filed, Notice to relative remains outstanding

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054048	In the Matter of Cahuis Guess, Amelia Rose	Move Away Hearing- no issues to address
9/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	Appoint Guardian- no issues to address

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/21/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR053969	In the Matter of C.G.V.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511- GRANDPARENTS Declaration of Guardianship Orientation Attendance needs to be filed
9/21/26 1:30 PM	Department 19	PPR053451	In the Matter of I.S.L.	NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating FATHER, MATERNAL GRANDFATHER & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS  were served (15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1510) with a copy of the Notice of Hearing for this termination hearing

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/22/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053854	In the Matter of J.S.	APPEARANCE REQUIRED- review re OTHER state establishment of guardianship- there have been no filings by the petitioners
9/22/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR051168	In the Matter of J.I.R.	Notice of Hearing (form GC-020) must be filed. Pursuant to California Probate Code §1460, at least 15 calendar days’ notice is required for any hearing on a petition to terminate a guardianship, the Notice of Hearing must be served on relatives as identified in §1510(c) - GUARDIAN, MOTHER, MATERNAL GRANDFATHER, & PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS. NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship