Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, November 10, 2026 (posted at 3:28 pm) are:

Re:                 Thompson, Jimmy Jr vs. Thompson, Lisa

Case No.:    PCU315874

Date:           November 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     OSC re: Motion to Enforce Judgment and Dismissal

Tentative Ruling: No party previously appeared at the continued hearing as to Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement as a judgment in this matter. As such, the Court set an order to show cause why the motion should not be denied and this case dismissed as to the failure to appear. The Court’s file reflects no updated declarations from either party and, as such, is prepared to dismiss this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              LUCINDA TERRELL et al vs. FERREIRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. et al

Case No.:     PCU334768

Date:           November 10, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend re: Punitive Damages; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Supplemental Deposition of Defendant FPW’s PMQ; (3) Defendant FPW’s Motion for Protective Order re: Supplemental Deposition of Defendant FPW’s PMQ

Tentative Ruling: (1) To deny the motion; (2) To grant the motion and order the deposition take place no later than November 19, 2026; (3) To deny the motion.

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend re: Punitive Damages

Facts

The underlying facts in this matter involve a vehicle accident. On February 9, 2026, Jack Terrell was driving on Highway 190 with his wife, Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell, and was engaged in a head-on collision with Defendant Carter Lee, who was traveling in the opposite direction. Jack Terrell was killed.

Plaintiff commenced suit on May 8, 2026, with a complaint asserting a wrongful death claim and a negligence claim. The complaint names, as Defendants, Lee and various entity defendants, including FPW, Lee’s alleged employer. No punitive damages were pled in the initial complaint.

On June 17, 2026, Plaintiff moved for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36. On July 21, 2026, the Court granted the motion for trial preference and set trial December 1, 2026.

On October 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to amend the complaint to add allegations seeking punitive damages.

In support, Plaintiff indicates that the proposed amendment:

“adds allegations that the conduct of Defendants, as described herein, to wit, that Defendant CARTER LEE operated a vehicle while repeatedly falling asleep during the hour before the collision, was aware that he was dangerously fatigued, and nevertheless continued driving rather than stopping, crossed into the lane of Decedent JACK TERRELL’s vehicle, and collided with it head-on, causing Decedent’s death and injuries to Plaintiff LUCINDA TERRELL; and that Defendant FERREIRA POWER WEST, LLC. (“FPW”), through its officers, directors, and/or managing agents, had advance knowledge of Lee’s unfitness to drive and nevertheless authorized or permitted him to continue driving, participated in the conduct, or later ratified or approved it, constitutes conduct.” (Declaration of Wise ¶6.)

Further, that “the proposed amendment adds specificity to Plaintiffs’ allegations, legal theories, and damages theories based on facts learned through investigation and discovery, including facts supporting Plaintiffs’ request to add punitive-damages allegations and a prayer for punitive damages” and “These facts were learned after filing of the original Complaint. Plaintiffs required investigation and discovery to obtain and evaluate the Tenna clips, FERREIRA POWER WEST, LLC.’s termination form and training materials, LEE’s discovery response, and evidence concerning the company’s fatigue-management practices and whether any officer, director, or managing agent knew of LEE’s alleged drowsiness before the collision.” (Declaration of Wise ¶¶7 ,9.)

Plaintiff further states that “Plaintiffs’ counsel discovered the facts giving rise to the proposed amendment through investigation and discovery conducted after the filing of the original Complaint, including investigation into inward-facing Tenna clips reportedly showing LEE appearing to nod off or doze while driving before the collision, FERREIRA POWER WEST, LLC.’s termination form, LEE’s discovery response concerning fatigue, and the company’s fatigue-management practices.” (Declaration of Wise ¶8.)

Plaintiff states further that “no prejudice” will arise from the proposed amendment.

In opposition, Defendants argue that they would suffer prejudice by lacking sufficient time to move to strike the punitive damages claim, bring summary adjudication thereof or conduct additional discovery as to the claims. Additionally, Defendants argue that these facts were known well before the filing of this motion and the delay, therefore, is improper.

Authority and Analysis

The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  

Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  

The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1424

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

The Court finds subsection (a) has been substantially complied with and is not at issue here.

As to subsection (b), the Court finds subsections (1) and (2) do not appear in dispute. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have known of the facts underlying the proposed amendments since the collision and that the declaration is conclusory and general as to the exact time frame this information was discovered. While the Court does not agree that the date of the collision is when Plaintiff knew or should have known facts alleged as to Defendant Lee’s fatigue, falling asleep, the warning system and Defendant FPW’s alleged knowledge or ratification thereof, the Court does agree that the declaration in support as to when the facts arose lacks sufficient detail. Further, that lack of detail precludes the Court from evaluating the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. This issue is magnified by the proximity to the trial date and the Court’s restricted ability to continue the trial date under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(f).

It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.) The Court does not find compliance with subsection (b). Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

Delay and Prejudice

Typically, dilatory acts are not sufficient, alone, to deny the motion. However, “[t]he law is also clear that even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial. The cases indicate that the denial may rest upon the element of lack of diligence in offering the amendment after knowledge of the facts, or the effect of the delay on the adverse party.” (Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 939–940.) (See also Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746 [“he failed to offer any explanation for his delay in seeking leave to amend.”]; See also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136 [“The law is well settled that a long deferred presentation of the proposed amendment without a showing of excuse for the delay is itself a significant factor to uphold the trial court's denial of the amendment.”].) Plaintiff has not provided a substantive excuse or explanation for not seeking leave to amend earlier.

However, even where a plaintiff has been dilatory in bringing the motion, the Court typically grants a motion for leave unless the opposing party can show prejudice. (Kittredge Sports Company v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048.)

Prejudice exists where amendment would: (1) cause a delay of trial; (2) increase preparation costs; (3) change the focus of the complaint; or (4) increase discovery burdens. (Magpali, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) Additional discovery costs may support a claim for prejudice. (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739 [“Prejudice exists where the proposed amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens.”].)

Further, as to prejudice ,the Court notes Duchrow v. Forrest (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1381, states the following in the context of motions for leave made during or after trial:

“California courts have denied leave to amend where the proposed amendment to the complaint is during or after trial, and the amendment would require the defendant to have litigated or acted differently to assert his rights before and at trial. (See, Cota v. County of Los Angeles (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 282, 293, [“Granting of the motion would have been prejudicial to defendants, inasmuch as they were not prepared to defend against such evidence”].) For example, where a plaintiff filed a motion to amend mid-trial that changed how the defendant might have litigated because it added a new theory of damages, a court of appeal found it would result in prejudice to the defendant because he had not been on notice to conduct discovery on the issue, nor to retain an expert to testify at trial, and he may have acted differently in respect to settlement negotiations.”

Additionally, whether facts or legal theories are being changed and whether the opposing party will suffer prejudice “represent[ ] a different side of the same coin: If new facts are being alleged, prejudice may easily result because of the inability of the other party to investigate the validity of the factual allegations while engaged in trial or to call rebuttal witnesses. If the same set of facts supports merely a different theory—for example, an easement as opposed to a fee—no prejudice can result.” (City of Stanton v. Cox (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1563.)

Here, the Court notes additional facts and theories of punitive damages that change the focus of the complaint and expand discovery. Further, as noted by Defendants, permitting amendment here would cut off Defendants’ right to move to strike the allegations, file a summary adjudication motion on punitive damages or conduct additional discovery and investigation. The Court finds a sufficient showing of prejudice under these circumstances. Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

Punitive Damages

Additionally, the Court will also examine whether punitive damages, under these facts, would be permitted as a matter of law. The Court notes that “the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.” (California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 274, 281 disapproved of on other grounds by Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390.)

However, the California Casualty court further noted:

““While the cases cited for the point are not overly explicit, we are confident Mr. Witkin is correct that the failure of a proposed amendment to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or defense may support an order denying a motion to amend. (See 5 Witkin, op. cit. supra, Pleading, § 1125, and cases cited.) That rule would find its most appropriate application, however, in cases in which the insufficiency of the proposed amendment is established by controlling precedent and where the insufficiency could not be cured by further appropriate amendment...”

Here, Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for non-intentional conduct, that is Defendant Lee’s falling asleep, use of cell phone, distracted driving and speeding and Defendant FPW’s knowledge of these acts and failure to correct over a period of at least approximately 10 days. (Proposed FAC ¶¶17-46.)

Authority nonetheless indicates that "a nonintentional tort can have the characteristics of an intentional tort to the extent of embracing the concept of malice as used in Civil Code section 3294." (Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286). "A tort having some of the characteristics of both negligence and willfulness occurs when a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result. (Citation). Such a tort…is most accurately designated as [w]anton and reckless misconduct." (Id.) Such a claim justifies an award of punitive damages. (Id.).

“Punitive damages are imposed as punishment for the defendant’s serious misconduct.”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933.)  Claims for punitive damages are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 3294, which limits their availability to circumstances where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.”  Consequently, punitive damages “cannot be recovered without a pleading of malice, oppression, or fraud … .”  (5 Witkin Cal. Proc. (5th ed. 2019) Pleading, § 933, citing Hall v. Berkell (1955) 130 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804.)

Relevant here, “malice” as used in section 3294, means conduct “intended … to cause injury to the plaintiff” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”  Section 3294’s reference to “despicable conduct” represents a “substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found. [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)

The factual allegations must support entitlement to punitive damages. “Notwithstanding relaxed pleading criteria” permissible with other claims, punitive damages “demand firm allegations.”  (G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)  “…When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.”  (Ibid., internal citations omitted.) 

As explained by the court in Lackner, however, California’s punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294 was amended in 1987 as to the definition of malice, and “[a]s amended, malice, based upon a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights, requires proof that the defendant's conduct is ‘despicable’ and ‘willful.’ ” [Citation.] (Id.)  Lackner held specifically that, “[t]he statute’s reference to ‘despicable conduct’ represents ‘a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.’ ” (Id., citing College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.)  College Hospital explained that, “[u]sed in its ordinary sense, the adjective ‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’ [Citation.] As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.”  [Citations.] (Id. at 725.)

Although, as explained by the court in Lackner, California’s punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294 was amended in 1987 as to the definition of malice, the Court finds pre-amendment driving under the influence cases assistive.

In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, the defendant had previously caused a serious automobile accident while driving under the influence, had been arrested and convicted for drunken driving on numerous prior occasions, had recently completed a period of probation following a drunk driving conviction, and was presently facing an additional pending criminal drunk driving charge at the time of the accident. (Id. at 895)

The California Supreme Court found a sufficiently pleaded claim for punitive damages where a plaintiff included allegations regarding the defendant’s history of driving under the influence and previous involvement in criminal legal proceedings to show that defendant was aware of the dangerousness of his driving while intoxicated. (Id. at 893.)

In Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 82, the plaintiff’s punitive damages claim was supported by allegations that “the defendant … while intoxicated, was … driving a 1967 Ferrari automobile; … made a righthand turn … without stopping at the stop sign controlling traffic and proceeded in an easterly direction on said … [s]treet, zigzagging in and out of traffic, in a designated 35 mile per hour zone, and gaining speed until he was traveling in excess of 65 miles per hour, with reckless disregard of the probable consequences of said conduct and with reckless disregard of the safety of others.” (Id., at 86.) The plaintiff had further alleged the defendant “…knew that he was intoxicated and knew that he was operating said 1967 Ferrari at a speed in excess of 65 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone, on a Sunday afternoon, in a marina visited by many persons, and with knowledge that probable serious injury would result to persons in the area as a result of said conduct, and with reckless disregard of the safety of others, including [the plaintiff].” (Id.) In addition the complaint alleged that, “immediately following the accident [the defendant] and his fellow employee and passenger … falsely and fraudulently informed the investigating California Highway Patrol officer that [the passenger] was operating the vehicle when it struck the minor; and that this was done for the purpose of obstructing the investigation and [defendant’s] avoiding responsibility.” (Id.)

The allegations proposed here in support of punitive damages not akin to allegations of driving while intoxicated under Taylor and Dawes. As noted above, to show malice in the non-intentional context, the conduct must be despicable, that is "'…so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.'" (Lackner, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 1211.) The Court does not consider driving while fatigued and falling asleep as a result to rise to malice, as “ordinarily, routine negligent or even reckless disobedience of traffic laws would not justify an award of punitive damages.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal. 3d. at 899-900.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion on this ground.

(2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Supplemental Deposition of Defendant FPW’s PMQ; (3) Defendant FPW’s Motion for Protective Order re: Supplemental Deposition of Defendant FPW’s PMQ

Facts Common to (2) and (3)

At issue is the further deposition of Defendant FPW’s PMQ as to the “Tenna system.” The Tenna system appears to be an inward facing dash camera within the Subject Vehicle that Plaintiff indicates demonstrates that Defendant Lee had his eyes closed a few seconds before the accident.

Plaintiff deposed Defendant’s PMQ on October 20, 2026. Defendant FPW designated Michael Baeza. However, Plaintiff contends that Baeza did not sufficiently answer questions related to the Tenna system.

As such, at the conclusion of the deposition, Plaintiff served a supplemental notice of deposition as to FPW’s PMQ as to the Tenna system, including 20 document requests related thereto. The categories are as follows:

1. Selection, procurement, implementation, and purpose of Tenna.

2. Tenna’s distracted-driving detection, video, real-time warning, and alert functions.

3. All pre-crash settings for distracted-driving alerts, including audible-volume settings.

4. All persons involved in, consulted about, or approving those settings.

5. The factual and business reasons for setting alerts to minimum or near-minimum volume.

6. FPW’s process for receiving, reviewing, routing, investigating, documenting, and responding to distracted-driving alerts.

7. Identification of all recipients and reviewers of alerts.

8. Event data, video, reports, and communications for Carter Lee.

9. All distracted-driving events generated fleetwide and FPW’s aggregate response.

10. Record retention, video retention, audit logging, preservation, data exports, and any unavailable data.

11. FPW’s training, discipline, coaching, and removal-from-driving procedures based on Tenna events.

12. The February 2026 stand-down and all post-crash changes concerning distracted-driving alerts.

13. The volume-increase decision, employee communication, rollout, and rationale.

14. Corporate structure, decision-making authority, safety governance, and the identities of managing agents involved in Tenna-related decisions or oversight.

That deposition was set for November 3, 2026.

However, Plaintiff notes FPW, by letter on October 26, 2026, stated no witness would be produced for the supplemental deposition and FPW would move for a protective order.

On October 27, 2026, the parties filed competing motions. Plaintiff moves to compel the further deposition of FPW’s PMQ. Defendant PMQ seeks a protective order to preclude the post-discovery cut off deposition in its entirety and to preclude from having to produce documents requested.

Authority and Analysis Common to (2) and (30

The Court starts with its prior order on discovery, including on Defendant FPW’s prior protective order, wherein the Court noted:

          “Application of Diaz v. Carcamo

In [Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148] the California Supreme Court stated “an employer's admission of vicarious liability for an employee's negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment.” (Id. at 1161.) Further, that an employer could be held liable for negligent driving either under vicarious liability or via negligent entrustment of the vehicle to the employee, but not both. (Id. at 1151-1152.) As such, evidence proving a negligent entrustment theory is rendered irrelevant via the vicarious liability admission. (Id. at 1159.)

"If, as here, all of a plaintiff's causes of action depend on a contention than  an employee's negligent driving in the scope of employment was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and if the defendant-employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee's negligent driving, then that offer will 'remove[ ] from the case' the issue of the employer's liability for any damage caused by its employee's negligent driving, leaving 'no material' to which negligent entrustment evidence can be relevant." (Id. at 1157-1158.) "[A]n employer's admission of vicarious liability for an employee's negligent driving in the course of employment bars a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment." (Id. at 1161.)

However, the Court recognizes that admissibility is not the standard on discovery matters.  "Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with [the discovery statutes], any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action…." (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012-1013.) "For discovery purposes, information is relevant if it 'might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement….' [Citation.] Admissibility is not the test and information unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. [Citation.] These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery [citation], and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at 1013.)

Therefore, under the circumstances of Diaz, such evidence of negligent entrustment may be inadmissible at trial, discovery of such evidence is not necessarily barred when reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Nevertheless, the Court evaluates whether, in light of the holding of Diaz, evidence regarding negligent entrustment, training or supervision is relevant to the vicarious liability claim and might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.

Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiffs maintain a negligence claim against Defendant Lee and requested information is within the scope of potential discovery and may prove relevant to Plaintiff's negligence claim.

Therefore, the Court will make a blanket order that limiting any such responses to FPW only and limiting the responses to those related to Defendant Lee’s negligence.” (September 22, 2026 Ruling.)

Discovery Beyond the Cut Off

The initial issue is whether discovery should be permitted within 30 days of the December 1, 2023.

As such, the Court must determine whether Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050 has been satisfied as to reopening discovery as to the deposition of Defendant’s PMQ and production of documents. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2024.050(a).)

Section 2024.050(b) requires the Court to consider:

(b) In exercising its discretion to grant or deny this motion, the court shall take into consideration any matter relevant to the leave requested, including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) The necessity and the reasons for the discovery.

(2) The diligence or lack of diligence of the party seeking the discovery or the hearing of a discovery motion, and the reasons that the discovery was not completed or that the discovery motion was not heard earlier.

(3) Any likelihood that permitting the discovery or hearing the discovery motion will prevent the case from going to trial on the date set, or otherwise interfere with the trial calendar, or result in prejudice to any other party.

(4) The length of time that has elapsed between any date previously set, and the date presently set, for the trial of the action.

On this issue, the Court examines Pelton-Shepherd Industries, Inc. v. Delta Packaging Products, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1568.

There, the plaintiff filed a motion to compel defendant to provide discovery responses, after the discovery motion cut-off date. (Id. at 1574-1575.) The trial court granted the motion to compel, over defendant's objection that the motion was untimely. (Id. at 1577.) Further, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for terminating sanctions, based on a finding that defendant had not complied with the prior order compelling responses. (Id. at 1583-1584.)

However, the court of appeal reversed, finding that an abuse of discretion in hearing plaintiff's original motion to compel responses, absent a motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2024.050:

“Although Pelton-Shepherd had no right to have its motion to compel heard after the passage of the discovery motion cutoff date, we do not question that the trial court had discretion to hear the motion. But ‘[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the 'legal principles governing the subject of [the] action ' Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an 'abuse' of discretion." [Citation.] Here, the trial court's discretion to hear Pelton-Shepherd's motion to compel was governed by section 2024.020, which provided that (1) the last day for Pelton-Shepherd to have its motion to compel heard as a matter of right was October 31, 2005, and that (2) the postponement of the trial date did not "operate to reopen discovery proceedings" "[e]xcept as provided in Section 2024.050"—that is, except upon a successful motion for leave to reopen discovery. Moreover, under section 2024.050, subdivision (b), the trial court's discretion to grant such a motion was not unfettered, but could be exercised only upon [the consideration of the items specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050(b)] …” (Id. at 1587-1588.)

By contrast to Pelton-Shepherd, Plaintiff here expressly seeks relief under section 2024.050 and addresses the subsection (b) factors. The deposition topics and requests seek information related to Defendant Lee’s negligence, the Subject Vehicle and the present accident. The Court agrees Plaintiff diligently set the initial deposition prior to discovery cut off and that this supplemental deposition is necessitated by the inability to answer questions regarding the Tenna system in the initial PMQ deposition. This discovery will not severely impact the trial date, as the Court notes the restrictions contained Code of Civil Procedure section 36(f). As such, the Court will examine the merits of the motion and protective order.

Motion to Compel Deposition and Protective Order

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.020(a):

“(a) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”

As the Court noted in its prior ruling discussing Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1148, discovery and admissibility are separate tracks that the Court must consider independently. The Court’s prior ruling on the protective order noted discovery should be limited to Lee’s alleged negligence. The Court considers information surrounding an inward facing dash camera, which may or has revealed Lee’s eyes closing moments before the incident at issue squarely within its prior order as to Lee’s potential negligence. Consistent with this, therefore, the Court will grant the motion to compel the further deposition of FPW’s PMQ and order that the deposition take place no later than November 19, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Rodriguez, Delia vs. Rocha, Anthony III et al

Case No.:    PCU334212

Date:           November 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      OSC re: Issuance of Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling: To issue the preliminary injunction; to order Plaintiff to serve and lodge a proposed order no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing; to extend the TRO until entry of the preliminary injunction.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff, on April 29, 2026, filed a verified complaint against Defendants Rocha III, Nixon and Rispoli for: 1. Quiet Title (CCP § 760.010) 2. Constructive Trust 3. Financial Elder Abuse (WIC § 15610.30) 4. Fraud and Misrepresentation 5. Unjust Enrichment 6. Cancellation of Instruments 7. Declaratory Relief 8. Injunctive Relief.

On April 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the same causes of action.

Plaintiff alleges:

“8. On or about August 25, 2016, Plaintiff entered into an owner-financed purchase of [2071 West Orange Avenue, Porterville, California 93257, APN 259-360-040]”

9. Plaintiff paid a down payment of $30,732.82, evidenced by cashier's check, attached as Exhibit "A".

10. Plaintiff was assisted by First American Title and reasonably believed she was purchasing the home and would be placed on title attached as Exhibit "8".

11. From 2016 to present, Plaintiff has:

• Paid approximately $1,300 monthly

• Paid property taxes attached as Exhibits "C" and "D"

• Maintained exclusive possession

12. Plaintiff relied on Defendants' representations and would not have paid these sums otherwise.

13. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, title was transferred by Anthony Rispoli to Anthony Rocha III in or about 2020 attached as Exhibit "E".

14. Plaintiff was never informed, did not consent, and received no consideration.

15. Defendant Rocha III has since:

• Retained benefits of Plaintiffs payments

• Refinanced the property

• Retained approximately $75,000 in proceeds

16. On March 16, 2026, Plaintiff was served with a 60-Day Notice to Terminate Tenancy attached as Exhibit "F".

17. Plaintiff is not a tenant, but an equitable owner.” (FAC ¶¶8-17.)

The Court granted an ex parte application to amend the operative complaint to substitute Does 1 and 2 for Alejandro Gil Avalos (“Avalos”) And Leticia Arias Maldonado (“Maldonado”), respectively, in both their individual capacities and as trustees of the Gil Arias Family Trust dated June 9, 2026.

Plaintiff notes that the April 24, 2026 recorded grant deed identifies both Avalos and Maldonado as grantees, and two deeds executed June 9 and recorded June 26, 2026 reflect subsequent vesting first in both spouses as community property with right of survivorship and then in both as trustees of the Trust.

Further, that Avalos filed an unlawful detainer matter against Plaintiff as PCL336903. Trial in that matter has been continued to September 1, 2026.

Plaintiff previously moved for a TRO, and an OSC re: preliminary injunction.

The Court granted the TRO to stay the unlawful detainer matter and set an OSC re: preliminary injunction.

As to the unlawful detainer stay, the Court noted:

“In Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 367, 385, the court addressed the issue of staying an unlawful detainer matter where there is an issue of title in an unlimited action as follows.

There, the plaintiff brought an unlawful detainer action against the defendant, alleging the plaintiff's ownership of the property; the defendant subsequently filed suit against the plaintiff seeking quiet title to the property, alleging that the parties were longtime domestic partners, that the property was rightfully his and had been in his family before his relationship with the plaintiff, and that the title had been held by a third party and transferred to the plaintiff in 2004 in trust as a business arrangement for the benefit of the defendant and his corporations. (Id. at 371.) The Martin-Bragg trial court ended up insisting upon a summary trial of the parties' title dispute. (Id. at 387.) The appellate court reversed the trial court, finding that the defendant's rights were compromised by the summary nature of proceedings that were designed only to determine the straightforward issue of a landlord's right to possession. (Id. at 395.)

The appellate court found:

“However, the trial court has the power to consolidate an unlawful detainer proceeding with a simultaneously pending action in which title to the property is in issue. That is because a successful claim of title by the tenant would defeat the landlord’s right to possession. [Citation.] When an unlawful detainer proceeding and an unlimited action concerning title to the property are simultaneously pending, the trial court in which the unlimited action is pending may stay the unlawful detainer action until the issue of title is resolved in the unlimited action, or it may consolidate the actions. [Citation.]  If it does neither and instead tries the issue of title under the summary procedures that constrain unlawful detainer proceedings, the parties' right to a full trial of the issue of title may be unfairly expedited and limited. If complex issues of title are tried in the unlawful detainer proceeding, the proceeding loses its summary character; defects in the plaintiff's title ‘are neither properly raised in this summary proceeding for possession, nor are they concluded by the judgment.’ [Citations.]” (emphasis added)

Therefore, if “complex issues of title are involved…the parties' constitutional rights to due process in the litigation of those issues cannot be subordinated to the summary procedures of unlawful detainer.” (Id. at 391)

As such, the general rule appears to be that complex issues of title cannot, and should not, be litigated within the summary proceedings of a unlawful detainer action. “The trial court properly held that in the summary proceeding in unlawful detainer the right to possession alone was involved, and the broad question of title could not be raised and litigated by cross-complaint or affirmative defense.” (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal. 2d 158, 159.) Rather, complex issues of title should be litigated properly in the unlimited quiet title action. (Id. at 161.)

The Court here notes that  the Martin-Bragg court indicated that that the trial court is not obligated to stay unlawful detainer actions “in all cases” when there is a pending quiet title action concerning the same property, “no matter how straightforward the issues, and no matter what the circumstances.”  (Martin-Bragg, supra, 219 Cal. App. 4th  at 393.)

Here, this matter, PCU334212, was filed first and therefore not in response to the unlawful detainer action.

Granting a stay is a matter of the court’s discretion under its inherent power.  The court in OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 141 noted that the “court ordinarily has inherent power, in its discretion, to stay proceedings when such a stay will accommodate the ends of justice.” Under the present circumstances, the court shall exercise its discretion to stay the unlawful detainer case.” (September 1, 2026 Ruling.)

Therefore, the Court evaluates the issuance of the preliminary injunction.

Preliminary Injunction Standard

The burden is on plaintiff to show all elements necessary to support issuance of the injunction.  (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)  “A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.  (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.)  The court employs a more probable than not standard.  (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

As to (1), Plaintiff provides a record of 56 payments $78,969.00, of which 23 are exactly $1,300.00 and 33 exceed $1,300.00; 17 property tax payments totaling $20,001.65 that the county payment history attributes to Rodriguez; and several memo or reference notations using the term “mortgage.”

“Under the doctrine of part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is enforced when the buyer has taken possession of the property and either makes a full or partial payment of the purchase price, or makes valuable and substantial improvements on the property, in reliance on the oral agreement…payment of the purchase price alone, without the buyer obtaining possession or making substantial improvements to the property, is not sufficient part performance to preclude application of the statute of frauds…The part performance by the buyer must clearly relate to, and must be pursuant to, the terms of the oral agreement." (Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415, 422.)

As to (2), the interim harm, Plaintiff was faced with eviction, a sufficient interim harm. Moreover, the monthly rental amount of $1,300 has been offered as an undertaking each month of the stay, which mitigates an harm to Avalos as plaintiff in PCL336903.

Therefore, the Court will grant the application for preliminary injunction. The Court will require a proposed order on preliminary injunction. Plaintiff shall serve and lodge the proposed order no later than fifteen (15) days from the date of this hearing. The TRO previously entered shall remain in effect until the preliminary injunction is ordered.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared November 4, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054200	In the Matter of Horst, Mark Edward	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval
VPR054208	In the Matter of Derrick, Sadie Yakne	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: re any surviving registered domestic partner. 2. Petition Item 8: relationships of parties to decedent omitted. 3. Notice of Petition to Administer not served on all parties 15 days prior. 4. Proof of Publication not filed
VPR054222	In the Matter of Burns, Gregory A	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 3c omitted: Decedent's residence at time of death. 2. Petition Item 3e(3): Bond Waivers not filed by all beneficiaries. 3. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representatives (DE-147) not filed. 4. Supplemental Statements of Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed. 5. Notice of Petition to Administer not filed. 6. Proof of Publication not filed
VPR053982	In the Matter of Estudillo Ramirez, Maria	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	1. Duties & Liabilities of Personal Representative (DE-147) not filed, Prob C § 8404(a). 2. Supplemental Birth Date and DL Number (DE-147S) not filed, TCSC LR, rule 1000(c)(4). 3. Decedent is a citizen of a foreign country: if a citizen of a foreign country dies without leaving a will or leaves a will without naming an executor, notice shall be given to a recognized diplomatic or consular official of the foreign country, Prob C § 8113. 4. Proof of Publication not filed
VPR053982	In the Matter of Estudillo Ramirez, Maria	Contested Hearing - Spousal Property Petition	Appearance Required	Contested
VPR053982	In the Matter of Estudillo Ramirez, Maria	Contested Hearing - Probate	Appearance Required	Contested
VPR051795	In the Matter of Bertussi, Garryn Paul	Petition for Transfer Orders - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Notice of Withdrawal of Petition submitted to court
VPR054207	In the Matter of Tarvin, Diana	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054117	In the Matter of Madriz Raya, Manuel Jr	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing and Citation not filed. Investigation has not been completed
VPR054115	In the Matter of Emerick, Ralph Raymond	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Filed documents in order. Investigation has not been completed
VPR054152	In the Matter of Andrews, Vicki Darlene	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Conservator Screening Form (GC-314) not filed as required by CRC, rule 7.1050
VPR050525	In the Matter of Cartagena, Maria Carmen	OSC Hearing	Appearance Required	Second Accounting has not been filed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday,  November 5, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: regarding any surviving registered domestic partner. Publication Improper, filed 4/14/26: Published not in accordance with Probate C § 8120
PPR054240	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Roberto	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	In a Petition to Determine Succession to Real Property, all persons who are succeeding to the property must be listed as petitioners. Probate Code §13151, requires that the successors of the decedent must “join in the petition.”
PPR054348	In the Matter of Garcia, Magalena Maria	Spousal Property Hearing		Recommended for approval
PPR054364	In RE: The Suarez Family Trust Dated August 9, 2010	Petition Hearing		Recommended for approval

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
11/2/26 8:30 AM	Department  2	VPR054411	In the Matter of N.S.H.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person Required to be completed - Attendance of Guardianship Orientation and Declaration of Attendance needs to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding