Tentative Rulings

Civil Tentative Rulings and Probate Examiner Recommendations are available below. All attempts possible are made to have the information on these pages updated by 3:00pm the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.

Civil Tentative Rulings: The court does not issue tentative rulings on Writs of Attachment, Writs of Possession, Claims of Exemption, Claims of Right to Possession, Motions to Tax Costs After Trial, Motions for New Trial, or Motions to Continue Trial. Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308 and Local Rule 701, any party opposed to the tentative ruling must notify the court and other parties by 4:00 p.m. today of their intention to appear for oral argument. The court's notice must be made by facsimile (fax) to 559-733-6774; by email to research_attorney@tulare.courts.ca.gov; or by telephoning (559) 730-5010.

Probate Examiner Recommendations: For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at 559-730-5000 ext #1430. The Probate Calendar Clerk may be reached at 559-730-5000 Option 4, then Option 6. Note: The court does not issue probate examiner recommendations on petitions for approval of compromise of claim.

Civil Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, September 24, 2026 (Modified as to Dept. 19 only at 3:41 pm) are:

Re: Azevedo, Envy vs. Tulare Nursing & Rehabilitation Hospital, Inc.

Case No.: VCU293325

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Hearing re: Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: On September 17, 2026, the settlement administrator, through its case manager, filed a declaration as to the status of the distribution of the settlement fund. The administrator notes that the deadline to cash the settlement award check was August 11, 2025, that as of this date of this Declaration, 99 checks, totaling $7,166.70, remain uncashed. Further, on September 8, 2026, the amount of $7,166.70 was sent directly to the California State Controller’s Office - Unclaimed Property. Therefore, the Court finds the settlement has been distributed in full in accordance with the settlement in this matter. No appearances are required.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re: Covarrubias Gonzalez, Felisa vs. Case Vander Eyk Dairy, LLC et al

Case No.: VCU293120

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Hearing re: Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: Tentative Ruling: The Court’s file reflects no updated declaration from the settlement administrator as to the status of the distribution of the settlement. Therefore, the Court continues this matter to October 15, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders a supplemental declaration filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing.

Re: Bravo, Juan vs. Santana Rios Farm Labor

Case No.: VCU285413

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Hearing re: Distribution of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: On September 16, 2026, the settlement administrator, through its case manager, filed a declaration as to the status of the distribution of the settlement fund. The administrator notes that the Defendant deposited the first installment of $175,000.00 into the settlement fund on March 24, 2026. The second and third installments, each in the amount of $175,000.00, are due on March 2, 2027, and January 31, 2028, respectively. As such, the Court will continue this matter as to the status of the second installment to March 25, 2027; 8:30 am; D1. If the settlement administrator files a supplemental declaration, no appearances will be required and the Court will set a further status date at that time as to the third installment.

Re: Bermudez, Alejandro vs. Shannon Bros. Co.

Case No.: VCU301866

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the Final Compliance Hearing for April 8, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on September 24, 2026. The Court finds and rules as follows:

On August 18, 2026, the settlement administrator ILYM Group Inc., through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On March 2, 2026, the administrator received a mailing list of 458 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On March 16, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 458 members. 27 notices were returned and updated addresses for 13 were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, 14 notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until May 15, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Five (5) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, 441 Class Members or 96.3% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections. (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.)

A net settlement amount of $136,300 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $1,134.24, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $11.94, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $309.07.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133. This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert. The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33% of the gross settlement fund of $275,000 or $90,750. Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 167.25 hours on this case, at a rate of $495 per hour, providing a base lodestar of $112,620.71. (Declaration of Seligson ¶63.)

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $15,435.22, noting, however, that the parties agreed to costs not to exceed $15,000 (Declaration of Seligson ¶64.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $7,950. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable.

The settlement agreement designates Valley Children’s Healthcare Foundation as the designated cy pres beneficiary, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $275,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$90,750
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$15,000
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$50,000
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,950
Approved PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$20,000
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$136,300

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiffs on August 18, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for April 8, 2027; 8:30 am; D1.

Re: Acevedo, Claudia vs. Valley Healthcare Centers

Case No.: VCU319349

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval and CMC to October 8, 2026; 8:30 am; D1; to order a supplemental declaration as to the notice period, lodestar and presently incurred costs filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the continued hearing.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $212,000)

The gross settlement amount is $450,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 254 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $834.65 per member.

The Class Members consist of: all current and former hourly-paid or non-exempt employees of Defendant in California employed from March 20, 2021, through the date the Court grants Preliminary Approval or sixty (60) days after July 2, 2026, whichever is sooner.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: 1. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, and 1197]; 2. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194 and 1198]; 3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512]; 4. Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7]; 5. Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses [Cal. Lab. Code § 2802]; 6. Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203]; 7. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements [Cal. Lab. Code § 226]; 8. Unfair Business Practices [Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.]; and 9. Civil Penalties Under PAGA [Cal. Lab. Code § 2698, et seq.].

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Moon ¶¶30-43.) Plaintiff estimates the maximum recovery is $5,680,661.01. Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates a realistic recovery figure of $710,019.93.

After agreeing to participate in mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after mediation.

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $450,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$150,000
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$25,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$10,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs:	$8,000
Proposed Total PAGA Payment:	$45,000
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$212,000

2. Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions. Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 45 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period is therefore not approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable. It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3. Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Claudia Acevedo as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $450,000 or $150,000 and costs not to exceed $25,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $25,000 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended.

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5. Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Phoenix Class Action Administration Solutions as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court as well as the declaration of Jodey Lawrence, Phoenix’s President of Business Development. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $8,000.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Moon indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (s)(2).) ).) (Declaration of Moon ¶13 – Exhibit 3.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.) To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.” (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.)

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 254 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to October 8, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the notice period, lodestar and presently incurred costs filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the continued hearing.

Re: Scalia, Frank vs. Patel, Anilkumar K.

Case No.: VCU324378

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Defendant Patel’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, as to Plaintiff Scalia; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order responses no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling; to issue sanctions against Plaintiff Scalia, and counsel of record, in the amount of $560 due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling; to order Defendant to provide notice

Facts

On June 26, 2026, Defendant Patel electronically served Request for Production of Documents, Set Two, on Plaintiff Scalia. Responses were due no later than July 28, 2026.

On July 29, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to compel initial responses.

Further, Defendant seeks sanctions against Plaintiff and counsel of record, in the amount of $2,990 consisting of 7 hours at $250 per hour plus 2 hours at $350 per hour plus $60 filing fee for nine (9) separate motions. Defendant indicates this is time incurred as to 9 motions filed simultaneously.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s second set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

Sanctions

The Court will not award sanctions for this motion where Defendant’s declaration fails to itemize the time incurred on this motion specifically and, instead, bills for nine (9) separate motions.

The Court will award the $60 filing fee and 2 hours for this motion at the $250 per hour rate. The motion is deemed non-complex.

Therefore, the Court sanctions Plaintiff Scalia, and counsel of record, in the amount of $560 due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling.

Re: C.R. a Minor vs. Central Valley Christian School Society et al

Case No.: VCU319118

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs re: Enforcement of the Attorney Fee Award

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $230 in attorneys’ and $212 in costs.

Facts

On October 9, 2025, this Court granted Defendants Central Valley Christian School (CVC) and Blake Hiemstra’s (“Defendants”) motion for fees and costs, awarding $16,358 in fees and $64.87 in costs.

The proposed order granting the motion for fees lodged with the Court on September 12, 2025 did not reflect the Court’s adopted tentative ruling and was not signed by the Court.

Instead, the proposed order granting the motion for fees was lodged July 14, 2026 and signed the same day, as it reflected the Court’s ruling on October 9, 2025.

Thereafter, on July 28, 2026, an abstract of judgment was issued, with the entry of judgment date noted as July 14, 2026. (Abstract ¶8.a.)

On August 12, 2026, Defendants filed a memorandum of costs seeking $347.06 in costs consisting of $100 in filing and motion fees, $135.06 for electronic filing or service and $112 for recording of the abstract of judgment.

Further, on August 12, 2026, Defendants filed this motion for fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040, in the total amount of $9,032.00 in attorneys’ fees and $347.06 in costs.

Defendants indicate 39.2 hours incurred between November 10, 2025 and the filing of this motion August 12, 2026.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the costs are listed on an incorrect form, that there is no declaration sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080(b), that the hours incurred are duplicative, clerical or unnecessary to the judgment, including the 13.8 hours incurred preparing this motion.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 states:

“The judgment creditor is entitled to the reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law. Attorney’s fees incurred in enforcing a judgment are included as costs collectible under this title if the underlying judgment includes an award of attorney’s fees to the judgment creditor pursuant to subparagraph (A) of paragraph (10) of subdivision (a) of Section 1033.5.”

York v. Strong (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1477, citing to Ketchum v. Moses 24 Cal.4th 1122 noted:

“…our Supreme Court previously ruled in Ketchum that attorney fees incurred in an effort to enforce a fee judgment obtained under the anti-SLAPP law do qualify as recoverable costs under section 685.040: “Ketchum also asserts that Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 precludes an award of ‘collection’ fees. He is incorrect. The statute provides that attorney fees incurred in enforcement efforts ‘are not included in costs collectible under this title unless otherwise provided by law.’ Under its provisions, a litigant entitled to costs for successfully enforcing a judgment is entitled to costs, but not attorney fees unless there is some other legal basis for such an award. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c) provides a legal right to attorney fees, they are a permissible item of costs.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1141, fn. 6, first italics added.)”

Further, York noted:

“Moreover, the Supreme Court recently reiterated the same conclusion when it relied on the Ketchum footnote in Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602, 613–614 [174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 55, 328 P.3d 46]: “[W]e adhere to the reading we gave the statute in Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th 1122. … [W]hen a fee-shifting statute provides the substantive authority for an award of attorney fees, any such fees incurred in enforcement of the judgment are within the scope of section 685.040.”

As such, the Court agrees that Defendants are entitled to fees and costs incurred with respect to collection of the fees awarded as to the special motion to strike.

Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080 requires the following:

“(a) The judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by Section 685.040 by noticed motion. The motion shall be made before the judgment is satisfied in full, but not later than two years after the costs have been incurred. The costs claimed under this section may include, but are not limited to, costs that may be claimed under Section 685.070 and costs incurred but not approved by the court or referee in a proceeding under Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 708.010) of Division 2.

(b) The notice of motion shall describe the costs claimed, shall state their amount, and shall be supported by an affidavit of a person who has knowledge of the facts stating that to the person's best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied. The notice of motion shall be served on the judgment debtor. Service shall be made personally or by mail.

(c) The court shall make an order allowing or disallowing the costs to the extent justified under the circumstances of the case.”

Here, the motion is timely, but the Court agrees the initial declaration by Thies fails to attest that “…that to the person's best knowledge and belief the costs are correct, are reasonable and necessary, and have not been satisfied.” The declaration, however, does sufficiently described the itemized billing entries sufficiently.

As to the hours incurred, the Court’s plain language interpretation of this section is that there was no entry of judgment as to fees until, at the very earliest, July 14, 2026 when this Court signed the corrected order granting the motion reflecting the Court’s October 9, 2025 ruling.

In assessing attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), the court begins with “a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ ” (Ketchum v. Moses 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131-1132, citation omitted.)

“Under this method, a court assesses attorney fees by first determining the time spent and the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. [Citation.] The court next determines whether that lodestar figure should be adjusted based on various relevant factors [citation], including a plaintiff's limited success in the litigation [citations].” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342.)

Therefore, the Court starts by striking the hours incurred between November 10, 2025 and July 13, 2026, as no order granting the motion for fees had been entered and no judgment can be said to have been entered or subject to enforcement.

In examining, therefore, the hours incurred between July 14, 2026 and the filing of this motion, the Court breaks down the hours into three categories:

First, the Court notes 3 hours total between July 14, 2026 and July 29, 2026 by two attorneys as to research and preparation of the abstract of judgment, the recording thereof and review of the Court’s order (prepared by Defendants) granting the motion. The Court will strike the .6 hours incurred by Walker as duplicative and reduce the remaining 2.4 hours incurred by Thies to 1 (-.6 as to Walker; -1.4 as to Thies.) This reflects, in the Court’s opinion, reasonable time to review an order prepared by Defendants and prepare the abstract of judgment.

Second, the Court notes .3 incurred by Thies as to an email for which the remainder of the content is redacted. The Court will strike this entry. (-.3 as to Thies.)

Third, the Court notes the remaining 13.5 hours incurred by both attorneys solely as to this attorney fee motion to collect what is now 1 hour spent on enforcement of the judgment. In other words, the motion for fees incurred enforcing the judgment consists nearly entirely of its own filing.

The Court notes 5.2 hours incurred by Thies on July 30, 2026 to plan and prepare for the motion, to draft and revise the motion and draft and revise the declaration in support thereof. The Court will reduce these entries to .5 hour total (-4.7 as to Thies.)

Next, the Court notes 1.2 hours on July 31, 2026 as to the exhibit list and proposed order. The Court will reduce these entries to .5 hours total. (-.7 as to Thies.)

The remaining 7.1 hours incurred between August 3, 2026 and August 12, 2026 involve further drafting and revising of exhibits, the motion, the memorandum of costs and further review thereof. The Court starts by striking the 1.2 hours incurred by Walker on August 6 (-1.2 as to Walker) and reduces the remaining 5.9 hours to 0. (-5.9 as to Thies.)

The Court, therefore is inclined to award 1 hour as to the fee motion, the same time spent collecting the judgment, reduced by the Court above.

The rate of $230 is consistent with this Court’s prior attorney fee award.

Therefore, the Court awards $230 in attorneys fees as to enforcement of the attorney fee award.

The Court agrees that no award of fees may be ordered against Plaintiff’s counsel.

Costs

The memorandum of costs, filed on MC-010, seeks $347.06 in costs.

However, Plaintiff argues this is insufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.070, which requires the attestation under subsection (e), and which is found on MC-012, stating “The memorandum of costs shall contain the following statement: “The fees sought under this memorandum may be disallowed by a court upon a motion to tax filed by the debtor notwithstanding the fees having been included in the writ of execution.”

The Court, then, will evaluate the costs pursuant to post-judgment MC-012 form.

The $60 filing fee and $40 fee for issuance the abstract of judgment appear properly recoverable as “reasonable and necessary costs” incurred in enforcing the judgment. Likewise, the $112 incurred as to recording of the judgment is recoverable as to 1.a.(1), (2) (MC-012.)

However, fees for electronic filing, in the amount of $135.06 are recoverable expressly via the MC-012 and Defendants have identified no statute permitting such recovery. Th Court will not award the $135.06.

Therefore, the Court will award $212 in costs.

Re: Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.: Lead: VCU3245716; consolidated with PCU325122

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion to Quash Records Subpoenas

Tentative Ruling: The motion is granted as to the Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Fresno Escrow Inc. subpoenas and otherwise denied. Sanctions in the amount of $4,380 are awarded against moving parties and their counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2.

This is a motion to quash deposition subpoenas for production of business records under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1.

Moving parties are Ron Cook; Jennifer Cook; Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL); and CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms). Moving parties move to quash 15 deposition subpoenas served by Michael and Cynthia Graham for the production of records from the following non-parties: (1) Chicago Title Company; (2) Chicago Title Insurance Company; (3) Fidelity National Title Company of California; (4) Fidelity National Title Insurance Company; (5) Fidelity National Title; (6) Financial Title Company; (7) First American Title Company; (8) First American Title Guaranty Company; (9) Fresno Escrow Inc.; (10) Lawyers Title Company; (11) Lennar Title Inc., formerly known as North American Title; (12) Old Republic Title Company; (13) Placer Title Company; (14) Stewart Title of California; and (15) Trans-County Title Co.

As a preliminary matter, moving parties object to the Grahams’ subpoenas directed to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Fresno Escrow Inc. on the ground that they fail to request any documents. This is true. The Grahams acknowledge they inadvertently failed to include attachments to their subpoenas describing the records they sought and indicate the subpoenas “can be withdrawn and reissued” with the missing attachments. Accordingly, it is not in dispute that the motion to quash should be granted as to these subpoenas, and, therefore, it is. It is unfortunate that this issue was not, as it evidently could have been, addressed without the need for law and motion.

In any event, the remaining subpoenas include an identical description of documents that the Grahams direct to several deponents to produce. The Grahams demand from each deponent “all documents in [the deponent’s] possession, custody, or control relating to any real estate transaction, escrow, or title work involving” several described parcels of real property (over 20), “AND which involved any of” Michael and/or Cynthia Graham, Ronald Cook, Jennifer Cook, CAL, CA Farms, and/or Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity Farms). (Emphasis in original.)

ANALYSIS

Standards

“In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad. ‘[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action … if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010; see Davies v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 291, 301 [204 Cal. Rptr. 154, 682 P.2d 349] [‘discovery is not limited to admissible evidence’].) … Section 2017.010 and other statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 377.) This means that ‘disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it.’ (Id. at p. 378.)” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 [220 Cal.Rptr.3d 472, 398 P.3d 69].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 permits “the court, upon motion reasonably made by” “[a] party” (amongst others), to “make an order quashing [a] subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (Id., subd. (a).) “In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Ibid.)

Discussion

Moving parties scatter a litany of different objections to the Grahams’ serially deployed identical description of documents, without differentiation between the several deponents from whom documents are sought. None persuade this court that any of the targeted subpoenas should be quashed because the objections are transparently meritless.

Moving parties first object that the “request[s]” have “no limit as to time.” They contend that, because of this, the requests are overbroad, and because they are overbroad, that they do “not seek admissible evidence” and are “not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.” It does not follow, of course, that all records sought by a subpoena are not admissible evidence or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence merely because the request for them was overbroad, but that does not particularly matter here.

More fundamentally, moving parties entirely fail to explain why the lack of a “limit as to time” renders the several “request[s]” challenged overbroad. Instead, they merely state “[t]he request[s] [have] no limit as to time,” and “[are] therefore”—by virtue of that alone—“overbroad as to time.”

The requests are not obviously overbroad merely incident to lacking a “limit as to time.” Without more, moving parties’ contention is without merit. As the Grahams point out, the records demanded are limited to “documents … relating to any real estate transaction, escrow, or title work involving” both specifically described parcels of real property” and specifically listed persons who are parties to this case.

Moving parties next contend the requests are “overbroad, and irrelevant, in that [they] seek[] information regarding real properties for which no reference can be found in the pleadings of either Case No.: VCU324716 or Case No.: PCU325122.” The objection is also not persuasive.

As the Grahams’ point out, there is no strict requirement that discovery can only be sought for “information regarding real properties for which … reference can be found in the pleadings.” Counsel for the Grahams avers, moreover, that each of the parcels listed in the serially used description of documents demanded was found, in the course of their investigative efforts, to have appeared “in one or more recorded instruments or in documents produced in these consolidated actions in connection with a transaction in which Ron Cook, Corporate America Lending, Inc., or CA Farms, LLC solicited, obtained, or applied funds advanced by the Grahams.” Presumably, moving parties could have easily identified specific reasons why one or more of the parcels listed by the Grahams are irrelevant to the claims in this case, and the court can only assume they did not because they cannot.

Moving parties additionally submit a perfunctory privacy objection. First, they paraphrase various statements of law concerning the right of privacy in personal records; then they conclude with single, flat assertion: “Here, the Cook Parties have a right of privacy to the financial information they disclosed to the escrow agents, title insurance companies, and/or title companies.”

Perhaps they do. Clearly proclaimed in cases the moving parties cite: “A constitutional amendment adopted in 1974 elevated the right of privacy to an ‘inalienable right’ expressly protected by force of constitutional mandate [citing Cal. Const., art. I, § 1],” which “extends to one’s confidential financial affairs as well as to the details of one's personal life” (Valley Bank of Nev. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656 [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977]), and “protects against the unwarranted, compelled disclosure of various private or sensitive information regarding one's personal life [citation], including his or her financial affairs [citation]” (Hooser v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 997, 1003-1004 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 341]).

It is not enough, however, for moving parties simply to identify their constitutional right to privacy in personal/financial records and state that they “have” such right with respect to records of this type sought in discovery. Instead, “[t]he party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.)

Moving parties fail to do so here. They do not even make any attempt. As the Grahams point out, moving parties only submit a declaration by their counsel establishing that the 15 subpoenas at issue were issued, and that copies of those subpoenas attached to the declaration are “true and correct cop[ies].”

This objection, then, is also without merit.

Beyond this, moving parties assert objections in which they have no stake. They contend the subpoenas are unduly burdensome and oppressive, despite that they direct production of records by others; and they contend the privacy rights of third parties are implicated without reference to any interest in the protection of those rights. Of course, these objections are also meritless.

Moving parties present no meritorious argument in support of their motion. Except with respect to the subpoenas directed to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and Fresno Escrow Inc., their motion is denied.

The Grahams, in their opposition, request sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2. Subdivision (a) of that section provides, in relevant part: “[I]n making an order pursuant to motion made under … Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in … opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made … in bad faith or without substantial justification … .”

The court finds the motion to quash was made in bad faith and without substantial justification.

It is not merely that moving parties present objections without merit, it is that they present them—several, in fact—without any attempt even to support them. It is, accordingly, easy to conclude that the instant motion was made “without substantial justification.” The motion’s focus was transparently only to identify grounds that would trigger responsive efforts, without any effort to show merit to the grounds asserted. The only discernable motivation for such approach is bad faith; to force the Grahams to respond to as many legal issues as possible with as little affirmative effort to put them at issue as possible. The court recognizes the motion to quash was successful with respect to two of the 15 subpoenas challenged, but this does not establish substantial justification or good faith. It might, if the motion were so limited to those two subpoenas, but it was not.

The court further finds the Grahams request for $4,380 in reasonable attorney’s fees, representing 12 hours of attorney time, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate of $365 per hour, is appropriate. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 198, 997 P.2d 511].) The court finds 12 hours is a reasonable amount of time with respect to the Grahams’ opposition, which included an opposition brief, and declarations in support both by the Grahams’ counsel and Michael Graham. The court additionally finds $365 is within the range of reasonable rates in the area for attorneys of commensurate ability as attorney Jendian, particularly given the complicated nature of this litigation.

Finally, the court agrees that it is appropriate to order these sanctions payable jointly and severally by the moving parties and their counsel. The court agrees with the Grahams that moving parties’ motion presents as part of a troubling theme of demands by at least some of these moving parties “for sweeping relief” that are “unsupported by evidence or law.” What’s more, while the decision to advance meritless arguments in a motion to quash may, in many cases, be properly attributed to a client, particularly, for example, where facts supplied by a client as a basis for relief prove to be insufficient or otherwise inadequate, the decision to advance meritless arguments without any factual support or justification cannot be attributed to the client alone. An attorney is responsible for knowing, and, indeed, certifies when submitting a pleading, that it is not being presented for an improper purpose; that legal contentions submitted in a motion must be warranted by the law or a nonfrivolous extension, modification or reversal of it; and that factual contentions asserted have evidentiary support. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7.)

Accordingly, the court orders the $4,380 in sanctions awarded payable jointly by the moving parties and their counsel.

Re: State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Alexander, Dominique

Case No.: VCU294631

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Motion for Entry of Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment in the amount of $49,402.07.

Facts

In this insurance subrogation matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant for payments made by Plaintiff under its policy, paid to or on behalf of its insured and the driver and/or passengers in the vehicle the sum of $53,908.62.

On October 6, 2023, the parties filed a stipulation as to resolution of this matter as follows:

“The parties agree the above captioned matter is settled in the amount of $7,837.00

A. Insurance carrier of Defendant, Kemper Insurance Company, shall pay the balance of the policy limit available to Defendant under the policy of insurance issued by Kemper Insurance Company in the amount of $4,837.00.

B. Upon Plaintiff’s receipt of the limits funds of $4,837.00, Kemper Insurance Company or its affiliated insurance companies have no duty to defend or indemnify Dominique Alexander with respect to any proceeding to enforce this Stipulation; for any claims of breached obligation that may exist under this Stipulation; or for any damages arising out of such breach.

C. Defendant shall pay the remaining balance of $3,000.00 in the following manner: Defendant shall make payments of $50.00 per month, beginning May 1, 2024 with each payment being due, consecutively, on the fifteenth (15th) day of each month thereafter until the balance of $3,000.00 is paid in full.

D. If all payments are made as set forth above, then the payments will be interest free…”

The stipulation further states “Should Defendant fail to make the payment, as agreed, on the first (1st) day of each month, he/she will be deemed to be in default of this agreement, and Plaintiff may immediately cause Judgment to be entered pursuant to the terms set forth in this Stipulation for the full amount of $53,908.62, less any monies paid by Defendant and Kemper Insurance Company to date of the breach…”

Further, the stipulation states “It is further stipulated and agreed that, in the event of an uncured default in payments as provided herein, the judgment shall be entered pursuant to this Stipulation is deemed reasonably related to the breach of this Stipulation and the losses sustained by Plaintiff as plead in the underlying cause(s) of action and therefore does not amount to an unenforceable penalty, and defendant(s) voluntarily disclaim and waive any rights or benefits under the holding in Greentree Financial Group, Inc., v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495, and any other similar law, which states in essence that an acceleration clause seeking a judgment amount that exceeds the damages arising strictly from a breach of the minimum payment stream called for herein may be deemed an unenforceable penalty.”

Further, that if the Court dismisses the matter, the Court shall retain jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

This matter was dismissed pursuant to the stipulation on October 23, 2023.

On August 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for relief from dismissal and for entry of judgment in the amount of $60,762.55, comprised of the principal settlement amount, plus interest accrued thereon at 7% per annum, court costs, and attorney’s fees, less payments received from Defendant and Defendant’s insurance carrier.

Plaintiff seeks costs in the amount of $580.45, including a $471.45 filing fee for Plaintiff’s initial Complaint, a $49.00 service of process fee, and a $60.00 motion fee.

Plaintiff seeks interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287(a) and the stipulated agreement.

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,632.16 based on the Court’s “default” schedule for attorneys’ fees in Appendix 8 of its Local Rules.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states:

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

However, the issue for the Court is whether entry of the judgment as requested is proper as to the principal amount or whether it is an unenforceable penalty. The starting point for this issue appears to be Greentree Financial Group, Inc. v. Execute Sports, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 495.

Greentree

In Greentree, the plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract for failure to pay $45,000 due under the contract. (Id. at 498.) The parties resolved this dispute via stipulation for entry of judgment providing that defendant would pay $20,000 in two installments of $15,000 and $5,000. (Id.) Further, if the defendant defaulted on either installment, the plaintiff would be entitled to have judgment entered for the amount prayed for in the complaint, plus interest, attorney fees and costs, less any amounts already paid. (Id. at 498.) The defendant defaulted on the first payment, and the plaintiff sought entry of judgment pursuant to the stipulation. (Id.) The trial court entered judgment in the amount of $61,232.50, consisting of the $45,000 prayed for in the complaint, plus $13,912.50 in prejudgment interest, $2,000 in attorney fees, and $320 in costs. (Id.) The defendant argued at the appellate level that the judgment of $61,232.50 for failure to make a $15,000 payment constitutes enforcement of an illegal penalty. (Id. at 498-499.)

The appellate court, agreeing with the defendant, interpreted the stipulation as an unenforceable liquidated damages clause that effectively imposed $61,232.50 in liquidated damages for breach of the defendant's obligation to pay $15,000 as follows:

“Greentree and ESI did not attempt to anticipate the damages that might flow from a breach of the stipulation. Rather, they simply selected the amount Greentree had claimed as damages in the underlying lawsuit, plus prejudgment interest, attorney fees, and costs. But the appellate record contains nothing showing Greentree's chances of complete success on the merits of its case—the record contains only the complaint, the answer, and the stipulation. In the stipulation, ‘[e]ach party disclaims any admission of wrongdoing, fault, liability, or violation of law.’ The lack of a guarantee of success at trial may explain, at least in part, why Greentree was willing to accept in settlement less than half the amount demanded in the complaint.

Also, the $ 61,232.50 amount in the judgment bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages the parties could have anticipated from a breach of the stipulation to settle the dispute for $20,000. ‘[D]amages for the withholding of money are easily determinable—i.e., interest at prevailing rates…’ [citation omitted.] The amount of the judgment, however, was more than triple the amount for which the parties agreed to settle the case.” (Id. at 499-500.)

The court in Greentree noted that the validity of a liquidated damages provision is governed by section 1671, subdivision (b) and that “‘A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671[, subdivision] (b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.’” (Id. at 499.) Damages for failing to pay money are “‘easily determinable’” and are limited to “‘interest at [the] prevailing rate[]’” and (perhaps) “reasonable costs [incurred] in pursuing the payment.” (Id. at 500.)

Here, however, by contrast, the stipulation states “It is further stipulated and agreed that, in the event of an uncured default in payments as provided herein, the judgment shall be entered pursuant to this Stipulation is deemed reasonably related to the breach of this Stipulation and the losses sustained by Plaintiff as plead in the underlying cause(s) of action…”

Further, the stipulation notes the parties have agreed that “Plaintiff has paid out $53,908.62 in property damages, and is seeking recovery of the monies paid in the amount of $53,908.62.” This appears sufficient to distinguish the case before the Court and Greentree.

In Creditors Adjustment Bureau, the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of a commercial lease, and the parties acknowledged the amount due under the lease was $251,200.13, via stipulation for entry of judgment (Id. at 134-135.) Specifically, the stipulation stated “’…In such event, judgment shall be immediately entered in the sum of $251,200.13 together with reasonable attorneys fees in favor of [respondent] and against [appellant], … less any sums received by [respondent].’” (Id. at 134.)
Defendant was to pay $30,000 in 24 monthly installments, and if he defaulted, judgment would be entered in the full amount due under the lease. (Id. at 134.) The defendant defaulted, and judgment was entered against him for $251,200.13. (Id. at 135.)

The defendant argued the judgment was void because it imposed an unenforceable liquidated damages in an amount that bore no reasonable relationship to the damages the parties could have anticipated would be caused by his failure to pay the settlement amount. (Id. at 135–136.) The appellate court found that the “appellant's admission in the stipulation that he did not dispute the amount of the stipulated judgment and that $251,200.13 was in fact due and owing on the lease” was critical in determining that “that appellant was not compromising a disputed claim when he signed the stipulation.” (Id. at 136-137.) The appellate court noted that “We cannot isolate the relevant breach of contract as only the breach of settlement agreement … and excluding the underlying contract.” (Id. at 136.)

Again, the stipulated admissions by the defendant in Creditors Adjustment Bureau include the fact that $251,200.13 was “not arbitrarily drawn from thin air. It is the actual and stipulated amount of damages.” (Id. at 136.) “Respondent correctly relies upon appellant's admission in the stipulation that he did not dispute the amount of the stipulated judgment and that $251,200.13 was in fact due and owing on the lease.” (Id.)

The court concluded that “Nothing in [Greentree]…compel[s] a contrary conclusion. Why? Those cases involved disputed claims and here, appellant admitted owing the $251,200.13 as unpaid rent, i.e., damages. Appellant's financial wound was self-inflicted.” (Id. at 137.)

As such, the Court finds this matter closer to Creditors Adjustment Bureau and therefore it has a sufficient basis to enter judgment in the principal amount of $53,908.62 as contemplated by the stipulation.

Interest

The only reference to interest is as follows: “D. If all payments are made as set forth above, then the payments will be interest free.”

This, in the Court’s view, is insufficient to award prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3287(a). Prejudgment interest is an element of damages, and as such, a settlement agreement is presumed to embody the parties' mutual agreement of the amount that the adequately compensate a plaintiff in exchange for a release of claims. (BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1220, 1225-26 ("We disagree that Civil Code section 3287 authorizes an award of prejudgment interest on a judgment entered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 where, as here, the parties have reached their own agreement about what compensation is owed for damages that would otherwise be addressed by an award of prejudgment interest.”)

As such, the Court will not award interest.

Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff seeks fees pursuant to this Court’s default fee schedule found in Appendix 8 of its Local Rules. However, this section states:

“Exclusive of costs, the following counsel fees will be awarded under normal circumstances in a default action on a promissory note or contract providing for the payment of counsel fees:

25% of the first $5,000 with a minimum fee of $250

10% of the amount over $5,000

In any default action when the attorneys’ fees requested exceed $7,500.00, a prove up hearing may be required to establish the reasonableness of the requested fees.”

The Court does not consider this a “default action.” Rather, Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement. No default has been entered as to Defendant and no default judgment has arisen from this matter.

The Court, therefore, denies the request for attorneys’ fees.

Costs

The Court will award the remainder of the costs as requested in the amount of $580.45.

Summary

Therefore, the Court will enter judgment in the amount of $49,402.07 which is comprised of the principal settlement amount of $53,908.62, plus court costs of $580.45, less payments received from Defendant and Defendant’s insurance carrier of $5,087.00.

Re: Aranda, Heriberto vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange

Case No.: VCU333367

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Defendant’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 13 admitted; To impose sanctions against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $650.00 due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling; Defendant is ordered to provide notice.

Facts

On or about June 9, 2026, Defendant served, by electronic mail, Requests for Admissions, Set One on Plaintiff via counsel. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Defendant. Defendant now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 13 admitted.

No opposition appears filed. Defendant has filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Plaintiff has failed to serve a timely response and Defendant has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 13 of Defendant’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c), Defendant seeks sanctions in the amount of $797.50, consisting of 2.5 hours at the rate of $295 per hour plus a sixty dollar filing fee. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion deem admissions admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

The Court will award 2 hours at the rate of $295 plus the $60 filing fee and order sanctions imposed against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally in the amount of $650.00 due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling. Defendant is ordered to provide notice.

Re: Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.: VCU313509

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion: Continued Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: To continue the motion to October 15, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and order the notice of related case filed in VCU332655, the notice of this motion filed in VCU332655 and the proposed order filed in both VCU313509 and VCU332655;

Facts and Analysis

The Court, at the prior hearing, noted its inclination to grant the motion to consolidate this matter and VCU332655 upon the filing of the notice of related case in VCU332655, the notice of this motion in VCU332655 and the proposed order re: consolidation in both VCU332655 and this matter, VCU313509. The Court’s file reflects no updated filings.

The Court, therefore, continues this matter to October 15 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders Plaintiffs to file:

the notice of related case in VCU332655;
the notice of this motion in VCU332655; and
the proposed order in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

Re: Pelorus Fund LOC, LLC vs. Mogul Investments LLC

Case No.: VCU327181

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion: Continued Motion for Approval of Sale

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, Plaintiff sought judicial foreclosure and specific performance of loan documents, appointment of a receiver and injunctive relief as to real property located at 34368 Road 196, Woodlake, California 93286 and undeveloped, vacant land in Woodlake, California 93286 (the “Property”).

Ryan Baker was appointed on November 6, 2025 by this Court as Receiver in this matter.

Baker indicates that the Property is improved with cannabis cultivation facilities, including twelve (12) flowering rooms totaling approximately 15,000 square feet of canopy space, greenhouse structures, and associated infrastructure. However, Baker also indicates that, on the same day of the appointment and upon inspecting the Property, ten to fifteen people were actively stripping the Property of equipment and other assets. The cultivation facility had been stripped of all equipment, including lighting, HVAC systems, irrigation infrastructure, and processing equipment and there were no employees, no plants, no inventory, and no ongoing operations.

Baker further indicates that the Receivership Estate holds three active state cannabis licenses issued by the California Department of Cannabis Control: (i) CCL19-0002610 (Cultivation – Medium Indoor), expiring February 6, 2027; (ii) C9-0000568-LIC (Retailer – Non-Storefront), expiring May 11, 2027; and (iii) C11-0000873-LIC (Distributor), expiring July 21, 2026. In addition, the Estate holds four local cannabis licenses issued by the City of Woodlake: (i) 18-0001 (Cultivation); (ii) 18-002 (Manufacturing); (iii) 18-003 (Distribution); and (iv) 21-006 (Non Storefront Retail.)

Further, that Baker successfully renewed the cultivation license in February 2026 and the non storefront retail license in May 2026, and continues to work with the DCC to obtain access to the retail and distribution licenses, which remain associated with legacy Bureau of Cannabis Control accounts.

Baker indicates these licenses are significant assets of the Estate, but require continued preservation, including $309,000 in unpaid cultivation taxes, $35,044.61 in unpaid regulatory fees, $400 in LiveScan fees, $4,471.82 in unpaid trash fees, and additional unknown retail, distribution, and manufacturing taxes.

Further, delinquent property taxes on the Property total approximately $71,654.92, plus additional accrued penalties and default interest.

The Property is also subject to multiple deeds of trust and other encumbrances, including by Plaintiff Pelorus Fund LOC, LLC who holds the senior deed of trust.

Further, junior liens include deeds of trust in favor of Collect Access LLC ($250,000, Instrument No. 2022 0050714) and Jaskum Singh Briana ($200,000 and $100,000, Instrument Nos. 2023-0051379 and 2023-0051380, respectively). A UCC Financing Statement was filed by AGRI-BEST FINANCIAL in 2008, however no continuation statement appears of record.

The Estate generates no operating revenue. In April 2026, cash receipts totaled $18,952.85 and consisted solely of funding from Plaintiff, while disbursements totaled $11,624.83 for fire monitoring, insurance, utilities, and bank fees.

Baker has sought additional funding from Plaintiff to cover current and prior operating costs, engage engineering to comply with the City’s CUP requirements, and pay utilities, insurance, and professional fees.

Baker utilized Green Life Business Group (“GLBG”), a firm that specializes in selling cannabis licenses and real estate, to market and solicit buyers for the licenses and Property. Initially, Plaintiff initially made a credit bid of $4,000,000 and a third party made a bid of $5,000,000. Thereafter, Plaintiff increased its credit bid to $5,100,000 and Plaintiff was the prevailing buyer. No cash changes hands at closing as the purchase price reduces Plaintiff’s outstanding claims by $5,100,000. The transaction is structured as a sale of substantially all assets of the Receivership Estate.

Baker indicates Plaintiff’s credit bid is in the best interest of the estate because: (a) the business is defunct with no prospect of generating revenue; (b) the Property is incurring ongoing costs that deplete the Estate; (c) the cannabis licenses and CUP require continued funding and regulatory attention to avoid loss of value; (d) the credit bid eliminates financing risk and ensures certainty of closing; (e) the Property was broadly marketed through GLBG, and the only third-party bid received was $5,000,000, which Plaintiff exceeded; and (f) the alternative, continued deterioration of the assets, license jeopardy, and further depletion of the Estate’s limited cash, would result in even greater loss to the Estate and its creditors.

Baker seeks approval of the sale that includes lien stripping pursuant to this Court’s equitable authority and Code of Civil Procedure section 568.5.

Further, Baker requests authority to borrow funds and issue super property receiver certificates in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $500,000, only if and to the extent necessary to fund costs and expenses of the Receivership Estate. Baker indicates this is a reasonable estimate of the maximum funding that may be required through closing and the post-closing period and that Baker would not draw on this amount unless and until receivership costs require it pursuant to the authority in paragraph 9(k) of the Receivership Order.

On November 16, 2026, Third-Party in Interest Collect Access LLC filed an opposition to this motion. Much of the opposition notes Collect’s lack of timely notice of this continued hearing date and that Collect has had insufficient time to prepare a complete opposition to the motion, including challenges to the bidding and sale process.

Collect notes the proposed sale price is approximately 70% below the appraised value, that the Receiver’s real estate agent failed to return calls by Satinder Singh Malhi, and that its interest will not be protected by the proposed sale.

Collect indicates that it received notice of this hearing on September 8, 2026, which is 11 court days prior to the hearing date of September 24, 2026. Collect notes no order shortening time was entered when setting this continued hearing date.

However, on reply, Baker provides declarations of its counsel and of himself. Counsel for Baker notes “In addition to serving the complete Sale Motion papers on Collect Access by FedEx Priority Overnight on August 27, 2026, with confirmed delivery on August 28, 2026.” (Declaration of Bistritz ¶3.)

The Court finds the motion was timely served on Collect and finds no basis to continue this motion.

As such, the Court will proceed with analysis of the motion.

Matters related to receiverships rest in the Court's sound discretion and are "afforded considerable deference on review." (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 905, 931.) In exercising such discretion, the Court considers all material facts and evidence and "…applies legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent, and just decision. ... Where there is no evidence of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, the court has wide discretion in approving the receiver's proposed actions." (County of Sonoma v. Quail (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 696, 671.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 568 states “The receiver has, under the control of the court, power to bring and defend actions in his own name, as receiver; to take and keep possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, to compound for and compromise the same, to make transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may authorize.”

Further, section 568.5 states “A receiver may, pursuant to an order of the court, sell real or personal property in the receiver’s possession upon the notice and in the manner prescribed by Article 6 (commencing with Section 701.510) of Chapter 3 of Division 2 of Title 9. The sale is not final until confirmed by the court.”

Prior to authorizing an involuntary sale, “The receiver here had to establish actual, not imaginary, necessity for the sale… and also needed to demonstrate the sale had to be consummated at that time.” (Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown Development Corp. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 268, 276, FN7.) Further, "The receiver has the affirmative duty to endeavor to realize the largest amount from the sale of the receivership property." (Id., FN8.)

“‘Generally speaking if no good reason appears for refusing to confirm a receiver's sale, such as chilling of bids or other misconduct or gross inadequacy of price, the sale should be confirmed. . . . The order of confirmation gives the judicial sanction of the court, and when made, it relates back to the time of sale and cures all defects and irregularities except those founded in want of jurisdiction of the persons or the subject matter, or in fraud. The court has power to confirm the sale although the terms of the decree of sale may not have been strictly followed. The matter of confirmation rests upon the sound discretion of the appointing court to be judicially exercised in view of all the surrounding facts and circumstances and in the interest of fairness, justice and rights of the respective parties.’” (People v. Riverside University (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 572, 582.)

Here, Baker has sufficiently set forth the bid process, the estimated value of the Receivership Estate and the necessity to confirm this sale to preclude further loss to the property, including loss of the cannabis licenses and related land-use approvals.

The Receiver also declares that Rebecca Meekma, the Receiver’s project manager, on June 17, 2026, “emailed Mr. Malhi directly. She provided the listing link on greenlifebusiness.com, confirmed that while operations at the Property had ceased, the licenses remained current, and asked Mr. Malhi to schedule a tour for the following week. Mr. Malhi did not respond.” (Reply Declaration of Baker ¶4.) Further, that Meekma followed up with two emails, for which Malhi failed to respond. (Reply Declaration of Baker ¶¶5, 6.)

As such, the Court does not find the argument that the Receiver lacked responsiveness to potential buyers a valid basis to deny this motion.

Further, the Court has the power to order the sale of property free and clear of liens and encumbrances. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 670, 684.) Here, the proposed sale will result in the extinguishment of Plaintiff’s lien, as well as three junior liens. As Plaintiff is the bidder on the sale, there appears no objection to lien stripping the first priority lien. The Receiver further indicates that the junior liens were acquired after Plaintiff’s first priority lien and without the authorization or consent of Plaintiff.

In any event, the sale price, a credit bid, is insufficient to cover these junior liens. Such is the risk where a lender is in a subordinate position and lends funds secured by the property. As Baker argues in the reply “It is a consequence of Collect Access’s junior position behind more than $12 million in senior debt.”

As to the accrued property taxes on APN 059-090-002 and APN 059-090-049 totaling approximately $71,654.92 at the time of the Receiver’s appointment, plus additional accrued penalties and default interest, the Court notes no objections from the taxing authorities.

As to any taxes accruing after appointment of the Receiver, the Court approves the payment of such taxes from the funds to be borrowed by the receiver for which issue super property receiver certificates in an aggregate principal amount not to exceed $500,000 are issued.

The Court will authorize the receiver’s certificates as requested under Code of Civil Procedure section 568.

The Court will order the Receiver to execute the necessary documents and discharge following completion of post-closing obligations or nine (9) months after closing, whichever occurs first.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will sign the proposed order lodged with this Court on July 17, 2026.

Re: In the Matter of Micaela Gomez Living Trust

Case No.: PPR053973

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Maria Gomez Sanchez’s Continued Motion for Order Voiding Judgment and Confirming Existence of Trust and Directing Conveyance of Real Property to Trust

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and void the judgment in this matter; to deny the motion as to confirmation of the existence of the trust, directing conveyance of property and the Probate Code section 859 damages; to conduct a case management conference as to the setting of an evidentiary hearing as to Sonia Lozano’s petition to invalidate the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds.

Facts re: Petition for Non-Existence of Trust

On March 2, 2026, Petitioner Sonia Lozano filed a verified petition for order approving termination of trust, to reallocate trust property and for non-existence of trust under Probate Code sections 15403 and 17200(b).

The petition states Micaela Gomez, Trustee of the Micaela Gomez Living Trust, (“Decendent”) passed away on October 03, 2025. (Petition ¶1.)

Further, that on May 24, 2022, Quitclaim Deed, Document 2022 0033487 was recorded transferring decedents primary residence, real property commonly known as: 16554 Dillon Ave, Visalia, California 93292, APN 111-202-029-000 (“Subject Property”) to the “Micaela Gomez Living Trust, dated April 12, 2022” (“Trust”). (Petition ¶2.)

The petition further alleged that there was no known record of the Trust and no known will for Decedent, despite a search of Decedent’s personal property. (Petition ¶¶3-5.)

The Petition indicates personal service pursuant to Probate Code section 851 “on all parties” as to the following:

Sonia Lozano, Petitioner 373 E. Worth Ave. Porterville, CA 93257
Guadalupe Gomez 8781 Emerald Rd. Sunnyside, WA 98944
Maria Elva Gomez 4021 NE 65'" Ave. Vancouver, WA 98661
Maria Elena Gomez Navarro 12707 SE Bobby Bruce Ln. Boring, OR 97009
Maria De Jesus Gomez 523 N. Angelino Ave Azusa, CA 91702
Jose Gomez Navarro 100 Tuttle Rd. Grandview, WA 98930
Aurelio Gomez Navarro 6978 Hannegan Rd. Lynden, WA 98264
Ricardo Gomez 1035 W 15th Pl Kennewick, WA 99337
Griselda Gomez 1035 W. 15th Pl Kennewick, WA 99337

On April 24, 2026, this Court entered an order terminating the trust and relocating the Subject Property from the Trust, and for the non-existence of the Trust.

Facts re: Intestate Sucesssion Petition by Lozano - PPR054058

On April 23, 2026, Sonia Lozano filed a separate action in PPR054058 to determine succession to the Subject Property as a primary residence.

The PPR054058 matter noted nine (9) heirs the estate:

1. Sonia Lozano 373 E. Worth Ave. Porterville, CA 93257

2. Guadalupe Gomez 8781 Emerald Rd. Sunnyside, WA 98944

3. Maria Elva Gomez 4021 NE 65'" Ave. Vancouver, WA 98661

4. Maria Elena Gomez Navarro 25120 145th PI SE Monroe, WA 98272

5. Maria De Jesus Gomez 523 N. Angelino Ave. Azusa, CA 91702

6. Jose Gomez Navarro 100 Tuttle Rd. Grandview, WA 98930

7. Aurelio Gomez Navarro 6978 Hannegan Rd. Lynden, WA 98264

8. Ricardo Gomez 1035 W. 158 Pl. Kennewick, WA 99337

9. Griselda Gomez 1035 W. 15M Pl. Kennewick, WA 99337

Further, the PPR054058 petition attached assignment of entire interest in the estate documents for 2. Guadalupe Gomez, 3. Maria Elva Gomez, 4. Maria Elena Gomez Navarro, 5. Maria De Jesus Gomez, 6. Jose Gomez Navarro 7. Aurelio Gomez Navarro, 8. Ricardo Gomez and 9.Griselda Gomez.

Likewise, notice of the hearing on the petition in PPR054058 was provided to those nine (9) persons, including Sonia Lozano, listed above at the same addresses provided.

On May 28, 2026, this Court entered an order determining succession to the Subject Property in PPR054058 in favor of Sonia Lozano.

Facts re: Motion to Void Judgment by Maria Gomez Sanchez

On July 27, 2026, Maria Gomez Sanchez filed this motion to void judgment entered in this matter as to the determination no trust existed and to direct conveyance of the Subject Property to the Trust.

The facts stated in the motion are verified by Maria Gomez Sanchez and state that Maria Gomez Sanchez is the duly appointed and currently serving trustee of the Trust created by Decedent via written declaration. (Motion ¶¶1, 2 – Ex. A.) Maria Gomez Sanchez indicates she was appointed as primary successor trustee upon the death of the Decedent and that the Trust became irrevocable upon Decedent’s passing. (Motion ¶¶4, 5.)

The motion further states Decedent acquired title the Subject Property in 1996 via a grant deed and that on May 22, 2022, Decedent recorded a quitclaim deed transferring the Property to the Trust. (Motion ¶¶8-10 – Exs. C and D.)

The motion further notes that Maria Gomez Sanchez, sister of Sonia Lozano and daughter of Decedent, is not on the list of persons provided notice of the Petition in this matter. (Motion ¶¶14, 16, 17.)

The motion notes that Maria Gomez Sanchez was not on the list of persons provided notice in PPR054058 and that no assignment of interest was executed by Maria Gomez Sanchez or attached to the petition in PPR054058. (Motion ¶19-24.)

Therefore, the motion seeks to void the judgment and orders in this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d)

The response and petition in opposition by Sonia Lozano does not appear to address the service and notice issues, but instead seeks to invalidate the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds.

Authority and Analysis

Voiding the Judgment

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) provides:

The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.

In Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020 the appellate court described the process for a Section 473(d) determination as follows:

“In determining whether an order is void for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid through consideration of extrinsic evidence. This distinction may be important in a particular case because it impacts the procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the judgment [or order] is void. [Citation.] An order is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence. [Citation] ["[t]o prove that the judgment is void [on its face], the party challenging the judgment is limited to the judgment roll, i.e., no extrinsic evidence is allowed"]; [Citation.] There is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face. [Citations.] If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity. [Citation.]”

In Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 450, fn. 4, the court noted:

The items comprising the judgment roll in a probate action are defined in Probate Code section 1242 in pertinent part as follows: "The following papers, without being attached together, shall constitute the judgment roll in the proceedings mentioned in this code:

"1. The petition or application or contest or report or account which initiates a particular proceeding; any order directing notice to be given of the hearing thereof; any notice of the hearing thereof, or any order to show cause made thereon, with the affidavits showing such publication, posting or mailing of the notice or order as may be required by law or the order of the court; the citation, in case no answer or written opposition is filed by a party entitled, by law or order of court, to notice of the proceeding by citation, with the affidavit or proof of service thereof, and if service of such citation is made by publication, the affidavit for such publication and the order directing publication; any finding of the court or referee therein; the order or judgment made or rendered therein; and the letters testamentary or of administration, if any." (Italics in original.)

The court in Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 182, 186 noted that a judgment may be void “…because the judgment or order violated a party's due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heard. (§ 473, subd. (d) ....)”

Here, a review of the judgment roll, including the Petition itself indicates to the Court that moving party Maria Gomez Sanchez did not receive notice of the Petition in this matter. The response appears to concede no such service or notice was provided, arguing instead that the Trust should be invalidated due to capacity and undue influence, which necessarily recognizes the existence of the Trust.

As such, the judgment is void.

Probate Code section 859 and the Petition by Sonia Lozano to Invalidate Trust

Probate Code section 859 states:

“If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to a conservatee, a minor, an elder, a dependent adult, a trust, or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered by an action under this part. In addition, except as otherwise required by law, including Section 15657.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the person may, in the court’s discretion, be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The remedies provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies available in law to a person authorized to bring an action pursuant to this part.”

“The language of Probate Code section 859 is not ambiguous in specifying when a bad faith finding is necessary for double damages." (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1128.) "The statutory language contains three different . . . categories of conduct that can support double damages, each of which is separated by the conjunction 'or.' The first two categories require a separate finding of bad faith but the third one . . . does not." (Id. at 1128-1129.) Under the third category, therefore, double damages may be awarded without a finding of bad faith if the property was taken, concealed, or disposed of through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse as defined in section 15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Id. at 1128-1130.)

“Section 859 also applies to real property…Suppose a petitioner seeks to recover title to residential real estate valued at $100,000. If he prevails, the trial court will order the necessary reconveyance of title. If the opposing party acted in bad faith when transferring title to herself, she will be liable for $200,000.”
(Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1074.)

At oral argument at the initial hearing on this matter, counsel for Sonia Lozano requested that this Court set over the issues of the existence of the trust, the section 859 damages and Sonia Lozano’s challenges thereto under capacity and undue influence grounds at the same time.

The Court takes the position that the Probate Code section 859 damages cannot be adjudicated on a motion, but instead require a petition pleading the relief requested. The Court has before it only Sonia Lozano’s petition challenging the Trust.

The Court notes it makes no order here except as to the voiding of the judgment previously entered in this case.

The remaining relief requested by the motion is denied without prejudice as the issues of section 859 damages, as well as reasonable fees and costs, would appear to be determinable only on a petition alleging such recovery and proof of the allegations therein.

The Court, therefore, will conduct a case management conference at this hearing to set an evidentiary hearing on the petition by Sonia Lozano challenging the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds. The Court intends to set the evidentiary hearing with sufficient time to conduct discovery and/or permit the filing of any petition as to the section 859 damages, and any other such relief as requested.

Re: In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto

Case No.: PPR054182

Date: September 24, 2026

Time: 8:30 A.M.

Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion: Petitioners’ Continued Ex Parte Motion

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this matter, Petitioners filed Petition Probate of Will & For Letters Testamentary/Administration, attached a trust document, and that Petitions cannot locate the original will.

Although the petition, and amended petition, were served via mail on Respondent, Respondent has not yet appeared in this case.

On August 14, 2026, Petitioners filed this ex parte application for TRO seeking:

An Order prohibiting Respondent Araceli Martinez Oros and cemetery management from modifying, transferring, assigning, or utilizing the second interment space on the subject cemetery plot.
An Order freezing all administrative activity on the plot contract pending the hearing on Petitioners' Probate Code § 850 Petition.
An Order compelling Respondent Araceli Martinez Oros to render a full accounting of all funds withdrawn and post-mortem transactions made prior to and upon closing Decedent's bank accounts.

In support, Petitioners state Petitioner states “Xitlali Olvera was formally designated as Decedent’s agent under his Advance Health Care Directive and held primary legal authority to control the disposition of Decedent's remains pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 7100. Petitioner, Xitlali Olvera, was also designated as the Payable on Death (POD) beneficiary on Decedent's bank account.”

Further, that “Respondent had unilaterally closed Decedent's bank account and used the funds following his passing.”

Petitioners further argue Decedent lacked capacity and that “Respondent was added to Decedent's bank account only after this severe cognitive decline began while Decedent lacked financial capacity.”

Further, that “Respondent utilized Decedent’s financial card and bank accounts to pay the cemetery and funeral home for the two-space cemetery lot and funeral arrangements, subsequently closing Decedent's account entirely.”

As to imminent emergency and irreparable harm, Petitioner states “Because Respondent holds sole signature rights on the contract and has declared her intent to act unilaterally, there is an immediate risk that she will attempt to assign, transfer, or utilize the second interment space for a non-estate third party prior to our court hearing on August 20, 2026. If an unauthorized burial or transfer occurs, the second space will be permanently exhausted, causing immediate, irreparable harm to the estate that cannot be undone.”

As to notice, Petitioners state “Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1203, written notice of this Ex Parte Application was transmitted in clear Spanish via telephone text message to Respondent Araceli Martinez Oros at her phone number (831) 905-8797, prior to 10:00 AM on the court day prior to this filing.”

No opposition appears filed. This matter was continued to this hearing date.

Authority and Analysis

Here, Plaintiff seeks a TRO.

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, entitled “Preliminary injunctions and bonds” notes, in subsection (a), that:

“A party requesting a preliminary injunction may give notice of the request to the opposing or responding party either by serving a noticed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 or by obtaining and serving an order to show cause (OSC). An OSC must be used when a temporary restraining order (TRO) is sought, or if the party against whom the preliminary injunction is sought has not appeared in the action. If the responding party has not appeared, the OSC must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(a).)

Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, subdivision (c) states:

(c) Form of OSC and TRO The OSC and TRO must be stated separately, with the OSC stated first. The restraining language sought in an OSC and a TRO must be separately stated in the OSC and the TRO and may not be incorporated by reference. The OSC must describe the injunction to be sought at the hearing. The TRO must describe the activities to be enjoined pending the hearing. A proposed OSC must contain blank spaces for the time and manner of service on responding parties, the date on which the proof of service must be delivered to the court hearing the OSC, a briefing schedule, and, if applicable, the expiration date of the TRO.”

Here, Repsondent has not appeared, no OSC is sought, the restraining language sought in the OSC is not stated separately in the OSC, the OSC does not describe the injunction, and the proposed OSC does not contain appropriate blank spaces as to service, proof of service, or a briefing schedule.

Additionally, the burden is on plaintiff to show all elements necessary to support issuance of the injunction. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) “A superior court must evaluate two interrelated factors when ruling on a request for a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial and (2) the interim harm that the plaintiff would be likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant would be likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 749.) The court employs a more probable than not standard. (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.)

Here, Petitioners cannot establish a lack of capacity based solely on their own declarations as to the alleged acts of Respondent and Decedent’s capacity. As such, the Court cannot say there is a likelihood of prevailing on the merits demonstrated at this time. Further, Petitioners indicate the funds have been spent and there is no further injury to the estate. Petitioners do not sufficiently demonstrate an immediate risk of harm or other injury that would be suffered via purchase of the burial plot. Monetary relief, therefore, appears available and no irreparable harm has been demonstrated.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

Probate Examiner Recommendations

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared September 23, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054246	In the Matter of Pinheiro, Lucia Natal	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054226	In the Matter of Romero, Frank Jr	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	The court to determine at hearing that the property is property passing to the surviving spouse and confirm that the property is community or quasi-community property belonging to the surviving spouse under Probate Code § 100 or 101
VPR053600	In the Matter of Ortiz Espinoza, Jesus	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053255	In the Matter of Peter, Donald Alan	Final Distribution Hearing	Approval Conditional	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053130	In the Matter of Nitzsche, Sylvia M.	Appoint Successor Conservator	Appearance Required	Removal of current co-conservators is required prior to successor appointment. Successor appointment cannot be completed without a vacancy in the conservatorship Prob C § 2650, 2680. Review Hearing scheduled
VPR054065	In the Matter of Chavez, Mark Anthony	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Initial Petition: Capacity Declaration not filed; LiveScan and Orientation not completed. Competing Petition: Capacity Declaration not filed
VPR054062	In the Matter of Guerrero, Bibiana	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054061	In the Matter of Rodriguez Ramos, J. Niebes	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation not personally served on proposed conservatee

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

Probate calendar for September 24, 2026

Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR052024	In the Matter of Cannon, Preston Lloyd	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR052972	In the Matter of Mora, Erick Geovanni	Appoint Conservator	Appearance required	Orientation not completed by proposed successor conservators. Screening Forms incomplete for both proposed successor conservators.
PPR053556	In the Matter of Quintero, Leonides	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Notice of Petition to Administer Estate (DE-121) needs to be served all persons listed in the Will. Petition Item 8: Names of all persons mentioned in decedent’s Will.
PPR053975	In the Matter of Lopez, Ronald	Contested Hearing - Probate	Appearance required	No court filings since the 8/13/26 conference.
PPR054179	In the Matter of Lara, Paul Sr	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
PPR054182	In the Matter of Olvera Reyes, Jose Adalberto	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	#3.e – heirs at law are not all adults. Guardian Ad Litem must sign for a minor to waive bond on behalf of the minor. #2.d(2) re BOND setting is too low. NEEDS to be filed - Notice of Hearing—Decedent's Estate or Trust (DE-120)
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	There have been no filings to correct previous issues since last hearing. Numerous filings are required.
PPR054254	In the Matter of Siterlet, Lorraine M	Letters of Administration		Conditional Approval
PPR054283	In the Matter of Orr, James Olin	Petition Hearing	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE: All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required. For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054006	In the Matter of R.F.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment and Notice of Hearing were personally on PARENTS, and served by mail on GRANDPARENTS, pursuant to Probate Code §1511 DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member Petition for Appointment ATTACHMENT GC-210(CA) is incomplete – no relatives are listed at #2
9/24/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR053989	In the Matter of M.M.	Co-Petitioner has not yet submitted to DOJ Background record check
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054297	In the Matter of A.G.W.	Submit proof of parent’s D.O.D. the Notice of Hearing and TEMP Appointment Petition, are required to be personally served on parents with 5 court days notice, pursuant to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR054294	In the Matter of Cardenas Medina, Angel Abdiel	DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed by household member
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054293	In the Matter of B.U.T.	Notice of Hearing needs to be filed indicating MOTHER & GUARDIAN were personally served with a copy of the Petition for Appointment of Temporary Guardian, with 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
9/24/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054277	In the Matter of Ayon, Osiris Malakai	No issues to address for this hearing

Judicial Branch of California

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South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

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