Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, October 26, 2026, are:

Re:                Wilson, Tatyana et al vs. Sierra Minit Marts, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU308861

Date:           October 26, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion to November 9, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9; to order the declaration of Norma Ayala filed.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on October 26, 2026.

The Court notes, however, no filed declaration from Norma Ayala, the settlement administrator as to the mailing of the notice, the responses thereto and whether any disputes or objections have been raised. The Court notes that Counsel Zakay appears to have filed two declarations, both with eight exhibits, but with different page counts. In order to grant this motion, the Court will require the declaration from the settlement administrator.

As to the information provided to the Court, Class counsel has provided an updated declarations in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $750,000 or $250,000.

Zakay Law Group, APLC indicates 127.5 hours on this case, at rates of $800 to $475 per hour. (Declaration of Zakay ¶32 – Ex. 7.) Additionally, JCL Law Firm, APC has incurred 122 hours at rates ranging from $850 to $250 per hour. (Declaration of Lapuyade ¶8.) As such, the cumulative base lodestar is $182,992.50. Therefore, to award the $250,000 required, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.37. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. Therefore, the fees, as requested, are approved.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $21,072.36. (Declaration of Zakay ¶40; Declaration of Lapuyade ¶11.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

As such, the Court continues this motion to November 9, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9 and orders the declaration of Ayala filed.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Velocity Investments, LLC vs. Pecego, Gilbert

Case No.:   VCL309853

Date:           October 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:    Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested

Facts

In this breach of contract and money lent matter, the parties entered into a settlement agreement on or about February 12, 2025 wherein Defendant acknowledges owing $25,924.10 as a principal balance and that monthly payments of $360.06 would be paid each month until the balance is paid in exchange for dismissal. The Court notes this matter has not been dismissed.

In the event of default, the parties agreed that the Court was authorized to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $25,924.10 less payments received, and with court costs added thereto.

Plaintiff indicates payments of $1,800.30 were made.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

Based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $24,662.55., consisting of the principal amount due of 3,400.28, consisting of the principal sum of $25,924.10, plus previous court costs of $538.75, less $1,800.30 for payments made to date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Rivera, Rosario

Case No.:  VCL334671

Date:           October 26, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Facts

On or about July 8, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Wilson, Michael Stewart vs. County of Tulare

Case No.:   VCU335553

Date:           October 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     County of Tulare’s Motions for (1) Sanctions under 128.5; (2) Sanctions Under 128.7; (3) County of Tulare’s Demurrer; (4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Late Claim

Tentative Ruling:

(1) and (2) To deny the motions;

(3) To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint;

(4) To continue the motion to November 30, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9 and order Plaintiff to provide notice of the continued hearing and serve the motion and supporting documents on STMCD pursuant to Government Code section 946.6(d).

County of Tulare’s Motions for (1) Sanctions under 128.5 and (2) Sanctions Under 128.7

Facts and Analysis Common to (1) and (2)

Plaintiff alleges injury after falling from a ladder while performing contractor’s services at Pixley Memorial Hall, 719 N. Park Drive, Pixley, CA 93256.

The County of Tulare, in response to Plaintiff’s presentation of a government tort claim rejected the claim noting that the County does not own or have jurisdiction over the Pixley Memorial Hall.

Nevertheless, the County of Tulare was named as a defendant on theories of premises liability and negligence in the complaint.

Counsel for the County made several attempts to contact Plaintiff’s counsel and discuss this issue, requesting dismissal of the County.

No such dismissal has occurred.

On September 9, 2026, the County electronically served copies of the County’s separate motions for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7.

On September 30, 2026, the County filed separate motions for sanctions under sections 128.5 and 128.7.

In opposition, Plaintiff alleges the complaint is not frivolous, as it sets out theories that County hired Plaintiff and was injured due to the County’s negligence, which are issues unaffected by the County’s ownership of Pixley Memorial Hall.

The Court notes, however, that the filing of these motions on September 30, 2026, does not satisfy the 21 day safe harbor period under sections 128.5 and 128.7, as the opposing party is entitled to the entire 21 day period to take action and this period is extended by the manner of service.

Transcon Financial, Inc. v. Reid & Hellyer, APC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 547 is directly on point as to these issues, stating:

“Under section 128.7, the party moving for sanctions must serve the motion on the opposing party, but the motion “shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) Section 128.5 contains a nearly identical safe harbor provision. (§ 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(B) [sanctions motion “shall not be filed with or presented to the court, unless 21 days after service of the motion or any other period as the court may prescribe, the challenged action or tactic is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected”].)

Thus, a party seeking sanctions under sections 128.5 and 128.7 must follow a two-step procedure. ([citation omitted].) First, the “‘moving party must serve on the offending party a motion for sanctions.’” ([citation omitted].) Service of the sanctions motion triggers the 21-day safe harbor period during which the moving party may not file the motion. ([citation omitted].)That is because the offending party may avoid sanctions by withdrawing the challenged pleading during the 21-day period. ([citation omitted].) Second, if the offending party does not withdraw the challenged pleading during that period, then the moving party may file the sanctions motion. ([citation omitted].)

The “21 days is not a notice period. … It defines when the target of a sanctions motion can act without penalty and withdraw” an objectionable document. ([citation omitted].) The moving party must file the motion “outside the safe harbor period,” not “on day one of the safe harbor period, day 21 of the safe harbor period, or any day in between.” ([citation omitted].) In other words, the “sanctions motion cannot be filed until the 22nd day after service of the motion, i.e., after the 21-day safe harbor period expires.” (([citation omitted].)

Moreover, the law requires strict compliance with the safe harbor provisions. ([citation omitted].) Failure to comply with the safe harbor provisions “precludes an award of sanctions.” (([citation omitted].)

In this case, the court erred by concluding that Reid & Hellyer had complied with the safe harbor provisions. The firm served both sanctions motions on November 12, 2020. The parties agree that 21 days from that date was Thursday, December 3, 2020. The parties also agree that the safe harbor period was extended by two court days under section 1010.6, subdivision (a)(4)(B). That section concerns electronic service and states in relevant part: “[A]ny right or duty to do any act or make any response within any period or on a date certain after the service of the document, which time period or date is prescribed by statute or rule of court, shall be extended after service by electronic means by two court days.” (§ 1010.6, subd. (a)(4)(B).)

Section 1010.6 thus extended the safe harbor period by two court days to Monday, December 7, 2020. That means that Transcon and Talkov had through December 7 to withdraw the challenged complaint and avoid sanctions. And Reid & Hellyer had to wait for the period to expire fully before filing the sanctions motions. [(citation omitted)] The first day that the firm could file the motions was December 8, 2020. The trial court therefore erred by concluding that the firm had complied with the safe harbor provisions by filing on December 7.” (Id. at 550-552.)

Applying the above here, County electronically served the motions on September 9, 2026. As such, Plaintiff had the entire 21 day period through September 30, 2026, plus two days for electronic service through October 1, 2026 to take action. The earliest these motions could have been filed in compliance with the statute would have been October 2, 2026 and therefore County’s filing of these motions September 30, 2026 was premature and cannot support an award of sanctions.

The Court, therefore, denies the motions.

(3) County’s Demurrer

Facts

Plaintiff alleges injury after falling from a ladder while performing contractor’s services at Pixley Memorial Hall, 719 N. Park Drive, Pixley, CA 93256.

Plaintiff sues, amongst other defendants, the County of Tulare.

The complaint’s first cause of action is entitled “Premises Liability” and alleges negligence against the County, without checking the box for dangerous condition of public property.”

The second cause of action is entitled “negligence” and states:

“Defendants, and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, hired Plaintiff to perform contractor services, which involved painting of high ceilings, when Defendants and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, knew that Plaintiff did not have a contractor's license. As Defendants, and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, were required to hire sufficient workers to complete the dangerous work and to provide a safe and adequate work environment and appropriate safety equipment and Defendants and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, were negligent for failing to do so. Due to the unlicensed status of Plaintiff, Defendants and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, are responsible and liable for the subject accident, and Plaintiff's damages under Labor Code Section 2750.5. Pursuant to Labor Code § 3708, the Defendants are presumed to be negligent and Plaintiff has a right of action against under Labor Code Section 3706.”

The County demurrers on grounds that it does not own Pixley Memorial Hall, that no statutory basis for negligence is asserted and that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against the County as to a dangerous condition.

In support, the County submits the declaration of its General Services Agency Director for Tulare County, Brooke Sisk. Sisk’s declaration, for which judicial notice is requested, states:

“3. With respect to the property commonly known as the Pixley Memorial Hall, located at 719 N. Park Drive, Pixley, CA 93256, I directed staff within the General Services Agency Property Management Division to research the County’s real property records and Tulare County Assessor records to determine whether the County holds any ownership interest in this property.

4. Based on that research, I determined that the Pixley Memorial Hall is not owned by the County of Tulare. The records reviewed indicate that the Pixley Memorial Hall has been owned by the South County Tulare Memorial District since 1959, and no subsequent ownership transfers have been identified. Further, the County’s real property records do not reflect any ownership interest held by the County in the Pixley Memorial Hall.” (Declaration of Sisk ¶¶3, 4.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “Plaintiff has adequately pleaded Defendant is liable for premises liability and negligence. (Gov. Code §§ 815.2, 815.4, & 830.).” However, none of these statutes are pled in the complaint. 

Judicial Notice

County seeks judicial notice of the declaration of Sisk on the following: “Here, the Tulare County General Services Agency is an administrative agency within the County of Tulare. Brooke Sisk, Director of the General Services Agency, directed her staff to search for real property records and the Tulare County assessor’s records to determine the ownership of Pixley Memorial Hall. Director Sisk’s actions, as detailed in her declaration, are official acts, and the County of Tulare is requesting this Court to take judicial notice of them.”

Taking judicial notice under this provision "extends to the official act itself . . . but not the truth of the facts relayed through that official act." (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 902.) At most, the existence of Sisk’s declaration is subject to judicial notice. The Court cannot take judicial notice that Sisk’s statements are true.

The request for judicial notice is denied.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  (Gov. Code § 815(a).)  “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]”  (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)  It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) 

Government tort claims must be pled with particularity. (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) They must also be grounded in statute. (Gov. Code § 815; E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 512, fn. 9.)

As noted above, the Court cannot take judicial notice as to the ownership of Pixley Memorial Hall and therefore turns to the remaining arguments in support of the demurrer.

Here, neither cause of action appears to cite a statute that would impose statutory liability on Defendant.

The statutory basis for imposing liability on public entities as property owners is Gov. Code §835. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129.) Here, no section 835 claim is pled.

The elements of such a claim are found in Government Code section 835, which states:

Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

These elements are not sufficiently set forth in the complaint.

Additionally, as to the second cause of action for negligence, the Court notes that Government Code section 835 sets out the “exclusive conditions under which a public entity is liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition of public property.” (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129, citing Brown v. Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 829; see also Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112.)

Further, Plaintiff cites not authority that Labor Code sections 3602, 3700 or 3708 apply to public entities.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Late Claim

Facts

As noted above, this matter involves injury occurring at Pixley Memorial Hall on September 18, 2025.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit May 28, 2026, naming the County of Tulare and Does 1 through 20.

Plaintiff notes that a government claim was filed with County of Tulare “…on the basis Plaintiff believed he was paid by County for the work he was performing when injured.” (Declaration of Samrao ¶5.)

Plaintiff retained counsel “December 3, 2026” (though the Court believes that this should reference 2025) and “Upon retention, the firm began investigating liability through publicly and privately available record and property searches relative to Pixley Memorial Hall. These record searches included inquiries through the credit company TransUnion, and investigation into the local, state, or federal nature of the property.” (Declaration of Samrao ¶6.)

On March 10, 2026, Rebecca Fisher from County of Tulare stated the claim filed was “for the wrong entity” that “Pixley Memorial Hall [was] owned by Tulare County Memorial District” and the claim was rejected by mail the next day. (Declaration of Samrao ¶7.)

Plaintiff’s counsel indicates the firm presented a claim on the Tulare County Memorial District on March 12, 2026. (Declaration of Samrao ¶8.) Thereafter, the Tulare County Memorial District also rejected the claim stating it “does not own the building where the incident happened and has nothing to do with it.” (Declaration of Samrao ¶8.)

On May 13, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel learned of South Tulare County Memorial District’s (“STCMD”) potential liability and on May 22, 2026, presented the STCMD with a late claim application, which was rejected by operation of law 45 days later on July 6, 2026. (Declaration of Samroa ¶¶10, 12.)

Counsel states further “Between 1) March 16, 2026, through May 4, 2026, and 2) July 1, 2026, through August 3, 2026, our firm was heavily engaged in unprecedented litigation and trial preparation” and that “STCMD will suffer no prejudice due to the facts and circumstances in this case, i.e., the matter is not old or stale, discovery has not begun, no evidence was lost, contemporaneous evidence exists, and STCMD should have ability to ascertain all potential witnesses present during the incident due to its purported ownership interest in Pixley Memorial Hall.” (Declaration of Samrao ¶¶11, 13.)

Plaintiff moves “…to file a claim against a public entity beyond the statutory six month period” as to STMCD. Plaintiff argues excusable neglect and that STMCD will suffer no prejudice.

The Court notes service of this motion on Defendant County of Tulare only.

Authority and Analysis

Service

Government Code section 946.6(d) states:

“A copy of the petition and a written notice of the time and place of hearing shall be served before the hearing as prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure on (1) the clerk or secretary or board of the local public entity, if the respondent is a local public entity, or (2) the Attorney General, if the respondent is the state.”

As noted above, the proof of service indicates service on Defendant County of Tulare only. Service must be made on STMCD of this motion and notice of the hearing.  

The Court continues this motion to November 30, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Therefore, the Court orders Plaintiff to provide notice of the continued hearing and to serve the motion and supporting documents on STMCD before the hearing as prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the clerk or secretary or board of the STMCD.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Villanueva Penaloza, Jesus Miguel vs. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU331440

Date:            October 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and compel the Type A PAGA claim to arbitration; to stay this matter, including adjudication of the Type O PAGA claim pending arbitration.

Background Facts and Stipulation

In the first amended complaint, Plaintiff uses Defendant Wileman Bros & Elliot, Inc. for various Labor Code violations on a class basis and under PAGA.

Defendant moved to dismiss the class claims, compel the now individual Labor Code claims to arbitration, to split the PAGA claim and compel the “individual” PAGA claim to arbitration, and to stay the “representative” PAGA claim pending arbitration.

Thereafter, the parties stipulated that the Agreement is enforceable, that all the class claims alleged in the Action are dismissed without prejudice and that only remaining issue is interpretation of the provisions relating to PAGA.

It also appears undisputed that the FAA applies to the Agreement and its interpretation thereof.

Facts – Scope of Agreement and PAGA Claims

The Agreement states:

“1. Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Certain Claims and Disputes. Company and Employee mutually agree to arbitrate before a neutral arbitrator (the "Arbitrator") any and all disputes or claims by and between Employee, on the one hand, and Company, its parent, subsidiary, and affiliated corporations and entities, and each of their present and former officers, directors, agents, and employees (the "Company Parties"), on the other hand, including but not limited to any and all claims arising from or relating to Employee's recruitment, hiring, and employment, the termination of that employment, and any claims arising post-employment, including claims by or against the Company Parties, whether such disputes or claims arise in tort, in contract, or under a statute, regulation, or ordinance…”

Further, the Agreement notes:

“CLASS ACTION WAIVER: Both the Company and Employee agree to bring any dispute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class or collective basis. There will be no right or authority in arbitration for any dispute to be brought, heard, or arbitrated as a class, collective, or representative, or for either party to be a participant in any purported class, collective, or representative, including without limitation pending but not certified class actions…”

Finally, the Court notes the Agreement states:

“PRIVATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL ACT (PAGA) CLAIMS: Private attorneys general representative actions brought on behalf of the State under the California Labor Code are not arbitrable, are not within the scope of this Agreement, and may be maintained in a court of law, but any claim on your own behalf as an aggrieved employee for recovery of underpaid wages (as opposed to representative claims for civil penalties) shall be arbitrable.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement and PAGA Claims

To start, the Court notes “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.)

The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

Prior the Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, PAGA claims could not be waived, could not be split, and could not be compelled to arbitration pursuant to Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348. (Viking River at 1916.)

“Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner.” (Id. at 1924-25.) Therefore, “the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.”  (Id. at 1924.) 

That rule referred to above in Iskanian was that “PAGA claim ‘lies’ completely ‘outside the FAA’s coverage because it is not a dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of their contractual relationship.’  [Citation.]  It is . . . a dispute between an employer and the state, which alleges directly or through its agents—either the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or aggrieved employees—that the employer has violated the Labor Code.”  (Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at 395-396.)

Viking River therefore holds that the PAGA claim may be split into Type A and Type O claims and that, pursuant to a proper agreement, that the Type A claim may be compelled to arbitration under the FAA and that the Type O claim remains and cannot be submitted to arbitration. (Viking River at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

To start, the Agreement evidences an intent to submit all claims to arbitration via the first paragraph of the Agreement.Additionally, the Class Action Waiver evidences an intent to arbitrate only individual claims.

However, Plaintiff argues that a portion of the PAGA Claims term, stating “but any claim on your own behalf as an aggrieved employee for recovery of underpaid wages (as opposed to representative claims for civil penalties) shall be arbitrable” should be interpreted to permit Plaintiff’s “individual” PAGA claim to be maintained in a court of law.

Plaintiff, in support, cites to Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 59. In Duran, the agreement stated:

“In the event there is any dispute between [Duran] and the Company relating to or arising out of the employment or the termination of [Duran] … [Duran] and the Company agree to submit all such claims or disputes to be resolved by final and binding arbitration, instead of going to court, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Federal Arbitration Act” and encompassed wage and hour disputes. (Id. at 62)

The agreement in Duran also contains a class and representative action waiver that states:

“Except as prohibited under applicable law, [Duran] and the Company expressly intend and agree that: (1) class action, collective action, and representative action procedures shall not be asserted nor will they apply, in any arbitration proceeding pursuant to this Agreement; (2) neither [Duran] nor the Company will assert any class action, collective action, or representative action claims against each other in arbitration, in any court, or otherwise; and (3) [Duran] and the Company shall only submit their own respective, individual claims in arbitration and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person.” (Italics in original.) (Id. at 62)

The agreement in Duran then “carves out” the following claims from arbitration:

“Claims for unemployment compensation, claims under the National Labor Relations Act, claims under PAGA, claims for workers' compensation benefits, and any claim that is non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal law are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” (emphasis in original) (Id. at 63)

The court noted “This is the agreement's only reference to PAGA.” (Id.)

The appellate court affirmed the decision to deny the motion to compel arbitration as to all PAGA claims, that is, both the Type A and Type O claims. (Id. at 62.)

Here, the Court lacks the same broad language as in Duran, where “claims under PAGA” were carved out of the agreement. While the Court agrees that PAGA claims recover civil penalties, to adopt Plaintiff’s interpretation would be to read the term quoted above in isolation. By contrast, the Agreement here demonstrates an intent to compel arbitration of all individual claims and distinguishes representative claims with a “claim on your own behalf.”

Last, the Court notes the presence of the severance clause which states “Severability. If any term or portion of this Agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid or unenforceable or to be contrary to public policy or any law, then the remainder of this Agreement shall not be affected by such invalidity or unenforceability but shall remain in full force and effect, as if the invalid or unenforceable term or portion thereof had not existed within this Agreement.”

As such, the Court could strike the term “for recovery of underpaid wages” and reach the same conclusion as to enforcement of the Agreement’s intent to arbitrate individual claims, including Type A PAGA claims.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and compels the Type A claim to arbitration and stays the adjudication of the Type O PAGA claim pending arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Mateo, Yesenia vs. Snowdrop Holdings, LLC

Case No.:   VCU316517

Date:           October 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Hearing re: Compliance with PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: The Court, on March 9, 2026, approved the settlement of the PAGA matter and set this hearing as to distribution of the settlement funds in accordance with the agreement for this date. The Court’s file reflects no updated declaration from the settlement administrator as to distribution. Therefore, the Court continues this matter to November 16, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 26, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054318	In the Matter of West, Cheryl Annette	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing and DE-300 filed—all other previous issues remain
VPR054356	In the Matter of Stewart, Evelyn Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval
VPR054193	In the Matter of Coates, Claudia M	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on all relatives within the second degree
VPR053934	In the Matter of Betterton, Michael	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Death filed
VPR054229	In the Matter of Sandoval, Juventina	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Objection filed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday, October 22, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054299	In the Matter of Calderon, Christina	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	In accordance with Probate Code §13152(a), the petition shall be verified by each petitioner. Petitioner to file a recorded copy of the affidavit of death of joint tenant. Petition item 8- inventory and appraisal attached to the Petition doesn’t have the gross value of the real property (property has not been appraised). NO ORDER LODGED
PPR053526	In the Matter of Moreno, Judi Arlene	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Motion for Continuance submitted to the court

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/22/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054176	In the Matter of Cruz, Isaiah Alexander et al	DOJ Background Record Check needs to be completed