Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, February 17, 2026, are:

Re:                 Rideout, Jazzmin vs. First Pitch Entertainment, LLC et al

Case No.:   VCU329435

Date:            February 17, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Prior Settlement/Waiver and Enjoin Future / Further Contact

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion.

Background Facts

On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff served Defendants First Pitch Entertainment, LLC (“First Pitch”) and Samual J. Sigal (“Sigal” and collectively with First Pitch as “Defendants”) via Certified U.S. Mail and email, a copy of Plaintiff’s PAGA Notice that was filed with the Labor & Workforce Agency (“LWDA”).

On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative class action complaint, which alleges that Defendant: (1) failed to pay minimum wage; (2) failed to provide rest periods or premium pay in lieu thereof; (3) failed to provide and maintain accurate records; (4) failed to provide wages when due; and (5) engaged in unlawful business practices.

Upon exhaustion of the 65-day PAGA notice period on February 11, 2026, Plaintiff intends to amend the complaint to add PAGA claims. (Declaration of Barahmand ¶5.)

Defendants have been served, have acknowledged service, but have not made a general appearance in this matter.

Facts re: Appreciation Bonus and Waiver

On December 22, 2025, Defendants sent two (2) emails in sequence to putative Class Members, as to an “APPRECIATION BONUS.” The first email advised employees to expect an “important” forthcoming message regarding “the Sigal Family’s plan to issue Appreciation Bonuses to all [] staffers” and instructed them to watch for a DocuSign email.

The second email, shortly thereafter, was via DocuSign and announced Defendants were in the process of selling the business with an anticipated closing date of January 15, 2026. That email then offered an “APPRECIATION BONUS of $250.00” in exchange for signing the attached document.

That document contains the following relevant language:

“…For that reason, we are requiring that as a condition of receiving the Appreciation Bonus you sign this letter which contains a release of claims….

RELEASE AND WAIVER OF CLAIMS

You agree and acknowledge that as of the date you sign this letter you: (1) have been paid in full for all wages due to you (including minimum, regular, and overtime wages) for any and all work performed; (2) have been provided all required meal periods and rest breaks; (3) have timely received all earned wages, including at the end of each season; (4) have been furnished itemized wage statements, none of which were incomplete or inaccurate; (5) have been reimbursed for any necessary business expenditures; and (6) are not entitled to any additional money, wages, or compensation, except that by signing this letter you will be paid the Appreciation Bonus.

Contrary allegations have been made recently by a former staffer about the hours of work, working conditions, provision of rest breaks, calculation and payment of wages, and providing wage statements and pay stubs, including claims allegedly made on your behalf in the lawsuit entitled Jazzmin Rideout v. First Pitch Entertainment, LLC et al., Tulare County Superior Court Case No. VCU329435 (the "Rideout lawsuit") and including claims allegedly based on your employment that were made in a letter dated December 8, 2025, to the California Labor & Workforce Development Agency by former staffer Jazzmin Rideout ("PAGA letter").

          …

By signing this letter and in exchange for payment of the Appreciation Bonus, you compromise, settle, waive, release and discharge First Pitch Entertainment, LLC, and its owners, members, managers, supervisors and employees (including without limitation Elliott Sigal and Samuel Sigal) from any claims that you have, may have or may have had based on any act or omission before the date you sign this letter and arising out of or relating in any way to your employment by First Pitch Entertainment, LLC and your hour of work, working conditions, wages, and methods of compensation, or relating to any alleged violation of the Labor Code, including without limitation all of the claims allegedly asserted on your behalf in the PAGA letter and the Rideout lawsuit, (the "Released Claims"). The Released Claims include any claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the California Labor Code the applicable Wage Order(s) and the California Unfair Competition Law, including without limitation any claims for compensation, wages, overtime, missed meal period or rest break premiums, bonuses, commissions, sick leave, holiday pay, vacation pay, statutory penalties, civil penalties, statutory indemnity, expenses or attorney's fees. You agree that as of the date of signing this letter you are not aggrieved by any conduct you experienced during your employment and you do not assert any violation of the California Labor Code has been committed by the Company toward you and you waive and disclaim any contrary allegation made in the PAGA letter or the Rideout lawsuit or by any other person under California Labor Code§ 2698 et seq. As to the Released Claims, you agree not to sue or to join or participate in any claim, lawsuit or civil action brought by any other person. Section 1542 of the California Civil Code provides: "A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or released party." You waive all rights under section 1542 with respect to the Released Claims. You acknowledge that the release in this letter releases all claims existing or arising prior to the date you sign, whether such claims are known or unknown and suspected or unsuspected, and you waive any inquiry or investigation into any such claims. You warrant and represent that you have not assigned the Released Claims to any other person, and no other person is authorized to assert or pursue the Released Claims, whether on your behalf or in a representative or private attorney general capacity. You acknowledge and agree that this agreement is made as a compromise with you of such disputed or potential claims. You agree that neither this letter nor the payment to you of any amount under the terms of this letter may be construed as an admission of liability or responsibility.

Opting Out: By signing this letter and accepting payment, you are agreeing that you are not an aggrieved employee or otherwise interested party in any class, collective or representative action sought by the Rideout lawsuit or the PAGA letter, and you are agreeing that neither the plaintiff in the Rideout lawsuit, nor the State of California, nor any other person, nor their respective attorneys, are authorized to make or attempt to make any claim on your behalf. You agree to execute such documents or take such further actions as may be necessary to effectuate your intention to opt-out of any individual recovery or participation in the Rideout lawsuit. Although this letter does not waive any rights you may have under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, by signing below you are confirming that you do not consent to be joined to any putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act and are expressing your intention and desire to opt out of any such action and, instead, to submit any such claims to arbitration as described below.

…

Miscellaneous: By signing below, you acknowledge that you are agreeing to the terms of this letter freely and voluntarily, have had enough time to fully consider this letter agreement, have been advised to consult an attorney or other independent advisor, and that your decision was not coerced or made under any threat, duress or undue influence. You understand that this letter agreement is final and binding when signed, and you agree not to challenge its enforceability. Should you (or anyone acting or claiming to act on your behalf) nevertheless attempt to challenge the enforceability of this letter agreement, as a further limitation on any right to make such a challenge, you shall initially submit to ADR Services, by certified check, all monies received pursuant to this letter agreement, and such monies will be held pending resolution of the dispute as to whether or not this letter agreement shall be enforced. If either party breaches any provision of this letter agreement, the prevailing, nonbreaching party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all damages, costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred as a result. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as preventing you from participating as a witness in any lawsuit, administrative proceeding or government investigation. No waiver of any of the provisions of this letter agreement shall be deemed a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar. In the event any provision of this letter agreement is determined unlawful, void or otherwise unenforceable, it shall not alter the enforceability or validity of the remaining provisions and terms, all of which shall remain binding. This letter agreement contains and constitutes the entire agreement between you and First Pitch Entertainment, LLC regarding all matters occurring through today and supersedes all prior written or oral agreements and all contemporaneous oral agreements, understandings and negotiations with you. This letter agreement may be amended only in writing signed by both parties.”

Facts - Plaintiff’s Motion

By way of this motion Plaintiff seeks to void these agreements, or sever what Plaintiff deems unenforceable terms, and to enjoin further contact by Defendants with members of the putative class. Plaintiff does not present evidence that Plaintiff signed this agreement.

In opposition, Defendants argue Plaintiff lacks standing as Plaintiff did not sign the agreement, that the Court lacks jurisdiction based on the same, that communications with putative class members constitutes protected speech, that settlement offers to putative class members are lawful and Plaintiff has failed to show abuse, coercion or fraud in support of the motion.

Authority and Analysis

Pre-Certification Settlement Agreements

In Chindarah v. Pick Up Stix, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 796, two former employees filed a complaint alleging claims for unpaid overtime, penalties and interest due to the misclassification of their jobs as exempt from overtime pay. (Id. at 798.) They later amended the complaint to allege a proposed class action regarding unpaid overtime on behalf of plaintiffs and all other current and former general managers, assistant managers, and lead cooks employed by the defendant. (Id.)

Mediation was unsuccessful, however, defendant “…then decided to attempt settlement with as many putative class members as possible. It offered each of them an “amount … based upon a figure … Stix had previously offered at the mediation.” Over 200 former and current employees accepted the offer and signed a settlement agreement, which included a general release. By signing the agreement, the employee acknowledged that he or she had spent more than 50 percent of the time performing managerial duties, released Stix from all claims for unpaid overtime and any other Labor Code violations during the relevant time period, and agreed “not to participate in any class action that may include … any of the released Claims … .” (Id. at 798.)

The plaintiffs thereafter filed a second amended complaint alleging the settlement agreements violated numerous provisions of the Labor Code and eight current and former employees who had signed the settlement agreements joined the proposed class action as plaintiffs. (Id.)

The plaintiffs thereafter moved for summary adjudication of the employer’s cross-complaint, claiming the releases they signed were void under Labor Code sections 206 and 206.5. (Id.) The employer moved for summary judgment on the complaint, claiming the releases barred recovery by the plaintiffs. (Id.)

“The trial court found the Labor Code did not prohibit the release of a claim for unpaid wages where there is a bona fide dispute over whether any wages were owed. The trial court found because Stix “produced evidence showing a good faith dispute with regard to classification of the employees,” it had “produced evidence … creating a triable issue of fact as to whether or not [plaintiffs] were owed any additional wages.” Finding the releases valid as a matter of law, the trial court granted Stix's motion for summary judgment and denied the motion by the Chindarah plaintiffs.” (Id. at 798-799.)

The appellate court concluded that “…there is no statute providing that an employee cannot release his claim to past overtime wages as part of a settlement of a bona fide dispute over those wages” in finding that neither Labor Code sections 206 or 206.5 barred such a release.

In Watkins v. Wachovia Corp. (2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 1576, the court noted that Labor Code § 206.5(a) which provides, in relevant part that “An employer shall not require the execution of a release of a claim or right on account of wages due, or to become due, or made as an advance on wages to be earned, unless payment of those wages has been made. A release required or executed in violation of the provisions of this section shall be null and void as between the employer and employee” must be read together with Labor Code § 206(a), which, in the case of a dispute over whether wages are owed, requires the employer to "pay, without condition ... all wages, or parts thereof, conceded by him to be due...." (Id. at 1586-1587)

When 206.5 and 206 are read together, the Watkins court held:

“…Labor Code section 206.5 simply prohibits employers from coercing settlements by withholding wages concededly due. In other words, wages are not considered "due" and unreleasable under Labor Code section 206.5, unless they are required to be paid under Labor Code section 206. When a bona fide dispute exists, the disputed amounts are not "due," and the bona fide dispute can be voluntarily settled with a release and a payment—even if the payment is for an amount less than the total wages claimed by employee.” (Id. at 1587 [citing Chindarah, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th 796.].)

Here, in contrast to Chindarah and as argued by Defendants, Plaintiff did not sign the agreement at issue, no person who signed the agreement is a named party in the case, and there is no pending summary adjudication motion on the validity of the agreement under an amended complaint identifying that issue. Plaintiff, at this point, is neither a party to the agreement and has not yet been designated as class representative.

Borrowing from a Michigan district court, the Court agrees that:

“…it is inappropriate for a court to void releases without first knowing whether those who executed the releases want the releases to be voided. [citation omitted]; see also Friedman, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 767 ("[T]he putative class members here have not individually requested that [the court] void their releases, and doing so en masse would not be appropriate given the individualized nature of the inquiry."). Rather, courts have held that the appropriate solution is to wait until after the class is certified and then include a statement in the class-action notice stating that the court will entertain applications to void any releases previously signed. See Friedman, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 767.” (Tolmasoff v. GM, LLC (E.D.Mich. June 30, 2016, No. 16-11747) 2016 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 85101, at *47.)

This concern also reflects the reality that some that some putative class members may already have used the amounts paid to them and be unable to pay back the money which they may be required to do if the agreements are deemed void, rather than a determination that the agreements are voidable, at their option.

Additionally, were Plaintiff able to establish standing the challenge the agreements as void, the agreements themselves contain an arbitration provision with a delegation clause rendering the arbitrator, and not this Court, with the power to determine issues over formation, validity, enforcement, scope, breach or interpretation.

Barriga v 99 Cents Only Stores LLC (2020) 51 Cal App. 5th 299 involved the striking of the declarations of absent class members on a motion for class certification, an evidentiary issue that is significantly different than invalidating releases entered into by persons not before the Court.

Brown v. Upside Gading, LP (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 140, 145 contains what the Court considers dicta on this issue, because that court did not reach the merits of the case but instead determined the matter was not a final appealable judgment.

Based on the above, the Court denies the motion to void the settlement agreements or otherwise strike provisions therefrom.

Party to Putative Class Communications

In Parris, the named plaintiffs moved “…in the trial court for an order permitting precertification notice to potential class members and for approval of the proposed notice and method of dissemination.” (Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, 291.)

The appellate court held that “Because no judicial approval was needed for the proposed precertification communication with potential class members, Parris and Lopez's motion for leave to engage in such communications was unnecessary and should have been dismissed by the trial court on that ground.” (Id. at 299.)

In that context, the appellate court stated “A trial court may rule on the propriety of precertification communications only if the  opposing party seeks an injunction, protective order or other relief” and that:

“If such a motion is brought, the trial court may impose restrictions on such communications only "by a showing of direct, immediate and irreparable harm." [citation omitted] Broad-based assertions that a proposed informational notice is "unfair," contains some inaccurate statements, or is presented in a misleading form are simply insufficient bases for imposition of judicial limitations on protected speech in the form of a prior restraint. Even then, any restrictions " 'must be narrowly drawn and cannot be upheld if reasonable alternatives are available having a lesser impact' " on the right to free speech. [citation omitted] Finally, "the restraint 'must have been accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.' [Citation.]" [citation omitted]” (Id. at 299-300.)

In other words, "absent specific evidence of abuse, an order prohibiting or limiting precertification communication with potential class members by the parties to a putative class action is an invalid prior restraint" of speech. (Id. at 298.)

The Parris court further noted “The requirement of court approval for precertification communications is a classic example of a prior restraint on speech” and that although “‘[p]rior restraints are not unconstitutional per se’ prior restraints have long been held presumptively unconstitutional.” (Id. at 296.)

“’[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights. [citation omitted] Prior restraints on speech are permissible only in certain narrow circumstances constituting ‘exceptional cases.’ [citation omitted] The party seeking to enjoin speech ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’[citation omitted]” (Id. at 296-297.)

The Court further notes that in Gulf Oil, “Gulf began to send notices to the 643 employees eligible for backpay, stating the exact amount available to each person in return for execution within 30 days of a full release of all discrimination claims dating from the relevant time period.” (Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard (1981) 452 U.S. 89, 91.)

“Gulf filed a motion in the District Court seeking an order limiting communications by parties and their counsel with class members. An accompanying brief described the EEOC conciliation agreement, asserting that 452 of the 643 employees entitled to backpay under that agreement had signed releases and been paid by the time the class action was filed. Gulf stated that after it was served in the case, it ceased sending backpay offers and release forms to class members.” (Id. at 92.)

The district court “…entered a temporary order prohibiting all communications concerning the case from parties or their counsel to potential or actual class members…It was not based on any findings of fact.” (Id. at 93.) The order was later modified to include “…a complete  ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court. It gave examples of communications, including any solicitation of legal representation of potential or actual class members, and any statements "which may tend to misrepresent the status, purposes and effects of the class action" or "create impressions tending without cause, to reflect adversely on any party, any counsel, this Court, or the administration of justice." (Id. at 94-95.)

When the appeal was heard en banc, “A majority opinion joined by 13 judges held that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression accorded First Amendment protection.” (Id. at 98.)

The Supreme Court reviewed the matter as to whether the order limiting communications was constitutionally permissible, concluding that it was not.

The Supreme Court noted, however:

“Class actions serve an important function in our system of civil justice. They present, however,  opportunities for abuse as well as problems for courts and counsel in the management of cases. Because of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and the broad authority to exercise control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties. But this discretion is not unlimited, and indeed is bounded by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules. [citation omitted.]....” (Id. at 100-101.)

“Because of these potential problems, an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties...  In addition, such a weighing -- identifying the potential abuses being addressed -- should result in a carefully drawn order that limits speech as little as possible, consistent with the rights of the parties under the circumstances.” (Id. at 101-102.)

“We recognize the possibility of abuses in class-action litigation, and agree with petitioners that such abuses may implicate communications with potential class members. But the mere possibility of abuses does not justify routine adoption of a communications ban that interferes with the formation of a class or the prosecution of a class action in accordance with the Rules” (Id. at 104.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek a broad, sweeping order to preclude further communications by Defendants with putative class members. This constitutes a prior restraint on speech, which, under the authorities above, requires a specific, detailed factual showings which would permit the Court to enter, at most, a narrowly tailored order. Broad characterizations of abuse are insufficient.

As such, the Court denies the motion as to the request to enjoin future communications.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Hudson & Keyse LLC vs. Mora, Sylvia

Case No.:  TCL116560

Date:           February 17, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Continued Application for Order to Sell Dwelling

Tentative Ruling: To hold the hearing as indicated herein

Facts

Default judgment in this matter was originally entered on June 13, 2007 as against Sylvia Mora aka Sylvia Myrna Mora (“Judgment Debtor”) in the amount of $2,758.00. (Declaration of Zee ¶4.)

Judgment was renewed on May 19, 2017 in the amount of $7,561.65.

The judgment was renewed again on December 30, 2022 in the amount of $13,845.68. (Declaration of Zee ¶5.)

An abstract of judgment was recorded in Tulare County on January 19, 2012 as document number 2012-0003557, which was amended and recorded on July 28, 2024, as document number 2024-0028754, and on May 7, 2018, as document number 2018-0023561. (Declaration of Zee ¶7.)

On or about May 19, 1988, Judgment Debtor acquired 126 East Beacon Avenue Tulare, CA 93274, APN 187-071-032-000 (the “Levied Property”). (Declaration of Zee ¶8.)

The Judgment Creditor Assignee, Collect Access LLC, has initiated a levy on the Levied Property and the levying officer has recorded a Notice of Levy as of September 9, 2025. (Declaration of Zee ¶10.)

Further, that “The records for the county recorder do not reflect the filing of a homestead declaration under Article 5 (commencing with Section 704.910 ) that describes the dwelling and that has been recorded by the judgment debtor or the spouse of the judgment debtor. On information and belief, Judgment Creditor Assignee has no information which would indicate that the dwelling is a homestead and the amount of the homestead exemption, if any.” (Declaration of Zee ¶11.) Likewise, the records for the County Tax Assessor do not reflect the filing of a declaration of homestead for the Levied Property. (Declaration of Zee ¶12.)

The records for the county tax assessor reflect a homeowner's exemption for the Levied Property. (Declaration of Zee ¶13.)

There are no liens or encumbrances recorded against the Levied Property. (Declaration of Zee ¶16.)

The fair market value of the Levied Property is in excess of $285,900.00. (Declaration of Zee ¶17.)

The application and Notice of Hearing on Right to Homestead Exemption (Judicial Council Form EJ-180 were served personally on the Judgment Debtor. (Declaration of Zee ¶¶18, 19, 21.)

No written opposition appears filed.

At the hearing, Defendant/Judgment Debtor Mora appeared, indicated that she resided at the Levied Property,  and asserted the automatic homestead exemption under Code of Civil Procedure section 704.730.

The Court found the automatic exemption applied, but  Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor raised issues as to the proper amount of the exemption and the Court continued this hearing.

On January 29, 2026, Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor filed a supplemental brief arguing the amount of the exemption is based on the date the lien is established via recording the abstract of judgment, citing to Berhanu v. Metzger (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 445.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure sections 680.010-724.260), is “a comprehensive scheme governing the enforcement of civil judgments in California.” (California Coastal Comm. v. Allen (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 322, 326.)

Section 704.740 permits the sale of a dwelling or "homestead" to satisfy a money judgment in appropriate circumstances. If the dwelling is owned by a judgment debtor as a joint tenant or tenant in common, "the interest of the judgment debtor in the dwelling and not the dwelling shall be sold." (Code Civ. Proc. § 704.820.) Further, a sale shall not be ordered if the court determines that "the sale of the dwelling would not be likely to produce a bid sufficient to satisfy any part of the amount due on the judgment." (Code Civ. Proc. § 704.780.)

The Court notes:

“In California, a homestead exemption may be asserted two ways. First, a declaration of homestead may be recorded. (… § 704.920.) A recorded homestead protects the property from execution by certain creditors to the extent of the amount of the homestead exemption... [(§§ 704.730, 704.965.)] [Citation.] Because many California debtors failed to file homestead exemptions, the legislature in 1974 enacted legislation which created an ‘automatic’ homestead exemption. (… § 704.720.) This exemption need not be memorialized in a recorded homestead declaration in order to be effective … . [Citations.]”

 “[T]he two exemptions are distinct protections and they operate differently. The declared homestead provides greater rights than the automatic homestead. The declared homestead provides protection from a voluntary sale; judgment liens only attach to the equity in excess of consensual liens; and the protections of the declared homestead survive the death of the homestead owner. The proceeds from a voluntary sale may be reinvested within six months, thus allowing the debtor to invest in another residence. [Citation.] On the other hand, the automatic homestead only entitles the debtor to protection from a forced execution sale. … [¶] … With respect to a judgment lien, which is created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment, the judgment lien only attaches to the equity in the property above and beyond the recorded homestead exemption and any preexisting liens on the property. …”  (Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 582, 588–589)

Amount of Exemption

In Berhanu, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 445, the court set out the relevant facts as follows: In October 1990 a Portland, Oregon court entered a judgment against Metzger, on December 18, 1990, an abstract of the judgment was recorded in San Diego County and on February 21, 1991 the San Diego County Superior Court executed the judgment on a home owned by Metzger . (Id. at 446-447.)

The Berhanu court noted that “Before January 1, 1991, a $ 45,000 exemption existed on property Metzger claimed as a homestead. Effective January 1, 1991, the exemption increased to $ 75,000. (§ 704.730, subd. (a)(2).)” (Id. at 447.)

“On May 14, 1991, the court granted Metzger a $ 45,000 exemption. He contends the exemption should have been $ 75,000.” (Id. at 446.)

The court noted “A family's principal dwelling is its homestead. (Code Civ. Proc., § 704.710, subd. (c).)  A homestead is exempt from execution in the amount set forth in section 704.730.” (Id.) Therefore, Berhanu involved a claim under the automatic homestead exemption.

Metzger argued the increased exemption was warranted under subdivision (c) of section 703.050. (Id.) Instead, the court disagreed and stated: “Section 703.050, subdivision (a), is controlling. ‘The determination [of] . . . the amount of an exemption shall be made by application of the exemption statutes in effect (1) at the time the judgment creditor's lien . . . was created . . ..’ This occurred before the change in section 704.730 increasing the amount of the exemption.” (Id. at 447.) The court, therefore, concluded that the $45,000 amount applied.

While "[t]he automatic homestead exemption is available when a party has continuously resided in a dwelling from the time that a creditors' lien attaches until a court's determination in the forced sale process that the exemption does not apply" (In re Mulch (Bankr. N.D.Cal. 1995) 182 B.R. 569, 572, [citing Webb v. Trippet (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 647, 651]), the amount of the exemption appears determined, under Berhanu, by the date which the judgment creditor’s lien was created.

As noted in Bernhanu, “A lien on real property is created by recording an abstract of judgment (§ 697.310).” (Berhanu, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at 447, fn. 3

As applied here, the lien on the Levied Property was created on January 19, 2012 when the abstract of judgment was recorded.

As such, the automatic homestead exemption on January 19, 2012 appears to be $75,000.00 under the formed Code of Civil Procedure section 704.730(a)(2).

Hearing on Sale and Exemption

As to the process regarding sale of the Levied Property sought here, the court in Wells Fargo Financial Leasing, Inc. v. D & M Cabinets (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 59, 67-69 notes:

“Section 704.740 is part of the homestead laws. ‘Homestead laws are designed to protect the sanctity of the family home against a loss caused by a forced sale by creditors. … The homestead exemption ensures that insolvent debtors and their families are not rendered homeless by virtue of an involuntary sale of the residential property they occupy. Thus, the homestead law is not designed to protect creditors … . This strong public policy requires courts to adopt a liberal construction of the law and facts to promote the beneficial purposes of the homestead legislation to benefit the debtor [and his family].’ (Amin v. Khazindar (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 582, 588)

At issue here is the “automatic” homestead exemption (also called a “residential exemption”), which need not be memorialized in a recorded homestead declaration, and which is available when a party has continuously resided in a dwelling from the time that a creditor's lien attaches until a court's determination in a forced sale process that the exemption does not apply. (Ibid.) “Where a residential exemption is claimed, the judgment creditor is required to obtain a court order for sale of the real property homestead.” (Id. at p. 589.)More Like This Passage

A homestead exemption does not preclude sale of the home but entitles the  homesteader to receive the value of the exemption if the property is sold to satisfy a judgment lien. “When there is sufficient equity in the property, it may be sold and the exemption applies to the sales proceeds that are exempt from the claims of certain creditors and can be used by the debtor to acquire another residence.” (5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) Homesteads, § 13:43, p. 87.)

Compliance with section 704.740 affords the following protections to a person entitled to a homestead exemption: A hearing is held, at which the court determines whether a homestead exemption exists. (§§ 704.770, 704.780.) If the court determines a homestead exemption exists, “the court shall determine the amount of the homestead exemption and the fair market value of the dwelling. The court shall make an order for sale of the dwelling subject to the homestead exemption, unless the court determines that the sale of the dwelling would not be likely to produce a bid sufficient to satisfy any part of the amount due on the judgment pursuant to Section 704.800. The order for sale of the dwelling subject to the homestead exemption shall specify the amount of the proceeds of the sale that is to be distributed to each person having a lien or encumbrance on the dwelling and shall include the name and address of each such person… .” (§ 704.780, subd. (b).) If no bid is received at the sale that exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption plus the amount necessary to satisfy all liens and encumbrances on the property, “the homestead shall not be sold and shall be released and is not thereafter subject to a court order for sale upon subsequent application by the same judgment creditor for a period of one year.” (§ 704.800, subd. (a).) If no bid is received that is 90 percent or more of the fair market value determined by the court, the homestead shall not be sold unless the court, upon motion by the judgment creditor, grants permission to accept the highest bid exceeding the minimum bid or makes a new order for sale of the homestead. (§ 704.800.) When the property is sold, the proceeds are distributed in the following order: (1) to the discharge of liens and encumbrances, (2) to the  judgment debtor in the amount of the homestead exemption, (3) to reimbursement of the levying officer's costs, (4) to the judgment creditor, and (5) to the judgment debtor in the amount remaining. (§ 704.850.)”

(See also Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834, 844-845 [“The bid must exceed the amount of the homestead and the balance due on the deed of trust, and after [the] defendant's wife receives her share, there must be some amount remaining to partially satisfy [the] plaintiffs' judgments.”].)

Here, the declaration of Zee indicates to the Court that the last known address of the Judgment Debtor is the Levied Property, that it has been owned by the Judgment Debtor since 1988.

As noted above, at the initial hearing, the Judgement Debtor appeared and claimed the automatic homestead exemption.

Additionally, the Court notes that the estimated value of the Levied Property is $285,900.00.

As such, the Court intends to conduct the hearing consistent with the above. If the court grants the motion to sell the property, the court will consider whether it should find good cause to extend the sale period beyond the 45 days noted in CCP 704.770(a) if defendant wishes to have time to seek a loan on the property and pay this obligation without a sale.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                RANGEL, FELIPE vs. ORCHARDS AT TULARE LLC et al

Case No.:  VCU327273

Date:           February 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion on grounds of unconscionability

Background Facts

Plaintiff filed this Elder Abuse, Professional Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Assault, Battery and Premises Liability action against Defendants Orchards at Tulare, LLC and Kelly Orozco.

Defendant Orchards at Tulare, LLC filed this motion to compel arbitration of these claims.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

Counsel for Defendant attached a true and correct copy of the Arbitration Agreement as Exhibit 2, along with other documents signed by Plaintiff at or near the time of admission, constituting the Admission Agreement. (Declaration of Romano ¶5.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement contains his signature, but notes he signed it “…without knowing it was an arbitration agreement or that it waived my right to pursue my claims in court or to a jury trial, but under the impression that my signatures were required to receive treatment.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶7.)

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided a copy of the Arbitration Agreement purporting to bear Plaintiff’s signature.

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

Here, Plaintiff indicates he does not recall signing the arbitration agreement and would not have signed it had it been explained, consistent with the declaration in  Gamboa.

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient, as he fails to deny the signature is his own:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

Under Ramirez and in a handwritten signature case like this one, Plaintiff’s failure to deny he signed the Agreement is fatal the challenge as to the authenticity analysis. The Ramirez court noted that “Ramirez's declaration stated (1) he did “not recall ever being presented with an arbitration agreement,” (2) he did “not recall ever signing an arbitration agreement,” (3) no one informed him about an arbitration agreement, informed him of a desire that he sign an arbitration agreement, or explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, and (4) if someone had explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, he would not sign it.” (Id. at 836.)

The court, therefore, found the declaration insufficient to challenge the authenticity, stating “His declaration does not assert the signature on that document is not his and, furthermore, does not even state that he cannot recall signing that particular document.  Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

The Court here agrees that “the inability to recall signing a document does not ‘afford[] an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed’” and therefore, the burden has not shifted back to Defendant.

As to the argument regarding mutual assent, Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 notes:

“ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ [citation omitted] ‘A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.’ [citation omitted].) ‘[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.’ [citation omitted]”

As such, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states:

“This Agreement relates to the Resident’s admission to the Facility, and the Facility, among other things, participates in the Medicare and/or Medi-Cal programs and/or procures supplies from out of state vendors. The parties, therefore, agree that the underlying admission to the Facility involves interstate commerce. Accordingly, this Agreement is to be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the procedural rules set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16) shall govern any petition to compel arbitration…” (Agreement to Arbitrate – Article 7.)

Further, that the Arbitration Agreement applies to “any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorize or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered…,” that it includes any dispute that “…relates to the provision of care, treatment, and services the Facility provides to the Resident . . . including any action for injury or death arising from negligence, intentional tort, and/or statutory causes of action (including all California Welfare and Institutions Code sections and Health and Safety Code section 430)…” and is binding as to “…any dispute, except for disputes pertaining to collections or evictions.” (Agreement to Arbitrate – Articles 1, 2, 4.)

Further, that the Arbitration Agreement applies to any such disputes between the “…Resident, Facility, its owners, operators, officers, directors, administrators, staff, employees, agents, and any management and/or service company that provides services to the Facility…” (Agreement to Arbitrate – Article 2.)

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Arbitration Agreement expressly covers Plaintiff’s claims for Elder Abuse, Professional Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Assault, Battery and Premises Liability by including language such as “any dispute as to medical malpractice” and including “injury…arising from negligence, intentional tort, and/or statutory causes of action.”

As such, the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement covers the claims at issue in this matter.

Facts – Defense to Enforcement – Unconscionability

In support of the argument as to unconscionability, Plaintiff states that he was admitted September 9, 2024, that during the first several days from admission to September 12, 2024, he was in significant pain, stress and focused on receiving care. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶1-3.)

On or about September 12, 2024, Plaintiff indicates that Defendant’s staff member “brought me a stack of admission papers and directed me to “sign here” and “sign there.” I was told this paperwork was routine admission paperwork and that I needed to sign to permit treatment. I was not told that any document was an arbitration agreement.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶4.) Plaintiff states “The paperwork I was given included numerous forms bundled together and presented quickly, without any individual review or explanation of legal consequences.” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶7.)

Further, that no staff member indicated the documents contained an arbitration provision, did not explain arbitration was optional and was not informed of a time period to cancel or revoke the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶5.) Further, that Plaintiff did not receive a copy of the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶5.)

Further, that no interpreter was offered to explain legal terms nor was Plaintiff provided an opportunity to consult with anyone else as to the consequences of the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶8.)

Additionally, that the following render the Arbitration Agreement unconscionable:

“a. Waives Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), stripping the Court of its authority to avoid inconsistent rulings in cases involving multiple defendants.

b. Requires equal fee‑splitting, exposing Plaintiff—a dependent adult with limited resources—to potentially significant arbitration costs that he would not bear in court.

c. Contains a retroactive clause, applying the agreement to services rendered before its execution, a term California courts routinely view with disfavor.

d. Binds family members, heirs, and representatives in their individual capacities, far exceeding any legitimate interest of the facility and imposing obligations on nonsignatories.

e. Includes class and collective action waivers that limit statutory rights and restrict avenues of relief.

f. References entities such as “Merritt Manor Convalescent” and “ReNew Health Consulting Services,” creating confusion and ambiguity regarding the actual contracting parties.”

Authority and Analysis – Defense to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345, 357 indicates, however, that “…a determination that a contract is adhesive is merely the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms is concerned. Enforceability depends upon whether the terms of which the adherent was unaware are beyond the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person or are oppressive or unconscionable.”

Here, the Court agrees there is a relatively high degree of procedural unconscionability, where the Arbitration Agreement is provided along with the Admission Agreement during the first few days of admission while Plaintiff was in pain and focused on receiving care. Further, that no explanation as to the documents were provided, but that Plaintiff was instructed to sign here and sign there. The Arbitration Agreement was preprinted and relatively dense though consisting of two pages. On balance, the Arbitration Agreement is noted as optional and that it is not a condition of admission, but Plaintiff indicates that this was not expressly stated to him in light of the recent admission and on going treatment.

Substantive Unconscionability

“ ‘Substantive unconscionability’ focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’ ” (Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330 (citations omitted).) The paramount consideration in assessing [substantive] conscionability is mutuality. (Ibid.) Substantive unconscionability looks to overly harsh or one-sided results. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 99.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)

As to waiver of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), the Court notes Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 438, 447 appears to have approved of such a waiver, stating “The parties could not have stated their intent that section 1281.2, subdivision (c) would not be applied to defeat enforcement  of the arbitration clause in the 2008 agreement any more clearly.” Therefore, the Court does not find this term substantively unconscionable.

Fee Splitting

As to equal fee splitting by a dependent adult, the Court agrees that the provision requiring Plaintiff to pay a pro rata share of the arbitration costs has the potential of creating the overly harsh result of denying Plaintiff access to a forum to assert his claims and to vindicate his statutory rights under the Elder Abuse Act, rendering it substantively unconscionable. As such, the Court finds this provision to be substantively unconscionable under the circumstances of the instant action. (See Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 95-96.)

Retroactivity

As to the retroactive clause, ““[A]n arbitration agreement may be applied retroactively to transactions which occurred prior to execution of the arbitration agreement.” (Salgado v. Carrows Restaurants, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 356, 361.) As such, the Court finds no substantive unconscionability here.

Binding of Heirs and Representatives

As to the binding of family members, heirs, and representatives in individual capacities, "[g]enerally, a person who is not a party to an arbitration agreement is not bound by it." (Goldman v. Sunbridge Healthcare, LLC (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1169.) "However, there are exceptions. For example, a patient who signs an arbitration agreement at a health care facility can bind relatives who present claims arising from the patient's treatment." (Id.) As such, the Court does not find this term unconscionable.

Class and Collective Action Waivers

As to the class and collective waivers, under the FAA, the class action waiver is enforceable and not substantively unconscionable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

As the collective action waiver, it is irrelevant that Plaintiff here does not assert any claims under PAGA, as the agreement is reviewed of substantive unconscionability at the time it was entered into and is not dependent upon the claims asserted.
(Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 882.)

Here, the term at issue states:

“By signing this agreement, the parties waive their right to commence and/or be a party to any class or collective action in any court against the other party relating in any manner whatsoever to the Resident’s residency at the Facility. Further the parties waiver their right to commence or be a party to any group, class, or collective action claim in arbitration or any other forum”

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

 “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.) In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, the Court finds no intent to split the claims as required under Viking River and therefore considers this a improper attempt to waive PAGA claims wholesale. While, as noted above, the class action claims could be waived, the Type O PAGA claim cannot be waived. In the Court’s view, the waiver does seek to improperly waive PAGA claims in total, as it fails to delineate between individual and representative claims.

As such, the Court finds this term substantively unconscionable. 

References to Other Entities

As to references to other entities, the substantive unconscionability is eliminated as the Agreement includes in that definition the owners, operators, service companies and related entities of the expressly named “Merritt Manor Convalescent.”

Conclusion as to Unconscionability and Severance

The Court has found a relatively high degree of procedural unconscionability and has identified two terms of the Agreement that are substantively unconscionable. The Court notes that Article 8 contains a severance provision.

Courts have discretion to sever unconscionable clauses and enforce the remainder of the contract. (Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1244.)

There is a strong preference for courts to sever unconscionable provisions unless unconscionability permeates the entire agreement. (De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 476, 492.) However, if "the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced." (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 124.) But if "the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate." (Id.)  

While the Court could sever the collective action waiver term, and without apparent impact on this case, the Court, in its discretion finds sufficient substantive unconscionability with respect to the fee splitting in this context. In the Court’s opinion, however, it cannot sever the fee splitting provision without rewriting the Agreement as to a fee waiver or Defendant paying a higher percentage of the fee.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion, finding the Arbitration Agreement substantively unconscionable.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Dubose, Thomas vs. Gomes, Kimberly

Case No.:  VCU325823

Date:           February 10, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories – General, Set One, Special Interrogatories – Set One, Requests for Production of Documents – Set One, Requests for Admissions – Set One.

Tentative Ruling: To condition this order on the payment of the remaining $180 filing fees; upon payment of the remaining filing fees, Plaintiff shall give notice to Defendant; once notice has been provided, the Court orders Defendant to provide supplemental responses as indicated in this ruling no later than thirty (30) days from the notice:

To grant the motion as to Form Interrogatory Nos.  2.2, 2.5 – 2.8, 3.6, 3.7, 15.1 and 17.1; to deny them motion as to Form Interrogatory Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.7, 8.8, 9.1, 9.1, 12.1-12.7, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, 14.2, 16.1 – 16.3, and 16.6;

To grant the motion as to Special Interrogatory Nos. -9, 10, 14-34, 41-46, 50-55, 68-70; to deny the motion as to Special Interrogatory No. 67;

To grant the motion as to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 – 18, 20-24, 27-34, 35 and 36; to deny the motion as to Requests for Production Nos. 25 and 26.

To grant the motion as to Requests for Admissions Nos. 3, 4, 7-9.

Facts

In this fraud and conversion matter, Plaintiff, on October 22, 2025, served the following discovery on Defendant:

• Form Interrogatories – General, Set One
• Special Interrogatories – Set One
• Requests for Production of Documents – Set One
• Requests for Admissions – Set One

On November 24, 2025, Defendant served responses thereto. Plaintiff alleges the responses are incomplete, grossly deficient, inadequate and evasive.

On December 1, 2025, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter seeking further responses.

On December 19, 2025, Defendant responded, indicating that further responses would not be provided.

On December 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed this single motion to compel further responses to the above discovery.

In opposition, Defendant has filed a response that appears to be a mixture of further responses, continuing objections, is verified by Defendant and contains no legal argument or signature by counsel.

Authority and Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that four total motions are made here. The Court conditions the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $180.

Interrogatories

A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories if the propounding party deems that (1) an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, (2) an exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, or (3) an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).) Notice of the motion must be provided within 45 days of service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the parties have agreed in writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (c).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the requests. (Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

Form Interrogatories

Here, as to Form Interrogatory Nos. 2.2, 2.5 – 2.8, 3.6 and 3.7, the Court agrees that these interrogatories  are form interrogatories that was been approved by the Judicial Council, have been deemed by the Judicial Council as a proper area of inquiry and that these interrogatories seek basic information and request information that is typically exchanged in all lawsuits and are therefore applicable here. As such, the Court will order a further response to Nos. 2.2, 2.5 – 2.8, 3.6 and 3.7.

As to Form Interrogatory Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.7, 8.8, 9.1, 9.1, 12.1-12.7, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, 14.2, 16.1 – 16.3, and 16.6 these refer to the standard definition of incident as set out in the form interrogatories. The Court notes from review of the complaint there are any number of “incidents” to which this general definition could apply to as to the allegations of the marriage ceremony, the request to account for property, the discovery that no marriage license had been filed and other such “incidents.” As such, the Court denies the motion as to these Form Interrogatory Nos. 4.1, 4.2, 8.1, 8.2, 8.4, 8.7, 8.8, 9.1, 9.1, 12.1-12.7, 13.1, 13.2, 14.1, 14.2, 16.1 – 16.3, and 16.6

As to Form Interrogatory Nos. 15.1 and 17.1, the response that “These questions clearly relate to automobile liability…” is unfounded. These interrogatories are applicable across civil actions and a further response is ordered as to Form Interrogatory Nos. 15.1 and 17.1

Special Interrogatories

The Court denies the motion as to Special Interrogatory No. 67, as the separate statement fails to provide the text of Special Interrogatory No. 65. (Rule of Court, rule 3.1345(c) as to the contents of the separate statement states “A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.”)

The remainder of the special interrogatories, however, appear proper and require a further response. The Court notes that irrelevance and asked and answered are not proper responses to interrogatories and violate section 2030.220 as to the contents of a response. Additionally, the Court does not find the putative spouse determination in the family law matter is dispositive as to issues of fraud and conversion raised in the complaint.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220 requires that:

(a) Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible.

(c) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.

As to the use of contention interrogatories, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.010(b) authorizes such discovery expressly:

“An interrogatory may relate to whether another party is making a certain contention, or to the facts, witnesses, and writings on which a contention is based. An interrogatory is not objectionable because an answer to it involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, or would be based on information obtained or legal theories developed in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial.” (Code of Civil Procedure, § 2030.010(b).)

Here, these contention interrogatories, and follow up interrogatories as to witnesses and documents, appear to relate to allegations made in Defendant’s responsive pleadings and the Court, therefore will order further responses to Special Interrogatory Nos. 7-9, 10, 14-34, 41-46, 50-55, 68-70.

Requests for Production

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 requires, in response to a request for production, the following:

“(a) The party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed shall respond separately to each item or category of item by any of the following:

(1) A statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling by the date set for the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) of Section 2031.030 and any related activities.

(2) A representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of a particular item or category of item.

(3) An objection to the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling.”

 Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.220 provides “A statement that the party to whom a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling has been directed will comply with the particular demand shall state that the production, inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, and related activity demanded, will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.230 provides “A representation of inability to comply with the particular demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling shall affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand. This statement shall also specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party. The statement shall set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.”

Finally, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a) permits a party to demand a further response where:

“(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.”

Under subsection (b), the motion must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” In Digital Music News LLC v Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216 at 224, the court defined “good cause” as a showing that there “a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.”  If the moving party has shown good cause for the requests for production, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections. (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

Here, the Court finds Requests for Production Nos. 25 and 26 overly broad and not reasonably particular to as to the communications between the parties and any and all personal property.

However, the Court will order a further production as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 – 18, 20-24, 27-34. These requests appear to relate to property at issue between the parties and therefore require further responses. Therefore, the Court will order further responses to Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 – 18, 20-24, 27-34.

As to objections under privacy of the business entities, the Court notes corporations do not have a right of privacy that is protected by the California Constitution. Rather, Article 1, Section 1, protects the privacy rights of “people” only. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal App 4th 741, 755.) The court in SCC Acquisitions noted, however, that while some prior opinions have held that the California Constitution protects only the privacy rights of human beings, other opinions have held that business entities have zones of privacy rights and some have assumed, without deciding, that corporations enjoy a constitutional right of privacy. (Id. at 755.) The court concluded that while corporations have a right to privacy, it is not a constitutional right. Because a corporate privacy right is not constitutionally protected, whether a party’s requests for production infringe that right is resolved by a balancing test. (Id. at 756.). Any doubts about reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence generally are resolved in favor of permitting discovery. (Id. at 756.) Here, the Court applies this to the LLC entities at issue on some of these requests.

As to Nos. 35 and 36, there is no requirement that the request for production be full and complete of itself, and the Court finds the references to production of documents responsive to form and special interrogatories statutorily compliance. Therefore, the Court will order further responses to Requests for Production Nos. 35 and 36.

 Admissions

A party may move for an order compelling further response to a request for admission or request for production of documents if the demanding party deems that responses are incomplete, evasive, or contain meritless objections.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2031.310, subd. (a); 2033.290, subd. (a).) If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the discovery. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

As to these requests for admission, the Court does not find the irrelevance objection well taken and, rather, finds these requests reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to the fraud and conversion causes of action.

Therefore, the Court will order further responses to Requests for Admissions Nos. 3, 4, 7-9.

Conclusion

As noted at the outset, this order is conditioned upon the payment of the remaining filing fees. Upon payment of the remaining filing fees, Plaintiff shall give notice to Defendant. Once notice has been provided, Defendant shall have thirty (30) days to provide supplemental responses to the discovery noted above.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Knox, Sean vs. Visalia Unified School District

Case No.:   VCU327313

Date:           February 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: The Court has continued the demurrer to April 7, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 and has permitted Plaintiff to file an opposition to the motion. Defendant may file a reply per code.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Kaweah Container, Inc. vs. Bassetts Cricket Ranch

Case No.:   VCU319877

Date:           February 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form and Special Interrogatories and (2) Requests for Production; (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To grant the motions upon the payment of the remaining filing fee of $60; to order responses due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendant; (3) To deem the admissions admitted upon the payment of the remaining filing fee of $60; to issue sanctions against Defendant and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $590, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of payment of the filing fee and notice to Defendant; to order Plaintiff to give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (3)

As an initial matter, the Court notes three motion fees have been submitted to this Court, but that four motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $60.

In this fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair business practices, breach of contract, breach of implied covenant, open book account, common counts, and fraudulent transfer, Plaintiff, on September 29, 2025, served Form and Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions on Defendant Bassetts Cricket Ranch.

Responses were due November 3, 2025.

As of the date of the filing of this motion on January 13, 2026, no responses have been received.

As such, Plaintiff seeks to compel initial responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, and Requests for Production of Documents, and to deem admissions admitted. Further, Plaintiff seeks monetary sanctions.

No opposition appears filed.

(1)  Interrogatories

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $60 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion.

(2) Requests for Production

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty days after payment of the additional $60 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

(3) Requests for Admissions

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 34 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee.

Sanctions

Plaintiff seeks $679.80 in fees and costs as the interrogatories, $679.80 as to the requests for production and $872.60 as to the requests for admission

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions in the total amount of $590, consisting of 1 hour for all motions at the local, community rate of $350 plus $240 in filing fees for all four motions at $60 per motion. Sanctions are imposed jointly and severally against Defendant and counsel of record are due within thirty days after payment of the additional $60 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                H., Michelle vs. Porterville Unified School District

Case No.:   VCU311330

Date:            February 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Protective Order re: Student Records

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and order the records produced pursuant to a protective order.

Facts

In this negligence and breach of mandatory duty action, Plaintiff and Defendant jointly move for a protective order which orders the production of counseling notes and discipline files of Makayla Guerrero and minors Nataliesky G., Allison H., Nadia G., and Cameron M.

There is an alternative request that the Court interpret a failure to oppose the motion by the parents or legal guardians of the minors noted above as a stipulation to produce the records pursuant to a protective order.

It appears this hearing was set via an ex parte application on January 27, 2026. The motion and supporting documents were filed February 2, 2026.

On January 29, 2026, counsel for Defendant electronically served Makayla Guerrero with a Motion for Protective Order Regarding Production of Student Records of Makayla Guerrero and Minors Nadia G., Nataliesky G., and Cameron M. The declaration indicates personal service was attempted, alternative addresses were searched and a telephone number for Makayla Guerrero was located. Contact with Makayla Guerrero was made and the documents were electronically sent to an email address as requested by Makayla Guerrero, who confirmed receipt.

The parties to this action otherwise stipulate to the relevance of such records, but Defendant indicates that it may only produce the records of Makayla Guerrero and minors Nataliesky G., Allison H., Nadia G., and Cameron M., pursuant to a court order based upon Education Code section 49076.

Authority and Analysis

“A school district shall not permit access to pupil records to a person without written parental consent or under judicial order except as set forth in this section and as permitted by Part 99 (commencing with Section 99.1) of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations." (Educ. Code § 49076(a).) This statute is "directed at institutional records maintained in the normal course of business by a single, central custodian of the school. Typical of such records would be registration forms, class schedules, grade transcripts, discipline records, and the like." (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.)

Based on the stipulation of the parties and in the absence of any opposition thereto, the Court grants the motion for protective order and orders the records produced pursuant to Education Code section § 49076(a).

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Good Neighbor Homes, LLC vs. Scazighini, Tad

Case No.:   VCL328480

Date:           February 17, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories – UD Set One, Form Interrogatories – General Set Two, and Special Interrogatories, Set One and (2) Production of Documents Set One;  (3) Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2) To condition this order on the payment of the remaining $120 filing fees; upon payment of the remaining filing fees, Plaintiff shall give notice to Defendant; once notice has been provided, the Court orders Defendant to provide responses within five (5) days after service of the notice; (3) To condition this order on the payment of the remaining $120 filing fees; upon payment, to deem admission admitted; To issue sanctions in the amount of $650 total due due no later than twenty (20) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion and payment of the remaining filing fees; to order Plaintiff to give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (3)

As an initial matter, the Court notes three motion fees have been submitted to this Court, but that five total motions are made here. The Court conditions the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $120.

In this unlawful detainer matter, Plaintiff served Form Interrogatories – UD Set One, Form Interrogatories – General Set Two, Special Interrogatories – Set One, Requests for Production of Documents Set One and Requests for Admissions, Set One, on Defendant on January 7, 2026.

As of the filing of these motions on February 5, 2026, no responses have been received.

As such, Plaintiff seeks to compel initial response to the interrogatories and document requests and deem admissions admitted.

These motions appear timely under Code of Civil Procedure section 1170.8.

The Court notes Defendant may oppose these motions orally at the hearing.

Authority and Analysis

(1) Interrogatories

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond Form Interrogatories – UD Set One, Form Interrogatories – General Set Two, and Special Interrogatories, Set One, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – UD Set One, Form Interrogatories – General Set Two, and Special Interrogatories, Set One, within five (5) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion and payment of the remaining filing fees. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(2) Requests for Production

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within five (5) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion and payment of the remaining filing fees. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(3) Deem Admissions Admitted

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion and deems the facts and allegations in Request Nos. 1-11 admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fees.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions of $650 total consisting of one hour for all five motions at the rate of $350 per hour plus five (5) filing fees of $60 each. Sanctions are due no later than twenty (20) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion and payment of the remaining filing fees. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Discover Bank vs. Valdez, Roger Jr

Case No.:  PCL308784

Date:           February 17, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Continued Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

At the prior hearing on this motion, Defendant appeared and raised issues as to the service of the motion. The Court ordered Plaintiff to serve the motion and permitted Defendant to file an opposition or response thereto.

At the hearing on January 27, 2026, the Court indicated that the parties were instructed to discuss resolution of this matter, that contact information was exchanged and that this hearing would come off calendar if the matter was resolved.

No supplemental filings appear in the Court’s file and therefore the Court rules on the summary judgment motion as follows:

Undisputed Material Facts

Defendant applied to plaintiff for a credit card account and entered into a written credit card account agreement with plaintiff for the account number ending in 3547 (the “Account”). (UMF Nos. 1, 10.)

The defendant agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the Cardmember Agreement when the defendant applied for, received or used the credit card account. In addition, the Cardmember Agreement provides that use of the card constitutes acceptance of the agreement. (UMF Nos. 2, 11.)

After receiving the credit card, purchases were made by the use of the account and the charging of various goods, services and cash advances. Plaintiff complied with its obligations under the Agreement by paying vendors for all charges that were made on Defendant’s account. The principal balance of $8,453.15 prayed for in the complaint results from the defendant’s use of said account. (UMF Nos. 3, 12.)

Payments and charges are duly reflected on the computerized credit card record regularly kept and maintained by plaintiff in connection with defendant’s credit card accounts. Those records were mailed on a monthly basis in the form of billing statements to defendant reflecting all debits and credits to defendant’s credit account. (UMF Nos. 4, 13.)

There is no record that there is any unresolved dispute between the parties and/or that the defendant asserted a valid objection to the balance shown as due and owing on the monthly statements provided to the defendant. (UMF Nos. 5, 14.)

Before 02/13/23, the defendant defaulted in making the payments due under the terms of the cardmember agreement and plaintiff accelerated the account balance so that the entire unpaid balance on the account became immediately due and payable. (UMF Nos. 6, 15.)

The last payment applied to the account was on or about 10/30/24. (UMF Nos. 7, 16.)

Defendant owes to plaintiff $8,453.15 principal and court costs. (UMF Nos. 8, 17.)

Defendant’s affirmative defenses, if any, fail to raise any triable issues of fact material to this action and therefore do not preclude granting of summary judgment. (UMF Nos. 9, 18.)

Authority and Analysis

This motion for summary judgment arises out of Defendant’s default on a credit card obligation to Plaintiff. The complaint pleads common counts of open book account and account stated.

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. Aguilar, at 850.  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist as to each of the causes of action set forth in Plaintiff’s complaint.

As to the cause of action for open book account, Plaintiff must prove the following:

1.That Plaintiff and Defendant had financial transactions with each other;

2.That Plaintiff, in the regular course of business, kept a written account of the debits and credits involved in the transactions;

3.That Defendant owes Plaintiff money on the account; and

4.The amount of money that Defendant owes Plaintiff. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 460; CACI 372)

Here, the first element is met by UMF Nos. 1, 2, and 3.

The second element is met by UMF Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

The third and fourth elements are met by UMF Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.

As to account stated, the essential elements are: “(1) previous transactions between the parties establishing the relationship of debtor and creditor; (2) an agreement between the parties, express or implied, on the amount due from the debtor to the creditor; (3) a promise by the debtor, express or implied, to pay the amount due.  [Citations.]  [Citation.]” (Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 467, 491 (internal quotation marks omitted).)

The first element for account stated is met by UMF Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14

The second element is met by UMF Nos. 10 and 11.

The third element is satisfied by UMF Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, and 17.

Moreover, Defendant’s failure to file written opposition creates the inference that the motion is meritorious. Where no opposition to a motion is timely filed with the Court, the Court may only hear argument limited to a request for a continuance of the hearing to afford an opportunity for written opposition, and the Court cannot hear oral argument from the responding party to a discovery motion that goes to the merits of the motion. The basis for this rule is patently intended to prevent the introduction of legal theories without prior notice to opposing counsel and the court.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (Mullikin) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division