Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, August 18, 2026, are:

Re:                Gill, Jai vs. Deluxe Foods II, Inc. et al

Case No.:  VCU319543

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and award $21,784  in fees and $12,410 in interest; To deny the motion in part as to the costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant Deluxe Foods II, Inc. for breach of written contract, breach of oral contract, goods sold and delivered, account stated, open account, and foreclosure of mechanic’s lien bond, seeking $92,500 in damages.

Additionally, Plaintiff sued Defendants Emer Ahmed Saleh and Shogh Saleh for breach of oral contract, goods sold and delivered, account stated, open account, and foreclosure of mechanic’s lien bond, seeking $92,500 in damages.

Further, Defendant Deluxe Foods II, Inc. cross-complained against Plaintiff for breach of contract.

The case proceeded to bench trial on May 27 and 28, 2026. After trial, the Court entered judgment on June 18, 2026 as follows:

“1. Plaintiff JAI GILL is awarded the sum of Eighty-Seven Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($87,500.00) from Defendant DELUXE FOODS II, INC. on its first cause of action for breach of written contract

2. Plaintiff JAI GILL is not entitled to an award on its second, third, fourth, fifth or sixth causes of actions.

3. Plaintiff JAI GILL is not entitled to an award on any of its causes of actions against Defendant EMER AHMED SALEH or Defendant SHOGY SALEH.

4. Cross-Complainant DELUXE FOOD II, INC. is not entitled to an award on its first cause of action for breach of contract against Cross-Defendant JAI GILL.

5. Plaintiff JAI GILL shall recover pre-judgment interest at a rate often percent per year on the awarded the sum of Eighty-Seven Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($87,500.00) commencing January 16, 2025 through date of judgment.”

Further, that “6. Plaintiff JAI GILL shall recover attorney's fees, to be determined in a post judgment motion, in the amount of $ ___” and “7. Plaintiff JAI GILL shall recover costs, to be determined in a post-judgment memorandum of costs, in the amount of $___”

On July 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $28,485, consisting of 64.54 hours at the rate of $450 per hour and prejudgment interest in the amount of $12,410.00 “plus costs in the amount of $4,027.87.” The declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel states that Memorandum of Costs was filed “June 22, 2026.”

Plaintiff notes the contract at issue contains Paragraph 12 which states "In any action or proceeding between the parties hereto concerning this Agreement, or the rights and duties of any party in relation thereto, the party prevailing shall be entitled, in addition to such other relief as may be granted, to recover from the losing party its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in such action or proceeding, or an other separate action brought for that purpose."

In opposition, Defendants argue that the request for costs is procedurally defective, as no memorandum of costs was filed.

Further, that prejudgment interest should be denied because the amount at issue was not certain until trial.

Finally, that attorneys’ fees should be denied because Gill did not prevail on all claims and for the amount pled in the complaint. In other words, Defendants seek to deny attorneys’ fees based on mixed results.

Authority and Analysis

Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiff seeks fees under the attorneys’ fees provision in Paragraph 12 of the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants.

Where there is an agreement for attorney’s fees, Civil Code 1717 provides:

“(a) In an action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs. ...Reasonable attorney’s fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit.”

Additionally, “The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section…” (Civil Code § 1717(b)(1).)

As to Defendants’ “mixed results” claims, the Court notes Silver Creek, LLC v. BlackRock Realty Advisors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1539 provides:

“When determining the prevailing party under section 1717, the trial court “is to compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with the parties' demands on those same claims and their litigation objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening statements, and similar sources.” ([Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, ] 876.) Additionally, “in determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’ For example, a party who is denied direct relief on a claim may nonetheless be found to be a prevailing party if it is clear that the party has otherwise achieved its main litigation objective. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 877, italics omitted.) A trial court has wide discretion in determining which party is the prevailing party under section 1717, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination absent “a manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 577)”

Here, Plaintiff sued for $92,500 on the breach of contract claim as against Defendant Deluxe Foods II and recovered via the judgment $87,500. While Plaintiff did not recover on the other causes of action, the main litigation objective was payment under the contract for work completed on the project in this matter. Plaintiff achieved the main litigation objective: to be paid for the work following the notice of completion. In addition, the Judgment itself indicates Plaintiff is the prevailing party and Plaintiff properly seeks its fees here. Plaintiff is the prevailing party.

Calculation of Attorneys’ Fees

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285.)

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

Here, the hourly rate is $450 per hour. There is no evidence provided that the $450 per hour attorney rate is the prevailing rate in Tulare County, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended and Apportionment

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.) “Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 39.) 

Where a party is challenging the reasonableness of attorney’s fees as excessive that party must attack itemized billing with evidence that the fees claimed were not appropriate or obtain the declaration of an attorney with expertise in the procedural and substantive law to demonstrate that the fees claimed were unreasonable.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 563-64.)  A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.  (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.)  Attorney billing records are given a presumption of credibility.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Here, Defendants fail to specifically challenge the itemized billing records. The Court has reviewed the records and finds them generally reasonable and well-founded. The court will reduce the amounts requested for the Motion to Compel billed on November 4-5, 2025, by 1.3 hours as it appears two attorneys were billing for substantially similar work. The Court will also reduce the time awarded for the Motion to Compel drafted in March 2026 by one hour for the same reason. 

Therefore, the Court awards $21,784 in attorneys’ fees, calculated by multiplying $350 by 62.24 hours.

Prejudgment Interest

While Defendants argue prejudgment interest should be denied, the Judgment in this matter expressly states Plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest from Defendant Deluxe II.

Therefore, the Court awards the prejudgment interest as calculated by Plaintiff in the amount of $12,410.

Costs

The Court’s file reflects no filed memorandum of costs.

The Judgment expressly required costs to be determined via a “post-judgment memorandum of costs.”

Because no memorandum appears filed at this time, the Court denies the request for costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 LaRumbe-Torres, Josiah vs. Kaweah Health Medical Center et al

Case No.:   VCU313564

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:    (1) Plaintiff’s Motion re: Preferential Trial Setting; (2) Defendants Amergis and Dobbs’ Motion to Continue Trial

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion and inquire as to discuss potential trial dates with counsel at the hearing not sooner than six months and not later than nine months pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(g); (2) The Court does not issue tentative rulings on these motions.

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion re: Preferential Trial Setting

Facts

Plaintiff’s complaint for medical malpractice initially named Defendant Kaweah, Dr. Barrera, Does 1 through 50 and ABC Companies 1-50. The allegations of the complaint center on the birth of Plaintiff on January 12, 2024 and the surrounding care including a cesarean section birth.

On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff substituted Doe 1 for Defendant Amergis.

Plaintiff, via a prior motion, sought to add nurse Jacqueline Dobbs as a Defendant, as she was employed by Defendant Amergis via the motion to amend the complaint. The Court, having granted that motion, notes that Dobbs has been added as a Defendant.  

On July 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b).

It appears undisputed that Plaintiff is under the age of 14 and has a substantial interest in this matter.

Counsel for Plaintiff states “The Defendants in this matter have all been served with process and/or appeared through counsel.” (Declaration of Mungcal ¶6.)

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks, pursuant to section 36(f), a trial date 120 days from the date this motion is granted.

In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement as to service is insufficient and that this is a medical malpractice action governed by 36(g), requiring trial set between six and nine months from the date the motion is granted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 36(b) specifically provides:

“A civil action to recover damages for wrongful death or personal injury shall be entitled to preference upon the motion of any party to the action who is under 14 years of age unless the court finds that the party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole. A civil action subject to subdivision (a) shall be given preference over a case subject to this subdivision.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(b).)

As noted above, it appears undisputed that Plaintiff is under the age of 14 and has a substantial interest in this matter.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 36(c), a motion for trial preference must be accompanied by a declaration that all essential parties have been served with process or have appeared. (Code Civ. Proc. § 36(c)(1).)

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement as to service of essential parties is insufficient because Plaintiff has already amended the complaint twice to substitute Doe Defendants and other Doe Defendants remain in the operative amended complaint. In the Court’s view, however, this fact cuts against Defendants’ arguments. Plaintiff’s substitution of two Doe Defendants reinforces that, at this point in time, all essential parties have been served.

Trial preference under section 36(b) is mandatory. (Peters v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 218, 224:

“In contrast to the use of “shall” in section 36, subdivisions (a) and (b), the Legislature used the term “may” in subdivisions (d) and (e), in each latter reference linking the word “may” with the phrase “in its discretion.” Thus, the Legislature made unmistakably clear that motions for preference under subdivisions (d) and (e) were not mandatory. Equally clear, by the omission of the phrase “in its discretion” and by the use of “shall” instead of “may,” is that subdivisions (a) and (b) were intended to be mandatory.”

As such, the Court grants the motion.

However, the Court agrees the setting of trial is governed, in this professional negligence action, by subsection (g), as opposed to subsection (f). Therefore, the Court, at the hearing, will inquire as to available dates not sooner than six months and not later than nine months from hearing date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                LVNV Funding LLC vs. Ritchie, Joshua D

Case No.:   VCL328055

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 14 admitted.

Facts

On or about May 13, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 14 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 14 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Randhawa, Parminder S vs. Singh, Jatinder

Case No.:   VCL336069

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Defendant’s Ex Parte Motion to Set Aside Judgment after Trial

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court, therefore, takes the hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Figueroa, Shallon vs. Rivera, Primitivo et al

Case No.:   PCU325958

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.         19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant Valazquez as to (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions; (4) Defendant Velazquez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Plaintiff as to Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions.

Tentative Ruling:

(1), (2) and (3): To deny the motions; to deny the requests for sanctions;

(4): To deny the motions, to deny the request for sanctions.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Defendant Valazquez as to (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents; Sanctions;

Facts Common to (1), (2) and (3)

In this negligence, breach of habitability, nuisance and breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment action, Plaintiff sued, amongst other defendants, Defendant Alex Velasquez (“Defendant”). On January 15, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging the same causes of action.

On February 25, 2026, Plaintiff served first sets of (1) Form Interrogatories (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production of Documents.

On March 18, 2026, Defendant served responses to these sets of discovery.

On March 31, 2026, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter identifying various issues with the sufficiency of the responses and objections, seeking further, supplemental responses by April 14, 2026 or seeking an extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to file a motion to compel further responses.

On April 3, 2026, Defendant responded to the meet and confer letter, stating:

“In the interest of cooperation and to allow the parties additional time to resolve any issues without court intervention, I agree to the three-week extension of Plaintiff’s deadline to file a Motion to Compel, extending the deadline to May 26, 2026. This agreement is made without waiving any objections, rights, or protections previously asserted.

I remain willing to meet and confer in good faith. However, I stand by the objections and responses previously served, as they are appropriate, complete, and compliant with my discovery obligations.”

No further meet and confer appears to have occurred and these motions were filed May 26, 2026.

In addition to seeking further responses, Plaintiff seeks sanctions of $1,760 as to each motion.

In opposition, Defendant indicates service of documents on May 21, 2026 and that this otherwise satisfies the discovery obligations of Defendant as to the interrogatories.

The Court continued this hearing from July 14, 2026.

Authority and Analysis Common to (1), (2) and (3)

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration “showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (Code of Civil Procedure 2016.040, 2031.310(b)(2))

The meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order . . . . This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quoting Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435, internal quotations and citations omitted.) Thus, there must be a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294.)

 “[T]he law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” (Id.) The particular level of effort required in each case depends on the circumstances including the amount of discovery propounded, the time available to confer before the motion filing deadline, and the extent to which a party was complicit in the lapse of available time. (Obregon v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “An evaluation of whether, from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the discovering party, additional effort appeared likely to bear fruit, should also be considered. Although some effort is required in all instances, the level of effort that is reasonable is different in different circumstances, and may vary with the prospects for success.” (Id. at pp. 432–33.)   To that end, trial courts are entrusted with discretion and judgment to determine the necessary effort required to satisfy the requirement of an informal resolution. (Id. at 433.)

In this matter, the Court notes Plaintiff properly initiated the meet and confer process via the March 31, 2026 letter.

Defendant’s timely response to the letter on April 3, 2026, though standing by the responses, invited further discussion to avoid Court intervention and extended the deadline to file these motions to compel further responses by three weeks.

Despite obtaining the extension under the guise of resolving the issues, or at least engaging in further meet and confer efforts, Plaintiff appears to have made no such efforts during the almost two months between Defendant’s responsive meet and confer letter and the filing of these motions. Some higher level of effort, therefore, appears reasonable and Plaintiff was complicit for the two month period between the response to the meet and confer letter and the filing of these motions. As such, the Court does not find a sufficient meet and confer process evidenced by the single exchange, a period of inaction, and the subsequent filing of these motions.

Therefore, the Court denies the motions and denies the requests for sanctions.

(4) Defendant Velazquez’s Motion to Compel Further Responses by Plaintiff as to Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests for Admissions.

Facts and Analysis

On March 19, 2026, Defendant Velasquez served Plaintiff with, at issue here, a first set of Requests for Admissions, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.

Defendant indicates Plaintiff, on April 21, 2026, “responded with boilerplate objections, improper ‘cannot admit or deny’ statements, conclusory narratives, and no document production.” (Declaration of Velasquez ¶3.) Defendant indicates these responses were not verified. Further, that on April 22, 2026, Defendant sent a written meet and confer letter identifying these deficiencies. That Plaintiff’s counsel requested a phone call, but that Defendant reasserted a demand for a response in writing.

On May 5, 2026, Defendant Velasquez filed a single motion to compel further responses to Requests for Admissions, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. The motion contained a declaration from Plaintiff, a combined separate statement and a request for sanctions in the amount of $1,600.

On June 23, 2026, this Court denied the motion, finding the separate statement inadequate.

On June 24, 2026, Defendant Valesquez filed a single motion to compel further responses the same discovery noted above, for which Plaintiff served unverified responses to on April 21, 2026. Defendant states “Plaintiff's responses to each set consisted entirely of boilerplate, copy-pasted objections with no substantive answers.”

The Court continued the hearing on these motions to this hearing date.

To start, the general rule is that unsworn responses are tantamount to no responses.  (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) When no responses are received, there is no 45-day time limit to file a motion to compel initial responses and a motion to deem admissions admitted. (Code Civ. Proc, § 2030.290(a).)

However, because these responses at issue here consisted solely of pure objections on various legal grounds, no client verification was required under Code of Civil Procedure §2031.250(a), the discovery has been responded to and a motion to compel further responses within the 45 day time period (plus service) is required. The court in Food 4 Less Supermarkets,Inc v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657 summarizes this issue as follows:

“In contrast, subdivision (g) of section 2031 specifically provides that a response containing ‘only objections’ need not be signed by the party. The reason is clear. As Blue Ridge so cogently observed: ‘[O]bjections are legal conclusions interposed by counsel, not factual assertions by a party…’ [citation omitted] That is, an objection is based upon counsel's legal analysis of the matter (e.g., the document is privileged) as compared to a response which is based upon a party's factual representation of the matter (e.g., the document does not exist). There is absolutely no reason to require a party to verify an objection. It is sufficient to have the attorney sign the objection(s). If the attorney is wrong, the court will so decide after conducting the appropriate proceedings to determine if, for instance, the claim of privilege lies. Requiring the objection to be verified by the party would add nothing to the trial court's analysis. (emphasis in original.)

Therefore, the 45 day period applies because section 2031.250(a), for instance, states an objection-only response need not be verified, an objection is a code-compliant response, an objection-only response cannot be construed as the equivalent of no response at all in the same way untimely or unverified substantive responses are considered. (See also sections 2033.230, 2033.240(a) as to admissions; sections 2030.240 and 2030.250 as to interrogatories.) According to Weil & Brown, “….the 45-day limit probably also applies where the response is unverified and includes only objection [Y]ou should serve your motion within 45 days of unverified objections.” (Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.8:1492.4.)

In sum, no party verification is required as to “boilerplate, copy-pasted objections with no substantive answers” and the service of such responses starts the 45 day period.

As the responses were served April 21, 2026 by mail. Therefore, the deadline, therefore, to file a motion to compel further responses was June 10, 2026 (45 days plus 5 days extension as to mailing pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1013.)

This motion was filed June 24, 2026.

The 45-day requirement (plus the extension for service) is jurisdictional and mandatory and a late filed motion to compel must be denied. (Sexton v. Sup. Ct. (Mullikin Med. Ctr.) (1997) 58 Cal.App. 4^th 1403, 1410.)

Therefore, the Court denies the motion and request for sanctions.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jr Valencia, Jose Elias et al vs. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY

Case No.:  PCU325203

Date:           August 18, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Defendant’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories as to Plaintiff Morales; (2) Special Interrogatories as to Plaintiff Morales; (3) Requests for Production as to Plaintiff Morales; (4) Form Interrogatories as to Plaintiff Valencia Jr; (5) Special Interrogatories as to Plaintiff Valencia Jr; (6) Requests for Production as to Plaintiff Valencia Jr;

Defendant’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted as to (7) Plaintiff Morales and (8) Plaintiff Valencia Jr.

Sanctions

Tentative Ruling:

(1) – (6) To grant the motions and order responses due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling;

(7) and (8) To deem Admissions Nos. 1 – 65 admitted as to each Plaintiff;

to issue sanctions against Plaintiff Morales and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $940 due no later than thirty days from notice of this ruling;

to issue sanctions against Plaintiff Valencia Jr and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the total amount of $940 due no later than thirty days from notice of this ruling; Defendant to give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (8)

In this matter, Defendant served Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories, Requests for Production and Requests for Admissions on Plaintiffs Morales and Valencia Jr via counsel on May 8, 2026.

Responses were due no later than June 9, 2026.

No responses were received.

On July 22, 2026, Defendant filed these motions to compel initial responses and deem admissions admitted.

Further, Defendant seeks sanctions against Plaintiffs and counsel of record as follows as to $660 per motion, consisting of 1.5 hours at the rate of $400 per hour plus a $60 filing fee as to each motion.

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

(1), (2), (4), (5) - Interrogatories

Based on Plaintiffs’ failures to respond to the first sets of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Plaintiffs provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first sets of form interrogatories and first sets of special interrogatories, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

(3), (6) – Requests for Production

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice

(7), (8) – Deem Admissions Admitted

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to serve a timely response and Defendant has moved for orders to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant’s motions. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 65 of Defendant’s First Sets of Requests for Admission as to each Plaintiff shall be deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), Defendant requests sanctions.

The Court will reduce the hourly rate to $350. The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  

Further, the Court will permit one half hour per motion. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on these motions to compel initial responses or deem admission admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

The Court will award the $60 filing fee as each of the eight motions.

the Court imposes sanctions the issues sanctions as follows:

• $940 against Plaintiff Morales and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice
• $940 against Valencia Jr and counsel of record, jointly and severally due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                RODRIGUEZ vs. CENTRAL TULARE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

Case No.:   PCU329534 

Date:            August 18, 2026

Time:             8:30 A.M. 

Dept.             19-Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:        Demurrer and Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling: The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend as to the first cause of action; sustained with leave to amend as to the second cause of action, and the motion to strike is granted. 

Plaintiff Lysette Rodriguez, a minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Bryan Kevin Rodriguez, commenced this suit with a complaint against “Central Tulare County School District,” “Porter Unified School District,” “Tulare County,” and 100 “Does.” 

Plaintiff later filed an amendment “to reflect the true name of DOE 1 to be Porterville Unified School District … wherever it appears in the pleading.”  Plaintiff then caused “Tulare County” to be dismissed without prejudice.  After that, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint identifying the following as named defendants:  “Porterville Unified School District” and “Central Tulare County Schools JPA.”

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (FAC) contains four causes of action against all identified defendants therein.  

Defendants, who self-identify themselves as “Central Tulare County School District” and “Porterville Unified School District” demurrer to the first two causes of action of plaintiff’s FAC. 

Defendants state Porterville Unified School District was erroneously sued as “Porter Unified School District,” but they do not address plaintiff’s prior identification of “Central Tulare County School District” as a defendant in the original complaint as compared to plaintiff’s current identification of “Central Tulare County Schools JPA” as a defendant in the FAC (inferably, it appears, in place of “Central Tulare County School District”). 

For the purposes of its analysis here, the court assumes, given the absence of any apparent dispute, that Porterville Unified School District is a properly named defendant in this case and “Porter Unified School District” is not; and, further, that “Central Tulare County School District” and “Central Tulare County Schools JPA” refer to one and the same defendant.  Accordingly, “defendants” as used herein refers (a) to defendant Porterville Unified School District; and (b) to another single defendant known as “Central Tulare County School District” and/or “Central Tulare County Schools JPA.”

Moving on to the substance of the matter, the court notes that the first two causes of action of the FAC challenged on demurrer are for: (1) Breach of Mandatory Duties Imposed by Enactment (Gov. Code, § 815.6; Ed. Code, §§ 32280, 32281, 32282, 32286, 32288); and (2) Breach of Mandatory Duties Imposed by Enactment: Dangerous Pupil and Teacher Notification Duties (Gov. Code, § 815.6; Ed. Code § 49079).

Further, the court notes, defendants move to strike portions of the FAC on the ground that plaintiff’s prayer for pre-judgment interest is improper against a public entity in a tort action as a matter of law.

I. Demurrer

This action arises from an incident occurring at Monache High School on May 19, 2025. 

Plaintiff alleges Noah Serrate entered Monache High School through an open and unguarded gate, remained on campus undetected for approximately one hour, reached plaintiff’s second-floor classroom, and attacked her with a meat cleaver-style knife while she attended a school-sponsored Driver’s Education class taught by Robert Sundre.

Plaintiff alleges Serrate was a former student with known dangerous propensities.  Plaintiff specifically alleged that Serrate had previously threatened to shoot Monache High School’s baseball team, stab school employees, stab himself, and stab everyone nearby; that school employees had reported they believed Serrate’s threats were credible and feared he would carry them out; that Serrate’s school-issued device contained repeated searches concerning school shootings, mass shootings, firearms, knives, stabbings, terrorist attacks, and serial killers; that Serrate had been arrested for felony criminal threats; and that school district personnel had been informed that Serrate was released on bail and prohibited from returning to the Monache High School campus.

A. First Cause of Action - Breach of Mandatory Duties Imposed by Enactment (Gov. Code, § 815.6; Ed. Code, §§ 32280, 32281, 32282, 32286, 32288)

Government Code section 815.6 provides:  “Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

As indicated by the statutory text, section 815.6 “has three elements that must be satisfied to impose public entity liability: (1) a mandatory duty was imposed on the public entity by an enactment; (2) the enactment was designed to protect against the particular kind of injury allegedly suffered; and (3) the breach of the mandatory duty proximately caused the injury.” (B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 179 [195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 220, 361 P.3d 319] (B.H.).)

A “mandatory duty” under section 815.6 means “an obligatory duty,” as opposed to “a discretionary or permissive duty,” which cannot support liability under section 815.6.  (Thompson v. County of Los Angeles (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 376, 380 [301 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289].)  Accordingly, “[i]t is not enough that an enactment requires a public entity or officer to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.” (Ibid.)  “Courts have construed this requirement ‘rather strictly, finding a mandatory duty only if the enactment ‘affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.’ [Citation.]” (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 160, 178 [328 Cal.Rptr.3d 167].)

Plaintiff first cause of action asserts breach of mandatory duties imposed by Education Code sections 32280, 32281, 32282, 32286, 32288.

By way of background, these Education Code sections appear in article 5 regarding “school safety plans,” under chapter 2.5 of part 19 of division 1 of title 1 of the Education Code (article 5).  Generally, article 5 makes “[e]ach school district and county office of education … responsible for the overall development of … comprehensive school safety plans for its schools” (§ 32281, subd. (a)), with each school required to “adopt its comprehensive school safety plan by March 1, 2000, and … review and update its plan by March 1, every year thereafter” (§ 32286, subd. (a)).  School safety plans are required to include, without limitation, various items listed in section 32282, subdivision (a)(2)(A) through (O).

Plaintiff alleges defendants “failed to adequately review, update, approve, implement, and ensure implementation of Monache High School’s comprehensive school safety plan before the subject incident, including by March 1, 2025, as required by Education Code sections 32286 and 32288. 

As noted above, section 32286 requires schools to adopt, review and annually update school safety plans (id., subd. (a)).  Section 32288, separately, imposes requirements (i) for schools to forward their safety plans for review to the school district or county office of education for approval; (ii) for public meetings “to allow members of the public the opportunity to express an opinion about the school safety plan” before it is adopted; and (iii) for notice to the Department of Education regarding noncomplying schools. 

As indicated, however, plaintiff only alleges, in general terms, that defendants “failed to adequately review, update, approve, implement, and ensure implementation of Monache High School’s comprehensive school safety plan before the subject incident, including by March 1, 2025.”

Plaintiff goes on to further allege defendants breached various claimed duties under 32282, subdivision (a), which subdivision lists the various items “[t]he comprehensive school safety plan shall include.”  To wit:

Subd. (a)(1)

Subdivision (a)(1) requires safety plans to include “Assessing the current status of crime committed on school campuses and at school-related functions” and plaintiff alleges defendants “failed to adequately assess” that “‘status.’”

Subd. (a)(2)

Subdivision (a)(2) requires safety plans to include “Identifying appropriate strategies and programs that will provide or maintain a high level of school safety and address the school’s procedures for complying with existing laws related to school safety, which shall include the development of all of [various listed items]” and plaintiff alleges defendants “failed to adequately identify, develop, and implement such “‘appropriate strategies and programs.’”

As specifically listed in the FAC:

Subdivision (a)(2)(C) requires “[p]olicies pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 48915 for pupils who committed an act listed in subdivision (c) of Section 48915 and other school-designated serious acts that would lead to suspension, expulsion, or mandatory expulsion recommendations pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 48900) of Chapter 6 of Part 27 of Division 4 of Title 2. [The court notes: Section 48900, along with sections 48900.2 through 48900.4 and 48900.7, list various acts for which a pupil may be “suspended from school or recommended for expulsion”; section 48915 lists various acts for which “the principal or the superintendent of schools shall recommend the expulsion of a pupil”; and section 48915, subdivision (c) lists various acts for which “[t]he principal or superintendent of schools shall immediately suspend … and shall recommend expulsion of a pupil,” with subdivision (d) of that section requiring expulsion upon the school district board finding that a pupil committed an act list in subdivision (c).]

Subdivision (a)(2)(D) requires “[p]rocedures to notify teachers of dangerous pupils pursuant to Section 49079.”  [The court notes: Section 49079 requires school districts to “inform the teacher of each pupil who has engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, any of the acts described in any of the subdivisions, except subdivision (h), of Section 48900 or in Section 48900.2, 48900.3, 48900.4, or 48900.7 that the pupil engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, those acts.” (Id., subd. (a).)]

Subdivision (a)(2)(G) requires “[p]rocedures for safe ingress and egress of pupils, parents, and school employees to and from school.” 

Subdivision (a)(2)(H) requires “[a] safe and orderly environment conducive to learning at the school.” 

Subdivision (a)(2)(J) requires “[p]rocedures for conducting tactical responses to criminal incidents, including procedures related to individuals with guns on school campuses and at school-related functions.”

Subdivision (a)(2)(K) requires, “[i]f a comprehensive school safety plan includes procedures to prepare for active shooters or other armed assailants by conducting a drill, a school shall comply with [listed requirements] relating to the drill.”

Subdivision (a)(2)(L) requires “[p]rocedures to assess and respond to reports of any dangerous, violent, or unlawful activity that is being conducted or threatened to be conducted at the school, at an activity sponsored by the school, or on a schoolbus serving the school.”

With respect to each of the foregoing items, the “development” of which must be included as part of a school safety plan’s requirement of “Identifying appropriate strategies and programs” under subdivision (a)(2) of section 32282, plaintiff alleges defendants breached mandatory duties “to adequately identify, develop, and implement” the required policies and procedures (§ 33282, subds. (a)(2)(C), (D), (G), (J), (K) & (L)) and other strategies and programs (§ 33282, subds. (a)(2)(H)).

Plaintiff further alleges defendants breached a claimed mandatory duty under section 32282, subdivision (c), which requires “[e]ach schoolsite council or school safety planning committee, in developing and updating a comprehensive school safety plan, [to], where practical, consult, cooperate, and coordinate with other schoolsite councils or school safety planning committees.”

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants’ failure to discharge the mandatory duties alleged herein allowed Noah Serrate, a person whom Defendants knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have known had made violent threats against Monache High School, its students, and/or its staff, and who was under criminal prosecution and prohibited from being at, near, or in the vicinity of Monache High School, to enter the campus through an open, unguarded gate.”

Further, plaintiff alleges: “Defendants’ failure to discharge the mandatory duties alleged herein was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s injuries because, had Defendants adequately assessed campus crime, implemented adequate safety strategies and programs, implemented adequate serious-discipline policies, implemented adequate dangerous-pupil notification procedures, implemented adequate safe ingress and egress procedures, implemented adequate procedures for maintaining a safe and orderly environment, implemented adequate tactical response procedures, implemented adequate armed-assailant procedures and drills where applicable, implemented adequate dangerous-activity assessment and response procedures, and adequately consulted, cooperated, and coordinated with other schoolsite councils or school safety planning committees, Serrate would have been identified, excluded, stopped, reported, intercepted, removed, or otherwise prevented from entering campus through the open and unguarded gate and attacking Plaintiff in her classroom.”

Analysis

Regarding the various provisions of article 5 claimed to support Government Code section 815.6 liability in the FAC, the Fourth District in C.I. v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 974 [298 Cal.Rptr.3d 651] (C.I.) has explained:

“Education Code sections 32280–32289 require districts to develop a ‘comprehensive school safety plan that addresses the safety concerns identified through a systematic planning process,’ and that aims at preventing crime and violence on campus. (Ed. Code, § 32280.) While Education Code section 32280 imposes a duty to develop a school safety plan, it leaves implementation to the public entity's discretion or judgment: ‘It is the intent of the Legislature that all California public schools … develop a comprehensive school safety plan … . It is also the intent of the Legislature that all school staff be trained on the comprehensive school safety plan.’ (Ibid.) There is no mandatory requirement that a school's safety plan must include specific action items. (Ed. Code, § 32282, subd. (a)(2)(J).) Rather, the ‘procedures to prepare for active shooters or other armed assailants shall be based on the specific needs and context of each school and community.’ (Ibid.)” (Id., at p. 980, fn. 3.)

From this, despite the observation in C.I. that “Education Code section 32280 imposes a duty to develop a school safety plan” (ibid.), which defendants acknowledge (see Defendants’ MPA, p. 6), defendants go on to argue that Education Code sections 32280, 32281, 32282, 32286, 32288 impose no mandatory duty and they, contend, on that basis, that “there is no right to private cause of action for an alleged violation of the aforementioned code sections.”

Defendants maintain plaintiff’s first cause of action “alleges that Plaintiff suffered injuries resulting from Defendants’ implementation of the comprehensive school safety plan, an act which is in the public entity’s discretion,” and that they are immunized from liability for their exercise of that discretion pursuant to Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, subd. (b) [“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”]; 820.2 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”].)

Plaintiff correctly notes, however, that “Defendants’ assertion that the First Cause of Action merely challenges ‘implementation’ disregards the FAC,” in that plaintiff additionally and specifically alleges “[d]efendants failed to perform the antecedent, expressly required acts governing the plan’s development, contents, annual review, updating, evaluation, submission, and approval.”

On the point specifically of the defendants alleged duty to formulate safety plans in the first place, defendants highlight that Education Code section 32281, subdivision (b)(1), provides “that the school site council ‘shall write and develop a comprehensive school safety plan relevant to the needs and resources of that particular school,’” (emphasis in original) and they argue that “[t]his language … requires that the school safety plan is created as relevant to the needs and resources of a particular school, which involves discretion,” and, therefore, that “[t]his demonstrates that this duty”—the duty to “write and develop a comprehensive school safety plan”—is not mandatory, but rather discretionary.

The fact that discretion exists to “write and develop” a plan “relevant to the needs and resources of [the] particular school,” however, does not render the duty to “write and develop” a plan, in the first instance, discretionary. 

Defendants effectively concede this point, describing “whether Defendants created the comprehensive safety plan as required” as a “mandatory portion of these statutes,” but they argue that breach of such duty cannot support liability because “creation of such a safety plan does not protect Plaintiff from the type of injury she alleges.”  (See B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 179 [describing, amongst the three elements of Government Code section 815.6 liability, the elements that “the enactment was designed to protect against the particular kind of injury allegedly suffered,” and “the breach of the mandatory duty proximately caused the injury.”].)  Defendants argue that plaintiff’s injuries necessarily could have arisen solely from failures with respect to implementation of the safety plan, and that “[t]he creation of the plan,” itself, “without a mandatory requirement to implement the plan, means nothing.”

Plaintiff vehemently disputes this contention.  She argues that she “falls squarely within the class the enactments were intended to protect, and the attack constitutes the precise category of harm the enactments were intended to prevent or mitigate.”

The court agrees with plaintiff that, generally speaking, that she falls within the scope of persons article 5 was intended to protect. 

Although the case is not directly applicable to the circumstances here, the Fourth District in Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary School Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 331 [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 413] explained that “[b]y way of its enactment of a scheme of interrelated statutes,” including those found in article 5, “the Legislature has imposed on public schools in California an affirmative duty to protect public school students from discrimination and harassment engendered by race, gender, sexual orientation or disability,” and, in particular, noted “Education Code section 32282 requires that public schools develop and implement comprehensive school safety plans which include a discrimination and harassment policy. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 333.)

And, just as much as public school students who might suffer “discrimination and harassment engendered by race, gender, sexual orientation or disability” are subjects of the “affirmative duty to protect” that “the Legislature has imposed on public schools in California,” so too must be students who might suffer harm in the manner alleged by plaintiff in the FAC.  Indeed, just as a school safety plan must include identification of “appropriate strategies and programs that will provide or maintain a high level of school safety … which shall include the development of … [¶] … [a] discrimination and harassment policy … ” (§ 32282, subd. (a)(2)(E)) so too must such plans include identification of such “appropriate strategies and programs” that “include the development of,” by way of examples pertinent to the instant case, “policies … for pupils who committed … school-designated serious acts that would lead to suspension, expulsion, or mandatory expulsion recommendations” (§ 32282, subd. (a)(2)(C)); “[p]rocedures for conducting tactical responses to criminal incidents” (§ 32282, subd. (a)(2)(J)); and “[p]rocedures to assess and respond to reports of any dangerous, violent, or unlawful activity that is being conducted or threatened to be conducted at the school” (§ 32282, subd. (a)(2)(L)).

Undoubtedly, then, plaintiff falls within the scope of persons article 5 was intended to protect.

The court agrees with defendants, however, that, as a matter of law, the claimed breach of the duty to formulate a safety plan cannot be “the proximate cause of plaintiff’s alleged injuries.”  While proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact, here the “‘the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation, [and, therefore] the question is one of law, not of fact.’ [Citations.]” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013] (Dept. of State Hospitals).)

A line of California cases have held “that proximate cause was not established when a governmental defendant's failure to act allegedly caused injury, but the chain of causation included discretionary determinations for which no liability could be imposed.”  (Ibid., discussing, without criticism, Whitcombe v. County of Yolo (1977) 73 Cal. App. 3d 698 [141 Cal. Rptr. 189], State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal. App. 3d 848 [197 Cal. Rptr. 914], and Fleming v. State of California (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1378 [41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63], which were relied upon by the lower Court of Appeal in support of this proposition.)

And, while Dept. of State Hospitals recognized that “intervention of any discretion between breach of a mandatory duty and a subsequent injury will [not] always foreclose a finding of proximate cause” (id., at p. 355), it is evident that the defendants’ discretion under article 5 does foreclose such a finding.  While provisions of article 5 mandate the development of safety plans, and, in that respect, impose a mandatory duty intended to protect students such as the plaintiff, article 5 does not provide mandatory directives on how to implement the policy, and that matter of how to implement the policy, within the discretion of the defendants, is an the alleged source of the nature and type of injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered.  Plaintiff alleges no injury attributable to the failure to develop a school safety plan.  Instead, accepting her allegations as true, she alleges an injury attributable to the failure to develop a school safety plan that included “adequate” measures to protect her from the injuries she allegedly suffered. 

However, the adequacy of measures adopted in a safety plan, including the adequacy of assessments of campus crime; the adequacy of safety strategies and programs; the implementation of adequate serious-discipline policies, dangerous-pupil notification procedures, safe ingress and egress procedures, procedures for maintaining a safe and orderly environment, tactical response procedures, armed-assailant procedures and drills where applicable, dangerous-activity assessment and response procedures; and the adequacy of efforts in consulting, cooperating, and coordinating with other schoolsite councils or school safety planning committees are all matters that fall in the category of discretionary decisions for which governmental agencies are immune under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820.2. 

Because it the inadequacy of these measures and actions that plaintiff ultimately alleges proximately caused the failure to identify, exclude, stop, report, intercept, remove or otherwise prevent Serrate from entering the Monache High School campus through the open and unguarded gate and attacking her in her classroom, the court finds, as a matter of law, “‘the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation’ [citations]” (Dept. of State Hospitals, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 353.)

Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained to the first cause of action without leave to amend. 

B. Second Cause of Action - Breach of Mandatory Duties Imposed by Enactment: Dangerous Pupil and Teacher Notification Duties (Gov. Code, § 815.6; Ed. Code § 49079)

Plaintiff’s second cause of action additionally seeks to impose liability under Government Code section 815.6 based on a claimed breach of a mandatory duty imposed by Education Code section 49079. 

Section 49079 is also referenced in plaintiff’s first cause of action.  As noted above, subdivision (a)(2) of section 32282 requires safety plans to include “Identifying appropriate strategies and programs that will provide or maintain a high level of school safety and address the school’s procedures for complying with existing laws related to school safety, which shall include the development of,” inter alia, “[p]rocedures to notify teachers of dangerous pupils pursuant to Section 49079.” (§ 32282, subd. (a)(2)(D).)

As the court noted also above, section 49079 requires school districts to “inform the teacher of each pupil who has engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, any of the acts described in any of the subdivisions, except subdivision (h), of Section 48900 or in Section 48900.2, 48900.3, 48900.4, or 48900.7 that the pupil engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, those acts.” (Id., subd. (a).)

Notably, section 49079 solely imposes an obligation to provide notification to “the teacher” of a pupil in the circumstances described, and establishes criminal consequences for the failure, specifically, to provide that notification when required (while also immunizing school districts and their employees for providing such information to a teacher unless it is proven that the information was false and the district or employee knew or should have known the information was false, or the information was provided with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity).  (Id., subds. (b) & (c).)

Additionally, section 49079 provides that “[a]ny information received by a teacher pursuant to this section shall be received in confidence for the limited purpose for which it was provided and shall not be further disseminated by the teacher.” (Id., subd. (e).)

Defendant first argues that section 49079 “does not expressly provide terms indicating that the Legislature intended to create a private cause of action,” and, without citation to authority, submits that section 49079 was (along with section 49073, which is not at issue in the FAC) merely “enacted to provide school districts guidance on when the release of ‘pupil records’ is appropriate and/or proper.”

While section 49079 no doubt provides “guidance” on the matter of release of information concerning a “pupil,” however, the court agrees with plaintiff, insofar as it disposes of this first argument of defendants, that 49073 is “protective, not merely administrative” (Plaintiff’s opposition, p. 11) at least in the sense that the statute appears to impose a duty to inform teachers of a student’s record of physical violence (see Skinner v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 31, 39 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 384].)

Not addressed here, is whether plaintiff would be among those persons section 49079 was designed to protect (Gov. Code, § 815.6; B.H., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 179), notwithstanding that she alleges she was, “[a]t all times … mentioned” in the FAC, “a pupil at Monache High School” and not a teacher.  This issue is not raised in defendants’ demurrer.

Defendants next maintain the second cause of action is insufficiently plead because the FAC does not allege Serrate was a student of plaintiff’s teacher, Robert Sundre, in whose class plaintiff was seated at the time of the incident. 

Plaintiff responds by referencing mandates she apparently derives from a broader collection of statutes within the Education Code, and by arguing that her “claim is not limited to Sundre; it alleges a lack of notification to the other teachers required to receive the information.”

The court agrees with defendants on this point. 

The asserted basis of Government Code section 815.6 liability is solely Education Code section 49079.  Section 49079 solely imposes a duty to “inform the teacher of each pupil who has engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, any of the acts described in any of the subdivisions, except subdivision (h), of Section 48900 or in Section 48900.2, 48900.3, 48900.4, or 48900.7 that the pupil engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, those acts.” (Italics added.)  Plaintiff alleges she was attacked by Serrate while she “was seated in Robert Sundre’s Zero Period Driver’s Education class” and the only remotely possible way that plaintiff alleges that injury could have resulted from breach of a mandatory duty under section 49079 is that defendants failed “to provide the required information to Robert Sundre.”

For these reasons, if liability can be established under section 49079 at all, and the court does not here determine that it can be, it is at least necessary for plaintiff to allege that Serrate was a student of Sundre at a time Serrate had “engaged in, or [was] reasonably suspected to have engaged in, any of the acts described in any of the subdivisions, except subdivision (h), of Section 48900 or in Section 48900.2, 48900.3, 48900.4, or 48900.7 … during the previous three school years.” (§ 49079, subd. (a) & (d).)

The court does not here determine, as it is not occasioned to at this point, that failure to notify Sundre (assuming Serrate was, or is alleged to have been, a student of Sundre) may properly be determined the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. 

On the basis stated, the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. 

The court notes defendants additionally argue, their third ground stated in support of demurrer to the second cause of action, that plaintiff’s tort claim, a copy of which is attached to the FAC, “does not indicate to Defendants that a theory of liability included a violation of Education Code § 49079.”

The purpose of the Government Claims Act statutes is solely “‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.’ [Citation.] Consequently, a claim need not contain the detail and specificity required of a pleading, but need only ‘fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done.’ [Citation.]” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 176, 99 P.3d 500].)

The court finds the FAC reflects plaintiff’s compliance with this standard. 

There being no other grounds presented, the demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with leave to amend. 

II. Motion to Strike

Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), provides that “[a] person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day” is “entitled also to recover” pre-judgment interest.  Subdivision (a) further provides that it “is applicable to recovery of damages and interest from any debtor, including the state or any county, city, city and county, municipal corporation, public district, public agency, or any political subdivision of the state.”

Section 3287, subdivision (a) “is ‘an exception to the general rule that interest cannot be recovered against a state or municipality.’ [Citation.]”  (Flethez v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 630, 640 [214 Cal.Rptr.3d 482, 389 P.3d 1232] (Flethez).)

Where an action lies in tort, “it is the generally accepted view that interest cannot be awarded on damages for personal injury.”  (Curtis v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 668, 686 [180 Cal.Rptr. 843] (Curtis).)

Citing Flethez and Curtis, defendants contend each of plaintiff’s causes of action lie in tort and, therefore, plaintiff may not recover prejudgment interest.

Plaintiff submits no opposition.  The authorities cited by defendant appear to support their position.  The motion to strike is granted. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 17, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054191	In the Matter of Webley, John Clive	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054213	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Isabel	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	DE-300 not attached as required by Probate Code § 13152(e)
VPR054199	In the Matter of Macke, Joseph J.	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054107	In the Matter of Cooksey, Kelly Renee	Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Order	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054206	In the Matter of Gonzales, Patrick Joseph	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition Item 4c omitted: decedent died intestate or testate. 2. Petition Item 7 Attachment omitted: the legal description of the properties that petitioner requests to be determined as having passed to the surviving spouse. 3. Petition Item 9 omitted: the names, relationships, ages and addresses of issues to decedent. 4. Notice of Hearing not served on all heirs 15 days prior, Prob C § 13655. 5. Order not submitted
VPR054196	In the Matter of Daniel M. Jones Family Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR051031	In the Matter of Joanna M. Wall Irrevocable Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR050041	In the Matter of the Stanley Carty Special Needs Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR052225	In the Matter of the McClatchey Family Trust	Accounting Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR049398	In the Matter of Zimmer, Elke Susan	Petition Hearing– Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Contested Hearing – Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Initial Petition: documents in order. Competing Petition: Citation not served on proposed conservatee

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 13, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054075	In the Matter of McCue, Patricia Louise	Determine Succession to Primary Residence & OSC	Appearance required	Amended Petition needs to be filed addressing #11,  #13, and #14. All heirs should have signed this petition, pursuant to Prob C §13006
PPR054202	In the Matter of Bjorkman, Douglas	Letters of Administration	Appearance required	Petitioner claims priority in Attachment 3g(2)(a) – NO ATTACHMENT explaining priority NOT FILED - Waiver of Bond all heirs NOT FILED - Notice of Petition to Administer served on all parties 15 days prior, Prob C 8110 NOT FILED - Supplemental Statement of Birth Date and DL Number NOT FILED - Proof of Publication NO Order submitted

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 18, 2026that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/18/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054245	IMO L.A.	Notice of Hearing has not been filed indicating the great-grandmother received notice of this hearing.
8/18/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054243	IMO K.K.M	The FATHER (Mr. Rivera Jr.) for minor K.K.M. needs to be personally served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and TEMPORARY Appointment Petition, 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
8/18/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054241	IMO S.L.P	The MOTHER & FATHER need to be personally served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and TEMPORARY Appointment Petition, 5 court days notice required according to Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3).
8/18/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR053391	IMO M.L.	NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating MINOR, FATHER, MOTHER, and SIBLINGS were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing, 15 calendar days, as required by PROB Code §1460 NOT LODGED - ORDER TERMINATING GUARDIANSHIP
8/18/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053017	IMO G.L.S	FORM IS REQUIRED TO BE SERVED - 7/23/2026Post-Move Notice of Change of Residence