Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, November 12, 2026, are:

Re:               Citibank N.A. vs. Avila, David

Case No.:   VCL332883

Date:            November 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint; (2) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To grant the motion; to order the proposed cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days form the date of this hearing.  

(2) There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

(1) Defendant’s Motion for Leave to File Cross-Complaint

Plaintiff Citibank sued Defendant for a single cause of action for breach of contract.

Defendant, on May 6, 2026, answered the complaint. At that time, no cross-complaint was filed.

On August 27, 2026, Defendant filed this motion for leave to file a cross-complaint to allege a cause of action for identity theft under Civil Code § 1798.93 and declaratory relief against Citibank.

Avila’s declaration in support indicates the account at issue and balance sought by Citibank resulted from unauthorized activity or identity theft, which was reported to the Tulare Police Department and FTC. (Declaration of Avila ¶3, 4.) Further, that “I filed my Answer before I had completed review of the internal Citibank records later produced in discovery. I asserted identity theft as a defense, but at that time I did not have the same factual detail now available from Citibank’s own records.” (Declaration of Avila ¶6.)  Further, that “The subsequently reviewed records include Citibank account-history and fraud materials, a Print Notes History reflecting numerous internal entries, records concerning account/customer-service activity around October 14, 2019, internal fraud notes from 2024, and records concerning multiple account endings.” (Declaration of Avila ¶7.)

Avila attaches a copy of the proposed cross-complaint.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

A cross-complaint against any of the parties who filed the initial complaint or cross-complaint against the cross-complainant must be filed before or at the same time as the answer to the initial complaint or cross-complaint, which answer must be filed within 30 days of service of the complaint or cross-complaint.  (Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 412.20(a)(3), 428.50(a), 432.10.)  Any other cross-complaint may be filed at any time before the court has set a trial date.  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 428.50(b).) 

If a party fails to file a cross-complaint within the time limits described above, he or she must obtain permission from the court to file the cross-complaint.  (Code of Civ. Proc.§§ 426.50, 428.50(c).) 

The Court’s review of the cross-complaint indicates it is compulsory. Code of Civil Procedure section 426.30(a) defines a compulsory cross-complaint as having any related cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in the complaint. Code of Civil Procedure section 426.10 (c) defines “related cause of action” means a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint. The courts use a logical relationship test, which requires “’not an absolute identity of factual backgrounds for the two claims, but only a logical relationship between them.’” (Currie Medical Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 774, 777.) “At the heart of the approach is the question of duplication of time and effort; i.e., are any factual or legal issues relevant to both claims?” (Id.) Here, the cross-complaint involves the same transaction and occurrences, the use of this specific Best Buy credit account.

Where the proposed cross-complaint arises out of the same transaction as plaintiff’s claim, the court must grant leave to file the cross-complaint so long as defendant is acting in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.50.)  Section 426.50 further provides that:

“A party who fails to plead a cause of action subject to the requirements of this article, whether through oversight, inadvertence, mistake, neglect, or other cause, may apply to the court for leave to amend his pleading, or to file a cross-complaint, to assert such cause at any time during the course of the action. The court, after notice to the adverse party, shall grant, upon such terms as may be just to the parties, leave to amend the pleading, or to file the cross-complaint, to assert such cause if the party who failed to plead the cause acted in good faith. This subdivision shall be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture of causes of action.” (Emphasis added.)

Leave may be granted in the interest of justice at any time during the course of the action.  (Id., § 428.50(c).)  Indeed, where a cause of action would otherwise be lost, leave to amend is appropriate even if the party was negligent in not moving for leave to amend earlier.  “The legislative mandate is clear.  A policy of liberal construction of section 426.50 to avoid forfeiture of causes of action is imposed on the trial court.  A motion to file a cross-complaint at any time during the course of the action must be granted unless bad faith of the moving party is demonstrated where forfeiture would otherwise result.”  (Silver Organizations, Ltd. v. Frank (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 94, 98-99.) “[A] strong showing of bad faith [must] be made in order to support a denial of the right to file a cross-complaint under this section.” (Sidney v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 710, 718.) 

The Court discerns no bad faith on the part of Avila. The Court accepts Avila’s declaration that review of the account information led to the necessary factual details to bring the proposed cross-complaint.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders the proposed cross-complaint filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

(2) Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production of Documents

There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:   Lead: VCU3245716; consolidated with PCU325122 

Date:           November 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motions:    (1) CA Farms’s Motion to Stay; (2) Grahams’ request for injunctive relief

Tentative Ruling: (1) CA Farms’s motions to stay are denied; (2) the Grahams’ request for injunctive relief is granted.

Motions to Stay

CA Farms, LLC (CA Farms), in two concurrently filed motions, moves for orders “to stay” two causes of action (a) for judicial dissolution of Prosperity Farms Ranch 20 LLC (PFR20) and (b) for judicial dissolution of Prosperity Development, LLC (Prosperity Development), both contained in the cross-complaint of Michael and Cynthia Graham. 

Corporations Code section 17707.03(c)(1) permits, “[i]n any suit for judicial dissolution,” for “the other members [to] avoid the dissolution … by purchasing for cash the membership interests owned by the members so initiating the proceeding, the ‘moving parties,’ at their fair market value.” 

And, under subdivision (c)(2), “[i]f the purchasing parties elect to purchase the membership interests owned by the moving parties, [and] are unable to agree with the moving parties upon the fair market value of the membership interests, and [the purchasing parties] give bond with sufficient security to pay the estimated reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of the moving parties … , the court, upon application of the purchasing parties, … shall stay the winding up and dissolution proceeding and shall proceed to ascertain and fix the fair market value of the membership interests owned by the moving parties.”

Here, CA Farms relayed offers to buy the Grahams’ interest in PFR20 and Prosperity Development, each for “$-0- in cash,” and it served and filed, concurrent with sending the offers, “Notice[s] of Exercise … Of Statutory Right to Purchase Membership Interests … ,” each referencing section 17707.03(c).

CA Farms’s respective offer letters each stated their “$-0- in cash” offer was “based on the fair market value” of the Grahams’ 50% interests in the respective companies, less “50% of the money owed” by the respective companies “to [unidentified] creditors.”

The Grahams rejected both offers, but “tak[ing] the elections at face value,” relayed a willingness “to engage in good-faith negotiation to arrive at the fair market value of both entities.” “To do so,” however, the Grahams sought additional information to “to understand the basis for CA Farms’ valuations.”  To that end, the Grahams requested several categories of information concerning, inter alia, assets, profits and losses, loans, encumbrances, and creditors of the respective companies. 

CA Farms had relayed its offers and served and filed its related notices in late April and May of 2026, and the Grahams sent the above-described response immediately thereafter.  The Grahams received no further response from CA Farms.  Rather, CA Farms filed its respective motions to stay on September 2, 2026.

To be sure, subdivision (c)(2) of section 17707.03, by its terms, mandates a stay of judicial dissolution proceedings when the requirements of that subdivision are met.  (See Merlino v. Fresno Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 462, 464 [148 P.2d 884] (Merlino) [similar language providing for buyout procedures applicable to corporations under former Civil Code section 404(E) deemed mandatory]; Koenig v. Centralia Limited Investors (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1174, 1187-1188 [335 Cal.Rptr.3d 112] [similar language providing for buyout procedures applicable to partnerships under Corporations Code section 15908.02(c) deemed mandatory, citing Merlino, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d at p. 464.].)

The requirements of subdivision (c)(2) of section 17707.03, however, clearly include that the parties “are unable to agree … upon the fair market value of the membership interests,” and there has been no showing, here, that that the parties were unable to agree on the fair market value of the Grahams’ interests in the respective companies.  (See Merlino, supra, 64 Cal.App.2d at p. 465.)

The undisputed evidence submitted by the parties establishes, rather, that CA Farms merely sent perfunctory “$-0- in cash” offers and then—notwithstanding the Grahams expressed willingness to “engage in good-faith negotiation to arrive at the fair market value of both entities”—entirely ignored the Grahams reasonable request for information, which information, this court agrees, “any reasonable seller would need and any reasonable buyer would provide, to help … arrive at a fair valuation” of the respective companies.

CA Farms fails to show that the parties “are unable to agree … upon the fair market value of the membership interests”—or, arguably and relatedly, even that it has “elect[ed] to purchase the membership interests owned by” the Grahams, given that its “elect[ion]” is only to receive that which the Grahams own for nothing.   (§ 17707.03, subd. (c)(2).)

Accordingly, CA Farms’s motions to stay are denied. 

Request for Injunction

The Grahams seek an order restraining Ron Cook and associated parties Corporate America Lending, Inc. (CAL) and CA Farms, as well as PFR20, from transacting in any way (i.e., transferring, encumbering, disbursing, etc.) with respect to 2026 crop proceeds (i.e., any payment, advance, progress payment, pool or settlement payment) “that any of them has received or will receive on account of pistachios harvested from [the Tulare 20 ranch].”

The Grahams maintain such order is necessary to preserve loss of the Tulare 20 crop proceeds, which is a “subject” of their cross-complaint and, if lost, would render any judgment thereon ineffectual.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. (a)(3).) 

The Grahams’ concern, stated more precisely, is that Cook will abscond with, or otherwise render inaccessible to the Grahams, all or some portion of the 2026 Tulare 20 ranch crop proceeds, which they anticipate will ultimately total $2,000,000 when fully paid (according to the Grahams “Tulare 20’s 2026 crop is in an ‘on’ year”).   The Grahams maintain the 2026 crop “has not been delivered to Primex Farms, LLC, which processed the crop in prior years.” 

Undisputed in this and related proceedings is that the Grahams, together, are record owners of 50% of PFR20; that CA Farms (which is effectively controlled by Cook) is record owner of the remaining 50% of PFR20; and that PFR20 is currently owner of record of Tulare 20.

Also undisputed is that Tulare 20 was acquired initially by Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity), which was also owned 50% by the Grahams and 50% by CA Farms. 

It is also not disputed that on June 26, 2025, a deed was recorded reflecting that Prosperity granted to PFR20 the Tulare 20 ranch, and that the deed was executed solely by Cook.  The Grahams allege in their cross-complaint that “[t]he transfer of Tulare 20 to PFR 20 was never disclosed to the Grahams and they did not consent to the transfer prior to its occurrence” and that they later learned Cook had “recorded a Deed of Trust against the Tulare 20 showing a loan for $2,500,000.00” and “[t]he loan was pulled without the Grahams’ knowledge or consent.”  The Grahams further allege they later discovered Cook had “assigned the beneficial interest in the loan to SA9 Properties, LLC.”

The Grahams here assert the Cook parties and their counsel, attorney Georgeson, “have refused to say who has the crop, what it has earned, or where the money is going, while at the same time admitting that PFR20 recently borrowed money from Cook himself and taken funds from a ‘nonmember’ to finance the 2026 harvest.” 

The Grahams assert this conduct is distressingly consistent with other alleged conduct on the part of Cook relating to the transfer and encumbrance of the Tulare 20 ranch. 

Cook, in a declaration, represents that “the PFR20 pistachio harvest is completed” and initial payment for the crop proceeds is scheduled for “approximately December 2026.” Cook maintains the 2026 Tulare 20 crop “is a ‘short’ crop generating crop proceeds that will not cover the costs of production.” 

The court notes that, in a June 30, 2025 declaration filed in VCU322686, Bank of the Sierra v. Prosperity Farms, LLC, et al., Cook had previously described 2025, similarly, as “an off year” based on the “counts” of the then-identified farm manager, Shiloh Management, and Cook also explained, generally, that “[p]istachios are alternative bearing, meaning that they alternate between ‘on’ years of heavy production and ‘off’ years of lighter production.”  The court notes here that it declines to rule on the Cook parties’ objection to Grahams’ statement regarding the 2026 being an “on” crop year for Tulare 20, as it does not consider this fact (“on” vs. “off” year) relevant to its determination of the Grahams’ request. 

The court additionally notes Cook, in the just noted declaration, also described Tulare 20 as “being properly cared for and effectively managed, with all appropriate agricultural operations (i.e., irrigation, pruning, weeding, pest control, weed control, etc.), being timely and competently performed in conformance with local industry practice” and he stated that PFR20 was an “operating and profitable business[] and [had] timely paid the Tulare 20 Ranch manager, Shiloh Management, as well as insurance policies, taxes, and other expenses.”

Cook here states that “[t]he funds to purchase PFR20, T-20, were my personal funds loaned to CA Farms and a loan from Primex to PFR20, [and] no[] [sic] funds from any other sources … were utilized to purchase T-20.” 

Cook further states “[s]ubsequent to the purchase of T-20 and its transfer to PFR20 all billing for cultural practices, harvesting, etc. have been separately billed to and paid by me who lends the money to CA Farms who then contributes the funds to PFR20 for payment,” and the Grahams “have not contributed any money or other assets towards the cultural expenditures to produce the PFR20 T-20 2026 pistachio crop.”

Michael Graham asserts, in his own declaration, that Cook “controls PFR20's bank accounts, its books and records, and the sale of Tulare 20's crops,” and “[s]ince before this litigation began in 2025, [he has] not received from Mr. Cook any financial information about PFR20 or Tulare 20, including bank statements, processor settlement statements, or any accounting.”  Further, Graham asserts, “[n]o one has consulted [him] about the 2026 harvest on Tulare 20, the choice of a processor for the 2026 crop, or any advance or loan against that crop,” and “[n]o one has told [him] who harvested, hulled, processed, purchased, or received the 2026 crop, how much of the crop has been delivered, what has been paid for it, or where its proceeds have been deposited.”

The court overrules the Cook parties’ objection that Mr. Graham’s assertion regarding Cook’s “control[]” of accounts and records is an improper conclusion, opinion or assertion of ultimate fact” and, further, notes Cook, in his own declaration, offers no evidence to the contrary of Mr. Graham’s assertion regarding Cook’s “control[].”

The court further notes the Cook parties raise no objection and Cook does not contravene Mr. Graham’s statement that he was not consulted about the 2026 Tulare 20 crop. 

Cook instead asserts that it has paid all of various identified expenses associated with Tulare 20, which he asserts, “[t]o date,” total “at least $1,354,584.58.”  Cook asserts “[t]he primary expenses are payments to the farm manager, Shiloh Management, who performs the agricultural tasks for the orchard,” whom Cook asserts CA Farms has paid, “[t]o date,” “approximately $961,889.83.”  Cook describes additional, lesser amounts paid to identified vendors for “harvesting services,” “trucking equipment,” “weighing equipment,” “insurance coverage,” and “miscellaneous expenses such as fees for legal, accounting, and appraisal services and import and export consulting services; Franchise Tax Board taxes; and services for an electrician for a pump repair.”

Cook additionally maintains “[e]fforts to meet separately with the Grahams or to mediate our issues have been rebuffed by the Grahams.”

Cook explains that the funding of the 2026 crop by CA Farms is a consequence of the Grahams having instructed “Primex not to pay/advance any money for the 2026 T-20 crop year and actively interfering with PFR20 to acquire crop production money from Primex,” so that “PFR20 was faced with the dilemma of abandoning the PFR20 T-20 pistachio orchard, allowing trees to die and produce no crop for 2026 or to acquire funding elsewhere, protect the trees and produce a 2026 pistachio crop.” 

According to Cook, PFR20 “chose”—which inferably means CA Farms chose, or, Cook chose—“the later option.” Cook describes this as follows: “CA Farms, LLC, the other member of PFR20, arranged for [Cook] to personally loan from my own funds to CA Farms for all costs for the 2026 crop year to protect the trees, alleviate [the Grahams’] failure to contribute towards the 2026 crop year production, and protect the assets of PFR20 [that] it elected to buy from the Grahams pursuant to Corporations Code §17707.03(c) [see ruling above] … well before substantial cultural costs were to be spent to develop and produce the 2026 PFR20 T-20 pistachio crop.”

Analysis

Preliminary Injunction Standard

“In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a court must weigh two ‘interrelated’ factors: (1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction. [Citation.]” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 480, 842 P.2d 1240] (Butt).) These factors are “interrelated” in the sense that “[t]he trial court's determination must be guided by a ‘mix’ of the potential-merit and interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on the other to support an injunction.” (Id., at p. 678.)

Likelihood that KOG will ultimately prevail

“The scope of available preliminary relief is necessarily limited by the scope of the relief likely to be obtained at trial on the merits.” (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442 [261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610].) “A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits of the claim. [Citation.]” (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678.)  “In the absence of a reasonable probability of success, the court should deny the preliminary injunction.” (Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 458 [191 Cal.Rptr. 104].)

The court finds there is a high probability the Grahams will prevail, at least as to judicial dissolution of PFR20, and the Cook parties only real argument to the contrary relies on their purported invocation of the buyout procedures under Corporations Code section 17707.03(c) addressed in the ruling on their motions to stay above.  The Cook parties’ perfunctory invocation of the section 17707.03(c) procedures, however, does not demonstrate any material adverse showing on the propriety of issuance of the requested injunction. 

Further notable, the Cook parties do not even attempt to refute Mr. Grahams assertion in his declaration, by objection or otherwise, that Cook, through CAL, recorded a $2.5 million deed of trust against Tulare 20; that the loan was taken without Mr. Graham’s knowledge or consent; that Mr. Graham received no benefit from the loan; and that the loan was later “assigned” to SA9 Properties, LLC, which strongly tends to support the likelihood of the Grahams other claims in their cross-complaint in so far as they relate to the Tulare 20 ranch and PFR20.

Relative Harms

“The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause. [Citation.]” (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73 [196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121].)  “ ‘In the last analysis the trial court must determine which party is the more likely to be injured by the exercise of its discretion [citation] and it must then be exercised in favor of that party [citation].’ [Citation.]” (Jessen v. Keystone Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 454, 458-459 [191 Cal.Rptr. 104] (Jessen).)

The court finds that this factor additionally tips strongly in favor of granting the requested injunctive relief. 

Mr. Graham asserts, in his declaration, that he and Mrs. Graham “paid the down payment of approximately $8,881,781.49 for Prosperity Farms LLC to acquire” Tulare 20; plus $1,000,000 of their personal funds in April and May 2025 for Tulare 22 ranch farming expenses; and he further asserts, on information and belief, that “the profits from Tulare 22 funded Prosperity Farms' purchase of Tulare 20.”  Additionally, Mr. Graham asserts, “[t]o [his] knowledge, Mr. Cook has not contributed any of his own money toward the purchase of Tulare 22 or Tulare 20.”

The Cook parties object to the assertion that the Grahams put down the entire down payment for Tulare 22 as “irrelevant” and they object to the assertion that the profits from Tulare 22 funded the purchase of Tulare 20 as “improper[ly]” based on information and belief, but they offer absolutely no evidence to the contrary. 

The court additionally notes, as reflected in Compeer’s request for judicial notice filed back on December 24, 2025 in opposition to CAL’s prior motion to intervene in this case, it was determined, in the federal Minnesota litigation that Cook affiliated entity CAL unlawfully transferred nearly $30 million of $58 million in funds in loan payoff proceeds from refinancing transactions to friends and business associates with no evidence having been presented of any consideration returned for the transfers, and it transferred $23 million of those proceeds to the trust account of its counsel, attorney Georgeson, who is also attorney for the Cook parties in this litigation. 

In that Minnesota litigation, CAL had been ordered, twice, to preserve the $58 million in disputed funds and to refrain from disposing of the funds pending further court order, and CAL repeatedly failed to perform as ordered.  Following this, Cook then, somehow, procured a grant deed to transfer the Tulare 22 property to Compeer, and then, further, despite an express order to “continue to hold in trust, and take no action which would or may in any way release, transfer, dissipate, damage or impair the Grant Deed,” caused the deed to be recorded in derogation of the express order. 

CAL’s repeated failure—in other words, by attribution, Cook’s repeated failure—to comply with orders in the Minnesota litigation resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars of attorney fee awards.  A merits panel during arbitration concluded, at one point: “Mr. Cook has not acted credibly from the beginning of litigation with Compeer, likely intending from the outset to convert the Payoff Proceeds to his and CAL's own uses, and to ignore the orders of any court or arbitrator to do otherwise. Meanwhile, CAL has engaged in the litigation strategy of delay, asserting only collateral defenses and none that challenge the basic facts [underlying the litigation].”

The Minnesota litigation culminated in an arbitration panel award requiring CAL to pay Compeer approximately $57 million and approximately $3.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs, which award was later confirmed by the US District Court of Minnesota. 

The court recognizes that the Minnesota litigation did not involve Tulare 20 or PFR20, but it unquestionably involved the conduct of Cook, who demonstrated an absolute recalcitrance in the face of repeated orders intended to prevent his conversion of millions of dollars for “his and CAL’s own uses.”

The court is persuaded that Grahams face the prospect of substantially greater harm if the requested injunctive relief is not granted, as opposed to the harm the Cook parties face if it is.  The Grahams have credibly established an interest, and a significant probability of right to recovery, in the Tulare 20 ranch crop proceeds, and Cook has presented only a facially dubious account of his own entitlement to the entirety of the funds.  Cook claims he has paid all expenses, but that representation is supported solely by copies of invoices that do not prove that fact, and his own representations that he has.  Cook’s self-serving representations, given the historical context that proceeds them, are not sufficient to support his claim.   

The record, both in the Grahams papers, and in submissions throughout this litigation, demonstrate a very real risk that the Grahams risk losing their share of the 2026 crop proceeds absent express orders preventing disposition of such funds. 

For their part, the Cook parties principally assert an injunction is improper because the Grahams cannot show money would be inadequate to compensate them for any loss of crop proceeds.  The record, however, demonstrates that, absent court order, and perhaps even with a court order, the Grahams face significant risk that even money will be inadequate to compensate them for their potential losses because there is a credible threat that any such funds will be converted by Cook, just he has showing a willingness to do in the past, and with far greater sums. 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants the Grahams request for a preliminary injunction:  Ron Cook, CAL, CA Farms, and PFR20, and their respective officers, managers, members, agents, and employees, and all persons acting in concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice of this order, shall not, pending conclusion of trial on the Grahams’ cross-complaint, directly or indirectly: transfer, spend, encumber, pledge, assign, or disburse any crop proceeds, including any payment, advance, progress payment, pool or settlement payment that any of them has received or will receive on account of pistachios harvested from Tulare 20 for the 2026 crop year, whether payable to PFR20, CA Farms, CAL, Ron Cook, or any other person or entity.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable David C. Mathias Presiding - Department 1

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared November 12, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054360	In the Matter of Brown, Leonard Franklin	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Recommended for Approval

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:   Thursday,  November 5, 2026

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR053968	In the Matter of Perez, Rosita	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance required	Petition Item 5a (3) or (4) omitted: regarding any surviving registered domestic partner. Publication Improper, filed 4/14/26: Published not in accordance with Probate C § 8120
PPR054240	In the Matter of Rodriguez, Roberto	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	In a Petition to Determine Succession to Real Property, all persons who are succeeding to the property must be listed as petitioners. Probate Code §13151, requires that the successors of the decedent must “join in the petition.”
PPR054348	In the Matter of Garcia, Magalena Maria	Spousal Property Hearing		Recommended for approval
PPR054364	In RE: The Suarez Family Trust Dated August 9, 2010	Petition Hearing		Recommended for approval

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
11/2/26 8:30 AM	Department  2	VPR054411	In the Matter of N.S.H.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511(a-i) for notice of this hearing the appointment of guardianship of the person Required to be completed - Attendance of Guardianship Orientation and Declaration of Attendance needs to be filed DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding