Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, April 27, 2026, are:

Re:                U.S. Bank National Associations vs. Quintero, Reyna

Case No.:  VCL319862

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

Defendant applied to Plaintiff for a credit card account and entered into a written credit card account agreement with Plaintiff for the account number ending in 4258 (the “Account”). (UMF No. 1.)

The Defendant agreed to be bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the Cardmember Agreement when the Defendant applied for, received or used the credit card account. In addition, the Cardmember Agreement provides that use of the card constitutes acceptance of the agreement. (UMF No. 2.)

After receiving the credit card, purchases were made by the use of the account and the charging of various goods, services and cash advances. Plaintiff complied with its obligations under the Agreement by paying vendors for all charges that were made on Defendant’s account. The principal balance of $8,336.70 prayed for in the complaint results from the Defendant’s use of said account. (UMF No. 3.)

Payments and charges are duly reflected on the computerized credit card record regularly kept and maintained by Plaintiff in connection with Defendant’s credit card accounts. Those records were provided on a monthly basis in the form of billing statements to Defendant reflecting all debits and credits to Defendant’s credit account. (UMF No. 4.)

There is no record that there is any unresolved dispute between the parties and/or that the Defendant asserted a valid objection to the balance shown as due and owing on the monthly statements provided to the Defendant. (UMF No. 5.)

Before 01/16/25, the Defendant defaulted in making the payments due under the terms of the cardmember agreement and Plaintiff accelerated the account balance so that the entire unpaid balance on the account became immediately due and payable. (UMF No. 6.)

The last payment applied to the account was on or about 05/23/24. (UMF No. 7.)

Defendant owes to Plaintiff $8,336.70 principal. (UMF No. 8.)

Defendant’s affirmative defenses, if any, fail to raise any triable issues of fact material to this action and therefore do not preclude granting of summary judgment. (UMF No. 9.)

No opposition appears filed.

Summary Judgment Standard

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 850.)  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Id. at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

Breach of Contract

To establish a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiffs' performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants' breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, the existence of the contract is established by the issuance of the credit card and Defendant’s use thereof (UMF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.) Plaintiff’s performance is demonstrated via issuance of the card, that charges were made against it for purchases and that monthly statements were generated as to the account. (UMF Nos. 3, 4, 5.) Defendant’s breach is demonstrated by the failure to pay the balance stated on the statements. (UMF Nos. 6, 7.) Finally, the balance on the account is $8,336.70 (UMF No. 8.)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist as to breach of written contract.

Therefore, the Court grants the undisputed motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mendoza, Refugio vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange

Case No.:   VCU322623

Date:           February 23, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling:  To grant the motion. 

Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange moves for summary judgment against all claims in the complaint of plaintiffs Refugio Mendoza and Emilia Arreola on the grounds that plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.

Plaintiffs have submitted no opposition.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges they purchased a homeowner’s policy from defendant and suffered “a sudden occurrence that is a covered peril” on April 13, 2024.

Defendant’s claims adjuster, Chelsea Lamas, asserts defendant’s first notice of the loss was on September 18, 2024, when plaintiffs’ counsel reported the alleged loss to defendant. 

Lamas states defendant sent plaintiffs a letter on October 8, 2024, partially accepting the claim but informing plaintiffs that no payment was due as the amount of covered damages was lower than plaintiffs’ deductible.  Lamas attaches a copy of the letter sent to plaintiffs to her declaration.  The letter advised plaintiffs of a provision of their policy, which provided, as pertinent here, that “Suit on or arising out of the Section I - Property Coverage of this policy must be brought within one year after inception of the loss or damage.”

Lamas’s declaration includes a copy of plaintiffs’ policy.  Under “Section I – Property Conditions”; subsection 12, entitled “Suit Against Us,” states, in part:  “Suit on or arising out of the Section I - Property Coverage of this policy must be brought within one year after inception of the loss or damage.” 

Lamas states, on October 18, 2024, and on November 7, 2024, plaintiffs’ counsel requested that defendant reconsider its decision denying payment, and, on both occasions, defendants advised their decision remained final and the claim remained closed.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on June 13, 2025, asserting causes of action for breach of contract and tortious bad faith.

Analysis

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).)  “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  (Id., subd. (c).) 

One way a defendant may show the causes of action pled in a complaint have no merit is to show a complete defense to them (id., subds. (p)(2); (o)(2)), for example, as here, based on expiration of the applicable limitations period. 

Defendant contends plaintiffs filed their complaint more than a year after the valid limitations period in their policy expired, not including the period of tolling between plaintiffs’ notice of the claim and the defendant’s closure of the claim, and, therefore, that it has a complete defense based on the contractual limitations period. 

Validity of limitations period

Limitations period provisions in insurance policies, such as presented here, have “long been recognized as valid in California. As is stated in Fageol T. & C. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 748, 753 [117 P.2d 669], of a policy provision requesting action to be commenced within 12 months after the happening of the loss: ‘Such a covenant shortening the period of limitations is a valid provision of an insurance contract and cannot be ignored with impunity as long as the limitation is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage. One year was not an unfair period of limitation. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]”  (C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1064 [211 Cal.Rptr. 765].)

The court finds, accordingly, that the plaintiffs’ policy included a valid one-year limitations period. 

Commencement of Limitations Period

Pursuant to the policy terms, the limitations period at issue commenced to run “after inception of the loss or damage.”  Our courts have concluded “ ‘inception of the loss’ should be determined by reference to reasonable discovery of the loss,” so that “[t]he insured's suit on the policy will be deemed timely if it is filed within one year after ‘inception of the loss,’ defined as that point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to the insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that his notification duty under the policy has been triggered.”  (Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 686-687 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230].)

Here, plaintiffs’ complaint includes no express allegations concerning delayed discovery of the alleged covered loss.  They do allege that “[u]pon notice or discovery of the loss, Plaintiffs timely reported the loss to Defendants and made a claim on the Policy,” which impliedly could be read to support an inference that the time when they “timely reported the loss”—which, according to Lamas, was “[o]n or about September 18, 2024”—was shortly after they were on “notice” of or had “discover[ed]” the loss, but the complaint, the court notes, ultimately does not state at all the specific date when plaintiffs had “notice” of or “discover[ed]” the loss. 

Plaintiffs’ other allegations, though, more directly support that there was no delayed discovery.  Plaintiffs allege “the subject date of loss” was “on or about 04-13-2024, when the Property suffered damage as the result of a sudden occurrence that is a covered peril under the Policy” (italics added), which “sudden occurrence” they describe as being that “the roof of the home on the Property was damaged due to strong wind and rain, causing creased and missing shingles on the roof which allowed rainwater to seep through the roof and into the interior of the home causing damage to the living room and guest bedrooms.”  Plaintiffs, having alleged that the damage to the property resulted from a “sudden occurrence,” indicate that they had immediate knowledge of the loss, since they could not otherwise know that the “occurrence” of it was “sudden.”

Taking these allegations as a whole, the court does not find that the complaint, which frames the issues on summary judgment, frames delayed discovery of the covered loss on some date after April 13, 2024, as a factual matter to which defendant’s motion must respond.  (See Scolinos v. Kolts (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 635, 640 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 31] [“On a motion for summary judgment, the issues are framed by the pleadings since it is those allegations to which the motion must respond.”].)

Accordingly, for the purposes of this motion, the court takes it as effectively framed in the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations in this case commenced to run on April 13, 2024.

Tolling

“The statute is tolled from the time the insured gives notice of the claim to the insurance company until ‘the time the insurer formally denies the claim in writing.’ ” (Migliore v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 592, 604 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 548], citing Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 678 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230] (Prudential-LMI).)

Defendant makes an unrefuted prima facie showing based on Lamas’s declaration sufficient to establish that plaintiffs gave notice of their claim to defendant on September 18, 2024.   Lamas’s declaration, coupled with plaintiffs’ own allegations in their complaint, further sufficiently establishes that defendant formally denied plaintiffs’ claim in writing on October 8, 2024. 

Taken together, these unrefuted submitted facts establish that the one-year period applicable to plaintiffs’ claims was tolled from September 18, 2024, to October 8, 2024.

Defendant makes a prima facie showing that the one-year period expired prior to the filing of the complaint

Based on the whole of the above unrefuted facts and evidence, defendant makes a sufficient prima facie showing that the one-year limitations period commenced running on April 13, 2024; that notice of the claim was given to defendant on September 18, 2024, 158 days later, which commenced a tolling of the one-year period; that defendant formally denied plaintiffs’ claim in writing on October 8, 2024, which resulted in the tolling period ending; that plaintiffs commenced suit on June 13, 2025, 248 days after the end of the tolling period, which 248 day period, combined with the 158 days that had elapsed between the “inception of the loss” and when plaintiffs gave notice of their claim, was a total of 406 days; and, thus, that suit was commenced far greater than “one year after inception of the loss or damage,” after accounting for the aforementioned tolling period.

Plaintiffs’ reconsideration requests did not further toll the limitations period

The court finds that none of plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their subsequent reconsideration requests frame any issue regarding a possible extension of their time to commence suit resulting from such requests and/or defendant’s alleged responses.

Salas’s declaration and plaintiffs’ own allegations establish that defendant unequivocally refused to change its coverage determination made on October 8, 2024.

“Once a claim has been made, the carrier has pursued its investigation, and the claim has been denied, the policies behind allowing equitable tolling have been fulfilled.”  (Singh v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 135, 142 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 546].)  Requests for reconsideration cause no extension of the time to commence suit where the insurer’s denial is unequivocal and the insurer does not agree to reopen the claim.  (See ibid., discussing distinguishable circumstances in Prudential-LMI and Walker v. American Bankers Ins. (1992) 108 Nev. 533 [836 P.2d 59].) “The justifications for equitable tolling are absent, once the carrier has initially denied the claim. The policies supporting the shortened limitation period are then fully applicable, and no reason for further tolling exists.”  (Id., at p. 142.)

The applicable limitations period applies to both plaintiffs’ causes of action

Both plaintiffs’ claims, for breach of contract and tortious bad faith, relate to defendant’s handling of plaintiffs’ claim under the terms of the policy.  The breach of contract claim is self-evidently covered by the contractual limitations period.  The bad faith claim is also covered because a bad faith action based on denial of a claim in the underlying policy is still, fundamentally, an action on the policy.  (Velasquez v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 1].)

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show a triable issue of fact as to defendant’s limitation period defense

Once a defendant meets its burden to show that an action has no merit based on a complete defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact as to the defense.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff, in meeting such burden, must “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists.”  (Ibid.) 

Plaintiffs, having failed to submit any opposition, necessarily fail to do so here.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the motion for summary judgment must be, and therefore is, granted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Uqdah, Priscilla vs. Friends of Allensworth, a California Public Benefit Corporation

Case No.:   VCU306537 

Date:           February 23, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Order Setting Aside Dismissal and Reinstating Defaults

Tentative Ruling:   The motion for set aside is granted as herein modified.  The dismissal of the cross-complaint entered on July 28, 2025 is set aside and is deemed to be of no effect with respect to the defaults entered as against Ann Williams, Emmett Harden, and Bernia Walker on June 20, 2025.  The default entered as against Priscilla Uqdah on August 11, 2025 is stricken.  Cross-plaintiff will need to file a new request for dismissal properly identifying the scope of its intended dismissal (i.e., as to David Schwartz only) and will need to file a new request for entry of default as to Uqdah, if they intend to proceed by default against her. 

Cross-plaintiff, which identifies itself as “Friends of Allensworth,” moves to set aside the dismissal of its cross-complaint and to “reinstat[e]” the defaults entered against certain of the cross-defendants. 

On April 18, 2025, cross-plaintiff, which is represented by attorney Daryl Reese, filed a cross-complaint against Ann Williams, Emmett Harden, Priscilla Uqdah, Bernia Walker, David Schwartz, and 100 “Does.” 

Schwartz was, when this case started, counsel for Uqdah, Walker and Williams, and, apparently in some related capacity, Harden (though Harden was not listed as a plaintiff in the original complaint).    On April 17, 2025, the day before cross-plaintiff filed its cross-complaint, however, Schwartz substituted out as counsel for Uqdah, Walker and Williams. 

Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden did not timely file answers to the cross-complaint, and, on June 20, 2025, defaults were entered as against Walker, Williams and Harden (but not Uqdah). 

Schwartz, on the other hand, who was named as a cross-defendant on causes of action for abuse of process and malicious prosecution—for his participation in the allegedly “baseless interpleader proceeding,” the underlying action that commenced this case—responded to the cross-complaint with an anti-SLAPP motion, filed June 27, 2025.

Following the filing of that motion, on July 28, 2025, cross-plaintiff filed a request for dismissal, with prejudice, as to its entire cross-complaint and dismissal was entered that same date.  After that, however, on August 11, 2025, cross-plaintiff filed a request for default as to Uqdah and that default was “entered” even though the cross-complaint was already, ostensibly, dismissed in its entirety.

On December 9, 2025, cross-plaintiff filed an ex parte application for order setting aside dismissal of the cross-complaint, reinstating the defaults against Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden, and “confirming” the dismissal as to Schwartz only.  This application additionally included a request for preliminary injunction (which has since been taken off calendar).

The court denied the ex parte application finding no good cause for the motions to proceed on an ex parte basis. 

On January 20, 2026, cross-plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting, as in the prior ex parte application, to set aside the dismissal of its cross-complaint and to “reinstat[e]” the defaults entered against Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden, but to “confirm[] the dismissal as to Cross-Defendant David Schwartz … , consistent with Cross-Complainant’s original intent.”

The motion was originally set for hearing on February 23, 2026.  On February 20, 2026, however, counsel for Williams submitted a “stipulation to continue motion for preliminary injunction,” which included a proposed order directing “that the hearing on the Motion for Order Setting Aside Dismissal and Reinstating Defaults currently set for February 23, 2026 … be continued to April 27, 2026 … .”  This court executed the order on the stipulation, which was entered the same February 20^th. 

On February 23, 2026, the parties appeared at the scheduled hearing on the motion and confirmed their stipulation to continue the instant motion for set aside to April 27, 2026, and the court ordered the hearing continued to that date. 

The court additionally continued a noticed motion filed for preliminary injunction, but, again, that motion has since been taken off calendar on cross-complainant’s request. 

Discussion

Attorney Reese avers it was his “intention,” on his client’s “instruction” “to dismiss only … Schwartz … while proceeding against [Uqdah, Walker, Williams and Harden],” but while he “specifically instructed [his] staff to prepare and file a Request for Dismissal … identifying only David Schwartz,” “[his] staff prepared and filed a complete dismissal of the entire Cross-Complaint … .”

Reese apparently did not review the request for dismissal filed by his office before it was filed, and apparent did not review the entry of dismissal after it was filed, but, rather, “discovered this error on November 21, 2025,” during a case management conference when Williams advised the court she had been told, by the court clerk, the case “had been dismissed in its entirety.” 

Reese, for what’s worth, though, takes “full responsibility” for his “inadvertence and mistake … as the supervising attorney … ,” as indicated in a declaration in support of cross-plaintiff’s instant motion, made under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). 

There has been no opposition filed in response to the motion. 

The court finds that the motion to set aside the dismissal based on the erroneously submitted request should be, and therefore is, granted.  Relief under section 473(b) is routinely granted for the types of “clerical or ministerial mistake[s] that could have been made by anybody” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 259 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 187, 47 P.3d 1056]), as occurred here. 

The court here confirms that the effect of set aside of the dismissal is that it shall be deemed to be of no force or effect with respect to the previously entered defaults as to Walker, Williams and Harden, and this ruling confirms as much. 

As to the default entered against Uqdah, however, default was not properly entered against her in the first place, since, at the time, the cross-complaint had already ostensibly been dismissed incident to cross-plaintiff’s erroneously submitted dismissal request.  Accordingly, the previously entered default as to Uqdah is stricken.  The court declines, however, to “reinstate” the entry of default as to Uqdah as of the date her default was entered (in error) because Uqdah was and has been, until now, entitled to rely on the entry of dismissal of the cross-complaint based on cross-plaintiff’s erroneously submitted request as a basis for having no cause to take any further action in connection with the cross-complaint against her.   Cross-plaintiff can, though, resubmit a new request for entry of default if it wishes to proceed by default against Uqdah now. 

As to Schwartz, the effect of set aside of the dismissal is that that dismissal is no longer deemed of any force or effect with respect to Schwartz, just as with Walker, Williams and Harden.  The court acknowledges that cross-plaintiff intended to dismiss Schwartz when it submitted its erroneous request for dismissal, and almost certainly still wishes for Schwartz to be dismissed now.  If so, however, cross-complainant must file a new request for dismissal properly identifying the scope of its intended dismissal. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Quintero, Zamira vs. Orchards at Tulare LLC

Case No.:  VCU330676

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the unopposed motion, split the PAGA claim, compel arbitration of the individual, Type A PAGA claim and stay this matter as to the representative Type O PAGA claim.

Background Facts

In this PAGA matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Orchards at Tulare, LLC.

Defendant moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s “individual claims” under PAGA and to stay the “group representative” claims pending completion of arbitration.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant submits what appear to be identical arbitration agreements executed both electronically and in the handwriting of Plaintiff.

Defendant submits the declaration of director of staff development, who indicates that Defendant and Plaintiff executed two mutual agreements to arbitrate on February 11, 2025, as well as a handout entitled “Questions & Answers Regarding Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate.” (Declaration of Aguilar ¶¶1-4; Ex. 2) Further, that declarant personally witnessed Plaintiff sign the handwritten Agreement and that Plaintiff returned the executed Agreement with other onboarding documents. (Declaration of Aguilar ¶5- Ex. 2.) Finally, that declarant physically signed the Agreement, handed it to the payroll clerk, who uploaded the document to Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Declaration of Aguilar ¶6.)

As to the electronically executed agreement, Defendant’s payroll clerk indicates the electronic version was also executed February 11, 2025 during onboarding. (Declaration of Mohamed ¶4 – Ex. 2. ) Further, this declarant describes the electronic process of onboarding via Paylocity, for which an employment application was completed using Plaintiff’s personal email address and which requires employees, including Plaintiff, to create a unique username and personal password to review and complete the electronic onboarding documents. (Declaration of Mohamed ¶¶8-10.)

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Defendant has filed a notice of non-opposition.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreements both executed in handwriting and electronically. (Exhibits 1 and 2.)

Absent any opposition, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states the following:

“Company and Employee mutually agree to resolve any and all disputes, claims and controversies between them, past, present or future, whether or not arising out of or in any way related to Employee's application for employment with Company or the employment relationship, including any disputes upon termination, as well as any and all disputes, claims and controversies which relate to or arise out of any subsequent employment of Employee by Company…Covered Disputes include, but are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due; claims for penalties or premiums; expense reimbursement claims; claims for breach of any express or implied contract or covenant;…claims relating to itemized wage statements and any other employment-related records; claims relating to meal and rest breaks…” (Exhibits 1 and 2 - ¶1.)

Further, that the “The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") shall govern the interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement and the arbitration proceedings.” (Exhibits 1 and 2 - ¶4.)

Finally, that:

“Individual Claim. The Parties agree that, to the fullest extent allowed by law, any claim a Party may bring will be solely in an individual capacity. The Parties understand and agree that unless otherwise required by law, there win be no right or authority for any Covered Dispute to be brought or heard in a non-individual capacity, such as a class, collective, mass, or representative action, or for either Party to participate as a member in any such non-individual action, with the exception of litigation in court of a non-individual representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”). To Employee: THIS WAIVER MEANS THAT YOU MAY NOT AND WILL NOT SEEK RELIEF ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER PERSONS, AND THE ARBITRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AND TO MAKE WRITTEN A WARDS WILL BE LIMITED TO YOUR INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BYLAW. COMPANY ALSO MAY ONLY ASSERT ITS OWN CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION.

If there is a binding judicial determination that any Covered Dispute need not be brought exclusively on an individual basis, and instead may as a matter of law be brought on a non-individual basis such as a class, collective, representative, or mass action basis, then such class, collective, representative, or mass action claim shall be heard separately in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the Parties' disputes include Covered Disputes that are subject to arbitration as well as claims subject to court jurisdiction, then unless the Patties otherwise agree in w1iting, the court action shall be stayed until the claims subject to this Agreement are fully arbitrated. For example, under current law, nothing in this Agreement prevents an employee from bringing a PAGA action in court on behalf of other employees, except that the Parties agree such group claims will be stayed pending arbitration of the employee's individual claims, unless otherwise required by applicable law.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement broadly covers Labor Code claims and those related to the employment of Plaintiff, including, expressly, PAGA claims.

The Court finds the Agreement applies to the claims alleged.

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.)

By expressly designated the FAA as the law governing the Arbitration Policy, the parties “adopted the FAA – all of it – to govern their arbitration.” (Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122; Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)

The Agreement here expressly states that the FAA shall apply. Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies.

Splitting PAGA Claim

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that, under an agreement permitting such, a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

However, the Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104,1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

In reaching these conclusions, Viking River observed that the word "representative" has been used "in two distinct ways" to describe PAGA actions: "In the first sense, PAGA actions are 'representative' in that they are brought by employees acting as representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State. But PAGA claims are also called 'representative' when they are predicated on code violations sustained by other employees. In the first sense, '"every PAGA action is . . . representative"' and '[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action,' . . . Iskanian, [supra,] 59 Cal.4th, at 387, because every PAGA claim is asserted in a representative capacity. But when the word 'representative' is used in the second way, it makes sense to distinguish 'individual' PAGA claims, which are premised on Labor Code violations actually sustained by the plaintiff, from 'representative' (or perhaps quasi-representative) PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees. For purposes of this opinion, we will use 'individual PAGA claim' to refer to claims based on code violations suffered by the plaintiff." (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at 648-649.)

Stated differently, “There is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

As summarized by the California Supreme Court in Adolph, an agreement that is covered by the FAA may require arbitration of "alleged Labor Code violations personally sustained by a PAGA plaintiff — so-called 'individual' claims." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1114, 1119.) "'[W]hen an appropriate arbitration agreement exists'" and "a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims," the trial court must "'bifurcate and order [the] individual PAGA claim[] to arbitration.'" (Id. at 1126, 1123.)

In this circumstance, the "order compelling arbitration of [the] individual claim[] does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims [i.e., claims on behalf of other employees] in court." (Id. at 1123) Instead, "'the individual PAGA claim[] in arbitration remain[s] part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court.'" (Id. at 1126.) The plaintiff would thus be "'pursuing a single PAGA action "on behalf of [himself or herself] and other current or former employees," albeit across two fora.' [Citation.]" (Id.)

Here, there is an intent to arbitrate all claims on an individual basis, which is permitted under the analysis above. The term noted above indicates that Plaintiff shall only bring “individual” (Type A) claims and that representative claims are waived, with the representative PAGA claim (Type O) carved out to be litigated in court. Therefore, the Court, consistent with the above, splits the claims and compels arbitration of the Type A claim. The Court stays this matter as to the Type O claim pending arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Quintero, Zamira vs. Orchards at Tulare LLC

Case No.:   VCU328301

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion, strike the class claims and compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s remaining individual claims.

Background Facts

In this class action matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant Orchards at Tulare, LLC.

Defendant moves to strike the class claims and compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s remaining individual claims under the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant submits what appear to be identical arbitration agreements executed both electronically and in the handwriting of Plaintiff.

Defendant submits the declaration of director of staff development, who indicates that Defendant and Plaintiff executed two mutual agreements to arbitrate on February 11, 2025, as well as a handout entitled “Questions & Answers Regarding Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate.” (Declaration of Aguilar ¶¶1-4; Ex. 2) Further, that declarant personally witnessed Plaintiff sign the handwritten Agreement and that Plaintiff returned the executed Agreement with other onboarding documents. (Declaration of Aguilar ¶5- Ex. 2.) Finally, that declarant physically signed the Agreement, handed it to the payroll clerk, who uploaded the document to Plaintiff’s personnel file. (Declaration of Aguilar ¶6.)

As to the electronically executed agreement, Defendant’s payroll clerk indicates the electronic version was also executed February 11, 2025 during onboarding. (Declaration of Mohamed ¶4 – Ex. 2. ) Further, this declarant describes the electronic process of onboarding via Paylocity, for which an employment application was completed using Plaintiff’s personal email address and which requires employees, including Plaintiff, to create a unique username and personal password to review and complete the electronic onboarding documents. (Declaration of Mohamed ¶¶8-10.)

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Defendant has filed a notice of non-opposition.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreements both executed in handwriting and electronically. (Exhibits 1 and 2.)

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Absent any opposition, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states the following:

“Company and Employee mutually agree to resolve any and all disputes, claims and controversies between them, past, present or future, whether or not arising out of or in any way related to Employee's application for employment with Company or the employment relationship, including any disputes upon termination, as well as any and all disputes, claims and controversies which relate to or arise out of any subsequent employment of Employee by Company…Covered Disputes include, but are not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due; claims for penalties or premiums; expense reimbursement claims; claims for breach of any express or implied contract or covenant;…claims relating to itemized wage statements and any other employment-related records; claims relating to meal and rest breaks…” (Exhibits 1 and 2 - ¶1.)

Further, that the “The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") shall govern the interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement and the arbitration proceedings.” (Exhibits 1 and 2 - ¶4.)

Finally, that

“Individual Claim. The Parties agree that, to the fullest extent allowed by law, any claim a Party may bring will be solely in an individual capacity. The Parties understand and agree that unless otherwise required by law, there win be no right or authority for any Covered Dispute to be brought or heard in a non-individual capacity, such as a class, collective, mass, or representative action, or for either Party to participate as a member in any such non-individual action, with the exception of litigation in court of a non-individual representative claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”). To Employee: THIS WAIVER MEANS THAT YOU MAY NOT AND WILL NOT SEEK RELIEF ON BEHALF OF ANY OTHER PERSONS, AND THE ARBITRATOR'S AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE DISPUTES AND TO MAKE WRITTEN A WARDS WILL BE LIMITED TO YOUR INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BYLAW. COMPANY ALSO MAY ONLY ASSERT ITS OWN CLAIMS IN ARBITRATION.

If there is a binding judicial determination that any Covered Dispute need not be brought exclusively on an individual basis, and instead may as a matter of law be brought on a non-individual basis such as a class, collective, representative, or mass action basis, then such class, collective, representative, or mass action claim shall be heard separately in a court of competent jurisdiction. If the Parties' disputes include Covered Disputes that are subject to arbitration as well as claims subject to court jurisdiction, then unless the Patties otherwise agree in w1iting, the court action shall be stayed until the claims subject to this Agreement are fully arbitrated. For example, under current law, nothing in this Agreement prevents an employee from bringing a PAGA action in court on behalf of other employees, except that the Parties agree such group claims will be stayed pending arbitration of the employee's individual claims, unless otherwise required by applicable law.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement broadly covers Labor Code claims and those related to the employment of Plaintiff.

The Court finds the Agreement applies to the claims alleged.

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.)

By expressly designated the FAA as the law governing the Arbitration Policy, the parties “adopted the FAA – all of it – to govern their arbitration.” (Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122; Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)

The Agreement here expressly states that the FAA shall apply. Therefore, the Court finds the FAA applies.

Authority and Analysis – Class Action Waiver

The FAA preempts any state law that bars enforcement of a class action waiver and therefore the class action waiver is enforceable under the FAA. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted.])

As such, the Court strikes the class claims.

Therefore, the Court compels arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims on an individual basis.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:               Valadez, Brenda et al vs. DLR Management Group, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU310362

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants DLR and Macuixtleruiz’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Facts

On March 3, 2026, Counsel FBT Gibbons, LLP filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendants DLR and Macuixtleruiz. Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties. 

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052).

The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under CCP §284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, and indicates a breach of the retainer agreement and that “the client has been non-responsive, or non-cooperative.” However, the declaration is silent as to an attempt to first secure a “Substitution of Attorney” and that these Defendants have refused to stipulate to a substitution. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on March 3, 2026. The declaration of Counsel indicates that Defendants’ address was confirmed as current via conversation within the last 30 days.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Defendants’ Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendants based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mckray, Sienna vs. Rodriguez, Cesar

Case No.:   VCU330647

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Quash Service

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion; to order Defendant Rodriguez to file a responsive pleading no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this breach of contract matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Cesar Rodriguez, CR Consulting Group, LLC and CR Construction Management LLC.

Relevant here, Plaintiff, on February 6, 2026, filed a proof of service purporting that personal service occurred as to Defendant Rodriguez (“Defendant”) on February 3, 2026, at 2:47 pm at 404 N 6th Street , Fowler, CA 93625 (“Service Address”) and that service was conducted by a registered California process server.

On March 4, 2026, Defendant Rodriguez, via a special appearance, filed this motion to quash service. Because the other named Defendants are limited liability companies and cannot be self-represented (See CLD Construction, Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1145 [as to corporate defendants which the Court applies here to the LLC Defendants].)

In support, Defendant’s declaration states that he lives at the Service Address with his wife and, at the time of purported service, 17 year old son. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶2.) Further, that on the date and at the time of purported service, Defendant Rodriguez was working at an office in Fresno, and was not present from 8:00 am to 5:00 pm on that date. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶3.) Further, that Defendant Rodriguez’s spouse works in Fresno, was working that day, and did not return to the Service Address until after the work day ended. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶4.) Additionally, that Defendant’s minor son attends high school and was at school at the time listed on the proof of service, but that upon returning home from school, Defendant’s minor son found the service documents laying on the front door step. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶5.) Therefore, Defendant Rodriguez states the documents were not personally served on him. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶7.)

In opposition, Plaintiff submits the declaration of the process server who states that “On January 31, 2026, at 7:05 p. m., I attempted service at 404 N. 6th Street, Fowler, CA 93625. I spoke with a man whom I described as Hispanic, 45 years of age, 5'10” 220 lbs., black hair. This man claimed he did not know the Defendant, or the Defendant companies.” (Declaration of Richardt ¶4.) Upon reporting this attempt to counsel, Plaintiff’s counsel provided photographs of Defendant Rodriguez and on February 3, 2026, the process server returned to the Service Address, encountered the same individual described above and determined, based on the photographs, that the person was Defendant Rodriguez. (Declaration of Richardt ¶¶5, 6.) However, the person refused to accept service and therefore the documents were dropped on the front door. (Declaration of Richardt ¶6, 8 – Ex. 3 [picture of documents on doorstep].)

Further, Plaintiff argues that the declaration of Rodriguez is unsupported by evidence other than the denial as to service. 

Authority and Analysis

“Failure to give notice violates ‘the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.’”  (Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 84.)  Moreover, “compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 410.50.)

 “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.”  (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439–1440.)  This burden applies to all motions challenging service as long as “the motions have similar objectives, raise the same issues, and can serve the same purpose.”  (Id. at 1440.)

“A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10.)  “A summons may be served by any person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 414.10.)

“It has been held that the filing of a proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the service was proper.”  (Id. at p.1441.)  “However, that presumption arises only if the proof of service complies with the statutory requirements regarding such proofs.”  (Id. at 1442.) A proof of service containing a declaration from a registered process server invokes a presumption of valid service that must be overcome by the party seeking to defeat service of process.  (American Express Centurion Bank, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p.390; see also Evid. Code § 647.)  Once facts are presented by the party seeking to defeat service, the trier of fact no longer assumes valid service but instead determines the fact of valid service based on the evidence presented.  (Palm Property Investments, LLC v. Yadegar (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428.)  Evidence must be presented to show that the service did not take place as stated, as merely denying that service took place is insufficient to defeat the presumption.  (Id. [holding that denying the fact of service under oath is insufficient to overcome the presumption without further evidence].)

Here, Plaintiff submits, in addition to the presumption above, a declaration from the process server further describing the service attempt and noting the effectuation of service by dropping the documents on the doorstep.

Here, the Court examines the facts and holding of Trujillo v. Trujillo (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 257, 259-260:

“The evidence regarding the due service of the summons, complaint and order to show cause, is conflicting. The affidavit of D. Giss avers that he was experienced in serving processes in legal actions, including divorce proceedings, having done so for a period of twenty years; that on October 10, 1944, he personally served upon the defendant, at his place of employment in Los Angeles, copies of the complaint, summons and an order to show cause, by reading to him the order to show cause and explaining the nature of the documents and the necessity of appearing and answering in the action, and by leaving with him the copies thereof. The affiant averred that the defendant attempted to avoid service of process by entering his automobile which was parked on a street near his place of business with the door of the car locked, but that the window adjacent to which the affiant stood was at first open; that the affiant explained to  the defendant the nature of the documents which he attempted to serve and read to him the order to show cause "in a loud and clear voice," but that the defendant rolled the window up and refused to accept the documents; that the affiant then placed them under the windshield wiper in plain view of the defendant, who first tried to dislodge the papers by starting the windshield wiper, but failed to do so until after he had driven away. The defendant's affidavits varied somewhat on the essential circumstances of that transaction. He admitted the presence of Mr. Giss at the time and place of the attempted service but insisted that he did not know what it was all about, or that any suit had been filed against him. He stated that, while Giss did talk to him, he failed to hear what he said because the window was closed. He admitted that the documents were placed under the windshield wiper, and that when he drove away they were dislodged and lost and that he never learned of their nature or contents.” (emphasis added.)

Under those facts, the Trujillo court held “defendant was duly served with the summons and complaint” based on the declaration of the process server indicating “…that he left the copies of the documents in the custody and control of the defendant with an explanation of the nature thereof, and that the defendant knew the nature of the documents and the purpose of leaving them with him, but deliberately attempted to avoid service by dislodging them from the windshield wiper. The evidence adequately supports the finding of due personal service of process.” (Id. at 260.)

Here, the Court finds sufficient personal service based on the description of the Defendant, the proof of service executed by the process server, the declaration and exhibits provided by the process server and therefore Plaintiff has carried its burden on this motion to quash.

The Court finds that Defendant’s declaration fails to rebut this evidence.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion to quash and orders Defendant Rodriguez to file a responsive pleading to the complaint no later than (10) days from the date of this hearing. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Fannin-Miller, Tracy Lee vs. Miller, Tracy Laynne

Case No.:  VCL308499

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Award of Settlement

Tentative Ruling: The motion that appears connected to this hearing date is entitled “Motion for Tulare County Settlement…Motion to Cease and Desist…Motion to Dismiss Judge Burke…Motion to Request Judge Ide to Assist in Restitution Settlement.” No statutory or case based authority for these motions appears in the motion itself. For purposes of clarification, this matter has been assigned to Judge Ide. However, it is unclear what relief is sought and what basis this motion is made under. The Court further notes no proof of service as to any of these filed documents. The Court, therefore, tentatively denies the motion(s).

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Mackey, Michael vs. Imperial Ambulance, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU324455

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: The filing of the amended complaint in response to the demurrer obviates the demurrer.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Miron, Sara vs. Porterville Lanes & Sports Center et al

Case No.:  VCU327240

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: In response to the demurrer, Plaintiff seeks to amend Defendant Bill B. Long to Defendant Estate of Bill B. Long. The Court will sign the order permitting the amendment and therefore the demurrer is moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Pacheco, Adrian vs. K.A. Vanderham Dairy

Case No.:   VCU302174

Date:           April 27, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as indicated herein; to set the motion for final approval for December 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

Facts

The Court previously continued this matter as to a supplemental declaration regarding the lodestar and presently incurred costs.

On April 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a declaration addressing these issues.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $320,168 or $106,722.66 and costs not to exceed $16,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel Brown indicates that he has spent 189.6 hours on this case, at a rates ranging from $1,500 per hour to $350 per hour, providing an initial base lodestar of $174,495. (Declaration of Yslas ¶ 25.)

The Court notes that these rates are higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work” or what the Court approves on these types of motions  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The Court, therefore, adjusts the hourly rates as follows:

Name	Stated Hourly Rate	Approved Hourly Rate	Hours	Total Adjusted
Jeffrey C. Bils	$900	$600	.6	$360
Theresa Chan	$350	$250	1.5	$375
Aram Boyadjian	$600	$350	2.1	$735
Andrew Sandoval	$500	$300	2.3	$690
Courtney M. Miller	$700	$400	6	$2,400
Mariam Nazaretyan	$650	$375	20.9	$7,838
John G. Yslas	$1,500	$950	48.6	$46,170
Harry Erganyan	$650	$375	52.8	$19,800
Diego Aviles	$850	$650	54.7	$35,555
		Total Adjusted Amount:	189.5	$113,923

Therefore, the Court preliminary approves the fees requested with no multiplier.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $12,808.27 (Declaration of Yslas ¶27.) The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $16,000.00.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $320,168 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$106,722.66
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$16,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement to Plaintiff Pacheco:	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement to Plaintiff Bautista:	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$7,690.00
Preliminarily Approved PAGA Payment	$20,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$159,755.34

The Court, therefore, grants the motion and sets the motion for final approval for December 14, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division