Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, July 20, 2026, are:

Re:               Munoz, Kaddish vs. C.H.L. EMS, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU309413

Date:          July 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the Final Compliance Hearing re: distribution of the settlement fund for January 25, 2027, 8:30 am in Department 9.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on July 20, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On June 25, 2026, the settlement administrator IYLM Group, Inc., through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On February 20, 2026, the administrator  received a data file regarding 322 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information.

On March 10, 2026, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 322 members, with eighteen (18) notices returned as undeliverable. Updated addresses for sixteen (16) members were obtained and notices were remailed. Therefore, two (2) notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until May 12, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 322 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $117,455.75 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $1,299.62, the lowest portion to be paid is approximately $4.78 and the average payment is $349.24.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by counsel.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $250,000 or $83,333.33. Counsel indicates that the firms have spent 186.9 hours on this case, at rates between $950 and $600 per hour, resulting in a base lodestar of $171,815.00 (Declaration of Otkupman ¶36.)

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $12,660.92. (Declaration of Otkupman ¶¶47.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $6,550.00. (Declaration of Castro ¶17.)

The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested enhancement payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $250,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$83,333.33
Approved Attorney Costs (actually incurred):	$12,660.92
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,550.00
Approved PAGA Payment	$25,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$117,455.75

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiff on June 25, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for January 25, 2027, 8:30 am in Department 9.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Matthews, Vicki L vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:  VCU311884

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike or Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part, to deny the motion in part, and to award $6,506.00 in costs.

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, the Court granted an unopposed summary judgment motion in favor of Defendant on December 1, 2025. Thereafter, on December 11, 2025, the Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant in this matter.

On December 9, 2025, Defendant filed its memorandum of costs, seeking $9,487.89 in costs as follows:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Plaintiffs?
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$1,103.25	Yes
4. Deposition costs	$5,308.50	Yes
16. Other	$3,076.14	Yes
Total	$9,487.89

The memorandum was served electronically on December 9, 2025.

On December 29, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this motion to strike all of the costs under the theory that Song Beverly provides a one-way fee and cost shifting statute in favor of a plaintiff that does not permit recovery by a defendant. Further, that, as to each category, Defendant has failed to provide receipts or invoices and failed to establish the costs are proper or reasonable. The motion also references recovery of fees of approximately $20,000. However, the Court does not find a reference to fees in the memorandum of costs.

In opposition, Defendant objects to portions of the declaration, including the filing fee schedule attached in support of the motion. Defendant argues further that it is the prevailing party based on the granting of summary judgment in its favor, that Civil Code section 1794(d) does not contain any express statutory language precluding Defendant from recovery of costs as a prevailing party and that the costs claim are recoverable.

Authority and Analysis

Song-Beverly Cost Recovery

Plaintiff argues first that Song Beverly one-way, cost-shifting mechanism to allow only prevailing consumers to recover fees and costs. While Plaintiff cites to the California Supreme Court in Murillo v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 985, the Court notes that Murillo affirmed that the prevailing seller could receive an award of costs under section 1032(b), reasoning that because the Song-Beverly Act “makes no mention of prevailing sellers[,] ... it does not expressly disallow recovery of costs by prevailing sellers.” (Id. at 991.)

Here, Defendant prevailed on its summary judgment motion and  the Court finds that Defendant is the prevailing party entitling it to recover costs.

Motion to Tax or Strike Costs

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).)

Here, Plaintiffs’ motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2) as to specific categories identified above in the chart and discussed in greater detail below.

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal_App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266).

1. Filing and Motion Fees

Here, Plaintiffs challenge the entirety of the filing and motions fees. Plaintiffs argue these fees are discretionary. However, these costs are expressly included by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(1).)

As to Plaintiffs’ challenges to the amount of the costs based on the Court’s fee schedule, this is not a basis to strike the entirety of the fee amounts. The Court, however, sustains the objection (No. 3) to the presentation of this document.

In opposition, Defendant provides invoices as to the fees incurred, noting that all fees in this category are for filing and motion fees. The Court notes, as to each invoice provided, there are various “E-FILING” charges over and above the base motion fees. Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5(a)(14) provides that "[f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents" are recoverable. Here, there is no requirement or order regarding electronic filing and therefore these costs are not expressly recoverable.

The Court’s review of the costs collected in association with this matter from Defendant total $1,035.

As such, the Court will strike $68.25 from this category.

4. Deposition Costs

Plaintiffs seek to strike the entirety of the costs here.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(3) expressly states that costs are allowable for: “taking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the party against whom costs are allowed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(3)) (emphasis added.) “A prevailing party is entitled to the reasonable cost of taking depositions unless it appears that the taking of the depositions was unnecessary.” (Ceranski v. Muensch (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 751, 755). “Travel expenses to attend depositions” are also recoverable. (Code. Civ. Proc. §§ 1033.5(a)(3)(A)-(B).) “Determination of whether a cost is reasonable is within the trial court's discretion.” (Thon v. Thompson (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548.)

The memorandum reflects charges for video recording and transcribing necessary depositions. Here, the depositions taken were those of the Plaintiffs in this case, which the Court considers necessary.

Therefore, the Court will not strike these costs.

15. Other

Here, the costs sought to be recovered are as follows:

• Expert's Review of Case Documents - $225.00
• Expert's Travel Time to and From Inspection - $620.00
• Expert's Performance of Vehicle Inspection - $250.00
• Videographer at Vehicle Inspection - $1,420.00
• Saed Atallah's Hotel for Travel to Inspection - $120.04
• Saed Atallah's Mileage to and from Inspection – $278.60
• Mediation with Grant Woodruff - $162.50

Plaintiffs seek to strike all costs in this category.

As to the expert’s costs, “Under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, ‘if the plaintiffs reject a defendant's offer to compromise and then fail to win a more favorable judgment, the plaintiffs cannot recover their post offer costs and must pay the costs the defendant incurred after the offer’ (Citation)” and that such costs include reasonable costs for expert witnesses under Code of Civil Procedure section 998(c)(1).)  (Duff v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 491, 499.) Neither party discusses a section 998 offer, the time the offer was made, and when these expert costs were incurred in connection therewith. Therefore, the Court strikes the $1,095 in costs sought related to an expert.

As to the videographer, hotel and mileage costs, these are not expressly permitted under section 1033.5(a), but such costs are also not expressly prohibited under section 1033.5(b). Under section 1033.5(c)(4), the court has discretion to award costs for items not specifically allowed nor prohibited, so long as they are "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation." (Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal. App. 4th 1121.) The Court, in its discretion, will strike these costs, consisting of $1,420.00, $120.04 and $278.60 as merely costs of convenience.  The bare statements “FCA reasonably arranged for a videographer in connection with that inspection. FCA reasonably arranged an expert to inspect Plaintiffs vehicle” are insufficient to support recovery.

Likewise, mediation costs are not expressly recoverable, but such costs are also not expressly prohibited under section 1033.5(b). The Court, in its discretion, finds mediation reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation. (Berkeley Cement, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2019) 30 Cal. App. 5th 1133.)

Therefore, the Court will not strike the mediation costs.

As such, the Court strikes $2,913.64 from this category.

Summary

Therefore, the Court awards the following costs:

Cost	Amount Sought	Amount Awarded
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$1,103.25	$1,035.00
4. Deposition costs	$5,308.50	$5,308.50
16. Other	$3,076.14	$162.50
Total		$6,506.00

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 E.W. Merrit Farms vs. Pixley Irrigation District, et al

Case No.:   VCU332014

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: The demurrer is sustained without leave as to the first cause of action (CEQA); sustained with leave to amend, as provided herein, as to the second cause of action (SGMA); and sustained without leave as to the third cause of action (declaratory relief) and fourth cause of action (injunctive relief). 

Respondents and defendants, the Pixley Irrigation District (Pixley ID); the Pixley Irrigation District Groundwater Sustainability Agency (Pixley GSA); and the Pixley ID board of directors demurrer to petitioner E.W. Merritt Farms’s petition and complaint (petition). 

This case involves claims arising under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

A.  Merritt’s Petition

In Merritt’s petition, Pixley ID is identified as an agency responsible for managing and furnishing water in its jurisdictional area; Pixley GSA is identified as a groundwater sustainability agency (GSA) formed under the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA); and the Pixley ID board of directors is identified as the decision-making body for both Pixley ID and Pixley GSA. 

Respondents are collectively identified in the petition as the “District” and it does not appear in dispute that the challenged action, as framed by the petition, may properly be considered an action of the respondents, collectively.  Accordingly, following the convention in the petition, this court also refers to respondents collectively as the “District.”

Merritt alleges the Tule Subbasin (Subbasin) is managed by seven GSAs … , including the District, pursuant to a coordination agreement executed in 2022.”

The challenged action in Merritt’s petition is the District’s decision to approve a water allocation of 1.78 acre-feet per acre for the 2026 calendar year (2026 Allocation).  Not apparently in dispute is that the District annually approves water allocation amounts as part of a Groundwater Accounting and Demand Reduction Program (Accounting Program) under its groundwater sustainability plan (GSP), and that these annual allocations principally affect the way in which the District imposes costs, by way of fees and penalties, when groundwater is extracted in the District’s jurisdictional area.  Also not in dispute is that the Accounting Program is amongst measures adopted in the District’s groundwater sustainability plan under SGMA to achieve sustainability and avoid undesirable results from excess groundwater extractions. 

Central to Merritt’s challenge of the 2026 Allocation, Merritt alleges that, in disregard of the advisements of the District’s consultants, “the District approved a total allocation in the amount of 1.78 [acre-feet of groundwater per acre of land].” 

Merritt alleges that, “[i]n the fall of 2025,” the District’s consultants “reported that groundwater conditions in the District were far worse than previously thought” and had recommended a total 2026 water allocation of no more than 1.2 af/acre.  According to Merritt, the District’s consultants had effectively determined that, at a total allocation of 1.6 af/ac—less than the 1.78 af/ac allocation set in the 2026 Allocation—27 of the District’s 33 defined “subsidence monitoring and management zones (‘SMMZs’)” would exceed a defined minimum subsidence threshold “before 2040.” 

Merritt flags that the District’s GSP, in addition to the Accounting Program, “calls for the implementation of a subsidence management plan (‘SMP’), setting forth specific management actions to ensure [minimum thresholds] for subsidence are not exceeded.”  Merritt explains: “Under the SMP, the District is required to establish subsidence monitoring and management zones (‘SMMZs’), identify high-risk SMMZs [those at designated percentage levels of a determined minimum threshold], and implement ‘early action plans’ for high-risk SMMZs to ensure subsidence in those areas does not exceed [the determined minimum thresholds].”  “These early action plans require increasingly aggressive measures, depending on how close [a] SMMZ is to exceeding the subsidence [minimum threshold].”  Under the “early action plans,” “increasingly aggressive measures” are required when a given SMMZ is at 50%, 75% and 100% of the determined minimum threshold. 

Against this backdrop, Merritt asserts “the District violated CEQA by completely failing to consider the potential environmental impacts of the 2026 Allocation.”  In its first cause of action, “Writ of Mandate — Violation of CEQA,” the District seeks set aside of the 2026 Allocation and an order enjoining any action in furtherance of the 2026 Allocation “unless and until Respondents have satisfied their obligations under CEQA.”

Separately, Merritt asserts that the District violated SGMA by disregarding its “express obligations” under that statutory scheme.  Merritt alleges “[t]he 2026 Allocation is inconsistent with the District's obligations under SGMA because substantial, credible evidence from the District’s own expert consultants shows the 2026 Allocation will not meet the sustainability goal, will not achieve sustainable groundwater management, and will cause undesirable results, contrary to the requirements of SGMA, the PID GSP, and the SMP.”  (Emphasis omitted.) In its second cause of action, “Writ of Mandate — Violations of SGMA,” similar to the first cause of action, Merritt seeks set aside of the 2026 Allocation and an order enjoining any action in furtherance of the 2026 Allocation “unless and until Respondents have satisfied their obligations under SGMA, the PID GSP, and the SMP.”

Following these first two causes of action, Merritt asserts a third cause of action for “Declaratory Relief – Failure to Comply with Applicable Law,” in which it seeks a judicial declaration that the District violated CEQA, SGMA, and its own GSP.  After that, Merritt asserts a fourth cause of action, “Injunctive Relief – Failure to Comply with Applicable Law,” in which, combining its prior requests in the first two causes of action, it seeks an order setting aside the 2026 Allocation and enjoining “any action in furtherance of the 2026 Allocation “unless and until Respondents have satisfied their obligations under CEQA, SGMA, the PID GSP, and the SMP.”

B. The District’s Demurrer

The District demurrers to each cause of action, arguing several different issues.  The District contends the first CEQA cause of action fails both because the 2026 Allocation is not a “project” subject to CEQA and because the action is time-barred. 

The District further contends, under the doctrine of judicial abstention, that the petition should be dismissed because the relief Merritt seeks will conflict with an ongoing Subbasin intervention process by the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to develop and adopt a new GSP for the Subbasin and will waste judicial resources. 

Notable here, Merritt alleges the SWRCB has determined that the District’s GSP, along with several other GSPs of other GSAs, is inadequate, and it has designated the Subbasin as a “probationary basin” under Water Code section 10735.2, subdivision (a)(3).  “The probationary designation under section 10735.2, subdivision (a)(3) is authorized when ‘the [Department of Water Resources (DWR)], in consultation with the [SWRCB], determines that a groundwater [plan] is inadequate or that the groundwater sustainability program is not being implemented in a manner that will likely achieve the sustainability goal.”  (State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Superior Court (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 734, 776 [338 Cal.Rptr.3d 530].)  Merritt’s petition alleges that DWR had previously made determinations that the District’s initial GSP and an amended version were inadequate.  “The [probationary] designation triggers multiple events including, … groundwater reporting requirements contained in part 5.2, beginning with section 5200 of the Water Code,” as well as potential imposition of certain fees. (Id., at pp. 776-777.)  The court notes various other escalating measures of state intervention, including adoption of an interim GSP for a probationary basin, are set forth in chapter 11 of part 2.74, beginning with section 10735 of the Water Code. 

Merritt alleges that, “[a]s a result of the SWRCB's decision to place the Tule Subbasin on probation, effective October 3, 2024, groundwater users in the Subbasin may be required to comply with heightened monitoring requirements, to submit data regarding their extractions to the SWRCB, and to pay administrative fees to the SWRCB.” 

Separate from this, the District additionally demurrers to the third declaratory relief cause of action on the ground that it “mirrors the relief requested in the writ claims” and to the fourth injunctive relief cause of action on the ground that the relief requested would obstruct the District from conducting its regulatory functions under SGMA. 

Finally, the District asserts the petition should be dismissed under California’s “pay-first” rule.

C. SGMA and CEQA

Before turning to the parties arguments, it is helpful to understand certain pertinent features of these the complex statutory schemes at issue in this case.

   1. SGMA

SGMA “essentially mandates locally developed and managed plans for sustainably using overdrafted groundwater basins.” (Kings County Farm Bureau v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 782, 794 [338 Cal.Rptr.3d 499] (Kings County Farm Bureau).)  To that end, SGMA authorizes the creation of local GSAs to develop and implement GSPs to achieve groundwater sustainability. (Wat. Code., §§ 10721, subd. (k), 10723–10724, 10727.)

“At the local level, the Act grants [GSAs] with ‘a number of powers, including the power to perform any act necessary to carry out’ the Act’s purposes, along with authority ‘to impose fees on groundwater extraction to fund the costs’ of the sustainability programs, groundwater management, investigations, and enforcement. [Citation.]” (Kings County Farm Bureau, supra,115 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.)  In addition, “[a] person who extracts groundwater in excess of the amount that person is authorized to extract under a rule, regulation, ordinance, or resolution adopted [in accordance with SGMA]” or “who violates any rule, regulation, ordinance, or resolution adopted [in accordance with SGMA]” is subject to the imposition of civil penalties.  (Wat. Code, § 10732.)

A GSA’s power with respect to prohibiting groundwater extraction, though, is generally limited.  SGMA expressly “specifies that it does not modify rights to use groundwater, and it expressly prohibits groundwater sustainability plans from determining water rights. (§ 10720.5, subds. (a), (b).)” (Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 616.)

A GSA may sue a groundwater user to recover an unpaid amount of fees, interest or penalties, and, as part of those recovery efforts, “order him or her to cease all groundwater extraction until the delinquent fees are paid.” (Mojave Pistachios, LLC v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 605, 616 [318 Cal.Rptr.3d 180], citing Wat. Code, § 10730.6, subds. (c) & (e) (Mojave Pistachios).)  And, GSAs that adopt a GSP have the power “[t]o control groundwater extractions by [inter alia] regulating, limiting, or suspending extractions from individual groundwater wells or extractions from groundwater wells in the aggregate, … or otherwise establishing groundwater extraction allocations,” though, “[a] limitation on extractions by a groundwater sustainability agency shall not be construed to be a final determination of rights to extract groundwater from the basin or any portion of the basin.” (§ 10726.4, subd. (a)(2).) 

But, again, a GSA cannot modify rights to use groundwater.  (Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 616.)

Ultimately, the powers granted GSAs under SGMA “are designed to support the adopted [GSPs], which are essentially a complex analysis of the relevant basin along with, among other things, measurable objectives and interim milestones, ‘to achieve the sustainability goal in the basin.’ (§ 10727.2, subd. (b).) The sustainability goal is another complex concept that seeks to determine the annual amount of water that can be extracted from the groundwater basin over a 50-year time period without undesirable results, such as chronic lowering of groundwater levels, significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage, and significant and unreasonable land subsidence, among others. (See § 10721, subds. (r), (v), (w), (x).) The groundwater plans can include such actions as the monitoring and management of groundwater levels, quality, and land subsidence, as well as mitigation of overdraft and groundwater recharging. (§ 10727.2, subd. (d).)”  (Kings County Farm Bureau, supra,115 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.)

When a GSA proves ineffective in carrying out its sustainability mission under SGMA, as noted above, various measures of intervention may be deployed by the state (see, e.g., Wat. Code, §§ 5200, et seq., 10735, et seq.), as has allegedly occurred in this case. 

   2. CEQA

Separately, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) establishes, more broadly, “ ‘a comprehensive scheme designed to provide long-term protection to the environment.’ [Citation.]” (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 326, 337 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 898] (Center for Biological Diversity).)  “ ‘Its purposes are manifold, but chief among them is that of providing public agencies and the general public with detailed information about the effects of a proposed project on the environment.’ [Citation.] Environmental protection is the guiding concept in interpreting CEQA.” (Ibid.)

“CEQA and its implementing administrative regulations (CEQA Guidelines) establish a three-tier process to ensure that public agencies inform their decisions with environmental considerations. [Citation.] The first tier is jurisdictional, requiring that an agency conduct a preliminary review to determine whether an activity is subject to CEQA. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15060; see Pub. Resources Code, § 21065.) An activity that is not a ‘project’ as defined in the Public Resources Code (see § 21065) and the CEQA Guidelines (see § 15378) is not subject to CEQA. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15060, subd. (c)(3).)”  (Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372, 379-380 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116] (Muzzy Ranch).) 

Notably, CEQA Guidelines, § 15378 expressly exclude certain activities from the definition of “project,” including, for example, “[t]he creation of government funding mechanisms or other government fiscal activities, which do not involve any commitment to any specific project which may result in a potentially significant physical impact on the environment.” (Id., subd. (b)(4).)

“The second tier concerns exemptions from CEQA review.” (Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th., at p. 380.) Notable concerning this tier is that, subject to certain exceptions, “generally no factfinding hearing is required to determine whether a proposed activity is exempt from CEQA.” (Del Cerro Mobile Estates v. City of Placentia (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 173, 182 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 413] (Del Cerro).)

“CEQA’s third tier applies if the agency determines substantial evidence exists that an aspect of the project may cause a significant effect on the environment. In that event, the agency must ensure that a full environmental impact report is prepared on the proposed project. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15063, subd. (b)(1); see also Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21100, 21151; CEQA Guidelines, § 15080 et seq.).” (Muzzy Ranch Co., supra, 41 Cal.4th., at p. 381.)

The requirements of an environmental impact report (EIR) can be quite onerous.  “An EIR must identify the significant effects on the environment of a project, identify alternatives to the project, and indicate the manner in which those significant effects can be mitigated or avoided. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.1, subd. (a).)”  (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 337.) And, “[c]onsistent with [CEQA’s legislative purposes], [courts] interpret CEQA to afford the most thorough possible protection to the environment that fits reasonably within the scope of its text.”  (California Building Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 369, 381 [196 Cal.Rptr.3d 94, 362 P.3d 792].)

  3. SGMA & CEQA, viewed together

Viewing these statutory schemes together, it becomes evident there is, ostensibly, significant potential overlap between them.  Given that, at the initial tier of CEQA analysis, the definition of “project” is quite broad, it could be deemed to encompass a significant range of activities a GSA might engage in under SGMA. 

Under CEQA Guidelines, “ ‘[p]roject’ means the whole of an action, which has a potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment, and that is [‘[a]n activity’ undertaken by, or supported by, a public agency].” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a).)  Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]his determination is made without considering whether, under the specific circumstances in which the proposed activity will be carried out, these potential effects will actually occur. Consistent with this standard, a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ indirect physical change is one that the activity is capable, at least in theory, of causing. ([CEQA] Guidelines, § 15064, subd. (d)(3).)” (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1197 [250 Cal.Rptr.3d 818, 446 P.3d 317].)

Given that SGMA essentially directs GSAs to develop GSPs “for sustainably using overdrafted groundwater basins.” (Kings County Farm Bureau, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th 782, 794), much of the GSA activity SGMA authorizes presumably could be deemed to have the “potential for resulting in either a direct physical change in the environment, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a)).

A consequence of this, inferably, could be that a GSA, in addition to the various complicated requirements it is required to meet under SGMA in carrying out its sustainability mission, would also, by virtue of the presumptive environmental impact of such activities, frequently be required to comply with CEQA’s onerous disclosure requirements, notwithstanding that its legislative charge under SGMA is, fundamentally, to provide for the sustainable management of groundwater basins and to avoid or minimize the adverse environmental effects of subsidence. 

Provisions of SGMA and CEQA, however, appear to create at least some space for GSA’s to carry out their mission under SGMA without always also being subject to CEQA.  Most significantly, Water Code section 10728.6 expressly states that CEQA “does not apply to the preparation and adoption of [GSPs]” under SGMA. 

Also of significant note, however, section 10728.6 also provides that nothing in SGMA exempts from CEQA “a project that would implement actions taken pursuant to a [GSP].” Still, though, certain activities “that would implement actions” pursuant to a GSP, however, will properly be considered exempt under one or more exemptions defined in the CEQA Guidelines. 

The CEQA Guidelines include “a list of classes of projects which have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and which shall, therefore, be exempt from the provisions of CEQA.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15300.)  For example, “exemptions in sections 15307 and 15308 of the Guidelines (referred to as ‘Class 7’ and ‘Class 8’ exemptions) … establish an exemption from CEQA for ‘actions taken by regulatory agencies as authorized by state law or local ordinance’ either ‘to assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement of a natural resource’ in the case of a Class 7 exemption or ‘to assure the maintenance, restoration, enhancement, or protection of the environment’ in the case of a Class 8 exemption.”  (Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. County of Marin (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 209, 226 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 763].)

And still yet, with these exemptions, like others set forth in the CEQA Guidelines, because, ultimately, they “represent[] a determination … that a particular project does not have a significant effect on the environment,” “[i]t follows that an activity that may have a significant effect on the environment cannot be categorically exempt.” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 124 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 939 P.2d 1280].)

D. Analysis -  Merritt’s CEQA Claims

Regarding Merritt’s CEQA claims, the parties’ principal dispute concerns whether the challenged action of the District constitutes a “project” under CEQA, and more fundamentally, what action of the District, specifically, is challenged. 

The District characterizes the 2026 Allocation as a “part” of its GSP, which is, itself, exempt from CEQA.  (Wat. Code, § 10728.6.)  Merritt does not dispute that CEQA does not apply to the District’s GSP, but it characterizes the 2026 Allocation as a separate project implementing the actions under the District’s GSP, such that the project is not exempt from CEQA.  (Ibid.)

Branching off this dispute, the parties dispute whether Merritt’s action is time-barred according to CEQA’s 180-day statue of limitations.  (Pub. Resc. Code, § 21167; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15112.)  The District contends the CEQA action is time-barred based on its characterization of the challenged action as the adoption of its GSP (or its latest iteration adopted in 2024), while Merritt contends the CEQA action is timely based on the December 2025 adoption date of the 2026 Allocation. 

Neither party submits authority directly addressing whether a GSA’s fee setting activity pursuant to measures adopted in its GSP would constitute “a project that would implement actions taken pursuant to a [GSP],” but the court is, in any event, more inclined to agree with Merritt that such activity is a GSP implementing measure, and not a “measure of preparation and adoption of [GSPs].” (Wat. Code, § 10728.6.) 

The court notes that “[p]rior to imposing or increasing a fee, a groundwater sustainability agency shall hold at least one public meeting, at which oral or written presentations may be made as part of the meeting,” and “[a]ny action by a groundwater sustainability agency to impose or increase a fee shall be taken only by ordinance or resolution” (Wat. Code, § 10730, subds. (b)(1) & (c)), which strongly suggests that fee imposition is a separate implementing measure of a GSP, since it requires a separate hearing, and separate “ordinance or resolution.”

While the 2026 Allocation was not, strictly speaking, a fee setting activity, that is the attributable purpose of the allocation.  As the District explains, its annual groundwater allocations enable it “to impose fees on landowners for groundwater use counted against their Transitional Credits (‘Transitional Fees’) [“transitional credits” are a component of annual allocations under the District’s GSP based on observed subbasin conditions and established management criteria, which are reduced over time at levels necessary to meet sustainability goals] and additional penalties on landowners who use groundwater in excess of their Transitional Credits (‘Exceedance Penalties’).”

This additionally addresses the statue of limitations issue, since the operative action is the approval of the 2026 Allocation, and not adoption of a prior GSP.

The question of more significant import, in the court’s view, though, is whether the 2026 Allocation is not a project under CEQA because it is subject to an applicable exception or exemption.  The court is “required to give effect to [an] exemption upon demurrer if no facts in [the] complaint suggest[] a scenario in which the exemption [does] not apply.” (Del Cerro, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 181.)

As a threshold matter, the court finds the District’s argument persuasive that the 2026 Allocation is not an activity that may result in direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change to the environment (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a)) given that the 2026 Allocations do not authorize landowners to pump a specific amount of groundwater, and, rather, the allocations enable the District to impose fees on landowners who extract groundwater. 

Notable again here, while the District has power under SGMA “[t]o control groundwater extractions,” it does not have the power to determine “rights to extract groundwater” (Wat. Code, 10726.4, subd. (a)(2)) and SGMA, at Water Code section 10720.5, subdivisions (a) and (b), “expressly prohibits groundwater sustainability plans from determining water rights” (Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 616).

Merritt’s suggestion to the contrary, based on reference to a collection of cases cited in Muzzy Ranch dealing with the impacts of land use determinations resulting from the enactment or amendment of a general plan (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 385) is unpersuasive because unlike the cited land use determinations, the 2026 Allocations do not directly or indirectly allow or prohibit any activity on the part of landowners.  Zoning determinations result in permitting authorization for development activity; fee determinations, instead, simply impose costs for activities.  Notable here, unlike with the fee setting activity at issue in this case, the CEQA Guidelines expressly state that “ ‘project’ includes ‘an activity directly undertaken by a public agency including but not limited to … enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, and the adoption and amendment of local General Plans or elements thereof.’ ” (Id., at p. 385, fn. 4, citing CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (a)(1).)

Also notable, the same cited section 15378 of the CEQA Guidelines expressly states that a “project” does not include “[t]he creation of government funding mechanisms or other government fiscal activities, which do not involve any commitment to any specific project which may result in a potentially significant physical impact on the environment.” (Id., subd. (b)(4).) 

Merritt contends that whether the 2026 Allocations “may also have some fiscal impact is immaterial,” since, “the District is committing to … a total allocation of 1.78 af/acre … that could produce a physical change in the environment,” but the District is not “committing” to the extraction of the total 2026 Allocation, rather it is “committing” to an annual fee imposition matrix based on categories of maximum allocated water and thereby imposing costs on activity that “could produce a physical change in the environment.” 

Notable here, SGMA specifically imbues GSAs with the authority to “impose fees on the extraction of groundwater from the basin to fund costs of groundwater management … .” (Wat. Code, § 10730.2, subd. (a)) and GSAs are generally authorized to “impose fees” for the purposes of funding “the costs of a groundwater sustainability program, including, but not limited to, preparation, adoption, and amendment of a groundwater sustainability plan, and investigations, inspections, compliance assistance, enforcement, and program administration, including a prudent reserve” (Wat. Code, § 10730, subd. (a)). 

In this respect, the 2026 Allocations are part of a fee setting activity squarely involving “government funding mechanisms or other government fiscal activities.”  (CEQA Guidelines, § 15378, subd. (b)(4).)

Based on the foregoing, it is additionally without question that the 2026 Allocations are not activities that have a “significant effect on the environment” (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 124.)  The fact that the District’s consultants recommended a lower 2026 total groundwater allocation does not change this fact merely because it effectively determined that complete exhaustion of the overall 2026 Allocation—an action that would ultimately result from landowners pumping excess groundwater in spite of contrary fee incentives—would create significant adverse subsidence consequences.  This is because the consultant’s determinations do not change the fact that the activity engaged in by the District—contrary to the consultant’s advisement or not—was a determination of what fees to impose on landowners for groundwater extractions pursuant to its authorization to impose such fees to fund its sustainability mission under SGMA.  Clearly, the District’s activity at issue is neither the pumping of groundwater (which is ultimately the activity that Merritt maintains will produce an adverse effect on the environment), nor permitting the pumping of groundwater. 

Accordingly, it follows that, as the District argues, the 2026 Allocations should properly be considered exempt as Class 7 and Class 8 exemptions under sections 15307 and 15308 of the CEQA Guidelines.  Indeed, the District’s sole authorization to determine the 2026 Allocations derived exclusively from SGMA and the sole purpose of the resulting fee impositions was “to assure the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement” of groundwater resources.  (Ibid.)

The test of whether the 2026 Allocation and resulting fee imposition “assure[s] the maintenance, restoration, or enhancement” of groundwater resources cannot be whether the fees resulting from the allocation effectively limit groundwater extractions to a level advised by a hired consultant, since prohibition of groundwater extraction is not an authorized purpose for the imposition of pumping fees. 

Instead, GSAs are only authorized to “impose fees on the extraction of groundwater from the basin to fund costs of groundwater management” (Wat. Code, § 10730.2, subd. (a)) and “to fund the costs of a groundwater sustainability program, including, but not limited to, preparation, adoption, and amendment of a groundwater sustainability plan, and investigations, inspections, compliance assistance, enforcement, and program administration, including a prudent reserve” (Wat. Code, § 10730, subd. (a)).  Again, a GSA does not have the power to determine “rights to extract groundwater” (Wat. Code, 10726.4, subd. (a)(2)) and is “expressly prohibit[ed] … from determining water rights” in its GSP (Mojave Pistachios, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 616).

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the demurrer must be sustained without leave to amend to Merritt’s CEQA cause of action.

E. Analysis – Merritt’s SGMA Claims

Merritt’s SGMA claim has two components.

First, Merritt asserts that the District generally “has a mandatory, ministerial duty to comply with its obligations under SGMA,” and that “[t]he 2026 Allocation is inconsistent with the District's obligations under SGMA because substantial, credible evidence from the District's own expert consultants shows the 2026 Allocation will not meet the sustainability goal, will not achieve sustainable groundwater management, and will cause undesirable results, contrary to the requirements of SGMA, the PID GSP, and the SMP.” (Emphasis omitted.)

In effect, Merritt contends the District generally violated its sustainability mandates under SGMA by adopting the 2026 Allocation contrary to recommendations of its consultants.  Because, however, the District is under no identified or obvious legal obligation to follow the recommendations of its consultants, this claim is that essentially the District violated its sustainability mandates under SGMA by adopting the 2026 Allocation.

As the District correctly notes, however, to the extent Merritt invites the court to evaluate whether the District generally violated its sustainability mandates under SGMA by adopting the 2026 Allocation, it asks this court to essentially make a determination whether the District “should be regulating differently.”

The court agrees with the District that, under the circumstances presented, judicial abstention is appropriate under the circumstances. 

“Under the doctrine of judicial abstention, a trial court has discretion to abstain from adjudicating an action if: (1) granting the requested relief would require a trial court to assume the functions of an administrative agency, or to interfere with the functions of an administrative agency; (2) the action involves determining complex economic policy, which is best handled by the Legislature or an administrative agency; or (3) granting injunctive relief would be unnecessarily burdensome for the trial court to monitor and enforce given the availability of more effective means of redress. Also, judicial abstention may generally be appropriate only if there is an alternative means of resolving the issues raised in the action.” (People ex rel. Elliott v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1128 [326 Cal.Rptr.3d 458], citations and quotation marks omitted.)

Here, in its petition, Merritt generally refers to broad directives under SGMA—that it requires establishment of GSAs; and directs GSAs to adopt GSPs specifying measures to eliminate overdraft, prevent undesirable results, and achieve the “sustainability goal”—and then essentially asserts that the 2026 Allocation violates those broad directives.  Merritt’s petition essentially calls on the court to perform a performance review of the 2026 Allocation as a sustainability measure based on its efficacy in achieving results generally consistent with SGMA directives. 

Merritt contends that is “simply asks the Court to determine whether the District is satisfying its legal obligation under … SGMA,” but there is nothing simple about that request.  The inquiry likely would involve, as the District notes, “analyzing groundwater modeling and monitoring data, evolving subsidence data, [and] whether sustainability actions are on track to achieve results during the planning horizon, and what, if anything, [the District] can or should do differently to avoid undesirable results.”

There is no dispute that SWRCB has made a determination that the District’s GSP is inadequate and designated the Subbasin in probationary status, and the court finds it appropriate under the circumstances to defer to the SWRCB’s process with respect to evaluation of the 2026 Allocation’s compliance with general SGMA directives. 

Merritt states that SWRCB “has not decided to implement an interim plan and even assuming arguendo the SWRCB will do so, the timing of that determination, and the ultimate implementation of any interim plan, are both entirely speculative,” and, that, under these circumstances, “the District’s failure to comply with the law is causing ongoing, permanent harm to the basin”

Merritt’s ultimate aim, however, is an order to set aside the 2026 Allocation—as well as, by implication, the fees imposed thereunder—and, further, to enjoin “any action in furtherance of the 2026 Allocation unless and until Respondents have satisfied their obligations under SGMA.”  It seems that what Merritt requests the court to order would cause far more harm during the pendency of proceedings before the SWRCB, than denying that order in maintenance of the status quo in deference to that pending proceeding. 

Accordingly, the court finds abstention appropriate with respect to the broad request to consider the District’s general compliance with SGMA’s sustainability goal.

The second component of Merritt’s SGMA claim is that by adopting the 2026 Allocation, the District has proceeded in violation of its own GSP, or, more specifically, the SMP measure included in its GSP. 

The SMP, as described in the petition, requires identification of high-risk SMMZs and implementation of “early action plans” for high-risk SMMZs that entail “increasingly aggressive measures” when a given SMMZ is at 50%, 75% and 100% of the determined minimum threshold.

According to Merritt, “[a]t least 10 SMMZs have exceeded the 50% threshold so as to trigger the SMP’s early action requirements,” but “the District has failed to discharge its clear and unambiguous duty under the SMP to implement early action requirements for those SMMZs, contrary to the PID GSP and SGMA.”

Confusingly, Merritt asserts that, in this manner, “the District failed to proceed in the manner required by law and/or abused its discretion in approving the 2026 Allocation,” but it does not appear the 2026 Allocation is the problem.  The problem, based on the allegations, appears to be that the District is not enforcing measures called for by the SMP for “[a]t least 10 SMMZs [that] have exceeded the 50% threshold so as to trigger the SMP’s early action requirements.”

The 2026 Allocation is of no consequence to this.  Based on what the petition alleges, it appears that, according to the District’s consultants, if landowners pump all of the allocation of water set in the 2026 Allocation, a majority of the SMMZs in the District will be subject, before 2040, to the most “aggressive” of the “increasingly aggressive measures” under the SMP (those that are required at 100% of the minimum threshold).  This says nothing, however, of whether the District is enforcing the SMP, it merely identifies an anticipated scenario in which an increasing level of enforcement will be required under the SMP. 

The court, in any event, does not find abstention would be warranted with respect to the limited issue of whether the District is failing to enforce the specific measure of implementing early action requirements from those SMMZs that allegedly have exceeded the 50% threshold so as to trigger the SMP’s early action requirements. 

The court finds that, in this limited respect, the petition indicates that there is a clear mandate under the GSP that is not being followed.  This court would be well within its authority and ability to determine the question of whether the District is failing to enforce the specific measure of implementing early action requirements from those SMMZ that allegedly have exceeded the 50% threshold.  (See People ex rel. Elliott v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1114, 1132 [326 Cal.Rptr.3d 458].)

The second cause of action, however, does not call for a limited determination that  the District is failing to enforce the SMP, but instead, set aside of the 2026 Allocation. 

Based on the foregoing, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to the second cause of action, but leave shall be limited to statement of a claim addressing the limited issue of the District’s alleged failure to enforce the SMP. 

The court, again, however, will exercise its discretion to abstain from adjudicating the broader claim that the 2026 Allocation violates the general sustainability mandates of SGMA. 

F. Third and Fourth Causes of Action

The court sustains the demurrer to the third cause of action because it seeks the same remedies as the first and second but via a declaratory relief route, but “[i]t is settled that an action for declaratory relief is not appropriate to review an administrative decision.”  (State v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 249 [115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281].)  The demurrer is sustained without leave to amend because if, as Merritt indicates, it intended to state this claim as seeking a declaration regarding an ongoing dispute—i.e., the parties disagreements about the manner in which District is complying with SGMA—the court abstains from adjudicating such issues in favor of the pending SWRCB proceedings. 

The court additionally sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action for the same reasons that it sustains the demurrer to the first and second causes of action.  Given that the fourth cause of action is entirely duplicative of the first two causes of action, the court notes that, in the event Merritt opts to file an amended petition, it need not and should not restate its prayer for relief under a claim as a separate cause of action.  Accordingly, demurrer is sustained to the fourth cause of action without leave.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                E.W. Merritt Farms vs. Pixley Irrigation District

Case No.:  VCU332714

Date:          July 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: Petitioner has filed an amended petition and therefore this demurrer is moot.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Moreno, Jose vs. Pena's Disposal, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU301267

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion for preliminary approval to August 10, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9; to order a supplemental declaration as to the information to calculate the lodestar to be filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the continued hearing date.

Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $179,966.67)

The gross settlement amount is $400,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 275 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $654.42 per member.

The Class Members consist of all hourly, non-exempt employees employed by Defendant in California at any time from August 28, 2019 to September 18, 2025.

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) failure to pay minimum wages; (2) failure to pay overtime; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to permit rest breaks (5) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (6) failure pay all wages due upon separation of employment; (7) violation of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; and (8) ) Labor Code section 2698 (Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Khaled ¶¶13-21.) Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. Counsel estimates a  potential recovery of approximately $649,550.97.

Defendant, after formal discovery, produced a 30% sample of time keeping and pay records, along with company policy documents and contact information. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $400,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$133,333.33
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$35,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,700.00
Proposed Total PAGA Payment:	$40,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$179,966.67

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is therefore approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Jose Moreno as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $5,000. The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely. Therefore, the proposed award is approved.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $400,000 or $133,333.33 and costs not to exceed $35,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

Counsel indicates presently incurred costs of $24,213.49. (Declaration of Khaled ¶38.)

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Phoenix Settlement Administrators as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $6,700.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

The declaration of Anderson indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Khaled ¶43 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 275 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Therefore, the Court continues this motion for preliminary approval to August 10, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9 and orders a supplemental declaration as to the information to calculate the lodestar filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the continued hearing date.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Vansicklen, Jon D vs. FCA US, LLC

Case No.:   VCU311609

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $24,890 in fees and $1,896.49 in costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff purchased a 2023 Ram 1500 (“Vehicle”) which allegedly experienced repeated defects, including a blurry/double heads-up display requiring windshield diagnosis and replacement, windshield wipers that failed to adequately clear the windshield and required replacement, complaints of loud clunking noises and hard shifting when shifting between drive and reverse, repeated failures or inconsistent operation of the forward collision warning and pedestrian emergency braking systems, including failure to detect pedestrians, vehicles, radar/camera alignment concerns, and the system appearing active but not engaging, as well as an “Emergency Call Error/SOS Call Unavailable” warning.

On October 7, 2025, this matter settled.

On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for recover of fees in the amount of $63,175.00, consisting of $50,540 in fees with a 1.25 times multiplier, as well as costs and expenses in the amount of $1,896.49.

On July 8, 2026, Defendant filed an untimely opposition to this motion, arguing that no multiplier should be permitted, that a lower hourly rate should be applied and that some of the entries should be eliminated, as discussed in further detail below.

Authority and Analysis

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover 120.9 hours at rates ranging from $750 to $150 and to for an award of a 1.25 multiplier.

No Multiplier

As to the 1.25 enhancement sought by Plaintiffs, such an award is based on the following factors:

1. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
2. The skill displayed in presenting them;
3. The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
4. The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ justification for the multiplier is conclusory and does not set forth an adequate basis to award an enhancement. The Court does not find that the work cited demonstrates such extraordinary skill to justify an enhancement to the award sought. This case settled before trial, and the Court finds that this appears to be a standard Song-Beverly case, with no additional novelty or difficulty of issues evidenced from the supporting papers filed by Plaintiff.

As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from accepting other work.

As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the “contingent risk” here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the “contingent” risk of “establishing eligibility for the award” is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].)

The Court will not award an enhancement in this case.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the $750 and $600 rates are the prevailing rates in Tulare County for counsel, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour for counsel. Further, the Court will set all paralegal work performed at the rate of $150 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 120.9 hours incurred on this matter.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)  

Here, Defendant specifically challenges the following entries:

• July 29, 2024 – Defendant seeks to strike the 1.5 hours by Yeck as to review of the draft complaint and review of repair documentation, noting that a paralegal had already drafted the complaint. The Court agrees some reduction is necessary, but notes this appears to be review by an attorney of paralegal work. Therefore, the Court will strike .5 hours from this entry. (-.5 as to Yeck.)
• September 16, 2024 – Defendant seeks to strike the 1.0 hours by Yeck to review the answer, the letter and documents. Again, a partial reduction appears proper and the Court will strike .5 hours from this entry. (-.5 as to Yeck.)
• February 2, 2025 – Here, Defendant challenges 2.2 hours under trial preparation for drafting and revising a damages spreadsheet and chronology. The Court will reduce this entry by 1 hour. (-1 hour as to Inscore.)
• September 19, 2025 – Defendant seeks to strike 2.5 hours incurred as to final review of joint trial documents by Yeck, noting 1.5 hours incurred by Inscore as to “drafting those same documents.” This appears, to the Court, as a review by a more senior attorney of other attorney work. The Court will reduce the entry by 1 hour (-1 hour as to Yeck.)
• September 23, 2025 – Defendant here seeks to challenge the 2 hours by Yeck as to preparation of client for the MSC and review of repair records and technical bulletins. Defendant argues that the records are insufficient to justify additional review of these documents and is otherwise vague as to the activities performed. The Court will strike 1 hour here. (-1 hour as to Yeck.)
• October 1, 2025 – Defendant seeks to strike 1.5 hours incurred by Yeck as to review further videos and evidence of repairs and meeting with client. The Court will strike .5 hours from this entry. (-.5 as to Yeck.)
• October 4, 2025 – Here, Defendant challenges the 2 hours incurred by Inscore as to review and revise the reply in support of the motion to compel deposition of Defendant’s PMQ on the basis that a paralegal billed 6 hours to draft the motion itself. The Court will reduce this entry by 1 hour. (-1 as to Inscore.)
• April 1, 2025 and May 8, 2025 – Defendant challenges the 1 hour billed by Yeck as to assist with preparation of fee motion and 2 hours billed as to reviewing the final draft thereof. Defendant notes a paralegal had billed 14 hours drafting the motion prior thereto. The Court will reduce these entries, in total, by 1.5 hours (-1.5 as to Yeck.)
• March 27, 2026, May 7, 2026, May 8, 2026 – Defendant challenges the 14 hours total incurred by paralegal Ulloa as to the drafting of the attorney fee motion, for which Defendant argues that attorneys billed an additional 6.5 hours thereto. The Court has reduced some of the attorney hours in the prior paragraph. The Court will reduce the hours as to Ulloa here by 4. (-4 hours to Ulloa.)
• Anticipated Fees – The Court does not award anticipated fees. (-3.5 as to Ulloa; -3 as to Inscore.)

As a result, the Court calculates the fees as follows: 46.9 hours at $350 per hour, 56.5 hours at $150 per hour, for a total of $24,890.

Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover $1,896.49 in costs. Defendant does not challenge the costs sought by Plaintiff.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Perez, Christine vs. Alexis Nails, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU324905

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Dismissal

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

Plaintiff alleges premises liability as to an incident occurring August 19, 2023 while receiving nail services at Fashion Nails and Spa II, located at 1428 North Ben Maddox Way, Visalia, California 93292.

Plaintiff’s complaint, filed August 19, 2025, named the following Defendants:

• ALEXIS NAILS, INC. DBA FASHION NAILS AND SPA
• BINH QUANG BUI DBA FASHION NAILS AND SPA, and
• DOES 1 to 20

On October 16, 2026, Defendants ALEXIS NAILS, INC. dba FASHION NAILS AND SPA and BINH QUANG BUI (erroneously sued as Binh Quang Bui dba Fashion Nails and Spa) filed an answer to the complaint.

On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amendment to complaint regarding an incorrect naming, noting:

“Plaintiff, having designated a defendant in the complaint by the incorrect name of Alexis Nails, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa, and having discovered the defendant's true name to be, Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa II, Plaintiff amends the complaint by substituting the true name for the incorrect name wherever it appears in the complaint.” (emphasis in original.)

Thereafter, on January 30, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal with prejudice of the complaint as to “Defendants Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa II and Bing Quang Bui dba Fashion Nails and Spa ONLY”

On May 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) for relief from the dismissal. In support, Plaintiff notes the following sequence of events:

7. On January 28, 2026, Belinda Porras, a Legal Assistant/Paralegal at Skane Mills [counsel for Defendants Alexis Nails, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa and Binh Quang Bui], transmitted a Request for Dismissal to handling attorney Sara Javid [counsel for Plaintiff] listing the dismissed parties as "Alexis Nails, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa and Binh Quang Bui ONLY." Sara Javid signed the form and returned it the same day. (Exhibit E.)

8. On January 30, 2026, Belinda Porras notified Sara Javid that the court clerk had rejected the original dismissal because the party names did not conform to the operative Complaint as amended. The clerk's rejection was legally correct: the Doe Amendment had replaced "Alexis Nails, Inc." with "Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc." throughout the Complaint, making the original form nonconforming.

9. Upon receipt of the clerk's rejection notification, the correct response was to recognize that Alexis Nails, Inc. was no longer a party by operation of the Doe Amendment and to advise defense counsel that only Binh Quang Bui needed to be dismissed. That recognition did not occur. Instead, handling attorney Sara Javid signed the revised dismissal presented by defense counsel now naming "Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa II and Binh Quang Bui" and returned it to defense counsel for filing, without consulting supervising counsel. Defense counsel filed it that same day, January 30, 2026, and the court entered it with prejudice. (Exhibits F, G.)

10. The filing of the revised dismissal was the direct result of the handling attorney's mistake and inadvertence. Sara Javid did not recognize that the Doe Amendment had legally extinguished Alexis Nails, Inc. as a party, and mistakenly believed the revised form was a technical correction to the same already-agreed-upon dismissal of the wrong parties.” (Declaration of Bauman ¶¶7-10)

Further that this issue came to light at the case management conference on April 27, 2026 and that this motion followed. (Declaration of Bauman ¶11.)

No opposition to this motion appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Where an “attorney affidavit of fault” is filed, there is no requirement that the attorney’s mistake inadvertence, etc., be excusable.  Relief must be granted even where the default or dismissal resulted from inexcusable neglect by the defendant’s attorney (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4^th 868 897 (disapproved on other grounds in Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4^th 830, 845)

The Court is not concerned with the reason for the attorney’s inexcusable mistake (Billing v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256.) Rather, the trial court may deny the motion if it finds that the attorney’s declaration of fault is not credible. (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4^th 907, 915)

The Court accepts counsel’s declaration as to the mistake regarding the dismissal as to the amendment, its effect, and the naming of the incorrect parties on the dismissal entered in this matter.

The purpose of the mandatory relief section of section 473(b) is “to alleviate the hardship on parties who lost their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 26 Cal.4^th 249, 257.) The Court, therefore, grants the motion, vacates the dismissal of Defendant Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa II and reinstates Defendant Fashion Nails Enterprise, Inc. dba Fashion Nails and Spa II as a defendant in this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:               Mancilla, Gabriel vs. Sierra View Dairy

Case No.:  VCU309938

Date:          July 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion. Motion for final approval is set for February 22, 2027, 8:30 am, Department 9.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $61,710)

The gross settlement amount is $155,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 96 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $642.81 per member.

The Class Members consist of:

All current and former California non-exempt employees of Defendant Sierra View Dairy who worked for Defendant in California at any time during the period of June 13, 2020, through October 29, 2025

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) minimum wage violations; (2) failure to pay all overtime wages; (3) meal period violations; (4) rest period violations; (5) waiting time penalties; (6) wage statement violations; (7) unfair competition; (8) failure to reimburse for necessary business expenses; and (9) Claims for civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”)

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Brown ¶¶ 13 – 22.) Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. The total estimated reasonable recovery after applying various discount rates is $168,291.00 (Declaration of Brown ¶23.)

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendant formally and informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $155,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (35%):	$54,250
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Mancilla:	$5,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Diaz:	$5,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$5,790
Proposed LWDA PAGA Payment	$3,250
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$61,710

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.  Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days.

The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Awards to Class Representatives

The Court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs Mancilla and Diaz as Class Representatives for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement awards to Plaintiffs are $5,000 each. The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely. The enhancement payments are therefore approved.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $155,000 or $54,250 and costs not to exceed $20,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel. Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel Brown indicates that he has spent 129 hours on this case, at rates of $1,109 per hour (at 112 hours) and $625 per hour (at 17 hours), creating a base lodestar of $124,753. (Declaration of Brown ¶ 25.) The Court notes that these rates are already higher than what is typically “…prevailing in the community for similar work” and does not award a rate on these cases exceeding $1,000 per hour.  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

As such, the Court will reduce the rates to $900 and $550 per hour, creating a modified based lodestar of $110,150, resulting in a negative multiplier of .49. Therefore, the Court preliminarily approves the fee request.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $14,946.40 (Declaration of Brown ¶25.) The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $20,000.00.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Apex Class Action Administration as the claims administrator for this class action based both on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court and on the Declaration of Sean Hartranft, Senior Vice President of Sales for IYLM. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $5,790 based upon the Declaration of Hartranft and the itemized estimate. (Declaration of Hartranft – Exhibit B.)

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to CASA of Tulare County in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

Counsel’s declaration indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Brown ¶ 30 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 96 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Accordingly, the motion to preliminarily approve the Class Action and PAGA settlement is granted. Motion for final approval is set for February 22, 2027 8:30 am, Department 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Wells Fargo Bank, NA vs. Ibarra, Kassandra R

Case No.:   VCL319717

Date:            July 20, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted

To grant the motion and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Facts

On or about March 20, 2026, Plaintiff served by mail Requests for Admissions, Set One on Defendant. The discovery was mailed to the address on Defendant’s answer. As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 admitted.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 9 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Trinidad, Tanya vs. BMW of North America, LLC

Case No.:   VCU313462

Date:           July 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

On May 15, 2022, Plaintiff Tanya Trinidad ("Plaintiff") purchased a used 2019 X3 xDrive30i, VIN 5UXTR9C5XKLD95872 ("Subject Vehicle"), from BMW of Visalia, an independent dealer, located at 111 N Neely St., Visalia, CA 93291. (UMF No. 1.)

At the time of purchase, the Subject Vehicle had 32737 miles on the odometer. (UMF No. 2.)

Pursuant to the Sale Agreement, Plaintiff was to pay a downpayment of $7,713.00, total financed payments of $34,895.87, and a finance charge of $6,141.25, for a total of $41,037.12, over the course of the 72 month finance schedule. (UMF No. 3.)

The Subject Vehicle was originally sold with a 4-year/50,000-mile New Vehicle Limited Warranty. (UMF No. 4.) BMW NA issued the applicable New Vehicle Limited Warranty on May 09, 2019, prior to Plaintiff's purchase. (UMF No. 5.)

Title of Subject Vehicle was originally transferred to another consumer before being purchased by Plaintiff. (UMF No. 6.)

Plaintiff received the remaining balance of the New Vehicle Warranty. (UMF No. 7.)

On or around September 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging causes of action for violations of the Song Beverly Act and Breach of Implied and Express Warranty. (UMF No. 8.)

The Court notes here that the complaint alleges “Pursuant to Section 1792.22, subdivision (e) (2), of the California Civil Code, the Subject Vehicle was purchased as a certified pre-owned (“CPO”) with an accompanying BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC’s new and full CPO warranty, and therefore constitutes a “new motor vehicle” vehicle under the Act. These causes of action arise out of warranty and repair obligations of BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC in connection with a vehicle that Plaintiff purchased and for which BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC issued a written warranty.” (Complaint ¶8.)

The only named defendant is BMW of North America, LLC. (UMF No. 9.)

Plaintiff adds that Defendant admits it is a distributor. For purposes of CPO certification, Defendant is a self-professed distributor. (AUMF No. 1.) Further, that Defendant is likewise a retail seller for purposes of C.C.P. § 1795.5 (AUMF No. 2.)

Further, that that the Certified Pre Owned warranty issued by BMW NA was effective at the inception of Plaintiff’s obtaining of the Subject Vehicle, runs in conjunction with the New Vehicle Limited Warranty, and remains active throughout Plaintiff’s ownership with unlimited mileage and a defined expiration date. (AUMF No. 3.)

Further, that BMW is a manufacturer. (AUMF No. 4.)

Additionally, that Defendant’s Warranty Booklet, on page 9, Defendant writes: THE DURATION OF ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, IS LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES HEREIN. (AUMF No. 5.)

Further, that The Subject Vehicle was brought in for repairs to an authorized BMW dealership less than three months after purchase, on August 1, 2022, for check engine light concerns, among other things. (AUMF No. 6.)

Authority and Analysis

Summary Judgment

A party may move for summary judgment in any action or proceeding if it is contended the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(a).) “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

To prevail, the evidence submitted must show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) The motion cannot succeed unless the evidence leaves no room for conflicting inferences as to material facts; the court has no power to weigh one inference against another or against other evidence. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Food Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 841.) In determining whether the facts give rise to a triable issue of material fact, “[a]ll doubts as to whether any material, triable, issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment…” (Gold v. Weissman (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-99.) “In other words, the facts alleged in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences there from must be accepted as true.” (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 179.) However, if adjudication is otherwise proper the motion “may not be denied on grounds of credibility,” except when a material fact is the witness’s state of mind and “that fact is sought to be established solely by the [witness’s] affirmation thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(e).) 

Once the moving party has met their burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party “to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(1).) “[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party... to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element... necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor.” (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) 

“The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues and to frame the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment proceeding.” (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493, quotations and citations omitted.) “Accordingly, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment only requires that he or she negate plaintiff's theories of liability as alleged in the complaint; that is, a moving party need not refute liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.” (Id.) 

Song Beverly

Defendant moves for summary judgment or adjudication as to the (1) first cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly Act - breach of express warranty, (2) second cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly Act - breach of implied warranty under Civil Code section 1792, and (3) third cause of action for violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b) pursuant to the holding in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189.

In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that "a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer's new car warranty does not qualify as a 'motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty' under section 1793.22, subdivision (e)(2)'s definition of 'new motor vehicle' unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale." (Id. at 196.) The Supreme Court found that "it would be anomalous to construe 'other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer's new car warranty' (§ 1793.22, subd. (e)(2)) to include any used car sold by a distributor or retailer with a preexisting, unexpired manufacturer's warranty." (Id. at 202.)

Here, however, in contrast to Rodriguez, the complaint alleges “the Subject Vehicle was purchased as a certified pre-owned (“CPO”) with an accompanying BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC’s new and full CPO warranty” and while Plaintiff received the balance of a new vehicle warranty, Plaintiff also provides evidence Plaitiff obtained a Certified Pre-Owned Warranty issued by BMW at the time of the purchase, which remains active. (Complaint ¶8, UMF No. 7, AUMF No. 3.)

As such, the Court does not find application of Rodriguez to bar the claims here, given that Plaintiff has presented evidence that a CPO warranty was issued at the time of the purchase of the used vehicle.

The Court notes here that Plaintiff’s opposition, in addition to arguing Rodriguez does not apply due to the issuance of the CPO warranty with the purchase by Plaintiff, argues that Plaintiff’s three causes of action are viable under Civil Code section 1795.5.

Civil Code section 1795.5 states:

  Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods to mean “new” goods, the obligation of a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is given shall be the same as that imposed on manufacturers under this chapter except:

(a) It shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such goods when new) to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities within this state to carry out the terms of such express warranties.

(b) The provisions of Section 1793.5 shall not apply to the sale of used consumer goods sold in this state.

(c) The duration of the implied warranty of merchantability and where present the implied warranty of fitness with respect to used consumer goods sold in this state, where the sale is accompanied by an express warranty, shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods, provided the duration of the express warranty is reasonable, but in no event shall such implied warranties have a duration of less than 30 days nor more than three months following the sale of used consumer goods to a retail buyer. Where no duration for an express warranty is stated with respect to such goods, or parts thereof, the duration of the implied warranties shall be the maximum period prescribed above.

(d) The obligation of the distributor or retail seller who makes express warranties with respect to used goods that are sold in this state, shall extend to the sale of all such used goods, regardless of when such goods may have been manufactured.

The Court will not adjudicate the validity or viability of a section 1795.5 claim presented in opposition to the summary judgment motion for this first time. However, if Plaintiff’s seek to present this theory at trial, Plaintiff’s may file a motion for leave to amend the complaint.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 20, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054147	In the Matter of Benson, Evelyn L.	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Approval Conditional	Proof of Publication to be filed
VPR052768	In the Matter of Denham, Elsie	Status Conference	Appearance Required	Review of related case VPR052938
VPR054140	In the Matter of Zuhdi and Sada Kahlil Living Trust u/d/t May 15, 2023	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
VPR054118	In the Matter of the Carol Lee Ellis 2019 Trust, u/d/t September 17, 2019	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Appearance Required	Petition paragraph 18:  all persons entitled to notice omitted, Prob C § 851
VPR053714	In the Matter of Palmer, Loveda	Final Distribution Hearing	Recommended for Approval
VPR053429	In the Matter of Frazzano, Carl	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order. An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a).
VPR054204	In the Matter of Beltran Sanchez, Omar	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing not served on proposed conservatee and all relatives within the second degree
VPR054050	In the Matter of Lizarraga, Emmanuel	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	All required documents filed. Public Defender to be appointed.

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 16, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054150	In the Matter of Smith, Carolyn Rae	Probate Will/Issue Letters	Appearance Required	Original will not lodged in case. Improper Notice of Hearing served, rather than Notice of Petition to Administer, DE-121.
PPR053976	In the Matter of Lemus Orozco, Yamilet	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing of appointment hearing with copy of the Petition required to be served
PPR048739	In the Matter of Luna, Guadalupe	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
PPR053492	In the Matter of Broome, Justin Bryton	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  July  17, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR054112	IMO M.A.C.C.	Matter submitted; CRC RULE 3.1110(g) Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR054006	IMO R.F.	Confidential Guardian Screening Form is incomplete at #1 Petition for Appointment ATTACHMENT GC-210(CA) is incomplete – no relatives are listed at #2
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 02	VPR053780	IMO C.G.	OSC Hearing
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053439	IMO J.A.	No procedural issues to address
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR048626	IMO G.T.J.	OSC Hearing
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR048472	IMO D.P.	OSC Hearing
7/17/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR045780	IMO D.W.R.	OSC Hearing