Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, April 20, 2026, are:

Re:                Zenaida Chavez, Francisca vs. Universal Labor Solutions

Case No.:  VCU311659

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the Final Compliance Hearing for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am in Department 7.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on April 20, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On March 26, 2026, the settlement administrator Phoenix Settlement Administrators, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On October 27, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 5,535 potential class members from Defendant’s counsel with names, contact information, social security numbers and relevant employment information. However, counsel did not provide addresses for three thousand three hundred twenty-six (3,326) Class Members

Phoenix caused a publication to be issued in The Fresno Bee on December 5, 2025, and December 12, 2025, pursuant to the Court’s December 2, 2025 Order. The purpose of the publication notice was to provide notice to the three thousand three hundred twenty-six (3,326) Class Members Defendant Universal Labor Solutions did not have addresses for. 

On December 12, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail to 2,209 members. 105 notices were returned and updated addresses for 36 were obtained and notices were mailed. Therefore, 69 notices have been deemed undeliverable.

Class members had sixty (60) days, until February 10, 2026 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. Zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) valid objections have been received from class members. Therefore, all 5,535 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $383,115.64 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest class portion to be paid is approximately $1,304.95, the lowest class portion to be paid is approximately $11.74, and the average class portion to be paid is approximately $69.22.

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the requests for attorney fees representing 35% of the gross settlement fund of $700,000 or $245,000. Here, Counsel indicates the firm has spent 287 hours on this case, at rates ranging between $1,019 and $625 per hour, providing a base lodestar of $283,391. (Declaration of Brown ¶¶22, 23.) However, the Court notes it preliminarily approved rates between $948 and $581 per hour and will apply those here, resulting in a base lodestar of $263,726.

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $6,384.36. (Declaration of Brown ¶25.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $28,000.00. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates Central Valley Immigration Integration Collaborative (“CVIIC”) to assist in their mission of providing immigration support services, including to Class Members, in the California Central Valley, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved a representative payment of $5,000 and finds that the requested class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $700,000 are approved as follows:

Approved Court Approved Attorney Fees:	$245,000.00
Approved Incurred Attorney Costs:	$6,384.36
Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Settlement Administrator Costs	$28,000.00
PAGA Payment (LWDA and Aggrieved Employees)	$50,000.00
Net Settlement Amount	$383,115.64

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed order submitted by Plaintiffs on March 26, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for December 7, 2026, 8:30 am in Department 7.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. vs. Azar, Nevin

Case No.:   VCL324040

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges two causes of action for breach of written contract and breach of implied contract against Defendant Azar.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment based on the following facts.

Defendant applied for and was issued a Wells Fargo credit card ("Subject Account") ending in 1605. (UMF No. 1.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant the credit card along with the written Customer Agreement associated with the credit card. (UMF No. 2.) Defendant accepted the terms of the written agreement when they used the Wells Fargo Credit Card. (UMF No. 3.)

Pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement associated with the card, Plaintiff would extend credit to Defendant whereby Defendant could charge goods, services, or obtain cash advances on the credit line. (UMF No. 3.)

In exchange, Defendant was to repay the principal amount lent plus applicable interest and finance charges. (UMF No. 5.)

In accordance with the Customer Agreement, Defendant used the account, and made payments, charges, and incurred a balance thereon. (UMF No. 6.)

Plaintiff sent Defendant monthly statements of the Subject Account each and every billing period. (UMF No. 7.)

The statements of the account reflected all charges, payments, minimum payment due that billing period, and any fees and interest incurred for each billing period. (UMF No. 8.)

Moreover, there is no record of any unresolved disputes on the account. (UMF No. 9.)

There is no record of any active lawsuits against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. for unresolved disputes on this credit card account. (UMF No. 10.)

Defendant’s last payment on the Subject Account was on May 9, 2024. (UMF No. 11.)

Thereafter, no further payments were made by the Defendant, and therefore, pursuant to the terms of the Customer Agreement, Defendant was in default. (UMF No. 12.)

The balance due on Defendant’s Subject Account is $6,383.05. (UMF No. 13.)

As a result of Defendant’s unpaid balance, Plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $6,383.05. (UMF No. 14.)

In opposition, the Court notes a memorandum of points and authorities, objections to the declarations in support of the facts stated above within the memorandum (which does not comply with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1354(a), (b), (c)), a document entitled “Defendant’s Separate Statement of Disputed Facts” which references three causes of action not at issue in this matter and does not comply with California Rule of Court 3.1350(f), (h)), and references to a declaration by Defendant that is not in the Court’s file.

Authority and Analysis

Objections

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1354(b)  requires “All written objections to evidence must be served and filed separately from the other papers in support of or in opposition to the motion.”  As noted above, the objections are raised within the memorandum in violation of this rule.

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1354(a) states:

“Unless otherwise excused by the court on a showing of good cause, all written objections to evidence in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication must be served and filed at the same time as the objecting party's opposition or reply papers are served and filed.”

Here, no such showing of good cause has occurred.

Further, there is no submitted proposed order under rule 3.1354(c).

As to the objections themselves, the Court notes a reference to In Re Vee Vinhee, 336 BR 437 (BAP, 9th Cir 2005) and an uncited statement that “While these rules have been promulgated for use in the Ninth Circuit, it is believed that the same authentication issues can be raised in state court since the evidentiary rules are very similar.” However, in that case the Ninth Circuit applied the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are inapplicable in this proceeding, and, further, Ninth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel cases are not binding on this Court.

Further, argument that Palisades Collection LLC v. Hague, 2006 N.Y.Misc. LEXIS 4036; 235 N.Y.L.J, 71 (Civ.Ct. Queens Co., April 13, 2006) applies as to “proper administration of the rules of evidence prohibit the use of generic contracts” appears to be from a New York trial court and discusses the issue of proof of assignment.

Further, Defendant argues that the declaration of the Loan Workout Specialist is insufficient with respect to the business records exception to the hearsay rule and personal knowledge of the declarant.

The Court observes here that the declaration of Gibbons as to the loan workout specialist in support of this motion indicates responsibility for “monitoring the legal process for credit card accounts, investigation and resolution of customer disputes, research and review of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 's business records for the purposes of litigation,” that the declarant researches specific account issues for Plaintiff and therefore has knowledge of the record keeping systems from which the information in the declaration was obtained. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶¶1-5.) Declarant states that Plaintiff’s automated computer processes created these documents and records at the time of the occurrences, that the documents attached to the declaration were printed from Plaintiff’s computer system by declarant personally and that these documents are true and correct copies thereof. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶¶5-7.)

Specifically, declarant states review of the Defendant’s account, that Defendant applied for and was issued a credit card account on or about January 24, 2013, that Plaintiff sent Defendant a credit card, that the most recent Customer Agreement was provided to Defendant, that Defendant accepted the terms of the Customer Agreement through use of the credit card, that Defendant, in exchange for making charges on the credit card, or allowing others to make charges on the credit card, agreed to repay the principal amount plus any applicable interest and finance charges thereon, that Defendant did charge goods or services to the account and incurred a balance for such charges. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶¶8-15.)

Further, that Plaintiff’s computer system, each month, generates a statement that is sent to the customer, including Defendant, that the monthly statements reflect the balance from the previous month, all payments and credits made since the last statement, new charges or cash advances made by the Defendant since the prior statement, specified a minimum payment that will be due for that month and showed the interest rate for the Defendant's account and the calculation of said interest rate on the balance. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶¶16-17.)

Further that “Pursuant to The Fair Credit Billing Act, California's Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971, and the Billing Rights Summary included with every monthly statement provided to the Defendant, Defendant has 60 days in which to notify Wells Fargo Bank, N.A of any disputes  on the activity of the account.” (Declaration of Gibbons ¶18.) Further, that there is no record of any unresolved disputes on this credit card account or any active lawsuits for unresolved disputes on this credit card account. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶20.)

Finally, that Defendant made payments of the principal and interest on the account up and through May 9, 2024, no further payments were made after that date and a balance of $6,383.05 remains. (Declaration of Gibbons ¶¶21-23)

The Court finds this declaration sufficient to fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1271. The facts here are similar to Unifund CCR, LLC v. Dear (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th Supp.1, where the custodian of records submitted a declaration with respect to the debt and supporting documentation over objections on lack of foundation, authentication and hearsay. The appellate court of the superior court affirmed the findings, stating:

"[The custodian of records] asserted she had personal knowledge of the manner, methods and practices by which plaintiff maintains its business records and otherwise does business. The various assignments and records attached to the declaration are asserted to be maintained by plaintiff in the form of computerized account records kept in the ordinary routine course of business by plaintiff. Computerized ledgers were also asserted to be maintained by plaintiff. She stated these computerized ledgers maintained by plaintiff constituted the principal records for amounts due and owing to plaintiff for all transactions that occurred when defendant used the original creditor's card account. Since this description coincides with our commonsense understanding of how credit card records are electronically generated, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [the custodian] adequately laid the foundation to authenticate the billing statements as business records within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1271.” (Id. at 7-8)

The court noted further: “A qualified witness need not be the custodian, the person who created the record, or one with personal knowledge in order for a business record to be admissible under the hearsay exception. (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301, 322; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 243, p. 1108.)” (Id. at 8.)

Here, under the same reasoning as Unifund, the Court finds Gibbons is qualified to authenticate the records attached to the declaration as the testimony “…coincides with our commonsense understanding of how credit card records are electronically generated…" are kept.

Therefore, Defendant's objections based on lack of relevance, foundation, authentication and personal knowledge are overruled. While only admissible evidence is liberally construed in deciding whether there is triable issue of fact, the Court finds that Plaintiff's evidence is admissible here and that Defendant has not shown otherwise. (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1044.)

No Supporting Evidence

As noted above, no evidence in support of the opposition, including a declaration of Defendant referenced in the “separate statement,” has been filed. The Court notes the proof of service filed does reflect service of “Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Declaration in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.” (The Court notes no reference to service of the separate statement appears in this proof of service.)

Separate Statement

To start, the separate statement in opposition to the motion lacks compliance with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350(f), (h) which set out the requirements for an opposition’s separate statement and the formatting thereof. It contains discussion of three causes of action not at issue in this case and fails, as to breach of contract, to set out the facts and evidence in opposition thereto, fails to indicate which facts, if any, are in dispute and fails to set forth further facts in support of the opposition.

As such, in the absence of sustained objections to the evidence presented in support of Plaintiff’s material facts or other evidence in dispute thereof, the Court finds the facts here undisputed.

Summary Judgment Standard

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of fact to meet its initial burden of production. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.App.4th 826, 861.)  “[A] [plaintiff] moving for summary judgment [must] present evidence, and not simply point out that the [plaintiff] does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” Aguilar, at 854, fn. omitted.  Circumstantial evidence to support a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion “can consist of factually devoid discovery responses from which an absence of evidence can be inferred,” but the burden should not shift without stringent review of the direct, circumstantial, and inferential evidence.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddle Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 83.)

Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 850.)  “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question. [citation] No more is called for.” (Id. at 851.) The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material facts and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. 437c(c).)

Breach of Contract

To establish a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff must establish: (1) the existence of the contract, (2) Plaintiffs' performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants' breach, and (4) the resulting damage to Plaintiff." (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Here, the existence of the contract is established by the issuance of the credit card and Defendant’s use thereof (UMF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.) Plaintiff’s performance is demonstrated via issuance of the card, that charges were made against it for purchases and that monthly statements were generated as to the account. (UMF Nos. 2, 6, 7, 8.) Defendant’s breach is demonstrated by the failure to pay the balance stated on the statements. (UMF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.) Finally, the balance on the account is $6,383.05. (UMF Nos. 13, 14.)

From a review of the undisputed material facts supplied in Plaintiff’s separate statement of undisputed material facts and the evidence that offered in support of these material facts that plaintiff supplied in this response, the Court finds that Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist as to breach of written contract.

"As to the basic elements [of a breach of contract claim], there is no difference between an express and implied contract… While an implied in fact contract may be inferred from the conduct, situation or mutual relation of the parties, the very heart of this kind of agreement is an intent to promise." (Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transportation Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.) As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has met its burden to that no triable issues of fact exist as to breach of implied contract.

As noted above, Defendant’s lack of a filed declaration, lack of a properly formatted separate statement and the Court’s overruling of the objections renders these facts undisputed. The Court finds Plaintiff has met its burden as to both causes of action for breach of contract.

Truth in Lending Act

As to the arguments in the motion regarding violations of the Truth in Lending Act, Defendant argues it requires certain disclosures in written form and that “the plaintiff has failed to provide any document signed by Defendant setting forth the requirements in existence from the date the contract between the parties allegedly formed until present. Instead the plaintiff has merely attached a generic agreement unsigned by Defendant.”

Defendant cites to no authority that Defendant must sign a document that provides the disclosures, as opposed to the disclosures being provided in, for instance, the monthly statement of the account.

The Court’s review of Exhibit 1 to the declaration of Gibbons indicates disclosure of “the annual percentage of interest applicable for purchases, cash advances, and balance transfers made using the account, the manner in which variable rates are determined, the amounts of annual fees or other fees for the issuance or availability of the card, the amount of minimum finance charges and transaction charges, the existence and duration of a grace period, if any, the name of the balance calculation method, and the amounts of cash advance fees, late payment fees, over-the-limit fees, and balance of transfer fees 12 C.F.R. 225.5a(b)” as argued in the opposition.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:              People of the State of California vs. Martinez, Alex

Case No.:    VCU320499

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:       Continued Petition Hearing

Tentative Ruling: To hold the hearing

Facts

On April 21, 2025, Petitioner Martinez requested a confidential hearing as to the denial or revocation of a license to carry a concealed firearm, challenging the determination that Petitioner is a disqualified person.

On May 22, 2025, the Court received a confidential criminal history report, filed under seal, as to the underlying basis for the disqualified person determination.

On July 9, 2025, counsel for the Tulare County Sherrif’s Office filed a memorandum to provide a background on the history of the application, the basis for the denial, and Petitioner’s potential remedies, including an appeals process and reapplication.

On July 15, 2025, Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and the Court set an OSC re: dismissal for August 20, 2025 and continued the hearing to that date.

On August 20, 2025, November 14, 2025, and January 5, 2026 this hearing was continued.

Therefore, the Court intends to conduct the hearing on the petition.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Torres, Jose vs. Kings River Farming, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU327349

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter to May 11, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 with respect to a certified translation of the Spanish version of the Agreement; to order supplemental filings by Defendants due no later than May 1, 2026 and any supplemental filing by Plaintiff related to Defendant’s supplemental filings due no later than May 5, 2026.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Kings River Farming, Inc., Kings River Packing, LP, Kings River Packing, Inc., Kings River Packing, LLC, Kings River Trucking, Inc., and Cobblestone Fruit (“Defendants”) on a classwide basis for violations of the Labor Code and Business and Professions Code, as well as under for violations of PAGA under Labor Code sections 2698, et seq.

Plaintiff alleges Defendants were “each acting as the agent, employee, alter ego, and/or joint venturer of, or working in concert with, each of the other co-Defendants and was acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, or concerted activity with legal authority to act on the others’ behalf.” (FAC ¶13.) Further, that each Defendant is a joint employer of Plaintiff and/or alter ego of each other Defendant. (FAC ¶¶15-21.)

Defendants seek to compel arbitration of these claims on an individual basis, to dismiss the class claims, and to stay the “representative” PAGA claims.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendants submit the declaration of the human resources generalist for Defendant Kings River Farming, Inc. (“KRF”) who declares they have access to the personnel records of current and former employees, kept in the ordinary course of business, including copies of documents signed copies by such current and former employees. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶1, 2, 3.)

The declarant indicates further that Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant KRF from February 21, 2023 to June 19, 2025 and that within Plaintiff’s personnel file, Plaintiff on October 7, 2024, attended an orientation session for which declarant was present, during which Plaintiff was provided with and executed a Spanish version of the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶12, 14.) A true and correct copy of the executed Spanish version of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit A (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶15 – Ex. A.) The declarant states further they are fluent in English and Spanish and that Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the English Version of the Agreement attached as Exhibit A. (Declaration of Hildebrandt ¶¶16, 17 – Ex. B.)

In opposition, Plaintiff challenges the failure to provide a certified translation pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g), which requires “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.”

As to the translation issue, on reply, Defendant states:

“Plaintiff argues the submission of the English and Spanish agreements does not comply with California Rules of Court 3.1110(g) because it does not have a certified translation. However, the Arbitration Agreement is provided in English and Spanish as presented by KRF to its employees. Mr. Hildebrant who is bilingual and familiar with both versions of the agreement stated, under oath, that he is fluent in both languages, he reviewed the English and Spanish versions of the document and that the translation is accurate. These are the forms in use by KRF. The opposition does not assert that the translation is not accurate, and in fact, argues for unconscionability of the terms of the agreement presumably based on the English translation as that is the verbiage quoted in Plaintiff’s opposition. The Rule of Court states a “qualified interpreter” must confirm the translation under oath. Should the Court require certification by a third party, Defendants request additional time to provide it, but were not able to obtain one in advance of the date of the deadline to reply.”

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendants have provided the Agreement, Exhibit A, in purported satisfaction of this requirement, as well as Exhibit B, an English version of the Agreement.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, however, Plaintiff challenges the attachment of Exhibit B regarding a violation of California Rule of Court, rule 3.1110(g) which requires, as noted above: “Exhibits written in a foreign language must be accompanied by an English translation, certified under oath by a qualified interpreter.” The Court agrees that the declaration provided does not indicate a certification by a qualified interpreter.

As such, the Court sustains Objection Nos. 2, 3, and 4 on this translation issue.

The Court notes that the moving party may submit additional evidence in reply. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060. [finding “the trial court abused its discretion” in striking supplemental declaration as untimely].)

No certified translation has been provided on reply. the only purportedly signed version of the Agreement at issue is in Spanish. The Court requires compliance with Rule 3.1110(g) with respect to a certified translation.

However, the Court will continue this matter to May 11, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 7 and order supplemental filings by Defendants due no later than May 1, 2026 and any supplemental filing by Plaintiff related to Defendant’s supplemental filings due no later than May 5, 2026.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Visalia Tile, Inc. vs. Shields, Anna

Case No.:  VCU324410

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Default

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order the proposed answer filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this verified complaint for foreclosure of mechanic’s lien, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting that personal service on Defendant Anna Shields occurred on September 10, 2025 at 9017 E Crowley Ave, Visalia, California 93291 at 11:29 am.

On October 22, 2025, default was entered.

No judgment appears to have been entered.

On February 17, 2026, Defendant Shields filed this motion to set aside default.

In support, Defendant states “That when I was served with the summons and complaint, I thought that all that was required was for me to appear at the Case Management Conference on December 5, 2025. Being ignorant of the law, I was unaware that I had to file an answer within 30 days of being served.” (Declaration of Defendant ¶3.) Further, “That my failure to file an answer was completely due to my inexperience, ignorance of the law and inadvertence. I simply did not know that an answer was required to be filed within a specified time period.” (Declaration of Defendant ¶5.)

On this basis, Defendant seeks relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b). A proposed answer to the complaint has been attached to the motion.

In opposition, Plaintiff challenges that the single basis asserted, as to the lack of knowledge necessary to respond timely, is insufficient under the discretionary provision of section 473(b) and that no attorney declaration has been provided with respect to any mandatory relief.

On reply, Defendant argues the mistake as to the term “default” is a sufficient grounds for relief and that no prejudice has been demonstrated. 

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) provides, in relevant part: 

The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. 

A trial court has broad discretion to vacate a judgment, dismissal, default judgment, or entry of default that preceded it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b).) However, that discretion can be exercised only if the moving party establishes a proper ground for relief, by the proper procedure, and within the time limits. (Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495.)

A party may seek discretionary or mandatory relief from default under Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.”

“A ‘mistake’ exists when a person, under some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does, or omits to do, some act which, but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done, or omitted. It may arise either from unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.” (Salazar v. Steelman (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 402, 405, 410.) 

Here, the Court finds a sufficient showing of excusable mistake as to the failure to timely respond to the complaint based on a lack of understanding as to the entry of default and that Defendant, having only obtained entry of default, has not demonstrated prejudice. (Rogalski v. Nabers Cadillac (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 816, 822.)

“… [T]he law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations].’” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.) “Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted.  [Citations.]  In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.’  [Citation.]”  (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.)

Next, subsection (b) additionally requires the filing of “a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.” Here, this requirement has been satisfied.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and orders the proposed answer filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Navarro, Yesenia vs. AWI Management Corporation

Case No.:    VCU329613

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: The parties have stipulated to arbitrating the individual claims, dismissing the class claims and staying this action pending the completion of arbitration. Further, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted a sufficient declaration pursuant to Rule of Court, rule 3.770 with respect to dismissal of the class claims. Therefore, the Court orders the individual claims submitted to arbitration, dismisses the class claims and stays any remaining claims.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Wooden, Paul vs. Visalia Ventures, LLC.

Case No.:  VCU328645

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion to compel arbitration as to elder abuse and professional negligence; to exercise discretion to stay the wrongful death claim.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff sues on behalf of Decedent for Elder Abuse and Professional Negligence. Plaintiff also brings a wrongful death cause of action on an individual basis.

Plaintiff names Visalia Ventures, LLC., Integral Senior Living Management, LLC. and Integral Senior Living, LLC as Defendants.

Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC moves to compel arbitration.

At the prior hearing, the Court permitted supplemental briefing to be filed with respect to non-signatory theories based on the relationship between the named Defendants and the party listed on the face of the arbitration agreement.

After the prior hearing on March 9, 2026, the parties, on April 7, 2026, filed a  stipulation to dismiss Defendants Integral Senior Living Management, LLC. and Integral Senior Living, LLC.

On April 10, 2026, the Court granted Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC’s ex parte application to file the supplemental brief and declaration addressing the non-signatory issue.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In the moving papers, Defendant Visalia Ventures provides the declaration of counsel who asserts a true and correct copy of the arbitration agreement executed by the Decedent in handwriting.

In opposition, Plaintiff challenges this showing, arguing a lack of authentication, a lack of mutual assent and that the agreement at issue does not reference, expressly, Visalia Ventures and that the moving papers fail to demonstrate Visalia Ventures either is a signatory to the arbitration agreement or can enforce the agreement as a non-signatory.

On reply, Defendant Visalia Ventures provides the declaration of the “Executive Director of Prestige Assisted Living & Memory Care in Visalia” who provides supplemental testimony as to Decedent’s execution of the agreement.

Further, as to the supplemental filings, Defendant submits the declaration of its chief legal officer as to Prestige Senior Living LLC and the facility formerly known as Prestige Assisted Living & Memory Care in Visalia (the "Facility") during Plaintiff’s residency. (Declaration of Delamarter ¶1.) Declarant indicates that the Facility operated through multiple related entities with distinct roles, including that Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC  “served as the licensee and operator of the Facility and was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Facility” and Defendant “carried out the functions necessary to operate the facility and deliver care and services to the residents.” (Declaration of Delamarter ¶¶2-5.) Further, that Defendant “was responsible for hiring, training, and supervising Facility staff, implementing policies and procedures, overseeing resident care, and managing the day-to-day functioning of the Facility.” (Declaration of Delamarter ¶7.) Further, that the signatory Prestige Senior Living, LLC, served as manager of the Facility and provided “management-level oversight.”  (Declaration of Delamarter ¶8.) Further, that the Agreement at issue was executed as to Plaintiff’s admission to the Facility. (Declaration of Delamarter ¶10.)

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, then, the Court finds counsel’s attachment of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the signature of the Decedent sufficient to meet this first step under Gamboa. (See also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219: “as a preliminary matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement's existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.”)

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, the declaration in Gamboa would be insufficient on a handwritten signature issue where there is no denial as to the authenticity of the signature:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

Here, although the signature is not Plaintiff’s signature, there is no evidence presented that the signature is not that of the Decedent. “Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

As such, the Court finds Defendant has met its first step as to the existence of the agreement, that Plaintiff has not met the burden on the second step and therefore accepts the existence of the agreement to arbitrate.

Neither Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208 nor Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804 involve facts regarding authentication issues as to the first step on a motion to compel arbitration. Toal involved attorneys’ who signed arbitration agreements on behalf of clients without a showing of consent or ratification. (Toal, supra, 178 Cal. App. 4^th at 1213-1214.) Kinder involved issues as to the signatures of the adult children of the resident of a skilled nursing facility to bind the resident, not at issue here where the Decedent purportedly signed the agreement himself. (Kinder, supra, 91 Cal. App. 5^th at 809-810.)

As to the argument regarding mutual assent, Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 notes:

“ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ [citation omitted] ‘A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.’ [citation omitted].) ‘[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.’ [citation omitted]”

Again, having found no challenge to the authentication of the signature on the agreement before this Court, the Court does not find a lack of mutual assent under the above.

Authority and Analysis – Non-Signatory Visalia Ventures LLC

Plaintiff argues next that Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC is not an expressly named “Facility” as defined in the agreement.

The agreement states that it is between the Decedent, as “Resident” and “Prestige Senior Living, LLC, doing business as Prestige Assisting Living & Memory Care in Visalia (‘Facility’)”

The agreement does contain language stating that the claims covered by the agreement include those against “…any parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the facility.”

When a petitioner seeks to compel arbitration as a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, there are six theories which may support the petition: “‘(a) incorporation by reference; (b) assumption; (c) agency; (d) veil-piercing or alter ego; (e) estoppel; and (f) third-party beneficiary…[Citations.]” (Benaroya v. Willis (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 462, 469.) 

Here, Defendant argues it may enforce the Agreement via an agency theory, as established by the declaration of Delamarter based on Defendant Visalia Ventures, LLC serving as the licensed operator of the signatory to the agreement, the Facility.

"Every California case finding nonsignatories to be bound to arbitrate is based on facts that demonstrate, in one way or another, the signatory's implicit authority to act on behalf of the nonsignatory." (Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC, 31 Cal. App. 5th 840, 860 (2019) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Courts look to traditional principles of contract and agency law to determine whether a nonsignatory is bound by an arbitration agreement signed by its principal or agent." (Id.) “A nonsignatory to an agreement to arbitrate may be required to arbitrate, and may invoke arbitration against a party, if a preexisting confidential relationship, such as an agency relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to arbitrate upon the nonsignatory.” (Westra v. Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co., Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 759, 765.) Here, the Court agrees that the non-signatory Defendant, acting as the day to day operator of the signatory Facility, has established a sufficient agency relationship and that the claims at issue in this matter arise from such operation of the Facility. 

Though discussing equitable estoppel, the Court finds the following, as stated by the court in Goldman v. KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220 assistive:

“So, if a plaintiff relies on the terms of an agreement to assert his or her claims against a nonsignatory defendant, the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from repudiating the arbitration clause of that very agreement. In other words, a signatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause cannot “‘have it both ways’”; the signatory ‘cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other hand, deny arbitration's applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.’ [citation omitted].”

Therefore, the Court finds a sufficient agency relationship between Defendant and the Facility and that it would be inequitable to prevent Defendant from enforcing the Agreement.

Plaintiff’s Wrongful Death Claim

The Court, therefore, turns to the issue of whether the wrongful death claim may be compelled to arbitration via the signature of the Decedent as to the Plaintiff as an  individual and non-party to the arbitration agreement.

The Primary Basis of the Wrongful Death Claim is Elder Abuse/Neglect

"Unlike some jurisdictions wherein wrongful death actions are derivative, section 377.60 'creates a new cause of action in favor of the heirs as beneficiaries, based upon their own independent pecuniary injury suffered by loss of a relative, and distinct from any the deceased might have maintained had he survived.'" (Horwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 283.)

Here, as noted above, the complaint pleads a third cause of action for wrongful death by Plaintiff as an individual.

There is no dispute Plaintiff did not sign the agreement.

However, the issue is whether the Decedent’s signature on the agreement that contains the term “It is the intention of the parties to this Agreement that it shall inure to the benefit of and bind the parties, all of their legal and family or business representatives, successors, and assigns” can bind Plaintiff as to the wrongful death claim.

While California has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration as an expeditious and cost-effective way of resolving disputes, “…parties can only be compelled to arbitrate when they have agreed to do so.” (Avila v. S. California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal. App. 5th 835, 843.)

Avila stated the test as follows:

“If the primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds in professional negligence as defined by MICRA, then section 1295 applies. If, as plaintiffs claim here, the primary basis is under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.) (the Act), then section 1295 does not apply and neither does Ruiz's exception to the general rule that one who has not consented cannot be compelled to arbitrate.” (Id. at 842)

“Carving out an exception to the general rule that arbitration agreements must be the subject of consent rather than compulsion, in Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 849, the California Supreme Court held that section 1295 permitted patients who consented to arbitration to bind their heirs in actions for wrongful death. (Id. at 841) It concluded that ‘all wrongful death claimants are bound by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to section 1295, at least when, as here, the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind these claimants.’ (Id.)” (Id. at 841–842) “The question, then, is whether Ruiz is controlling here, and we must therefore determine whether this case is about ‘professional negligence,’ as defined by MICRA, or something else.” (Id. at 841–842.)

In Ruiz, the California Supreme Court held that wrongful death claimants may be bound by pre-treatment arbitration agreements entered into by the decedent that limit the scope of the wrongful death action.  A wrongful death cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure Section 377.60 is a separate cause of action that may be brought by a decedent’s heirs and is separate and distinct from any rights that the deceased may have retained had decedent survived. (Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 844.) 

Ruiz involved a patient-decedent who signed an arbitration agreement with the defendant health care provider that purported to bind “all parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to treatment or service provided by the physician including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any children, whether born or unborn, at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the claim.”  (Id. at 841-842.)   Additionally, that agreement “specifically provided for arbitration of wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.” (Id. at 854.).

Specifically, the Supreme Court noted the arbitration agreement complied with the special health care arbitration statute within Code of Civil Procedure section 1295.  That section, the Court stated, is designed to permit patients who sign arbitration agreements to bind their heirs to arbitrate any subsequent wrongful death action if the language of the agreement manifests such an intent.  (Id. at 849.)  

As a matter of policy, the California Supreme Court concluded it would be impractical and unrealistic to obtain the signatures of all potential heirs prior to receiving medical treatment.  (Id. at 850–851.) Thus “wrongful death claimants are bound by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to Section 1295, at least when, as here, the language of the agreement manifests an intent to bind these claimants.” (Id. at 853.)

In Avila, the court found certain claims by the heirs not to be arbitrable as follows:

“The complaint includes allegations that could be categorized as professional negligence as well as elder abuse. There is at least some overlap between the two. But the complaint was pleaded as one for ‘negligence/willful misconduct,’ elder abuse and neglect under the Act, and wrongful death. The complaint alleges a ‘conscious and continued pattern of withholding the most basic care and services,’ which included a lack of monitoring, supervision, assistance, and other adequate care and services. It alleges the lack of availability of a physician, failure to provide properly trained staff and nursing, among other things.” (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at 843.)

Therefore, in Avila, the wrongful death claim is based upon neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and “Plaintiffs’ “chose to plead a cause of action under the Act, and they did so successfully. The fact that they could have also pleaded a claim for medical malpractice, had they wished to do so, is irrelevant. Accordingly, we conclude the plaintiffs’ claim is not one within the ambit of section 1295, and therefore, Ruiz ’s holding does not apply.” (Id.)

The California Supreme Court in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 364, 382 noted the following in support of this determination as follows:

“Again, we recognize that this distinction is not always an easy one to draw where, as here, the defendant facility provides both medical and custodial care. The challenge of drawing a bright line in this context is part of what motivated the court in Avila, which asked whether “the primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds in” medical malpractice or in custodial neglect. (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 842, italics added.) As noted, both parties in this case have agreed that Avila states the correct rule, so we have no occasion to further address the issue here. For present purposes, it suffices to observe that section 1295(a) and Ruiz do require lines to be drawn. Not every claim of neglect against a long-term nursing facility—not even neglect that takes the form of failure to prevent falls or infection—will qualify as a claim of medical malpractice subject to Ruiz. The critical question remains whether the complaint alleges negligent acts or omissions by “health care providers in their capacity as providers” rather than “against custodians and caregivers … that may or may not, incidentally, also be health care providers.” ”

Holland further recognized:

“…there is potential for confusion ‘in the fact that some health care institutions, such as nursing homes, perform custodial functions and provide professional medical care.’ (Delaney, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 34.) In contrast to a hospital or doctor’s office, where patients generally go to seek help for discrete medical issues and are discharged upon receiving treatment, residents at a skilled nursing facility receive both medical care and around-the-clock caretaking to satisfy “basic needs that an [*380]  able-bodied and fully competent adult would ordinarily be capable of managing without assistance.” (Winn, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 158; see also Health & Saf. Code, § 1250, subd. (c)(1) [“‘Skilled nursing facility’ means a health facility that provides skilled nursing care and supportive care to patients whose primary need is for availability of skilled nursing care on an extended basis”].) In other words, the facility wears multiple hats, rendering services in its capacity as a medical provider as well as in its capacity as custodian of residents’ general well-being, which includes responsibilities such as providing nutrition and hydration. This can complicate efforts to draw lines between claims concerning the provision of professional medical services and other services the facilities may provide” (Id. at 379-380.)

Further, that:

“…only acts or omissions by a skilled nursing facility in its capacity as a health care provider fall under the banner of professional negligence. [citation omitted] By contrast, ‘a failure to fulfill custodial duties owed by a custodian who happens also to be a health care provider … is at most incidentally related to the provider’s professional health care services.’ [citation omitted]The failure to provide basic necessities, such as assistance in personal hygiene, food, hydration, or clothing, are paradigmatic examples of a failure to fulfill custodial duties. [citation omitted.] The same is true of a failure to provide an adequate and habitable living space or protect from routine safety hazards. [citation omitted] Similarly, a failure of staff to attend to, monitor, or assist a resident in obtaining appropriate medical care generally falls on the custodial side of the line because such omissions involve ‘not … the undertaking of medical services, but … the failure to provide medical care.’ [citation omitted]” (Id. at 380.)

Therefore, the Court must review the allegations of the complaint as to wrongful death to determine if they fall under professional negligence (for which the arbitration agreement binds Plaintiff to arbitrate the wrongful death claim under MICRA) or the Elder Abuse Act (for which Plaintiff’s claim would be outside of MICRA’s arbitration provision)

Here, the wrongful death cause of action is pled as follows:

“136. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duty by Defendants, MR. WOODEN suffered grave personal injury and needless suffering, and ultimately passed away on March 27, 2024.

137. As a proximate result of the negligent conduct of Defendants, and breaches of the duty owed to plaintiffs and decedent, and breaches of the standard of care owed, MR. WOODEN passed away on March 27, 2024.

138. Pleading in the alternative, as a proximate result of the wrongful and abusive conduct of Defendants, including but not limited to the allegations of neglect and abuse, and acts or omissions undertaken with recklessness, malice, oppression and/or fraud, MR. WOODEN passed away on March 27, 2024.” (Complaint ¶¶136-137.)

Despite the pleading of the elder abuse allegations as to wrongful death “in the alternative,” the Court observes that the vast majority of the allegations of the complaint sound in elder abuse based on the custodial nature of the relationship and treatment. Further, that paragraph 126 of the complaint follows a lengthy list of allegations of abuse or neglect arising from the custodial relationship and states “126. Death: As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' misconduct, MR. WOODEN died on March 27, 2024.”

The Court does not find that this is an improper, artful attempt to avoid arbitration by pleading the majority of the allegations as to abuse and neglect. (Johnson v. Hydraulic Research & Mfg. Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 675, 682.)

Therefore, the Court finds the wrongful death claim sounds in abuse or neglect, as opposed to professional negligence, and therefore the Decedent cannot bind Plaintiff to arbitrate the wrongful death claim as pled herein.

The Agreement at Issue Does Not Expressly Incorporate the FAA’s Procedural Aspects and the CAA Applies by Default

The parties disagree as to the application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), preemption by the FAA and the Court’s discretion to stay or deny arbitration.

Section 1281.2(c) states:

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

…

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or before the date of the hearing on the petition. This subdivision shall not be applicable to an agreement to arbitrate disputes as to the professional negligence of a health care provider made pursuant to Section 1295.”

On the interaction between the FAA and California law, Best Interiors, Inc. v. Millie & Severson, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1325-1326 provides the following:

“The FAA governs contracts in interstate commerce. Unlike its California counterpart, the FAA “contains no provision permitting a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation involving third parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.” (Volt Info. Sciences v. Leland Stanford Jr. U. (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 472 However, the United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the FAA does not preempt the California statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c) (hereafter, section 1281.2(c)), “where the parties have agreed that their arbitration agreement will be governed by the law of California.” (489 U.S. at p. 470.) The court explained that the FAA “does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any  time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties’] agreement.’ ” (489 U.S. at pp. 474–475, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4.) So, even if the FAA applies because the subcontract affects interstate commerce—a point we need not discuss—the parties may agree that California law governs their agreement to arbitrate.”

“The CAA's procedural provisions therefore applied unless the parties expressly adopted the FAA. (See Rodriguez, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 1122.) Assuming the parties failed to incorporate the CAA's procedural provisions, that failure was of no consequence: A state's procedural statutes automatically apply in state court unless the parties expressly agree otherwise.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 179 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 180].)

Here, the only reference to the FAA in the agreement is:

“Except as otherwise expressly set forth herein this Agreement and the ADR proceedings shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 9 USC §§1-16 (the “Act”)”

This states that the ADR proceedings shall be governed the FAA, not that enforcement of this agreement shall be governed by the FAA via a motion to compel filed in state court.

The Court contrasts the language before it in the agreement with the finding of an express adoption of the FAA’s procedural aspects from Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 345-346, where the agreement stated: “Enforcement of this agreement [to arbitrate] shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”

Therefore, the Court does not find the procedural sections of the FAA have been expressly adopted as to enforcement of this agreement and therefore examines the application of section 1281.2(c)

The Court Applies Section 1281.2(c) to Compel Arbitration and Stay the Wrongful Death Claim

“As to the exercise of the court's discretion, section 1281.2, subdivision (c), permits a stay if: “‘[A] party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party … aris[ing] out of the same transaction or series of related transactions’; and … ‘there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.’” [citation omitted] All three requirements must be satisfied before section 1281.2, subdivision (c), may be used

Here, the Court, will exercise its discretion to stay the wrongful death claims pending arbitration of the other claims. While the Court recognize a risk of conflicting rulings, the Court notes a policy to enforce arbitration agreements under the FAA and that the inclusion of an elder abuse or neglect claim in these types of cases would eviscerate this policy. Here, the Decedent agreed to arbitrate claims with Defendants and while the wrongful death claim cannot be arbitrated as noted above, the Court is not willing to deny arbitration of matters within the agreement to arbitrate.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel arbitration as to elder abuse and professional negligence and stays the wrongful death claim.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Perez, Sabrina Veronica vs. Gomez, Jennifer

Case No.:  VCL296115

Date:           April 20, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           7-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     (1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Defendant’s to Pay their Own Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Reclassify Case as Unlimited; (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for Renewal and to Enter Proposed Order as to Demurrer and Motion to Strike (“Reconsideration”)

Tentative Ruling: (1)- (3): To deny the motions

Facts and Analysis Common to (1) through (3)

On October 27, 2025, the Court denied Plaintiff’s prior motions (1) for Defendant’s to pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs and (2) for reclassification of this case as unlimited.

The Court sent notice of these rulings via minute order on October 30, 2025.

By filing these motions a second time, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration thereof.

A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 10 days of service on him of notice of entry of the order in question. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(a).) As provided in section 1013, a 5 day extension of time for mail service applies in the absence of a specific exception, and no such exception is present in section 1008 (Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a).)

Therefore, the Court denies (1) and (2) as untimely.

Additionally, section 1008 requires new or different facts, circumstances or law. New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal. App. 4th 206, 212, states, "Section 1008, subdivision (a) requires that a motion for reconsideration be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law. A party seeking reconsideration also must provide satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time. [Citation.]"  Further, the New York Times Co. court noted "The burden under section 1008 is comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence: the information must be such that the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered or produced it at the trial. [Citation.] Case law after the 1992 amendments to Section 1008 as relaxed the definition of 'new or different facts,' but it is still necessary that the party seeking that relief offer some fact or circumstance not previously considered by the court. [Citations.]" (Id. at 212-213.) Here, Plaintiff has not presented new evidence or facts under this standard, and cannot be said to have met the requisite burden under section 1008.

Therefore, the Court denies motions (1) and (2) on this ground.

As to (3), Plaintiff expressly seeks reconsideration of the Court’s prior ruling on demurrer and motion to strike, also entered October 27, 2025, notice of which was also served October 30, 2025.

Again, this motion is untimely and does not present new evidence or facts subject to the requisite standard noted above. Therefore, the Court denies the motion as to (3).

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division