Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Monday, October 12, 2026, are:

Re:                 Mariner Finance, LLC vs. Tarango, Michael A et al

Case No.:   VCL330993

Date:            October 12, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motions to Deem Admissions Admitted as to (1) Defendant Tarango and (2) Defendant Kruyt

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2): To grant the motions and deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 admitted as to Defendants Tarango and Kruyt

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

On May 6, 2026, Plaintiff served Requests for Admissions, Set One, on (1) Defendant Tarango and (2) Defendant Kruyt via mail at address listed on the joint answer of Defendants.

No responses were received.

On July 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed these motions to deem the admissions admitted.

Authority and Analysis Common to (1) and (2)

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted.

Here, Defendants have failed to serve timely responses and Plaintiff has moved for orders to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 11 of Plaintiff’s First Sets of Requests for Admission as to  (1) Defendant Tarango and (2) Defendant Kruyt shall be deemed admitted.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Terrell, Derrell vs. Ferreira Construction Company, Inc. et al

Case No.:    VCU335559

Date:           October 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter to October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9 as to the procedural requirements of consolidation.

Facts

Via this motion, Plaintiff Darrell Terrell seeks to consolidate this matter, VCU335559, with LUCINDA TERRELL and Estate of JACK TERRELL, by and through its successor in interest et al vs. FERREIRA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. et al, PCU334768 for all purposes.

VCU335559

In VCU335559, after dismissal of the negligence claim, Plaintiff Darrell Terrell’s amended complaint alleges a cause of action wrongful death against Defendants Ferreira Construction Company, Inc., Ferreira Power West LLC, Ferreira Coastal Construction Company, Inc., and Defendant Carter Lee.

The wrongful death cause of action relates to the February 9, 2026 accident resulting in the death of Decedent Jack Terrell involving a vehicle operated by Defendant Lee. Plaintiff Darrell Terrell is alleged as the biological son of Decedent.

The Court notes no trial date has been set in VCU335559.

PCU334768

In PCU334768, Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell, alleged to be Decedent’s spouse and a passenger in the vehicle during the same incident on February 9, 2026, brings causes of action for negligence on behalf of herself and wrongful death as the surviving spouse of Decedent and “…the sole heir, successor in interest, and the only person lawfully entitled to assert a cause of action for the wrongful death of Decedents other than those identified herein as nominal Defendants pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382.”

Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell names Defendants Carter Lee, Ferreira Construction Company, Inc., Ferreira Power West LLC, and Ferreira Coastal Construction Company, Inc.

On August 17, 2026, Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell filed a dismissal of this action as to Defendants Ferreira Construction Company, Inc. and Ferreira Coastal Construction Company, Inc.

As such, Plaintiff Lucinda Terrell’s claims for wrongful death and negligence are now asserted against Defendant Lee and Defendant Ferreira Power West LLC (“FPW”).

Trial in PCU334768 is set for December 1, 2026 in Dept. 9.

The Court notes here that no notice of related cases appears filed in either case, that no notice of this motion was filed in PCU334768 and that the proposed order granting consolidation was not filed in PCU334768.

In opposition to the motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff in VCU335559 should not obtain the trial preference granted in PCU334768, that Defendants cannot prepare their defense if consolidation is granted.

On reply, Plaintiff in VCU335559 argues that wrongful death actions must be consolidated as a matter of law and that Defendants will suffer no prejudice, having completed discovery as to Plaintiff in VCU335559.

Authority and Analysis

Procedural Elements

Under California Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a), the notice of motion to consolidate must be filed in each case sought to be designated.

Here, the notice of motion has only been filed in VCU335559.

Further, California Rule of Court, rule 3.300 requires a notice of related cases filed in both matters. No notice of related cases appears filed in either VCU335559 or PCU334768.

Finally, California Rule of Court, rule 3.350(c) requires a proposed order to be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. While the proposed order was filed in the VCU335559, the same proposed order was not filed in the PCU334768.

Substantive Elements

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subd. (a), “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court…it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

“A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Wouldridge v. Burns (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)  “Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only.” (Id. at 1149.) Consolidation “is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial [court].”  Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.)

Here, the substantive elements of section 1048(a) appear to be met where both matters involve the same accident, two of the Defendants overlap and the causes of action overlap as to wrongful death based on a theory of negligence.

The difference, as identified by Defendants, is the damages by Decedent’s spouse in PCU334768 and Decedent’s son in VCU335559. Defendants, however, have not demonstrated an inability to conduct discovery, including as to damages, in either case. The Court finds substantial efficiency in trying this case one time with respect to liability of the Defendants. The same discovery as to liability appears applicable to both cases. The Court does not find prejudice has been demonstrated that Defendants cannot obtain discovery as to damages in VCU335559 if the cases were consolidated. Defendants appear to have deposed Plaintiff and served written discovery for which Plaintiff has responded thereto.

Further, Plaintiff in VCU335559, notes that Corder v. Corder (2007) 41 Cal. 4th 644, 652, states “While each heir designated in section 377.60 has a personal and separate wrongful death cause of action, the actions are deemed joint, single and indivisible and must be joined together in one suit.”

Therefore, the Court intends to consolidate the matters for all purposes, including trial on December 1, 2026.

However, as noted above, the Court requires the procedural elements satisfied before ordering consolidation.

Therefore, the Court continues this matter to October 26, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 United Services Automobile Association vs. Warner, Jedediah Forrest et al

Case No.:   VCL319418

Date:           October 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion to Enforce Settlement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this insurance subrogation matter, Plaintiff sued Defendant for payments made by Plaintiff under its policy, paid to or on behalf of its insured and the driver and/or passengers in the vehicle the sum of $28,514.61.

Plaintiff indicates that on October 14, 2025, this matter settled via a stipulation stating that “Subject to the conditions below, judgment may be entered forthwith in favor of PLAINTIFF and against said DEFENDANT for damages in the principal sum of $28,514.61 plus: interest at the rate of five percent (5%) from May 26, 2022 and court costs.”

Further, that Defendant previously made a payment of $2,600 and was to make installment payments as follows: The sum of $200.00 shall be paid on or before the 15" of each month from November 15, 2025 to July 15, 2036 an the sum of $114.61 shall be paid on or before August 15, 2036.

On October 21, 2025, this matter was dismissed pursuant to a request by Plaintiff for dismissal and jurisdiction was reserved under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On July 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the stipulation as a judgment. Plaintiff notes Defendant made no payments under the stipulation.

Plaintiff, therefore, seeks judgment in the amount of $34,884.74 consisting of the principal sum of $28,514.61, plus interest at the rate of 5% per annum from May 26, 2022 through July 15, 2026, in the amount of $5,902.13, plus court costs of $468.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Martinez, Fernando vs. Fire Insurance Exchange

Case No.:   VCU323858

Date:           October 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $18,830 in fees and $4,025.45 in costs.

Facts

In this breach of contract and tortious bad faith matter, Plaintiff alleges loss relating to wind damage to the roof of Plaintiff's home that allegedly occurred on April 13, 2024 and a loss relating to water damage under the kitchen sink which allegedly occurred on October 23, 2024.

On September 9, 2025, Defendant propounded Requests for Admissions, Set One to Plaintiff. (Declaration of Krutzsch ¶7.)

Defendant describes Request for Admissions No. 1, 2, and 3 as requesting that Plaintiff admit he has no facts, persons with knowledge, and documents to support a cause of action for breach of contract and describes Request for Admissions No. 4, 5, and 6 as requesting that Plaintiff admit he has no facts, persons with knowledge, and documents to support a cause of action for bad faith. (Declaration of Krutzsch ¶8.)

On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff served Verified Responses to Defendant's Requests for Admissions, Set One and Verified Responses to Defendant's Form Interrogatories, Set One. On November 25, 2025, Plaintiff served Amended Responses to Defendant's Form Interrogatories, Set One. (Declaration of Krutzsch ¶9.)

Plaintiff's responses to Defendant's Requests for Admissions deny Requests 1 through 6.

As to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1, Plaintiff responded:

1. Request for Admission No. 1: Plaintiff denied this request because there was an active insurance policy, number 100-007-3101, in effect with Fire Insurance Exchange at the time of the loss, which occurred on December 02, 2024. Plaintiff possesses reports, invoices for mitigation work, repair estimates, and other documents that substantiate the facts alleged.

2. Request for Admission No. 2: Plaintiff knows of persons with personal knowledge supporting the breach of contract claim, including himself and the contractors who inspected and performed work on the property. 3. Request for Admission No.

3: Plaintiff possesses documents supporting the breach of contract claim, including invoices, reports, and repair estimates related to the property damage.

4. Request for Admission No. 4: Plaintiff has facts supporting the tortious bad faith claim, including the insurer’s denial of coverage, inspections, and mitigation/repair work that demonstrate FIRE’s wrongful refusal to pay for covered losses.

5. Request for Admission No. 5: Plaintiff knows of persons with personal knowledge supporting the tortious bad faith claim, including himself and the contractors who inspected and performed work on the property.

6. Request for Admission No. 6: Plaintiff possesses documents supporting the tortious bad faith claim, including invoices, reports, repair estimates, and correspondence related to the insurer’s handling of the claim.”

Thereafter, counsel for Defendant indicates:

“12. This office met and conferred with Plaintiff's counsel to ensure full responses were provided by Plaintiff to Defendant's written discovery, and that Plaintiff provided all documents and facts supporting his claims.

13. I took Plaintiff's deposition in person in Visalia on February 23, 2026 to investigate the extent of Plaintiff's knowledge with respect to the basis for his Complaint allegation and the facts and documents cited to support his denial of the Key RFAs…

14. Defendant submitted all evidence produced by Plaintiff in response to written discovery in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [MSJ], including all evidence cited in support of Plaintiff's denial of the Key RFAs. Defendant's MSJ was brought on the premise that Plaintiff had no evidence to support his claims for breach of contract or bad faith as to either of the alleged losses as asserted in the Key RFAs.” (Declaration of Krutzsch ¶¶12-14.)

This Court, on June 22, 2026, granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all causes of action in Plaintiff’s complaint.

The Court’s ruling stated, in part:

“[As to the October 2024 Incident] FIE made both (a) a sufficient prima facie showing negating that plaintiff suffered a covered loss resulting from “a sudden, abrupt, and accidental discharge, eruption, overflow, or release of water … from within any portion of … a plumbing system”; and (b) a sufficient prima facie showing of discovery responses revealing that plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence that he suffered such a covered loss. 

…

[As to the April 2024 Incident] FIE made both (a) a sufficient prima facie showing negating that plaintiff suffered a covered loss resulting from entry of the water to the covered structure caused by wind; and (b) a sufficient prima facie showing of discovery responses revealing that plaintiff does not have and cannot reasonably obtain evidence that he suffered such a covered loss.”

The Court entered its order as to the ruling June 23, 2026 and entered judgment on July 10, 2026.
On July 14, 2026, Defendant provided notice of entry of judgment.

On July 29, 2026, Defendant filed a memorandum of costs seeking $4,195.05 in costs and this motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $23,629.50 to Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420(a):

"If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420(a).)

California courts have held that cost of proof sanctions are recoverable following summary judgment. (Barnett v. Penske Truck Leasing (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 494, 499.)

Further, the award is mandatory unless the Court finds any of the following:

“(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.

(2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance.

(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.

(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.420(b).)

The burden for justifying the denial of the requests for admission pursuant to these four exceptions falls on the responding party. (Samsky v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 517, 523-524.)

Here, the Court agrees that Request for Admission Nos. 1 through 6 were dispositive of major issues in this matter as to the lack of evidence to support the claims regarding both incidents. The Court expressly found the documents and information produced in discovery and deposition to Defendant failed to constitute sufficient evidence of breach of contract or bad faith as to both incidents.

In opposition / failing to oppose this motion, Plaintiff has failed to establish any of the four exceptions noted above.

Attorneys’ Fees

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

Here, the Court finds the $295 and $280 rates for counsel consistent with the rates in this County. Further, that the $150 rate for paralegal work is likewise permitted.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended and Apportionment

Here, Defendant seeks to recover 90.8 hours expended in this matter.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)  

“Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 39.)  

The Court notes here that every single entry is redacted. California law permits a party seeking attorney fees to redact those portions of the billing records containing information protected by the attorney-client privilege. (People v. Kelly (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1186.)

“The law is clear … that an award of attorney fees may be based on counsel's declarations, without production of detailed time records.” (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) Billing documentation is not required. (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.)” (Id. at 1183.)

However, courts have broad discretion to deny or reduce attorney fees for billing entries rendered unintelligible by redaction or that prevent the court from determining whether work was actually performed or the time spent performing the work was reasonable. (Guillory v. Hill (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 802, 814-816.)

However, the Court notes that fully redacted billing makes it difficult to analyze how much time was spent and for what. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 518.) The Court is concerned that duplicate billing is concealed by redacted billing. (Id.)

Here, there is no breaking out of time for different tasks, but Defendant does provide a description as to the fees incurred (Id.)

Defendant states the following as to the description of the work performed:

“During that period Defendant's counsel conducted discovery and motion practice to prove that Plaintiff's claims lack any evidentiary basis, including time spent on the following case handling:

• analysis of Plaintiff's responses to discovery and meet and confer on written discovery in October and November 2025;
• notice and meet and confer on the deposition of Plaintiff in December 2025, and January and February 2026;
• travel to and from Plaintiff's deposition in Visalia and to depose Plaintiff in February 2026;
• preparation of the MSJ and all supporting papers in February and March 2026 to prove Plaintiff lacks evidence to support his claims for breach of contract and bad faith;
• investigate additional witnesses and evidence to defend against Plaintiff's claims and prepare matter for trial in April - June 2026;
• attend case management conference in January 2026, and meet and confer with Plaintiff's counsel regarding court mediation requirements in May and June 2026;
• preparation of stipulation of counsel and ex parte application to continue trial to avoid expert discovery costs prior to issuance of a ruling on Defendant's MSJ in May and June 2026;
• preparation the reply for the MSJ and review the tentative ruling on the MSJ in June and July 2026; and
• communications with Defendant regarding the case status and recommendations for handling throughout the relevant time period.”

Based on the Court’s experience and without the benefit of review of the billing records, 90.8 hours appears excessive and reflects some duplication of work. However, these descriptions support Defendant’s theory of recovery of fees under a failure to admit requests for admissions, including the discovery, deposition and summary judgment motion necessary to obtain fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

As noted above, the breakdown as to fees is: “4 hours spent by partner Julie Hayashida at $295.00 per hour, 72 hours spent by senior counsel Robin Krutzsch at $280.00 hour, and 15 hours spent by paralegals at $150.00 per hour.”

The Court will award the 4 hours by Hayashida as requested. The Court will reduce the 72 hours to 55 hours by Krutzsch. The Court will award the 15 hour spent by paralegals as requested.

Therefore, the Court awards $18,830 in fees.

The Court notes the memorandum of costs is not opposed. The Court, however, notes Code of Civil Procedure Section 1033.5(a)(14) provides that "[f]ees for the electronic filing or service of documents through an electronic filing service provider if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents" are recoverable. Here, there is no requirement or order regarding electronic filing and therefore these costs are not expressly recoverable. Additionally, the Court does not find the electronic filing and service a “reasonable expense” incurred under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420.

As such, the Court will strike the $169.60 claimed for fees for electronic filing or service.

As such, the Court awards $4,025.45 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Mendez, Melissa Cervantes vs. American Honda Motor Company, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU321758

Date:           October 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $15,850.00 and $1,415.25 in costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff leased a 2024 Honda Civic which alleged suffered from electrical defects. On or around April 3, 2026, the parties reached a settlement via Defendant’s formal offer to compromise whereby Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff $23,000, which includes the repurchase value of the vehicle’s lease payments, and paying attorney fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to a noticed motion.

On June 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs seeking $1,415.25 in costs.

On September 15, 2026,  Plaintiff filed this motion for fees, costs and expenses, seeking $28,874.25 for: (1) $24,659 incurred in attorney fees; (2) an additional $2,800 for counsel to review Defendant’s Opposition, draft the Reply brief, and attend the hearing on this Motion; and (3) $1,415.25 for Plaintiff’s costs and expenses.

In opposition, Defendant argues the rates are unreasonable as to the work performed and seek to reduce individual entries.

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover 56.6 incurred hours (plus 5 anticipated hours) at rates ranging from $560 to $215 per hour.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

The Court does not find Plaintiff’s declaration, stating “I am familiar with the limited local attorneys the area, and based on my experience in the local community, I am aware there are no local attorneys who specialize in Song Beverly…in the Tulare area” sufficient to establish that there is a lack of local counsel and higher rates should be awarded.

There is no evidence provided that the attorney rates ranging from $540 to $440 for attorneys, and a rate of $215 for paralegals, are the prevailing rates in Tulare County for counsel, where this Court resides.

This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour for counsel. Further, the Court will set all paralegal work performed at the rate of $150 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 56.6  hours incurred on this matter.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)

As noted above, Defendant challenges the following categories:

• (5.9) Excessive, Unreasonable, and Unrecoverable Time to Recover Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
  • Here, the Court notes it does not award anticipated hours and therefore has not counted the 5 hours billed in anticipation. (-5 hours as to Wood re: anticipated hours.)
  • As to the remaining 5.9 hours, the Court does not find these hours excessive as to the drafting of the attorney fee motion and will make no reduction here.
• (10.2) Improper Billing for Routine Calendaring and Administrative Tasks
  • All of these tasks were performed by non-attorneys, the Court does not find the time entered unreasonable and does not consider all of the entries to be routine administrative tasks that are not compensable. These appear proper “costs and expenses… reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) No reduction will be made here.
• (4.8) Vague and Ambiguous Communications
  • Again, the Court does not find the entries here excessive as to communications with Plaintiff and opposing counsel. No reduction will be made here.
• (2.9) Improper Block Billing
  • Here, the Court does not find the entries set out by Defendant to be improper block billing. While multiple tasks are listed in the identified entries, the Court does not find the entries excessive based on the tasks identified. The Court will not reduce the hours here.

Therefore, the Court will award a total of $15,850 in fees, consisting of 36.8 hours at $350 and 19.8 hours at $150 per hour.

Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover $1,415.25 in costs as stated on the MC-010 filed in this matter and to which no motion to strike or tax costs has been filed.

To start, section 1033.5 sets forth allowable costs reasonably necessary to "the conduct of litigation." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5.) However, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) enables the prevailing "buyer" in a Song-Beverly matter to be "…allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses…” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d), emphasis added.) Courts have interpreted Section 1794's "expenses" provision to include "out-of-pocket expenses beyond the costs identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450, 457 [citing Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138, disapproved on other grounds].)

As such, the Court will award the costs as requested in the amount of $1,415.25.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ponce, Gabriel vs. Central California Baking Company

Case No.:   VCU311927

Date:           October 12, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           9-The Honorable Nathan D. Ide

Motion:      Continued Motion for Preliminary Approval 

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement for May 17, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

Background Facts

The Court previously continued this motion as to additional information regarding the notice period, lodestar and presently incurred costs. On September 24, 2026, counsel for Plaintiff filed two supplemental declarations addressing those issues.

Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are now to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is therefore approved.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33.3% of the gross settlement fund of $820,000.00 or $273,333.33 and costs not to exceed $35,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel

Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel Davies indicates that the firm has spent 246.6 hours on this case, at a rates ranging from $950 to $600 per hour, creating a base lodestar of $184,212.50. (Supplemental Declaration of Davies ¶9.)

Therefore, to award the $273,333.33 requested, the Court would need to apply a multiplier of 1.48. The Court permits a maximum lodestar multiple of 1.5 in these cases. Therefore, the fees are preliminarily approved as requested.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $23,369.65 (Second Supplemental Declaration of Davies ¶22.) The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $35,000.00.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $820,000.00 are preliminarily approved as follows:

Preliminarily Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$273,333.33
Preliminarily Approved Attorney Costs (up to):	$35,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$5,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$9,250.00
Preliminarily Approved Total PAGA Payment:	$50,000.00
Preliminarily Approved Net Settlement Amount	$447,416.67

Therefore, the Court grants the motion as indicated herein. The Court sets the hearing for final approval May 17, 2027, 8:30 am, Dept. 9.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding - Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared October 12, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054295	In the Matter of The Cheryl Finley 2025 Irrevocable Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Asset	Recommended for Approval
VPR054292	In the Matter of Lonzo and Gladys Woods 2003 Family Trust	Petition for Instructions	Appearance Required	Petition omitted the names and addresses of each person entitled to notice of the petition, Prob C § 17201
VPR053804	In the Matter of Wilson, John Lee	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition, Exhibit C not attached: the itemized costs
VPR053457	In the Matter of Scotton, Eric Anthony	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	An award of extraordinary compensation to the attorney is within the discretion of the court, CRC, rule 7.703(a)
VPR044347	In the Matter of Lovelady, Kylie A.	Accounting Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053681	In the Matter of LeBeau, Jeffrey Stewart	Contested Hearing - Conservatorship	Appearance Required	Investigation not completed
VPR054010	In the Matter of Gilheany, M. Pierce	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Investigation not completed
VPR054302	In the Matter of Parreira, Aiden	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054300	In the Matter of Anguano Sabalza, Christian Alexis	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared AS STATED BELOW that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
10/5/2026 8:30	Department 09	VPR054359	In the Matter of E.J.W.	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). Service on Father Mr. Addison & Mother Mrs. Wiliams are required Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/6/2026 14:00	Department 09	VPR054113	In the Matter of Madera, Shanylle	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511 on all grandparents
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 02	VPR054358	In the Matter of Johnson, River Lynn	TEMP- NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3), parents to be personally served 5 court day’s notice prior to hearing
10/6/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR052277	In the Matter of Bennett, Zoey Lynn	NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 calendar days before hearing
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR053711	In the Matter of Allende, Jorge Jr	No issues to address
10/14/2026 8:30	Department 01	VPR047286	In the Matter of Clevenger, Brea Marie	Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460,1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. The children may be of Native American ancestry, notice of termination proceedings must be given to the children’s tribe per ICWA NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054192	In the Matter of Venegas, Analise Rose et al	No issues to address
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054155	In the Matter of Hernandez, Julian Carlos et al	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, SERVICE to be completed on paternal grandfather DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding for proposed guardian and household member
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of Aviles, Irie A	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating the relatives named in the Petition for Termination were served with 15 calendar days notice, as required by PROB Code §1460, 1511, with a copy of the Notice of Hearing and Petition for Termination. Guardianship Status Review Report needs to be filed for 2026 NOT LODGED- Order Terminating Guardianship
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053787	In the Matter of Mendoza, Nolberto	Temporary guardianship for N.M. has terminated by operation of law as ward has reached the age of 18. NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, notice required by maternal grandparents DOJ Background record check appears to be outstanding
10/15/2026 10:00	Department 09	VPR053770	In the Matter of Mendoza, Paulette	household member is required to complete the DOJ background record check NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, by mail on the maternal grandparents and siblings 15 days prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054321	In the Matter of Pena, Rose Marie	Declaration of Due Diligence has not been filed for father Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054320	In the Matter of Rosales, Amelia Jade	NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed with proof of service to be in accordance with Prob Codes §2250(e) & 2250(e)(3). MOTHER to be personally served 5 court days prior to hearing Temporary Order and Temporary Letters need to be lodged prior to hearing
10/15/2026 8:30	Department 19	PPR054004	In the Matter of Leon, Ezra Invicto	No issues to address – notice to mother to be discussed at hearing