Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, August 11, 2026, are:

Re:                Estrella, Sarah vs. Swift Energy Solar, Inc et al

Case No.:   VCU332544

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     (1) Defendants Solar Mosaic LLC and WebBank’s Motion to Compel Arbitration; (2) Defendant Swift’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling:

(1) To grant the motion to compel arbitration, except that the Court stays the claims for public injunctive relief under the second and third causes of action pending completion of the arbitration; To set a Case Management Conference regarding the status of the arbitration on February 19, 2027, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

(2) No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. Therefore, the Court takes this hearing off calendar.

(1) Defendants Solar Mosaic LLC and WebBank’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

Background Facts

Relevant here, Plaintiff sues Defendants Solar Mosaic LLC and WebBank, amongst others, for violations of Civil Code section 1632, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition, Breach of Implied Warranties, and Business and Professions Code section 7071.5 involving a solar loan and home improvement contract for solar panel system.

Defendants Solar Mosaic LLC and WebBank (“Defendants”) move to compel arbitration based upon an electronically signed “Home Improvement Loan Agreement and Promissory Note” containing an arbitration provision.

Facts  - Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendants provide a declaration from Senior Vice President, Servicing & Collections for Solar Servicing LLC, the loan servicer for loan agreements such as this one that originated with Defendant Solar Mosaic, LLC. (Declaration of Treece ¶1.) The declarant indicates that Defendant Mosaic provided an online lending platform where consumers could obtain financing from various lenders, including WebBank, for their purchase of home improvement projects from third-party contractors. (Declaration of Treece ¶2.)

The declarant attaches a true and correct copy of the Home Improvement Loan Agreement and Promissory Note between WebBank and Plaintiff as Exhibit A. (Declaration of Treece ¶3 – Ex. A.)

Further, that Plaintiff executed the Loan Agreement via DocuSign and that Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the DocuSign certificate. (Declaration of Treece ¶¶5, 6 – Ex. B.)

The declarant further describes the DocuSign process whereby the document package is sent to Plaintiff, electronic signature through DocuSign is requested, Plaintiff clicked the link to open the package, Plaintiff created or approved a signature that was placed in various areas of the document and that DocuSign asked for confirmation of the signatures to finalize the process. (Declaration of Treece ¶¶7, 8.)

Here, declarant indicates further that this process occurred as to Plaintiff utilizing the email address sarahlemus68@gmail.com and the email from DocuSign was accessed via Plaintiff’s personal email account, with Plaintiff signing the Loan Agreement March 6, 2023. (Declaration of Treece ¶9.)

Plaintiff, in opposition to the motion, declares that:

2. I met in person with the solar salesperson Fabrizio Bravo on one occasion in about March 2023 during a home solicitation. All of our communications were in Spanish. I do not speak, read, or write English. On that visit, he had me sign documents on his electronic tablet. He did not give me his tablet to scroll through any documents. He did not go through any documents with me. He did not translate any documents for me. He did not give me copies of any documents.

3. When I signed on Mr. Bravo’s tablet, only he and I were present. That was the only time I signed documents for the solar panel system.

4. On that same date, there was a call with someone on Mr. Bravo’s telephone. The person on the other end of the line spoke English. Mr. Bravo interpreted for me and told me how to respond.

5. In approximately January 2025, I received copies of the solar contract and the loan. They are both in English. I did not receive any Spanish translations.

…

9. Mr. Bravo did not mention anything to me about arbitration at any time, and I do not know what it is. I did not agree to arbitration….” (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶2-5, 9.)

Authority and Analysis –Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, this burden is met through Treece’s attachment of Exhibits A and B, which contain the arbitration term as well as proof of Plaintiff’s electronic signature thereon. The Court agrees that Trecee’s declaration is sufficient to authenticate the DocuSign record of completion indicating Plaintiff, via DocuSign, executed the documents.

“If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that she electronically signed the document containing the arbitration provision. There is no challenge to the DocuSign process or that Plaintiff signed the document electronically as indicated in the DocuSign log. (See Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 687 [stating, "Under the general contract principles just discussed, the fact that [Plaintiff] signed a contract in a language he may not have completely understood would not bar enforcement of the arbitration agreement. If [Plaintiff] did not speak or understand English sufficiently to comprehend the English Contract, he should have had it read or explained to him."].) Plaintiff’s declaration admits signing the documents.

As such, the Court rejects the first argument in the opposition that Defendants have not met their burden as to the existence of the arbitration agreement.

Authority and Analysis –Civil Code section 1632

Section 1632 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny person engaged in a trade or business who negotiates primarily in Spanish" in certain transactions, "shall deliver to the other party to the contract or agreement and prior to the execution thereof, a translation of the contract or agreement in the language in which the contract or agreement was negotiated, that includes a translation of every term and condition in that contract or agreement." (Civil Code § 1632(b).)

Notwithstanding the translation provided, the "terms of the contract or agreement that is executed in the English language shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties," but the translation "shall be admissible in evidence only to show that no contract was entered into because of a substantial difference in the material terms and conditions of the contract and the translation." (Civil Code § 1632(j).) If a translation is not provided, "the person aggrieved may rescind the contract or agreement." (Civil Code § 1632(k).)

Here, the Agreement itself states “This Arbitration Provision shall survive the full payment of any amounts due under this Note; any rescission or cancellation of this Note…” (Agreement – (j) Survival, Severability, Primacy.)

As such, the adjudication of the section 1632 issue in favor of Plaintiff would result in rescission, and would not appear to affect the validity of the arbitration provision, based upon the Court’s finding of an agreement to arbitrate above where Plaintiff does not dispute signing the contract. As such, the Court rejects this argument in the opposition that Defendants have not met their burden as to the existence of the arbitration agreement under section 1632.

Defendant has also cast substantial doubt on plaintiff’s assertion that she can’t understand English by attaching a transcript of the Welcome Call with Solar Mosaic where she speaks fluent English. The transcript does not indicate the call was translated nor does plaintiff ever struggle to respond to a question in English.

Authority and Analysis – Fraud in the Execution

Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 688-689 summarizes fraud in the execution as follows:

“A contract is void for fraud in the execution where “‘“the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all.”’” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th 394, 415.) In this instance, “‘“mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.”’” (Ibid.) In a fraud in the execution case, “California law … requires that the plaintiff, in failing to acquaint himself or herself with the contents of a written agreement before signing it, not have acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. One party's misrepresentations as to the nature or character of the writing do not negate the other party's apparent manifestation of assent, if the second party had ‘reasonable opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract.’” (Id. at p. 423). Thus, a “party's unreasonable reliance on the other's misrepresentations, resulting in a failure to read a written agreement before signing it, is an insufficient basis, under the doctrine of fraud in the execution, for permitting that party to avoid an arbitration agreement contained in the contract.” (Ibid.)”

However, in Ramos, the court held “By providing Ramos with a document that purported to be the Spanish translation of the English Contract it was asking him to sign, Pena's Motors implicitly represented to Ramos that it was, in fact, accurate. Ramos was entitled to rely on this representation. The Ramos Translation was not just inaccurate. Rather, it completely omitted the arbitration agreement that Westlake now seeks to enforce. By providing Ramos a translation that did not even reference arbitration, let alone translate the terms of the arbitration agreement, Pena's Motors “deprived [Ramos] of a reasonable opportunity to learn the character and essential terms of the [arbitration agreement he] signed.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 428.)” (Id. at 690)

Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that a term in Agreement signed by Plaintiff omitted or included terms that were not discussed, as in Ramos. Plaintiff’s opposition argues that Bravo concealed that he was an agent for the lender and that the loan terms regarding the cost or repayment were concealed. However, Plaintiff does not establish that Bravo had a duty to disclose any such alleged fact. Additionally, the Loan states the amount, including that “This is a DEFERRED INTEREST Loan. You must pay your Loan In full by 09/11/2024 to avoid paying accrued Interest charges” and “You agree to pay us the Amount Financed, together with interest on the unpaid balance of the Amount Financed from time to time, commencing on the date(s) we disburse Loan proceeds to your Merchant and ending on the date of payment in full.”

Plaintiff does not otherwise identify terms that were represented by Bravo but not included in the agreement that was signed, like in Ramos, to establish fraud in the execution.

Additionally, The Court notes that the moving party may submit additional evidence in reply. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060. [finding “the trial court abused its discretion” in striking supplemental declaration as untimely].) Further, the court in Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal. App. 5th at 171, noted the following:

“In sum, once Gamboa produced evidence challenging the authenticity of the purported arbitration agreement, the Clinic was required to rebut the challenge by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the agreement was valid. The Clinic did not have to authenticate Gamboa's signature on the arbitration agreement. The Clinic could have met its burden in other ways, including a declaration from the Clinic's custodian of records. But proferring no admissible evidence was insufficient.”

Here, Defendants provide a transcript of the “welcome call” wherein Plaintiff discusses the solar system and loan in the English language. This transcript also reflects specific discussion as to the interest rate, promotional period, and automatic payment terms contained in the loan.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The arbitration term widely defines claim as “any claim, dispute or controversy” and “is to be given the broadest possible reasonable meaning and includes claims of every kind and nature…based on constitution, statute, regulation, ordinance, common law rule…and equity. It includes disputes that seek relief of any time, including damages and/or injunctive, declaratory or other equitable relief.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

As noted above, the complaint seeks relief for violations of Civil Code section 1632, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, Unfair Competition, Breach of Implied Warranties, and Business and Professions Code section 7071.5, all of which appear to be within the scope of the broadly defined term “claim” in the Agreement.

Therefore, the Court finds the claims are within the scope of the Agreement.

Facts - Defenses – Unconscionability

As to procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff notes the adhesive nature of the Agreement, that it was presented in English without a Spanish translation, that Plaintiff signed the Agreement on Bravo’s tablet, did not review the Agreement and was not told about the arbitration term by Bravo.

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff identifies the repayment obligation (regardless of whether the amount was distributed and whether the solar system was delivered as agreed), a pre-dispute resolution procedure, waiver of class and representative actions, and the bar on public injunctive relief in arbitration.

Authority and Analysis – Defenses – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

Here, the Court agrees there is a fairly high degree of procedural unconscionability, given the adhesive nature of the arbitration agreement on a preprinted form and the facts surrounding the presentation thereof. The Court notes here that the DocuSign record attached as Exhibit B to Defendants’ motion indicate less than a minute of time elapsed between the “viewed” entry at 6:32:47 pm and the “signed” entry at 6:33:30 pm for a document that is approximately 30 pages long and including dense sections of text such as the arbitration provision.

Substantive Unconscionability

Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

First, Plaintiff argues that the term of the loan that requires payment of the loan even if the system is not delivered or installed renders the arbitration provision unconscionable. However, the Court agrees that this term does not affect the enforceability of the arbitration provision or the Court’s analysis of substantive unconscionability with respect to arbitration.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the “Pre-Dispute Resolution Procedure” improperly adds a pre-lawsuit notice requirement for claims that do not otherwise have such a requirement. However, the Arbitration Agreement does not indicate that the failure to provide the pre-lawsuit notice and engage in that process results in a waiver of those claims. Subsection (k) states “Before a Complaining Party asserts a Claim in any Proceeding (including as an individual litigant or as a member or representative of any class or proposed class), the Complaining Party shall give the Defending Party:…” But, as noted in the reply, there appears to be no consequence as to the failure to provide notice, such as a bar to claims, waiver or other restriction. As such, the Court does not find this term substantive unconscionable.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement’s waiver of class and representative claims, including the waiver of public injunctive relief in arbitration, renders the “Class Action and Multi-Party Claim Waiver” invalid. If invalid, the Agreement states: “(j) Survival, Severability, Primacy…. If any part of this Arbitration Provision cannot be enforced, the rest of this Arbitration Provision will continue to apply, except that: (A), if the Class Action and Multi-Party Claim Waiver is declared invalid in a proceeding between you and us, without in any way impairing the right to appeal such decision, this entire Arbitration Provision (other than this sentence) shall be null and void in such proceeding.”

Plaintiff, in support, cites to McGill v. Citibank (2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 951:

“The question we address in this case is the validity of a provision in a predispute arbitration agreement that waives the right to seek this statutory remedy in any forum. We hold that such a provision is contrary to California public policy and is thus unenforceable under California law. We further hold that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. ) does not preempt this rule of California law or require enforcement of the waiver provision.”

In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not seek public injunctive relief. However, the opposition states “Plaintiff does currently seek public injunctive relief” and the complaint’s prayer seeks injunctive relief as to others.

The Court, however, notes the significant difference between McGill and this matter: McGill waived a right to seek a statutory remedy “in any forum.” Here, the Agreement states, in subsection (j):

“…if a Claim is brought seeking public injunctive relief and a court determines that the restrictions in the Class Action and Multi-Party Waiver or elsewhere in this Arbitration Provision prohibiting the arbitrator from awarding relief on behalf of third parties are unenforceable with respect to such Claim (and that determination becomes final after all appeals have been exhausted), the Claim for public injunctive relief will be determined in court and any individual Claims seeking monetary relief will be arbitrated. In such a case the parties will request that the court stay the Claim for public injunctive relief until the arbitration award pertaining to individual relief has been entered in court. In no event will a Claim for public injunctive relief be arbitrated.” (emphasis added.)

Therefore, the Court does not find this term substantively unconscionable under McGill. The Court does not find the “Class Action and Multi-Party Claim Waiver” invalid.

However, the Court does find Plaintiff seeks public injunctive relief under the second cause of action under the CLRA and the third cause of action under the UCL. As such, the claims for public injunctive relief are stayed, pending arbitration, pursuant to the Agreement’s statement that “In no event will a Claim for public injunctive relief be arbitrated.”

Therefore, while the Court has found procedural unconscionability, no substantive unconscionable terms have been identified by Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court does not find unconscionability precludes enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement. The Court sets a Case Management Conference regarding the status of the arbitration on February 19, 2027, at 8:30 AM in Dept. 2.

Discovery

The Court is not inclined to stay the hearing on this motion pending discovery under Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494, 508-509 as cited by Plaintiff. That case discusses, around the pinpoint cite, unconscionability of terms of an arbitration agreement, but does not discuss additional discovery to oppose a motion to compel arbitration.

Conclusion

Therefore, the Court grants the motion to compel these claims to arbitration, except that the Court stays the claims for public injunctive relief under the second and third causes of action pending completion of the arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ramirez, Carlos Alberto vs. Ramirez, Ramon

Case No.:  VCU326099 

Date:          August 11, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          2-Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike

Tentative Ruling:  (1) The demurrer is overruled, except as to the fifth (constructive trust), sixth (resulting trust) and ninth (specific performance) causes of action.  As to these three causes of action, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, but only to incorporate these claims for relief to the other substantive causes of action.  (2) The motion to strike is granted as to the prayer for attorney’s fees and denied as to the prayer for punitive damages and the prayer for a judgment determining plaintiff is equitable owner of the subject properties. 

In this action, Carlos Alberto Ramirez seeks an order determining that he is title owner of three real properties (the subject properties’): One, in Whittier, CA (the Whittier property); another, on Kohn Avenue in Tulare (the Kohn property); the third, in Visalia (the Visalia property). 

The pertinent background allegations are summarized as follows:

Carlos bought all the subject properties and has paid all expenses for them.  He bought the Whittier property in 2002.  The following year, he married Maria Ramirez, with whom he was “cohabitating” since 1992.  The year after Carlos and Maria married, Carlos bought another property on Atlantic Avenue in Tulare, CA (the Atlantic property).  Later, Carlos bought the Kohn property in 2012, and the Visalia property in 2013. 

Maria initiated marital dissolution proceedings in 2015.  In September the year prior, Carlos transferred the Atlantic Avenue property to his brother, defendant Ramon Rafael Ramirez.  Carlos alleges this was done “for convenience”; with Ramon “mak[ing] payments” but with “the underlying loan remain[ing] in [Carlos’s] name.”

Maria and Carlos later reconciled, and the dissolution proceedings were dismissed in March 2018.  Shortly after that, Carlos “made repeated requests to [Ramon] to transfer the Atlantic property back” to him.  In December 2018, Carlos and Maria scheduled an appointment with a notary, the purpose of which was—for Carlos—to have Ramon execute a notarized deed returning title to the Atlantic Property. 

Ramon brought he and Carlos’s father, Rafael Ramirez, Sr., to the appointment (also, Ramon’s spouse).  Ramon and Rafael insisted Ramon keep the Atlantic property.  Further, they pressured Carlos to transfer the three subject properties to Ramon.  At some point, this apparently evolved to a demand that Carlos transfer the three subject properties to Ramon as a condition of Ramon transferring the Atlantic property back to Carlos.  Ramon and Rafael stated that if Carlos didn’t transfer the subject properties, he would lose them to Maria “or through a future relationship.”

Carlos relented to the pressure and executed deeds transferring the subject properties to Ramon.  The transfers, however, were made solely in reliance on [Ramon’s] representations that the properties would be protected and later returned.”

Maria later re-initiated marital dissolution proceedings.  In March 2021, a family court judge scrutinized Carlos’s transfer of the subject properties to Ramon “without his spouse’s consent,” suggesting they “appeared improper and raised concerns of potential fraud.”

Members of the Ramirez family, including Ramon, gathered in December 2024 where they “acknowledged that the subject properties should be returned to [Carlos],” but Ramon refused.  “[I]n or about 2025, [Ramon],” instead, “transferred to properties into a revocable trust.” Carlos alleges, on information and belief, Ramon “is the settlor and trustee” of that trust. 

Carlos initiated this action on September 22, 2025.  Following the sustaining of two demurrers, Carlos filed his second amended complaint (SAC).  The SAC includes nine causes of action. 

The principal substantive claims are set forth in the fourth, “fraud and deceit”; seventh, “cancellation of instruments … procured by duress; and eighth, “breach of oral contract” causes of action.  The “fraud and deceit” cause of action frames Ramon’s statements inducing the property transfers as fraudulent (as evidenced by Ramon not returning the properties).  The breach cause of action frames those same statements as establishing an oral agreement that Ramon breached (by not returning the properties). The “cancellation” cause of action separately focuses on the “duress”/“coercion” aspect of the transfers—Carlos alleges he would not have executed the transfer deeds but for Ramon and Rafael, Sr.’s “coercion” when Carlos “was in a vulnerable position due to marital dissolution concerns.”

In the first three causes of action, Carlos seeks to quiet title to each of the three subject properties, essentially, based on his fraud and breach claims.  Carlos alleges he is equitable owner of the properties; that he purchased them, paid associated expenses; and would not have transferred the properties to Ramon—from whom he received no consideration—but for Ramon’s fraudulent representation/oral agreement “that the transfer would protect the property from potential division in dissolution proceedings and would not affect [Carlos’s] ownership.”

The remaining causes of action, for “constructive trust” (fifth); “resulting trust” (sixth); and “specific performance – alternative equitable relief” (ninth) are claims for relief styled as causes of action based on the substantive claims described above.

Ramon demurrers to each cause of action and moves to strike certain of Carlos’s prayers for relief. 

ANALYSIS

DEMURRER

1. Fraud

In paragraph 83 of the SAC, Carlos alleges Ramon “represented to [Carlos], in substance, that if [Carlos] did not immediately transfer title of the subject properties into [Ramon’s] name, [Carlos] would lose the properties in his pending marital dissolution proceedings or through future claims by his spouse or other relationships.” 

In paragraph 84, Carlos alleges Ramon “represented that transferring title into [Ramon’s] name would protect the properties from division in the dissolution proceedings and would not affect [Carlos’s] ownership interests.”  In paragraph 28, as noted above, Carlos earlier alleged the transfers “were made solely in reliance on [Ramon’s] representations that the properties would be protected and later returned.”

Focusing on paragraph 83 and ignoring paragraphs 84 and 28, Ramon maintains the fraud claim solely targets his “legal opinion” about what would happen to the properties “ ‘in a subsequent divorce or through a future relationship.’ ” He argues his representation, being “nothing more than a legal opinion by a layperson,” cannot support Carlos’s fraud claim.  Relatedly, Ramon argues the fraud claim is time-barred because Carlos had inquiry notice regarding the falsity of his “legal opinion” when the family court judge, in March 2021, suggested the transfers could be deemed fraudulent. 

These arguments are without merit.  Obviously, the basis of Carlos’s fraud claim is that Ramon lied when he said “transferring … would not affect [Carlos’s] ownership interests” and the properties “would be … later returned.” Indeed, Ramon’s “legal opinion” would be inconsequential to Carlos’s marital dilemma without the promise to hold and return the properties. 

Accordingly, the relevant discovery event, for statute of limitations accrual purposes, was not when the family court judge cast aspersions on the propriety of the transfers, but when Ramon expressed refusal to return title in December 2024 at the Ramirez family meeting. 

The demurrer to the fourth “fraud and deceit” cause of action is overruled. 

2. Breach of Oral Contract

a. Statute of Frauds

Carlos’s original complaint asserted an oral contract breach cause of action, alleging Ramon “was to hold title only of the properties” and that “[i]t was the intent of the parties” that Ramon would hold title “temporarily … and would then revert to Carlos at a future date of Carlos’ choosing,” during which time “Carlos was to … pay the mortgage, property taxes, and other impounds as the rightful and true owner of the properties.”

Ramon demurred on statute of frauds grounds.  (See Civ. Code, §§ 1091; 1624, subd. (a)(3); Code Civ. Proc., § 1971 [agreements for transfer/sale of real property must be in writing].) 

The court posted a tentative ruling the day before the hearing indicating it did not appear that Carlos had filed an opposition.  The court noted the absence of a “written note or memorandum” and indicated it would sustain the demurrer, but with leave, noting “exceptions to the statute of frauds.”  Carlos had filed an opposition, but not until the day before hearing on the demurrer.  Carlos did not request oral argument on the tentative ruling.  The court adopted the tentative ruling.  (TCSC Local Rule 700 [“The tentative ruling will become the ruling of the court if the court has not directed oral argument by its tentative ruling and notice of intent to appear has not been given.”].)

Carlos filed an amended complaint again asserting an oral contract breach cause of action.  Ramon again demurred, arguing that Carlos failed to plead any exceptions to the statute of frauds. 

The court posted a tentative ruling the day before the hearing, which was prepared, again, without the benefit of a timely filed opposition.  Carlos again filed a late opposition, on the Friday before hearing of the matter the following Tuesday.   The court’s tentative ruling once again observed exceptions to the statute of frauds, including, specifically, the “part performance” exception under Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 632] (Sutton).  The court observed, however, there were “no allegations with respect to possession which would effectuate the part-performance exception, despite allegations of partial payment of the purchase price and continued payment of the monthly payments, property taxes and expenses” (see id., at p. 422) and indicated the demurrer should be sustained.  Carlos did not request oral argument on the tentative ruling.  The court adopted the tentative ruling. 

Carlos again asserts an oral contract breach cause of action.  This time he alleges his “performance, including transfer of title, continued possession, and payment of all ownership expenses, constitutes part performance that is unequivocally referable to the agreement and sufficient to remove it from the statute of frauds.”

In Sutton, the Court of Appeal discussed the part performance exception to the statute of frauds on appeal from a judgment granting specific performance of an oral agreement to purchase real property in favor of former tenants, the Suttons.  (Id., at p. 418.) As part of the agreement, the Suttons were to make a down payment and were required to make all mortgage payments and real estate tax payments and the sellers, the Warners, were not to have to make any payments.  (Ibid.)

Sutton observed, “ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is enforced when the buyer has taken possession of the property and either makes a full or partial payment of the purchase price, or makes valuable and substantial improvements on the property, in reliance on the oral agreement.’ ” (Id., at p. 422, italics omitted, citation omitted.)

In Sutton, the nature of the Sutton’s possession as tenants was presented by the Warners as a bar to accepting the Warners’ evidence of having made payments (and having made some improvements) as substantial evidence of their part performance.  The court’s determination on that specific issue—which was essentially that “prior possession by the purchaser is not an absolute bar to proof of a change in the character of the possession after the making of a parol contract of sale” (id., at p. 423)—is not particularly relevant to this case. 

Somewhat applicable to this case is Sutton’s determination of whether the Sutton’s “other actions,” i.e., payments and improvements, coupled with their continued possession, were “sufficiently related to the parol option contract to constitute part performance.” (Ibid.)  Sutton had observed that, as to the performance analysis, “[t]he part performance by the buyer must clearly relate to, and must be pursuant to, the terms of the oral agreement.”  (Id., at p. 422.) 

The trial court had determined the Sutton’s actions—making a down payment, increasing monthly payments from the rental amount by the precise amount of the mortgage payment, payment of property taxes, and paying for certain improvements—“were unequivocally related to the purchase agreement.” (Id., at p. 424.)  The Court of Appeal concluded “[t]he actions taken by the Suttons in reliance upon the oral agreement, when considered together with the Warners' admission that there was an oral agreement of some duration, satisf[ied] both elements of the part performance doctrine--evidence of the existence of the oral contract on the terms found by the court and reliance by the Suttons upon that contract warranting specific performance relief.”  (Ibid.)

While Sutton states principles somewhat applicable to the instant case, it is important to distinguish the distinct factual scenario presented there, an oral agreement to purchase real property in favor of former tenants, from the scenario presented here, an oral agreement under which Ramon agreed to hold title to property for Carlos’s benefit during a marital dissolution, and to return title to him after. 

The court believes it is clear that the statute of frauds applies to the alleged oral agreement between the parties (see Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 908] (Byrne)), but also finds that Sutton can only properly be relied upon, in this distinct scenario, for its statement of general equitable principles.  Of some assistance here, Sutton explains:  “Two distinct elements underlie application of the part performance exception: ‘first, the extent to which the evidentiary function of the statutory formalities [of the statute of frauds] is fulfilled by the conduct of the parties; second, the reliance of the promisee, providing a compelling substantive basis for relief in addition to the expectations created by the promise.’ [Citation.]” (Sutton, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th., at p. 422.) 

Generalizable to the instant case, the court concludes that an exception to the statute of frauds is supported by the SAC if the allegations reflect conduct of the parties evidencing the alleged oral agreement, and reliance by Carlos that reflects a compelling substantive basis for deeming that oral agreement enforceable.  Ultimately, “ ‘the part performance doctrine rests on estoppel and virtual fraud.’ [Citation.]”  (Ibid.)  And, more broadly: “ ‘The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circumstances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one party has been induced by the other seriously to change his position in reliance on the contract … .’ ” (Byrne, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.)

The court has no difficulty in determining that the allegations of the SAC support application of such equitable principles in the circumstances of this case. 

Carlos alleges his “performance, including transfer of title, continued possession, and payment of all ownership expenses, constitutes part performance that is unequivocally referable to the agreement and sufficient to remove it from the statute of frauds.”  More specifically, Carlos alleges that he has paid for everything in connection with the subject properties and Ramon has paid nothing.  These allegations clearly support that an unconscionable injury would result from denying enforcement of the alleged oral agreement because Ramon would benefit not just from three free real properties, but from Carlos having paid all expenses from them in reliance on his alleged agreement to eventually return title. 

Ramon’s only argument is that Carlos’s claimed performance of having paid for all the expenses of the properties is insufficient to establish the part performance exception because it was “not unequivocally referable to the oral agreement.”  Ramons claims Carlos paying for everything is insufficient because “[t]hese acts are equally consistent with [Carlos’s] claimed status as the equitable owner of the properties independent of any separate oral reconveyance contract.”

This is, of course, completely nonsensical.  Carlos’s paying for everything relating to the properties clearly “relates” to the alleged agreement that Ramon was holding the properties for Carlos’s benefit—otherwise, Ramon would be expected to pay these expenses himself (consistent with being the owner).  This performance is, of course, “consistent with [Carlos’s] claimed status as the equitable owner” precisely because the specific agreement alleged was that Ramon would hold the property during the dissolution for Carlos’s benefit, but Carlos would be the true (i.e., “equitable”) owner, and Ramon would return the property after the dissolution was over. 

b. Consideration

Ramon further argues the alleged agreement fails for lack of consideration.  The court need not address this argument at great length.  It might be a good argument if Carlos had asserted Ramon breached the alleged oral agreement by refusing to accept and hold title to Carlos’s properties for Carlos’s benefit, but, of course, it is entirely without merit as a defense to Ramon’s obligation to return the properties to which he allegedly did, indeed, take title, given the equitable considerations just discussed. 

Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled to the eighth “breach of oral contract” cause of action. 

3. Cancellation of Deeds - Duress

Ramon characterizes Carlos’s cause of action to cancel the transfer deeds based on duress, in essence, as an action to rescind the alleged agreement that Ramon would accept and hold title to Carlos’s properties for Carlos’s benefit.  Ramon then posits that a thing of value that he gave up in this agreement is the Atlantic property, and he argues that, in order to support the cancellation cause of action, Carlos was required to allege, and he fails to allege, “willingness or ability to restore to [Ramon] … the Atlantic property.”

Ramon cites Fleming v. Kagan (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 791 for the principle, codified in Civil Code section 1691, that to obtain cancellation of a contract, the party seeking cancellation must restore to the other party everything of value which he has received under the contract. 

The SAC, however, obviously does not set up the Atlantic property as something Ramon received under the alleged oral agreement.  The SAC sets up, instead, that Carlos bought the Atlantic property and, the year prior to the initial commencement of dissolution proceedings by his former spouse, transferred it to Ramon with the expectation that he would return title to Carlos, and then when Carlos sought to have Ramon return title to the property, he (and their father) leveraged Ramon’s title position to “pressure[], intimidate[], and coerce[]” Carlos to transfer the three subject properties in exchange. 

Needless to say, the oral agreement that Carlos alleges existed, the subject of his breach claim, was clearly not for Ramon to keep the property he agreed, but refused, to turn over in exchange for three more of Carlos’s properties.  

In any event, and more to the point, Carlos does not seek to cancel an alleged oral agreement, he seeks to enforce one, and separately, he seeks to cancel the deeds he signed as a product of pressure, intimidation and coercion, and, in both claims, has the same aim, getting title back from Ramon to properties he alleges Ramon promised (or fraudulent represented) he would return. 

Ramon further argues, the court notes, that these allegations of pressure, intimidation and coercion, are undermined by other allegations that the notary present at the December 2018 appointment “advised” Carlos to “reconsider” and offered him “additional time to think,” since they reflect “[t]he availability of a meaningful choice,” which is “inconsistent with the involuntary execution required to void instruments for duress.”  The court does not find, however, this allegation by Carlos undermines his allegations of duress and, rather, finds this ground concerns factual matters of proof, not properly addressed at the demurrer stage. 

Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled to the seventh, “cancellation of instruments … procured by duress” cause of action.

4. Quiet title causes of action

The quiet title causes of action are based on Carlos’s fraud and breach claims and Ramon demurrers to them on the same grounds that he demurrers to those claims.  Accordingly, as the demurrer is overruled to the fraud and breach claims, so it is also overruled as to the quiet title causes of action.

5. Constructive trust, resulting trust and specific performance causes of action

Ramon correctly points out that the causes of action for “constructive trust” (fifth); “resulting trust” (sixth); and “specific performance – alternative equitable relief” (ninth) are claims for relief, that, while presented as causes of action, are not.  (Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, fn. 3 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 661] [constructive trust is a remedy, not a cause of action]; Green Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 433 [194 Cal.Rptr.3d 19] [specific performance is a remedy, not a cause of action]; Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 76 [269 Cal.Rptr. 337] [constructive trust and resulting trust are remedies, not causes of action].)

Ramon demurrers to these causes of action insofar as they assert claims for relief, not causes of action. 

Carlos acknowledges as much and only asserts the “labels … do not justify discarding the underlying factual allegations or requested equitable relief.”  Carlos requests leave “to recast constructive trust, resulting trust, and specific performance as remedies and equitable theories incorporated into the quiet-title, fraud, cancellation, and contract causes of action.”

The court finds Carlos presents a fitting course of action for the circumstances.  The demurrer is sustained to the “constructive trust” (fifth); “resulting trust” (sixth); and “specific performance – alternative equitable relief” (ninth), with leave to amend solely to incorporate these claims for relief into the other substantive causes of action against which the demurrer has been overruled. 

MOTION TO STRIKE

Ramon moves to strike allegations pertaining to punitive damages and attorney’s fees. 

Carlos concedes the attorney’s fees prayer should be stricken.  The SAC does not reveal a basis for an award of attorney’s fees and, accordingly, the prayer for attorney’s fees is stricken.

Ramon asserts Carlos’s prayer for punitive damages must be stricken because it is supported solely by conclusory allegations.  Carlos’s fraud cause of action includes conclusory allegations that “DEFENDANT’s conduct was willful, intentional, and carried out with conscious disregard for PLAINTIFF’s rights, thereby entitling PLAINTIFF to an award of punitive damages,” and he includes a prayer “For punitive damages as permitted by law.”

Carlos correctly notes, however, that the SAC includes specific allegations of fraud.  Under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of [inter alia] fraud … the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

In the SAC, Carlos alleges Ramon exploited Carlos feeling of vulnerability during his marital dissolution proceedings and leveraged that vulnerability during the notary meeting, and that Ramon fraudulently misrepresented that the transfers would preserve Carlos’s ownership despite that Ramon would ultimately fail to return the properties as allegedly agreed, and, instead transferred title into his trust. 

The court finds such allegations sufficiently support Carlos’s prayer for punitive damages at the pleading stage. 

Additionally, Ramon moves to strike Carlos’s prayer “For a judgment that PLAINTIFF is the equitable owner of Subject Property #1, Subject Property #2, and Subject Property #3, and is entitled to legal title thereto.”  Ramon asserts this prayer is duplicative of Carlos’s other prayers, “For a decree quieting title in favor of PLAINTIFF against all adverse claims” and “For a declaration that DEFENDANT holds title to the Subject Properties for the benefit of PLAINTIFF.”

The court is not persuaded, based on Ramon’s uncited and unsupported arguments that the prayers are entirely duplicative and, accordingly, denies the motion to strike Carlos’s prayer for a determination that he is the equitable owner of the subject properties. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jasso, Guy vs. Visalia Unified School District

Case No.:    VCU321582

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories, (2) Special Interrogatories and (3) Requests for Production

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with these motions. Therefore, the Court takes these hearings off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:              Hernandez, Hipolito vs. Ford Spraying Inc.

Case No.:     VCU323233

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motion to Continue Trial

Tentative Ruling: The Court does not issue tentative rulings on these motions. Counsel may appear in any manner. Counsel may appear in any manner.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club vs. Souza, Gary Martin Jr

Case No.:   VCL324944

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default Judgment, Vacate Entry of Default and Quash Service

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment; to grant the motion to quash.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club sues Defendant Gary Martin Souza Jr for subrogation.

On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting to indicate substitute service occurred on December 1, 2025 on a “’JANE DOE’, REFUSED TO GIVE NAME, CO-RESIDENT Description: HISPANIC, Female, 55 yrs old, 5' 7" tall, 170 lbs., BROWN hair,” noted as a competent member of the household at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party, indicated to be “2327 W SUNNYSIDE AVE VISALIA CA 93277”

The proof contains a declaration from a registered California process server indicating two prior attempts at different times in November 2025 and that this substitute service occurred on the third attempt.

Thereafter, default was entered on January 29, 2026.

Default judgment in the amount of $14,082 was entered on February 19, 2026.

On July 7, 2026, Defendant filed this motion to set aside entry of default and judgment and moves to quash service. In support, Defendant provides the declaration of Penny Alcantar, Defendant’s mother and whose home address is the 2327 W Sunnyside Ave address. (Declaration of Alcantar ¶4.) Further, Alcantar declares: 

5. Defendant has never lived at the Sunnyside Address with me.

6. Defendant does not send any mail to the Sunnyside Address, and I have never received any mail addressed to him at the Sunnyside Address.

7. Defendant is homeless and does not have any permanent address.

8. The Sunnyside Address is not Defendant’s place of abode. It is my home and he does not, and did not, live there; and he does not, and did not, receive mail at the Sunnyside Address.” (Declaration of Alcantar ¶¶5-8.)

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Relief from Default – Void Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d)

"'[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service." (Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544.)

Such a motion under section 473(d), prior to the California Supreme Court’s decision in California Capital Ins. Co. v. Hoehn (2024) 17 Cal.5th 207, used to be subject to the two year statutory period provided by section 473.5 (See Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 175, 180, overruled by California Capital.)

However, under California Capital, supra, 17 Cal. 5^th at 225 “We hold that a section 473(d) motion to vacate a judgment that is void for lack of proper service is not subject to the judicially imposed two-year limitation”

Therefore, this motion is timely.

Void on its Face

“A judgment ‘is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence.’ [Citation.] When a default judgment has been taken, the judgment roll consists of ‘the summons, with the affidavit or proof of service; the complaint; the request for entry of default ..., and a copy of the judgment.’ (§ 670, subd. (a).) If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order/judgment is not void on its face.” [Citation.] (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 370.)

Here, the proof of service, summons, complaint, entry of default and copy of the judgment demonstrate the judgment is not void on its face.

Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b) provides for substitute service:

“If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.”

“ ‘A judgment or order is said to be void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the judgment-roll.’ [citation omitted] In a case in which the defendant does not answer the complaint, the judgment roll includes the proof of service. (§ 670, subd. (a).) Thus, in a motion under the sixth paragraph of section 473 [“The court…may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order” and now subsection (d)], the moving defendant need make no evidentiary showing whatsoever, so long as the jurisdictional defect is shown by the proof of service.” (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441.)

Here, there is no such defect readily apparent from the judgment roll. The face of the proof of service reveals apparent compliance with the statutory requirements. There appears to be reasonable due diligence as to the attempts at personal service, the proof indicates that the process server served the substitute person at the “Home” and provides a description of the person, over 18 years of age, with whom the summons and complaint was left.

Defendant appears to concede this via presentation of the declaration of Alcantar.

Void via Extrinsic Evidence

California is a jurisdiction where the original service of process, which confers personal jurisdiction, must conform to statutory requirements or all that follows is void.  (Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App. 4th 1043, 1048.)  Accordingly, the Court may set aside a default when the summons and complaint were not properly served because the default is void. (Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 182, 186 n4.) “A judgment may be void due to improper service of summons . . .” (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852, 857–858; Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 (“a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.”).)

Under Evidence Code section 647: “[t]he return of a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code upon process or notice establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return.”  (Evid. Code § 647.) Under Evidence Code section 604: “[t]he effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference that may be appropriate.”  (Evid. Code § 604.)

Therefore, such a completed proof of service creates a rebuttable presumption that the documents as indicated in the proof of service were received.  (Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1479-1480.)  The presumption of proper service can be rebutted by introducing evidence that the document was not received.  (Phay Him v. City & County of San Francisco (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 437, 445.)  A rebuttal of the presumption of proper service should be supported by sworn testimony that neither the attorney of record nor the party received the document.  (Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1479-1480.)  

Therefore, the Court starts with the presumption of service established.

In rebuttal, the Court notes the declaration of the resident of the Sunnyside Address who indicates that the Sunnyside Address is not Defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode.

A person's dwelling house or usual place of abode is the place the person holds out as his or her principal residence and where he or she is mostly likely to receive actual notice. (Zirbes v. Stratton (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1407, 1415-1417.)

The declaration indicates Defendant is homeless and has never lived at the address. This is sufficient to rebut the presumption.

As such, the Court finds Defendant has established a sufficient showing of excusable neglect as to the failure to timely respond to the lawsuit.

As such, the Court grants the motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) as void based on extrinsic evidence that the Sunnyside Address is not Defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode.

Motion to Quash

“Failure to give notice violates ‘the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.’”  (Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 84.)  Moreover, “compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 410.50.)

 “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.”  (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439–1440.)  This burden applies to all motions challenging service as long as “…the motions have similar objectives, raise the same issues, and can serve the same purpose.”  (Id. at 1440.)

As no opposition has been filed, Plaintiff has not met its burden on this motion to quash. Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Estes, Jeremy Lee vs. Cheema Transport, Inc.

Case No.:    VCU289306

Date:            August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved as Counsel

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion without prejudice

Facts

On June 26, 2026 Counsel Micah K. Nilsson and Justin L. Thomas of Zimmer & Melton, LLP, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Defendant Cheema Transport, Inc. Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Counsel has filed proofs of service of these documents by electronic service.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, Counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties. 

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052).

The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052 and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. However, the declaration is silent as to an attempt to first secure a “Substitution of Attorney” and that the client refused to so stipulate. Absent this information, the Court cannot grant the motion.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail at the last known address with return receipt requested and via email at addresses consistently used by the Defendant.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Counsel has complied with this requirement.

The Court denies, without prejudice, Defendant’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as to Defendant based upon the lack of compliance with California Rule of Court 3.1362(c) with respect to attempting to obtain a “Substitution of Attorney” prior to moving to withdraw and reflecting such efforts in the declaration. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ramos, Bryan Gaeta vs. FCA US LLC

Case No.:   VCU334416

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Defendants’ Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion

Facts

In this Song Beverly Action, Defendants seeks to compel the deposition of Plaintiff.

On November 25, 2025, Defendants’ served a Notice of Taking Deposition of Plaintiff (“Notice”). The deposition was set for February 12, 2026.

On February 10, 2026, Plaintiff objected to the Notice on the basis of unilateral notice and unavailability.

Thereafter, between March 2026 and June 2026, Defendants met and conferred in attempts to obtain mutually convenient deposition dates. However, no apparent agreement could be reached, no deposition has taken place and Defendants seek to compel the deposition of Plaintiff pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(c).

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450

Section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.”

No motion to compel here lies where the deponent merely states they will not attend the deposition and no notice of nonappearance is placed on the record.

Proper service of a notice of deposition is effective to require the attendance of parties as well as compelling production of specified documents or electronically stored information at their deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280(a).)

Serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, subdivision (b), provides that any deposition taken after the timely service of a valid objection cannot be used against the objecting party if the party did not attend the deposition, such objection mentioned in section 2025.410 relates to an error or irregularity in a deposition notice that does not comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 2025.210). (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)The types of objections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq., deal with procedural requirements such as when a defendant or plaintiff may serve a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.210), the contents required to be included in a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.220, 2025.230), to whom notice of the deposition must be given (CCP § 2025.240), the location of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.250, 2025.260), the number of days required to be given in advance of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.270), and the manner of service upon party deponents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280).

There is no indication the objections raised by Plaintiff pertained to any irregularity or error in the deposition notice, so there was no reason to believe that service of objections alone would have prevented Defendants from moving forward with the deposition. A notice that a party is unavailable, that the deposition was unilaterally set, and various substantive objections to the categories, are not one of such grounds as provided under Article 2, Chapter 9 of the Civil Discovery Act that would prevent the deposition from moving forward and from a nonappearance being recorded.

Therefore, Defendants cannot move for an order compelling Plaintiff’s attendance at deposition under section 2025.450 because Plaintiff has not "fail[ed] to appear for examination" at any time (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)

Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(c).

However, Defendants also cite Code of Civil Procedure section 871.26(c) as a basis to compel the deposition of Plaintiff, which states, in pertinent part:

“(c) Within 120 days after the filing of the answer or other responsive pleading, all parties have the right to conduct initial depositions, each not to exceed two hours, of the following deponents:

(1) The plaintiff…”

However, section 871.26 does not appear to provide an enforcement mechanism which would order compelling the deposition of Plaintiff.

Rather, subsection (j) indicates:

(j) Unless the party failing to comply with this section shows good cause, notwithstanding any other law and in addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this chapter, a court shall impose sanctions as follows:

…

(2) A one-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($1,500) sanction against the plaintiff’s attorney or two-thousand-five-hundred-dollar ($2,500) sanction against the defense attorney respectively, paid within 15 business days for failure to comply with the provisions relating to depositions as prescribed in subdivision (c).

(3) For a plaintiff’s repeated noncompliance with subdivision (b), (c), or (d), a court shall order the case dismissed without prejudice and the plaintiff’s attorney to be responsible for costs awarded to the manufacturer.

…

(5) Notwithstanding paragraph (3) of subdivision (o) of Section 6068 of the Business and Professions Code, the court may, in its discretion, require an attorney who is sanctioned pursuant to this subdivision to report the sanction, in writing, to the State Bar of California within 30 days of the imposition of the sanction.”

As such, Defendant appears entitled to, at most $1,500 in sanctions under section 871.26, absent a showing of good cause by Plaintiff. However, the Court will, in the absence of an express section in 871.26 providing a procedure to compel the deposition of Plaintiff, require that Defendant comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450.

As noted above, no compliance with section 2025.450 has been demonstrated, as no notice of non-appearance was recorded.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Galvan-Padilla, Jose De Jesus vs. Nissan North America, Inc.

Case No:   VCU329280

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc.’s Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

Facts

In this Song Beverly matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Nissan North America, Inc. and Groppetti Ltd., Inc., a California Corporation d/b/a Nissan of Visalia.

On December 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service purporting substitute service occurred as to Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc. via service on Don Groppetti, agent for service of process at 830 South Ben Maddox Way, Visalia, CA 93292.

On July 6, 2026, Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc. filed this motion to quash. In support, counsel states that a different entity, Shel-Don, Inc. is the entity doing business as Nissan of Visalia. (Declaration of Broderson ¶3.) Further, Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc. requests judicial notice of:

1. Fictitious Business Name registration for Nissan of Visalia, filing number FBN-2026-0103, expiration date 1/19/2031, filed by registrant Shel-Don, Inc; and

2. Fictitious Business Name registration for Nissan of Visalia, filing number 2020-0001896, expiration date: 11/8/2025, filed by registrant Shel-Don, Inc.

Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc notes these are recorded documents and official records of the Tulare County Clerk-Recorder and attaches certified copies of the documents.

Based on the above, Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc seeks to quash service based on a lack of personal jurisdiction and that California Code of Civil Procedure section 412.20(a)(2) mandates that a summons contain the "names of the parties to the action."

No opposition has been filed

Authority and Analysis

Improper service is properly challenged by a motion to quash. (Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 830, 855, fn. 4; Code Civ. Proa., § 418.10(a)(1).)

Here, Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over it because Plaintiff has connected Defendant Groppetti Ltd., Inc to Nissan of Visalia, where no such affiliation exists and where Shel-Don, Inc. is the corporation doing business as Nissan of Visalia.

“When a defendant challenges the court's personal jurisdiction on the ground of improper service of process ‘the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.’” (Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.)

As no opposition has been filed, Plaintiff has not met its burden in opposing the motion to quash. Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:               Hunt, Norma vs. IN-N-OUT Burgers

Case No:   VCU324892

Date:           August 11, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Depositions of (1) Defendant's person(s) most qualified on the matters set forth in that notice (noticed for July 23, 2026); (2) Micah Mosqueda and (3) Ashley Haynes; and (4) Juan Solorio

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to order the depositions occur prior to August 17, 2026; to impose sanctions of $760 on Defendant, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

In this premises liability matter, Plaintiff sues Defendant In-N-Out Burgers.

On June 22, 2026 Plaintiff served deposition notices, each with an accompanying demand for production of documents, setting the depositions as follows: Micah Mosqueda on July 20, 2026 at 10:00 a.m.; Ashley Haynes on July 20, 2026 at 1:00 p.m.; Juan Solorio on July 21, 2026 at 10:00 a.m.; and Defendant's person(s) most qualified on July 23, 2026 at 10:00 a.m.

Defendant, on July 16, 2026, emailed Plaintiff stating the witnesses would not be produced as unilaterally noticed by Plaintiff and on July 17, 2026, Defendant indicated it would stipulate to liability and asserted the depositions were therefore moot.

Defendant did not serve any written objection to any of the deposition notices under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, and did not move for a protective order under section 2025.420.

Each of the deponents failed to attend the depositions as noticed. Plaintiff, as to each deposition, obtained a notice of non-appearance.

On July 28, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed Defendant’s counsel of record, inquiring as to the failures of the deponents to appear.

Therefore, Plaintiff seeks to compel the depositions of the deponents noted above, and for sanctions in the amount of $9,060, consisting of 12 hours at the rate of $750 per hour.

No opposition has been filed.

Plaintiff has filed a notice of non-opposition.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450 states:

“(a) If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.”

“(b)(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040, or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance.” (emphasis added)

A motion to compel a deposition must be accompanied "by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2).) No traditional meet and confer was required by law. As Rutter notes,  "No 'meet and confer' is required where the deponent 'fails to attend the deposition ....' In such cases, all that is required is a declaration by the moving party that he or she has contacted the deponent 'to inquire about the nonappearance.'" (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial [The Rutter Group 2023], ¶ 8:813 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2)].)

Proper service of a notice of deposition is effective to require the attendance of parties and "an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party" as well as compelling production of specified documents or electronically stored information at their deposition. (C.C.P., § 2025.280(a).)

Even serving an objection based on unavailability or unilateral setting does not impose a stay on a notice of deposition and is not a substitute for a protective order. (Snyder v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 579, 586 [applying former Code Civ. Proc. § 2021]; Carl v. Superior Court (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 73,76.)

Although Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, subdivision (b), provides that any deposition taken after the timely service of a valid objection cannot be used against the objecting party if the party did not attend the deposition, such objection mentioned in section 2025.410 relates to an error or irregularity in a deposition notice that does not comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 2025.210). (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)The types of objections contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq., deal with procedural requirements such as when a defendant or plaintiff may serve a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.210), the contents required to be included in a deposition notice (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.220, 2025.230), to whom notice of the deposition must be given (CCP § 2025.240), the location of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.250, 2025.260), the number of days required to be given in advance of the deposition (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.270), and the manner of service upon party deponents (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280.)

Here, as to each deponent, the Court finds a properly served notice, no objection by Defendant, no protective order sought by Defendant, that Plaintiff obtained notices of non-appearance as to each deponent and Plaintiff’s counsel’s inquired as to the failure to appear.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and compels the depositions of Micah Mosqueda, Ashley Haynes, Juan Solorio, Defendant's person(s) most qualified. The depositions shall occur prior to August 17, 2026. If the depositions cannot be completed prior to August 17, 2026, the Court grants the alternative relief requested by Plaintiff under Code of Civil Procedure section 2024.050(a) to complete these depositions closer to the September 14, 2026, trial date. The Court finds sufficient necessity to the discovery sought and notes this is the initial trial date in the matter. Further, that Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient diligence regarding these depositions via attempts to coordinate dates with Defendant starting in April 2026.

Sanctions

As to sanctions, section 2025.040(g)(1), which states “…the court shall impose monetary sanctions under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent…unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”

First, the Court will reduce the hourly rate to $350. The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  

Next, the Court does not award anticipated hours.

Further, as to the 8 hours spent preparing the motion, the Court will reduce this time to two hours total. As  the court has said at recent hearings in this matter, the defense should have responded more promptly and directly to plaintiff’s attempts to schedule depositions, and plaintiff should have moved more promptly to seek these depositions in the face of this defense recalcitrance. Plaintiff did not do so until the eve of trial. The court will not reward this negligence with the substantial sanctions requested. Also, from the comments made at the hearing last Friday, it appeared both sides are now working diligently to schedule these depositions.

Therefore, the Court will award a total of $760, consisting of 2 hours at the rate of $350 plus the $60 filing fee. Sanctions are imposed against Defendant, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, and due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 10, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054127	In the Matter of Price, Patricia Annette	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Supplemental documents in order
VPR054187	In the Matter of Wommack, Gary M.	Letters of Administration	Recommended for Approval	Documents in order
VPR054186	In the Matter of Rosa, Tommy Earl	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Petition Attachment 14: not all persons designated in the will to receive any property are listed, surviving or deceased
VPR054183	In the Matter of Clarence H. Hill Revocable Trust	Petition to Confirm Trust Assets	Appearance Required	Proposed order to be submitted for review
VPR053418	In the Matter of Guzman, Altagracia	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Petition: Notice to Franchise Tax Board not addressed, Prob C § 9202(c)
VPR052385	In the Matter of Gilpin, Lula	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR052046	In the Matter of Gracie Mae Rocha Irrevocable Special Needs Trust	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054095	In the Matter of Aguayo, Armando	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Questionnaire (PRO-006) not filed. Limited Powers requested under Probate Code § 2351.5 and 1830(b)—orders, powers and duties not specified in Attachment 1h; 1j. Notice of Hearing not served 15 days prior on proposed conservatee.

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for August 6, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054082	In the Matter of Clawson, Richard	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance required	Objection filed
PPR054179	In the Matter of Lara, Paul Sr	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	No Order lodged

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared August 6, 2026 & August 10, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
8/6/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR054070	IMO  A.W.T.	Request for Dismissal has not been filed. Numerous mandatory requirements have not been completed and mandatory forms have not been filed.
8/6/26 8:30 AM	Department  2	VPR054059	IMO  A.F.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating Petition for Appointment was served pursuant to Probate Code §1511, re notice to grandparents & parents
8/10/26 8:30 AM	Department   9	VPR050929	IMO  A.M..	Status Conference
8/10/26 8:30 AM	Department  2	VPR044873	IMO  J.A.E.	Accounting appears to be in order
8/10/26 8:30 AM	Department  1	VPR050006	IMO  S.A.S.	Review hearing re visitation & termination OSC hearing for FTA