Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, July 7, 2026, are:

Re:                Lal, Chaman vs. Singh, Avtar

Case No.:  VCU321658

Date:          July 7, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Adopt Appraised Value

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and hold the required hearing as to the value.

Facts

The verified complaint in this matter seeks partition as to two properties.

The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s motion to appoint an appraiser, appointed Jake Hower and held a hearing as to the appraisal value of the property at issue. Jake Howser agreed to appraise the property  at 770-778 E. Date Avenue, Porterville CA (The Multi-Family Property).

At his suggestion, Rachel Unger agreed to appraise the Property at 814. E.  Date Avenue, Porterville, CA (The Gas Station Property).

On April 27, 2026, Plaintiff lodged a copy of the appraisals with the court and  filed  a notice of election to purchase Defendant’s interest in the Multi-Family Property at the appraised value.

The Multi-Family Property was valued at $400,000, and the Gas Station Property was valued at $2,850,000 inclusive of the property, the business enterprise, furniture, fixtures, and equipment, but not the business inventory.

On April 29, 2026, Defendant dismissed the cross complaint’s first cause of action for partition.  

On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to adopt the appraised fair market values of both the Multi-Family Property and the Gas Station Property pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 874.316(f) and (g).

In opposition, Defendant agrees as to the collective appraised values but “opposes the motion’s attempt to have the Court determine that Singh is seeking a partition by sale that would subject him to Civil Procedure § 874.317(a). Singh’s cause of action for partition by sale in the Cross Complaint was dismissed prior to the filing of this motion to adopt the appraised values. The dismissal was timely and acts as a reset.”

Further that, under Guttman v. Guttman, 72 Cal. App. 5th 396, 408, “the issue is not properly before the Court and no orders on the issue should be made” as to a buyout proceeding.

Finally, that “Based on the pleadings in their current state, Civil Procedure § 874.317(a) does not apply. Instead, the Court should follow Civil Procedure § 874.317(d) as both the Plaintiff and Defendant each wish to purchase the Subject Properties.”

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 874.316(f) states:

“If an appraisal is filed with the court pursuant to subdivision (d), the court shall conduct a hearing to determine the fair market value of the property...”

Further, Code of Civil Procedure section 874.316(g) states:

“After a hearing under subdivision (f), but before considering the merits of the partition action, the court shall determine the fair market value of the property and send notice to the parties of the value.”

Therefore, the Court intends to hold the hearing under subdivision (f), finding that the appraisal was filed with this Court in order to determine the fair market value of the two properties and thereafter determine the fair market value pursuant to subdivision (g).

As to the opposition, the Court does not find either citation impacts the determination of the fair market value of the Subject Properties pursuant to the ordered appraisals. Further, Defendant does not appear to contest the appraised value. It appears both parties wish to purchase the properties and the court is willing to discuss a procedure to facilitate that sale to the highest bidder.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Leon, Elizabeth Jane vs. County of Tulare

Case No.:   VCU322061

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Production

Tentative Ruling: There are no tentative rulings on the merits for these motions. The parties are directed to meaningfully meet and confer before the hearing of these motions to resolve the discovery disputes identified in the moving and opposition papers for these discovery motions. If unable to resolve, counsel are directed to personally appear for the hearing on these discovery motions. No CourtCall or Zoom appearances will be permitted if the parties are unable to resolve this matter prior to the scheduled hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Garcia, Anna Teresa vs. Hyundai Motor of America

Case No.:  VCU333839

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Tos et a CMC regarding the status of the arbitration on February 19, 2027.

Background Facts

In this Song Beverly Act case, Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of claims for breach of express and implied warranty, and under Business and Professions Code section 17200 involving the purchase of a 2023 Hyundai Palisade, VIN: KM8R44GE7PU640306 (“Vehicle”).

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate and Delegation Clause

Defendant notes that the Vehicle contains a “optional Connected Services system that includes various functions and features such as remote start with climate control, remote door lock and unlock, remote car finder, on-demand diagnostics and alerts, enhanced roadside assistance, and automatic emergency assistance” entitled “Bluelink.” (Declaration of Rao ¶5.) To enroll in Bluelink services, customers must agree to the then-effective Connected Services Agreement (“CSA”). (Declaration of Rao ¶6.)

Further, that on January 11, 2024, Plaintiff enrolled the Subject Vehicle in Bluelink services on the Dealer Web Portal (“DWP”) through a process known as the Dealer Assisted Enrollment process. (Declaration of Roa ¶6.)

The Bluelink CSA states:

“Hyundai and you agree to arbitrate any and all disputes and claims between us arising out of or relating to this Agreement, Connected Services, Connected Services Systems, Service Plans, your Vehicle, use of the sites, or products, services, or programs you purchase, enroll in or seek product/service support for, whether you are a Visitor or Customer, via the sites or through mobile application, except any disputes or claims which under governing law are not subject to arbitration, to the maximum extent permitted by applicable law. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted and to make all disputes and claims between us subject to arbitration to the fullest extent permitted by law. […] The agreement to arbitrate otherwise includes, but is not imited to: claims based in contract, tort, warranty, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising) […]” (Declaration of Rao ¶ - Ex. B.)

Plaintiff argues no agreement has been formed under the Bluelink CSA and further that the Bluelink CSA is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Neither party appears to discuss the presence of the delegation clauses, however, the Bluelink CSA contains the following delegation clause:

“All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision as well as the Agreement´s other terms and conditions, and the arbitrator shall have exclusive authority to resolve any such dispute relating to the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision or any other term of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this arbitration provision or Agreement is void or voidable.”

Authority and Analysis - Delegation Clause

Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551 summarizes the applicable analysis with respect to delegation clauses:

“A delegation clause requires issues of interpretation and enforceability of an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator. Delegation clauses have the potential to create problems of circularity. For example, suppose an arbitration agreement delegates the issue of enforceability to the arbitrator. If the arbitrator concludes that the arbitration agreement is, in fact, not enforceable, this would mean that the entire agreement, including the delegation clause, is unenforceable-a finding that would undermine the arbitrator's jurisdiction to make that finding in the first place. For this reason, courts have treated the delegation clause as a separate agreement to arbitrate solely the issues of enforceability…

“For this reason, when a party is claiming that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable, it is important to determine whether the party is making a specific challenge to the enforceability of the delegation clause or is simply arguing that the agreement as a whole is unenforceable. If the party's challenge is directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable. In contrast, if the party is making a specific challenge to the delegation clause, the court must determine whether the delegation clause itself may be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue of enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable). (Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 70)”

Here, clear and unmistakable language is found in the Bluelink CSA:

“All issues are for the arbitrator to decide, including the scope and enforceability of this arbitration provision…”

Challenge to Agreement in its Entirety as Unenforceable

Here, Plaintiff has challenged the Bluelink CSA, noted above, are unenforceable in its entirety on a number of grounds.

The Court, therefore, interprets this challenge, under Rent-A-Center and Malone, above, a challenge “…directed to the agreement as a whole--even if it applies equally to the delegation clause--the delegation clause is severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, will determine whether the agreement is enforceable.”

Therefore, the Court will sever out the delegation clause and enforce it.

As such, the Court grants the motion and compels issues of interpretation, applicability, enforceability, and formation to the arbitrator pursuant to the Bluelink CSA.

The Court further stays this matter pending the arbitrator’s rulings on these issues.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 Renteria, Edward Anthony vs. Miller, Cary Darrel

Case No.:   VCU326433

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Set Aside / Vacate Dismissal following OSC

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and set the matter for trial.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff filed this matter September 30, 2025.

On January 28, 2026, a Case Management Conference (“CMC”) was held. Plaintiff failed to file a Case Management Statement or attend the CMC.

On February 2, 2026, this Court issued an OSC why sanctions in the amount of $250.00, including dismissal of this action, should not be imposed for the failure to file a proof of service, appear at CMC on January 28, 2026, and file a Case Management Statement.

At the OSC and continued CMC on March 25, 2026, no appearance was made by Plaintiff and the Court dismissed this matter without prejudice.

On May 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for relief from dismissal based on Plaintiff’s counsel’s sole fault pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, stating “The CMC/OSC of March 25, 2026 was not properly entered on the office calendar or appearance calendar, and no appearance was made. Although calendaring tasks are delegated within my office, the duty to ensure compliance with court orders and to appear at scheduled hearings rests with me as counsel of record.” (Declaration of Soofer ¶10.)

The Court notes proofs of service of the complaint filed May 11, 2026, indicating that service occurred February 3, 2026.

In opposition, Defendants argue “Code of Civil Procedure, §473(b), provides that relief MAY be granted from dismissal through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” The opposition argues that the reason for the failure to appear must be excusable neglect.

However, where an “attorney affidavit of fault” is filed, there is no requirement that the attorney’s mistake inadvertence, etc., be excusable.  Relief must be granted even where the default or dismissal resulted from inexcusable neglect by the defendant’s attorney (Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Winbond Electronics Corp. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4^th 868 897 (disapproved on other grounds in Even Zohar Const. & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4^th 830, 845)

The Court is not concerned with the reason for the attorney’s inexcusable mistake (Billing v. Health Plan of America (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 250, 256.) Rather, the trial court may deny the motion if it finds that the attorney’s declaration of fault is not credible. (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4^th 907, 915)

The Court accepts counsel’s declaration as to the calendaring error. The purpose of the mandatory relief section of section 473(b) is “to alleviate the hardship on parties who lost their day in court due solely to an inexcusable failure to act on the part of their attorneys.” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 26 Cal.4^th 249, 257.) The Court, therefore, grants the motion and vacates the dismissal.

The Court intends to conduct the CMC at the date of the hearing on this motion and set the matter for trial.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Jimenez, Jose Louie III vs. Land O'Lakes, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU300278

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Counsel’s Motion to be Relieved

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion

On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff’s Counsel Kane Moon, Allen Feghali, and Julie S. Oh, Kane Law Group, filed a motion to be relieved as counsel as to Plaintiff  Jose Louie Jimenez III as to this PAGA matter. Plaintiff’s Counsel filed the following with respect to withdrawing:

(1) MC-051 - Notice of Motion and Motion to be Relieved as Counsel;

(2) MC-052 – Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel; and

(3) MC-053 - Order Granting Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel

Additionally, Plaintiff’s Counsel has filed proof of service of these documents by mail.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides that “[t]he attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment of final determination, as follows: 1. Upon the consent of both client and attorney, filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes; [or] 2. Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other.”

California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) requires that the “notice of motion and motion to be relieved as counsel under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) must be directed to the client and must be made on the Notice of Motion and Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel-Civil (form MC-051).”

As noted above, counsel has complied with California Rule of Court 3.1362(a) by submitting the notice and motion on MC-051 and by directing the notice and motion to all parties.

California Rule of Court 3.1362 (c) further mandates that: “The motion to be relieved as counsel must be accompanied by a declaration on the Declaration in Support of Attorney's Motion to Be Relieved as Counsel--Civil (form MC-052). The declaration must state in general terms and without compromising the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship why a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(2) is brought instead of filing a consent under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1). Specifically, the declaration that Rule 3.1362(c) requires must state that the moving attorney attempted to secure a “Substitution of Attorney” from the client as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 284(1) and that the client refused to so stipulate.

Here, the declaration is properly made on form MC-052, and uses general terms without compromising confidentiality. The declaration indicates that counsel has been unable to contact Plaintiff for several months but has attempted to reach Plaintiff via telephone, through other known contacts, by mail, by email, and by arranging for an in-person attempt at Plaintiff's last known address, all without success. Although the declaration does not indicate attempts to obtain a substitution by stipulation, in light of the lack of contact, the Court will accept the declaration as satisfactory.

Next, service under Rule 3.1362(d) requires personal service, electronic service, or mail and counsel’s declaration must note the service made. Here, service was by mail on May 11, 2026. The declaration of counsel indicates that Plaintiff’s  address was attempted, unsuccessfully, to be confirmed as current, but that the address is the last known address of Plaintiff.

Finally, Rule 3.1362(e) requires the proposed order be lodged with the Court on MC-053 with the moving papers, specifying all hearing dates scheduled, including date of trial. Plaintiff Counsel has complied with this requirement.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Flores, Rafael vs. HR Mobile Services, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU314557

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To continue this motion to August 4, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2; To order counsel to provide a supplemental declaration, to be filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing, which states the attorney rate and hours information to calculate the lodestar and provides information as to the presently incurred costs. To take the CMC off calendar. To discharge the OSC re: sanctions.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $32,500)

The gross settlement amount is $150,000. Plaintiff estimates approximately 148 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $219.59 per member.

The Class Members consist of:

“All persons who Defendant employed in a non-exempt capacity in California during the Class Period (the time period from October 29, 2020 through the date the Court signs the Preliminary Approval Order, or an earlier date voluntarily selected by Defendant in the event the Escalator Clause in Section 7.1.2 of the Agreement is triggered)”

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: (1) failure to provide meal periods in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7, 512, 558; (2) failure to provide rest periods in violation of Labor Code sections 226.7, 512, 558; (3) failure to pay all wages in violation of Labor Code sections 510, 1194, and 1194.2; (4) knowing and intentional failure to comply with itemized employee wage statement provisions in violation of Labor Code sections 226(a), (e), 1174(d); (5) failure to timely pay wages due at termination in violation of Labor Code sections 201-203; (6) failure to timely pay employees in violation of Labor Code section 204(a), (b); (7) failure to reimburse for business expenses in violation of Labor Code section 2802; (8) violation of Labor Code sections 212(a)(2) and 213 (payment by gift card); (9) failure to pay all accrued and vested vacation/PTO wages in violation of Labor Code section 227.3; (10) failure to pay for all hours worked, including overtime hours worked, in violation of Labor Code sections 210, 218; (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (12) penalties pursuant to Labor Code section 2699(f) for violations of the foregoing Labor Code provisions.

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized, noting the maximum potential liability, after factoring in probability of prevailing, to be $319,322.78, inclusive of the estimated PAGA penalty recovery of $34,000. (Declaration of Otkupman ¶38.) Therefore, the proposed settlement represents approximately 47% of this maximum potential recovery. (Declaration of Otkupman ¶38.)

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $150,000 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Court Approved Attorney Fees (35%):	$52,500
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$20,000
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff :	$10,000
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs	$10,000
Proposed Total PAGA Penalties	$25,000
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$32,500

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator. 

Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer.

The class notice period is therefore approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The Court preliminarily approves Plaintiff Rafael Flores as Class Representative for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiff is $10,000.

The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely.

Enhancement payments “are fairly typical in class action cases.” (Cellphone Termination Fee Cases (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1393.) Enhancement payments “are intended to compensate class representatives for work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaken in bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney general.” (Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 948, 958-959.) “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that he or she should be compensated for the expense or risk he has incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” (Clark v. American Residential Services LLC (2009) 175 Cal.App.4^th 785, 806.)

Therefore, the Court will approve a $5,000 enhancement.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 35% of the gross settlement fund of $150,000 or $52,500 and costs not to exceed $20,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Although the Court recognizes the utilization of the percentage of the common fund methodology to award attorneys’ fees, the Court requires a declaration from counsel that provides an estimate as to what the lodestar would be in this case. The ultimate goal of the Court is to award reasonable attorneys’ fees irrespective of the method of calculation. As such, the court needs to know the estimate of the approximate lodestar supported by declarations for preliminary approval. Counsel should submit information as to the time spent on this action and the hourly rates of all counsel working on the case. Without such information, the Court declines to preliminarily approve the fees.

The Court also cannot preliminarily approve costs up to $20,000.00 without a declaration which states the costs currently expended. 

The Court, however, finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The Court preliminary approves Apex Clas Action Administration as the claims administrator for this class action based on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this Court and the estimate provided by Apex.  The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $10,000.

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The Court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to Bethlehem Center, 506 N. Garden St., Visalia, CA 93291, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

Counsel’s declaration indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Otkupman ¶39 – Exhibit D.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Otkupman sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 148 employees have been identified through Defendant’s employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representative, through their declaration, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representative was employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Based on the above, the motion to preliminary approve the settlement is continued to August 4, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.  Counsel is directed to provide a supplemental declaration, to be filed no later than five (5) court days prior to the hearing, which provides attorney rate and hours information to calculate the lodestar and the presently incurred costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Fuentes, Amanda vs. General Motors, LLC

Case No.:   VCU333368

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend; to sustain the demurrer to the fifth cause of action with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff alleges that on or about July 30, 2020, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant GM regarding a 2020 Cadillac CT5, vehicle identification number 1G6DN5RK4L0136420 (hereafter "Subject Vehicle") (FAC ¶6.)

Plaintiff further alleges that defects and nonconformities arose and included transmission defects, engine defects, and electrical defects. (FAC ¶13.)

Plaintiff alleges discovery of the alleged wrongful conduct on February 2, 2026 when Plaintiff requested a buyback and/or restitution of the Subject Vehicle from GM, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following GM's unsuccessful attempts to repair them. (FAC ¶27.) Plaintiff generally alleges tolling under equitable tolling, the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling. (FAC ¶26.)

Relevant here, as to the fourth case of action for breach of implied warranty, Plaintiff alleges that “At the time of sale, the subject vehicle was sold with one or more latent defect(s) as set forth above. The existence of the said latent defect(s) constitutes a breach of the implied warranty because the Vehicle (1) does not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, (2) is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, (3) is not adequately contained, packaged, and labelled, and (4) does not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” (FAC ¶47.)

As to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement, Plaintiff alleges:

“53. Defendant GM committed fraud by allowing the Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Vehicle and its 10-speed transmission were defective and susceptible to sudden and premature failure. Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle equipped with GM's defective 10-speed transmission.

…

55. On or about July 30, 2020 when vehicle odometer reading was 79,751, Plaintiff experienced defects and non-conformities in the Vehicle including, but not limited to shuddering, jerking, hesitation on acceleration, car turning off and not going into drive mode at stop lights, loss of power, oil leaks, stalling.

56. On nine occasions, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to Defendant GM’s authorized repair facility Giant Chevrolet Cadillac, with complaints.

…

58. Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to experience symptoms of the defects in the Vehicle, despite Defendant’s representation that the various defects had been repaired.

…

61. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, Defendant GM was well aware and knew that the 10-speed transmission installed on the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiff prior to and at the time of sale and thereafter.” (FAC ¶¶53, 55, 56, 58 61.)

Further, that GM knew the transmission had various defects that could result in “(1) hesitation or delayed acceleration, (2) harsh or hard shifting, (3) jerking, (4) shuddering, or juddering; (5) surging and/or inability to control the vehicle's speed, acceleration, or deceleration, (6) symptoms requiring reprogramming of the transmission control module ("TCM") and/or powertrain control module ("PCM"), (7) failure or replacement of the transmission” and that these defects present a safety hazard. (FAC ¶62.)

Further, that GM acquired knowledge of the defect based on sources not available to consumers, including testing data, consumer complaints, and aggregate warranty data. (FAC ¶63.)

Further, Plaintiff alleges “Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who interacted with sales representatives, considered Defendant GM's advertisement, and/or other marketing materials concerning GM Vehicles prior to purchasing Subject Vehicle. Had Defendant GM and its dealership(s) revealed the Transmission Defect in these disclosures, Plaintiff would have been aware of it and would not have purchased Subject Vehicle.” (FAC ¶64.)

Defendant demurrers to the fourth cause of action on the basis of the statute of limitations.

Defendant demurrers to the fifth cause of action on the basis of the statute of limitations, as to lack of specificity, failure to allege a duty to disclose and failure to plead GM had exclusive knowledge. Further, that the economic loss rule bars the fraud cause of action.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the complaint does not, on its face, demonstrate that the statute of limitations applies regarding the fourth cause of action and that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled the fifth cause of action.

Authority and Analysis

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. Of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4^th 32, 42 states, “ ‘ “A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar . . . to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”

Fourth Cause of Action – Implied Warranty

"The Song-Beverly Act does not include its own statute of limitations. [Citation.] California courts have held that the statute of limitations for an action for breach of warranty under the Song-Beverly Act is governed by the same statute that governs the statute of limitations for warranties arising under the Uniform Commercial Code." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305-1306.)

As noted by Defendant, implied warranty claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations under the California UCC. (Comm. Code, § 2725(1).)

Defendant argues that the breach of implied warranty claim accrues upon purchase of the Subject Vehicle and that delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims, citing Nguyen v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2020) 487 F.Supp.3d 845, 854 n.3. The Court notes Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 132 agrees, noting that delayed discovery does not apply to implied warranty claims under Commercial Code section 2725. The Court notes "In the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery." (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1305.)

Therefore, where the complaint alleges a purchase date of July 30, 2020 and this complaint was filed March 27, 2026, the claim for breach of implied warranty is beyond the four-year statute of limitations.

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer to the fourth cause of action without leave to amend.

Fifth Cause of Action - Concealment

Statute of Limitations

Defendant contends the statute of limitations begins the date the Vehicle was purchased on July 30, 2020 and that the three-year statute of limitations for fraud therefore bars Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action against Defendant, as the complaint was filed March 27, 2026.

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d).)

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.) The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.) "The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

Further,  "[i]t has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. [Citation.] Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an 'otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. [Citations.]" (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)

The Court does not believe the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after some presentation of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the alleged defect.

However, the first amended complaint alleges  “On or about July 30, 2020 when vehicle odometer reading was 79,751, Plaintiff experienced defects and non-conformities in the Vehicle including, but not limited to shuddering, jerking, hesitation on acceleration, car turning off and not going into drive mode at stop lights, loss of power, oil leaks, stalling.” (FAC ¶55.)

Defendant notes this in the opposition, arguing:

“Only one of those presentations was dated, July 30, 2020 (which also happens to be the same date the vehicle was purchased), is well before this lawsuit was filed. (Id., ¶ 55.) On the contrary, given nine presentations and a presentation in July 2020, by Plaintiff’s own allegations they should have discovered the alleged defects with reasonable diligence, which is first required before tolling can be applied.”

Further, this allegation lacks sufficient specificity to establish delayed discovery or other tolling theories. (E-Fab, Inc., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at 1319.)

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend as to this issue. Therefore, the Court will not rule on the other arguments regarding other issues of specificity, lack of duty, transactional relationship and other arguments in support of the demurrer.

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Therefore, the Court orders an amended complaint as to the fifth cause of action filed no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Ramirez, Laura H vs. FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE

Case No.:   PCU331315

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Defendant’s Motion to Deem Admissions Admitted; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and deem Nos. 1 through 20 admitted; to order sanctions against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $207.50 due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling; Defendant shall give notice.

Facts

In this breach of insurance contract and tortious bad faith action, Defendant served Plaintiff, via counsel, with Requests for Admissions, Set One, via mail on March 24, 2026.

The deadline to respond is indicated as May 15, 2026.

As of the date of the filing of this motion, no response has been received by Defendant.

Defendant now seeks to deem Admissions Nos. 1 through 20 admitted and for sanctions in the amount 1,358.00.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Plaintiff has failed to serve a timely response and Defendant has moved for an order to deem the admissions admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions Nos. 1 through 20 of Defendant’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

As to sanctions, the Court notes 4.4 hours incurred, with additional time anticipated, as to the filing of this motion at a rate of $295 per hour, plus a $60 filing fee.

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) the Court imposes sanctions in the total amount $207.50, consisting of one half hour for this motion at the stated rate of $295, plus the $60 filing fee. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to deem admissions admitted is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Sanctions in that amount are imposed against Plaintiff and counsel of record, jointly and severally, and are due no later than thirty (30) days from notice of this ruling. Defendant shall give notice

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                In the Matter of Orey, Michael Paul

Case No.:   PCU331903

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to modify the proposed order as indicated herein; to set a status conference for July 21, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19, as to the mutual selection of the arbitrator or, alternatively, the joint filing of a list from which the Court will nominate five therefrom pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6.

Background Facts

In this matter, the Court previously granted the petition to obtain a case number, open a file and obtain the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Cal. Ins. Code § 11580.2(f)(1) and Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 921-926 in order to arbitrate this underinsured motorist claim.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

Counsel’s declaration states that on February 2, 2023 at or near Highway 65 and Hermosa Street, Harvinder Kaur ("Defendant Driver”) failed to stop at a red light and collided with a vehicle in which Claimant was a passenger. (Declaration of Russell ¶4.)

On December 10, 2024, Claimant sent Defendant Driver an Insurance Policy Limit Demand Letter. (Declaration of Russell ¶5.)

On or about January 23, 2026, American Family Connect Property and Casualty Insurance Company tendered its entire policy limit in the amount of $250,000. (Declaration of Russell ¶6.)

However, this amount was insufficient to compensate Claimant and on December 10, 2024, Claimant sent Respondent Nonprofits Insurance Agency an Underinsured Policy Limit Demand Letter. (Declaration of Russell ¶8.)

On February 25, 2026, Claimant sent Respondent a Demand for UIM Arbitration. (Declaration of Russell ¶10.) No response was received from Respondent. (Declaration of Russell ¶11.)

Claimant Orey now seeks to compel arbitration via this motion.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

As noted by Petitioner, underinsured motorist policies must provide for binding arbitration of disputes regarding the insured's right to recover damages and the amount thereof under California Insurance Code section 11580.2(f):       

“… The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration.” (California Insurance Code, § 11580.2(f).)

While no copy of the Policy was provided, the agreement to arbitrate this type of dispute appears to be mandated by law. Therefore, the Court finds an agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

As stated above, a party moving to compel arbitration under Code Civil Procedure Section 1281.2 must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate; (2) one or more of the claims at issue are covered by that agreement; and (3) the responding party refused a prior demand for arbitration under the agreement of the claims at issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Villacreses v. Molinari (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1230.)

Here, the Court has found an agreement to arbitrate via the insurance policy, finds that this underinsured claim is covered under the insurance policy and that Respondent has refused a prior demand for arbitration.

As such, in the absence of any opposition, the Court grants the petition to compel arbitration.

Selection of Arbitrator

Claimant’s proposed order states that the parties are ordered to choose an arbitrator within ten (10) days of the hearing on this petition and that if they cannot agree, the Court will appoint the arbitrator.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6 provides the process for selection as follows, in part:

“If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointing an arbitrator, that method shall be followed. If the arbitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration is sought may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator and that method shall be followed. In the absence of an agreed method, or if the agreed method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator appointed fails to act and his or her successor has not been appointed, the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator.

When a petition is made to the court to appoint a neutral arbitrator, the court shall nominate five persons from lists of persons supplied jointly by the parties to the arbitration or obtained from a governmental agency concerned with arbitration or private disinterested association concerned with arbitration. The parties to the agreement who seek arbitration and against whom arbitration is sought may within five days of receipt of notice of the nominees from the court jointly select the arbitrator whether or not the arbitrator is among the nominees. If the parties fail to select an arbitrator within the five-day period, the court shall appoint the arbitrator from the nominees.” (Code Civ. Proc § 1281.6.)

As such, the Court will keep in place a portion of the proposed order that states:

“2. Petitioner MICHAEL PAUL OREY and Respondent NONPROFITS INSURANCE ALLIANCE are hereby ordered to choose an arbitrator within (10) days from the hearing on this Petition.”

However, the Court will strike the following from the proposed order:

“3. If Petitioner MICHAEL PAUL OREY and Respondent NONPROFITS INSURANCE ALLIANCE do not agree upon an arbitrator within (10) ten days from the hearing on this Motion, an arbitrator will be appointed by the Court.”

The Court will order instead of the above:

“3. If Petitioner MICHAEL PAUL OREY and Respondent NONPROFITS INSURANCE ALLIANCE do not agree upon an arbitrator within (10) ten days from the hearing on this Motion, the parties are ordered to jointly supply a list of arbitrators so that the Court may nominate five from that list pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.6.”

Therefore, the Court will set a status conference for July 21, 2026, 8:30 am, Dept. 19, as to the mutual selection of the arbitrator or, alternatively, the joint filing of a list from which the Court will nominate five therefrom.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                 L.A. COMMERCIAL GROUP, INC., a Corporation vs. MOSQUEDA, CHRISTINE MARIE et al

Case No.:   PCL325912

Date:           July 7, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Motion to Enforce Settlement as Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion as requested.

Facts

In this common counts and breach of contract action, Plaintiff filed a notice of conditional settlement on November 26, 2025.

Defendants were served with the summons and complaint, but did not file an answer. Entry of default occurred on November 7, 2025, but no default judgment has been entered in this matter.

On or about November 24, 2025, the parties entered into a stipulation to resolve this matter for a total of $7,596.87 due as follows:

$2,000.00 due on or before November 19, 2025

$2,000.00 due on or before December 20, 2025

$2,000.00 due on or before January 20, 2026

$1,596.87 due on or before February 20, 2026

In the event of default, the stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above, less any credit, plus attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as to this motion.

The stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. However, the Court notes that this matter has not been dismissed and the Court has not lost jurisdiction over the parties and this matter.

Plaintiff indicates that Defendants have made payments totaling $4,000.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court retains jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

Defendant appears to have breached the settlement, based upon the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel and, the Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $4,056.87, consisting of the principal amount of $7,596.87, plus attorneys’ fees of $400.00, plus costs of $60.00, less $4,000 in credits for payments made.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared July 8, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054053	In the Matter of Corona, Francisco	Spousal Property Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued Hearing—Documents in order
VPR053985	In the Matter of the Opal L. Parker Revocable Trust	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Continued Hearing—Response filed
VPR053623	In the Matter of Ali Ahmed Saleh and Nahklah Ahmed Saleh Family Trust	Review Hearing	Appearance Required	Accountings to be filed
VPR053560	In the Matter of Alberti, Joseph Frank	Final Distribution Hearing – Ex Parte	Appearance Required	Inventory and Appraisal missing Attachment 1 and/or 2: the inventory and appraisal shall separately list each item and shall state the fair market value, Prob C § 8802
VPR054170	In the Matter of Santoyo Gomez, Enrique	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration not filed
VPR054169	In the Matter of Pacheco, Daniel	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Capacity Declaration not filed
VPR054158	In the Matter of Diaz, John Anthony	Appoint Temporary Conservator	Appearance Required	Notice of Hearing to proposed conservatee not filed; need Citation (GC-320) to be issued for service prior to the appointment hearing. Capacity Declaration to be filed
VPR053946	In the Matter of Guzman Zuniga, Martha Catalina	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Attachment Requesting Special Orders Regarding a Major Neurocognitive Disorder (form GC-313) not attached to Petition
VPR053915	In the Matter of Martinez, Ana Rebecca	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Citation, Notice of Hearing and Orientation Completion Certificate not filed

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for JULY 2, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
PPR054082	In the Matter of Clawson, Richard	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Appearance Required	Previous issues remain as discussed on the court's record
PPR054099	IMO Don Edward Siegal Living Trust	Confirm Property to Trust	Recommended for Approval

South County Justice Center & Visalia-County Civic Center

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared  July  2, 2026 that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date	Dept	Case	Comments
7/2/26	Dept 19	PPR053451; IMO  I.S.L.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460, 1510.  No Order Terminating Guardianship lodged with the court prior to hearing.
7/2/26	Dept 1	VPR047286; IMO B.C.	Notice of Hearing (GC-020) has not been filed indicating service was completed pursuant to Probate Code §1460. Notice to Tribe is required.  Petition for Appointment of Successor Guardian has not been filed.