Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, April 14, 2026, are:

Re:                 Garcia, Maria vs. Super Center Concepts, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU319504 

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling:  To deny the motion

This is a slip-and-fall negligence case.  The following facts about the incident at issue are generally not in dispute:

Defendant Super Center, the party here moving for summary judgment, operates a grocery store in Dinuba.  On a windy day, November 11, 2024, a small 8.5- by 11-inch sign, affixed to a bucket in front of defendant’s store, became dislodged and blew out into the path of a concrete walkway proximate to the store’s public entry and exit door.  About 10 minutes later, plaintiff, walking with her son following behind her, approached the area of the public entry/exit door, and when she reached that area, stepped and slipped on defendant’s dislodged sign, causing her to fall to the ground.  The objections submitted by both parties to the evidence submitted by the opposing party are overruled. The court has also not considered the untimely amended response and declaration filed by plaintiff’s counsel on April 7, 2026.

Plaintiff complaint frames a premises liability claim.  “Premises liability is a form of negligence based on the holding in Rowland v. Christian [(1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561] (Rowland)] and is described as follows: The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.”  (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619 [264 Cal.Rptr. 756].)

“It is well established in California that although a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.”  (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 36 P.3d 11] (Ortega), citations omitted.)

As premises liability is a form of negligence, the elements of a premises liability claim, as with any negligence claim, are “duty, breach, causation and damages.” (Ibid., citations omitted.)  And, as with any other negligence claim, “[a] plaintiff meets the causation element by showing that (1) the defendant's breach of its duty to exercise ordinary care was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff's harm, and (2) there is no rule of law relieving the defendant of liability. [Citation.] These are factual questions for the jury to decide, except in cases in which the facts as to causation are undisputed. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor's personal safety [citation],” however, “the owner's actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability. Although the owner's lack of knowledge is not a defense, ‘[t]o impose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to [a] defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier “must have either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises. . . .” ’ [Citation.]”  (Id., at p. 1206.)

In defendant’s initial moving papers, and plaintiff’s opposition, the parties spent significant effort disputing whether a triable issue remains in this case as to whether defendant had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition of the dislodged sign in front of defendant’s store.  (The parties devoted little effort to arguing whether defendant had actual knowledge of the sign falling, perhaps, as plaintiff appeared to have conceded, at least impliedly, that defendant hadn’t “physically placed the Signage on the ground” and it is not disputed that only approximately 10 minutes passed between the sign falling and plaintiff’s having stepped and slipped on it.)

Defendant purported to show that plaintiff could not establish defendant had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition based on prior discovery admissions to the effect that she lacked evidence to contradict that defendant’s employee had inspected the area where the sign had fallen about eight minutes prior to the sign falling (or, about 18 minutes prior to plaintiff’s slip-and-fall). 

Drawing on purported analogies to Girvetz v. Boys' Market, Inc. (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827 [206 P.2d 6] and Louie v. Hagstrom's Food Stores, Inc. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 601 [184 P.2d 708]—two slip-and-fall cases in which courts concluded a foreign object on the ground that caused a fall had not been on the ground for a sufficient period of time to support a conclusion that a store proprietor, through ordinary care, could have discovered it—that no reasonable jury could conclude, more probably than not, that the sign in this case was on the ground for a sufficient period of time to support a conclusion that defendant, through ordinary care, could have discovered it. 

Plaintiff, in response, submitted an inspection log maintained by defendant showing the last inspection of the area occurred 51 minutes before plaintiff’s injury occurred (or, as can be derived from this, approximately 41 minutes prior to the sign falling) and, further, correctly noted, citing Ortega, that, the issue of constructive knowledge—i.e., “[w]hether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it”—is generally “a question of fact for the jury”; “the cases do not impose exact time limitations”; and “[e]ach accident must be viewed in light of its own unique circumstances.”  (Id., at p. 1207.)

Plaintiff additionally raised that triable issues remain as to whether defendant created the risk of plaintiff’s injury by failing to properly secure the sign that caused plaintiff’s injury, based on her own undisputed factual submissions that defendant (inferably, its employee) had attached the sign to a bucket with Velcro outside the store despite the windy conditions existing during the period relevant to the incident at issue.  Notably here, defendant did not attempt to show in its motion that plaintiff did not have (and could not reasonably obtain) evidence that negligence on the part of defendant’s employee in affixing the sign to the bucket was a substantial factor in the sign’s becoming dislodged and falling into the customer walkway and defendant did not present evidence that conclusively negated that possible source of liability either.  (see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853-854 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493]; Leyva v. Garcia (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1103 [236 Cal.Rptr.3d 128].) 

Accordingly, it would seem, although plaintiff did not state the point explicitly, that defendant essentially failed to address, and therefore failed to carry its prima facia burden on, the issue of whether defendant, vis-à-vis its employee, could “have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discover the condition [of a poorly affixed sign], which if known to him, he [defendant’s employee] should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on [defendant’s] premises.”  (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) 

Arguably, however, it is also debatable whether, strictly speaking, this is a theory of liability actually raised in plaintiff’s complaint.  In the complaint, plaintiff most specifically alleged that defendant “failed to maintain and clean the floors causing injury to Plaintiff”; that “[t]he accident in question was caused by a failure on Defendant's part to maintain a safe and hazard-free environment”; and that “Defendant's failure to warn of the hazard was a further cause of Plaintiff’s injuries, as was their failure to cure the dangerous condition.”  Still, though, plaintiff’s complaint did include the allegation that defendant “negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises,” and so it is also arguable that the complaint sufficiently framed the issue of defendant’s negligence in affixing the signage such that this was an issue to which defendant’s motion was required to respond. 

In any event, however, none of this is further argued in defendant’s reply brief.  Instead, defendant expressly asserts that “[w]hether Defendant had notice” of the dangerous condition of the fallen sign “is a non-issue for determination of Defendant’s motion,” as is the issue of whether the condition existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to have discovered it.  Defendant instead devotes the entirety of its reply brief to supporting another submitted ground for summary judgment raised in its moving papers:  That the dislodged sign in the walkway was open and obvious and, therefore, that defendant had no duty to warn about, or remedy, it.  Regarding even “Plaintiff’s arguments about the use of Velcro” defendant only maintains this “has nothing to do with the sign being open and obvious.”

Given the express statement of defendant in its reply that the above issues are “non-issue[s] for determination of Defendant’s motion,” the court won’t further address them except to observe the apparent implied concession of defendant, at this stage, that triable issues of fact remain as to whether defendant had constructive notice of the condition of the fallen sign and/or whether possible negligence on the part of defendant in affixing the sign to the bucket was a substantial factor in the sign’s becoming dislodged and falling into the customer walkway (at the very least, it is expressly conceded that these issues are no longer issues, from defendant’s perspective, that must be adjudicated “for determination of Defendant’s motion”); and to express the court’s determination, based on that concession and the parties’ respective showings here, that, indeed, triable issues of fact remain as to whether defendant had constructive notice of the condition of the fallen sign and/or whether possible negligence on the part of defendant in affixing the sign to the bucket was a substantial factor in the sign’s becoming dislodged and falling into the customer walkway.

The “Open and Obvious” Issue

The court now turns to the “open and obvious” issue presented in defendant’s motion.

Defendant cites Obrien v. Fong Wan (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 112 (Obrien) for the following proposition:  “ ‘The owner of property, in so far as an invitee is concerned, is not an insurer of safety but must use reasonable care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition and give warning of latent or concealed perils. He is not liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care.’ ”  (Id., at p. 116.)

In Obrien, a plaintiff brought an action for personal injuries received in a fall down a flight of stairs.  Plaintiff was looking at a display of kimonos in the windows of a downtown Oakland store, and a window she was looking at bordered on a recessed entranceway to a staircase leading to the basement.  When plaintiff walked close to the window to examine a price tag, and stepped a little closer, she fell down the flight of stairs.  (Id., at pp. 114-115.)  Plaintiff sued the proprietor of the store, who was leasing the premises from the building owners, and other defendants who separately leased, from the same owners, the basement area, the stairs and the recessed entranceway where plaintiff fell.  (Id., at p. 115.)  Plaintiff also sued the owners/landlords.

The court rejected several arguments of the plaintiff submitted to support liability on the part of the various defendants, including that the owner/landlord defendants “had breached a duty to her as a member of the public in failing to see that the premises were reasonably safe for the purposes intended to be made thereof.”  (Id., at pp. 119-120.)  Regarding this specific argument, the court observed, inter alia, that “absent fraud or concealment, a landlord is not liable to an invitee for injury upon the leased premises” and “[n]or is a landlord liable to an invitee where the danger is obvious.”  (Id., at p. 120.)

Distinguishable in Obrien, of course, is that a recessed staircase cannot, at least not through conventionally reasonable measures, by remedied in the same manner that a fallen 8.5- by 11-inch plastic sign can. 

Defendant also cites Martinez v. Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179 [18 Cal.Rptr.3d 152] (Martinez) and characterizes it as “a case with similar facts as the instant case,” in which “the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the wet concrete caused by landscaping sprinklers was an open and obvious condition.” “The Court of Appeal,” according to defendant “agreed with the trial court that the wet pavement was an open and obvious condition, and that the open and obvious nature of the condition discharged any duty the defendant had to warn of the condition.”

Defendant is, though, completely wrong about Martinez, and Martinez actually provides clear support for the denial of defendant’s motion on the issue submitted, and on facts more similar to this case than those in Obrien.   

The case had, as defendant indicates, come before the Court of Appeal on plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court order granting summary judgment to a defendant, at whose real property the plaintiff slipped on wet pavement, on grounds defendant had not owed plaintiff any duty of care with respect to the open and obvious condition of water on the ground.  (Id., at p. 1181.)

Contrary to defendant’s representation, however, the Court of Appeal reversed the grant of summary judgment by the trial court.  (Id., at p. 1186.)  While the appellate court found the trial court correctly determined “the allegedly dangerous condition plaintiff encountered—the water and wetness at the area (sidewalk or driveway) where she fell—was ‘open and obvious,’ ” the court held the fact “that the hazard was open and obvious did not relieve defendant of all possible duty, or breach of duty, with respect to it.”  (Id., at p. 1184.) 

The court explained:  “In the trial court and again here, defendant argued only that the obvious appearance of the wet pavement excused defendant from a duty to warn of it. That was most likely so. But the obviousness of a condition does not necessarily excuse the potential duty of a landowner, not simply to warn of the condition but to rectify it.  The modern and controlling law on this subject is that ‘although the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be a duty to remedy the danger, and the breach of that duty may in turn form the basis for liability … .’ ” (Ibid., citations omitted.)

The court then continued:  “The court's analysis therefore was incomplete, and led to a premature conclusion of no duty and therefore no liability. The palpable appearance of the wetness may itself have provided a warning of the slippery condition, excusing defendant from having to do so. But it may yet have been predictable that despite that constructive warning, the wet pavement would still attract pedestrian use. For example, the pavement appears to have provided a principal if not sole access way from the street to defendant's building, which housed a government office serving the public. In these circumstances—which the evidence did not negate, but supported—defendant may have been charged with a duty of relieving the dangerous condition. Whether such a duty existed depends upon a number of as yet unresolved factors, such as the foreseeability of harm, defendant's advance knowledge vel non of the dangerous condition, and the burden of discharging the duty. (See Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].) The facts presented on the motion for summary judgment, some of them in direct conflict (e.g., the source of the water), did not permit resolution of this question of duty in defendant's favor.”  (Id., at p. 1185.)

As a result, contrary to defendant’s characterization, Martinez supports that, notwithstanding whether it is determined in this case that the presence of the sign in the customer walkway was open and obvious, a duty may have still existed to resolve the dangerous condition, depending on various factors discussed in the Rowland case, that here, as in Martinez, remain unresolved, “such as the foreseeability of harm, defendant's advance knowledge vel non of the dangerous condition, and the burden of discharging the duty.”  (Ibid.)  Indeed, the undisputed fact that the sign fell at the entry/exit area of the store in a customer walkway that would foreseeably attract significant pedestrian foot traffic strongly supports it was foreseeable that failing to remedy the hazard of the fallen sign and/or failing to properly secure it in the first place would lead to injury to persons like the plaintiff, and this supports, rather than refutes, that defendant had a duty notwithstanding whether the fallen sign was open and obvious to plaintiff. 

What’s more, the evidence submitted by the defendant fails to establish, here, unlike in Martinez, the absence of a triable issue on the factual question of whether the fallen sign was, indeed, an “open and obvious” hazard. 

That plaintiff, after later watching a captured video of the incident and looking at photos, confirmed the sign was on the ground before she entered the area, the white side was facing up and visible, and that her son should have seen it, does not conclusively establish that the sign was open and obvious, particularly as it was plaintiff’s testimony that she didn’t see the sign prior to slipping on it.  Notably, in Martinez, the plaintiff specifically had “admitted having seen the wetness before stepping on it.”  (Id., at p. 1184.)  These are clearly distinguishable factual circumstances. 

Additionally, the court observes here the holding in Tuttle v. Crawford (1936) 8 Cal.2d 126, 130 [63 P.2d 1128]—cited by plaintiff:  “That it is the duty of storekeepers to keep the floors of their premises safe for those who must pass over them in the transaction of their business must be conceded. The fact that the attention of persons who visit public markets is attracted by the display of the wares offered for sale and more or less absorbed by the transactions which they have in mind would seem to increase the necessity of exercising care to the end that the floor spaces and aisles allotted to the use of customers should be made safe and kept fit for such purpose.” 

Based on this case, in the context of a public market, such as defendant’s store, where customers are “attracted by the display of the wares offered for sale and more or less absorbed by the transactions which they have in mind,” the court is disinclined to find that a fallen sign lying in a pedestrian walkway used for access to the store is an “open and obvious” hazard, given an ostensibly increased necessity of care to keep floor, or walkway, spaces, in such context, safe and fit for pedestrian passage. 

Accordingly, the court finds the defendant fails to carry its burden on summary judgment based on the “open and obvious” issue.  First, it fails to establish the absence of a triable issue on the factual question of whether the fallen sign was open and obvious.  Second, defendant fails to persuade the court that, even if the sign was open and obvious, that it did not have a duty to remedy the condition of the fallen sign or, relatedly, a duty to ensure its signage was securely affixed at the storefront.  Based on the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is denied.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Garcia, Carlos vs. Fruit Growers Supply Company, a California Agricultural Cooperative et al

Case No.:   VCU325579

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:       Motions to Deem Admissions Admitted; Sanctions

Tentative Ruling: To order the payment of an additional $60 filing fee by Defendants; to find the motions to deem admissions admitted moot due to service of Plaintiff’s verified responses; upon payment of the additional filing fee, to order sanctions in the amount of $470 against Plaintiff’s counsel of record; sanctions are due no later than thirty (30) days from payment of the additional filing fee and notice to Plaintiff; to order Defendant to give notice.

Facts

In this matter, Defendants Fruit Growers Supply Company, LLC and Sunkist Growers, LLC each served requests for admissions, set one, on Plaintiff on December 16, 2025. Responses were due January 19, 2026. On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff requested, and received, an extension to January 30, 2025 to respond, which was further extended to February 6, 2026 and later to February 13, 2026.

No responses were received and on February 23, 2026, Defendants filed this motion to deem admissions admitted as to both sets of discovery and for sanctions in the amount of $3,000.

In opposition, Plaintiff states that on March 18, 2026, Plaintiff served complete, verified responses to both Defendants' Requests for Admission, accompanied by verifications signed by Plaintiff under penalty of perjury. Counsel for plaintiff took full responsibility for the delay in producing timely responses. Therefore, Plaintiff argues that the motion is moot, except for the issue of sanctions.

Authority and Analysis

Insufficient Filing Fees

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court by Defendants, but that two motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to deeming admissions admitted upon payment of the remaining filing fee of $60.

Requests for Admissions

The Court agrees that the service of responses renders the motion to deem admissions admitted moot.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), Defendants seek sanctions of $3,000, consisting of 5 hours at the rate of $600 per hour.

The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Further, “[t]he reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [internal citation omitted]. “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)

As such, the Court sets the hourly rate at $350 and will permit one hour total as to the filing of this motion. As the Court has ordered the payment of a second filing fee, the Court will also impose an additional $120 in sanctions. Therefore, the Court orders sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel of record in the amount of $470, due no later than thirty days from payment of the additional filing fee and notice to Plaintiff of said payment. Defendants are ordered to provide notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Rangel, Emir vs. Ruiz Brands, LLC

Case No.:   VCU310694

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings  

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes this hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Licon, Rick vs. Blueline Epoxy Flooring, LLC

Case No.:  VCU330730

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Demurrer by Defendant Blueline Epoxy Flooring, LLC’s “Authorized Representative”

Tentative Ruling: To find the demurrer moot by the filing of the first amended complaint.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                King, Tracy vs. Sequoia Surgery Center et al

Case No.:   VCU319369

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant Sequioa’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: To grant summary adjudication as to Issue No. 2; to deny summary adjudication as to Issue No. 1.

Facts

This matter arises out of a right hip arthroplasty procedure that Plaintiff Tracy King (“Plaintiff”) received on August 22, 2024, and thereafter allegedly suffered right foot drop syndrome. (UMF No. 1.)

Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging a cause of action for professional negligence against Defendant Sequoia Surgery Center (hereinafter “SSC”). (UMF No. 2.) This is an action for damages based on alleged professional negligence (medical malpractice) involving the treatment of Plaintiff by Defendants Ian Duncan, M.D. (“Defendant Duncan”), Defendant Gurbir Athwal, M.D. (“Defendant Athwal”), and Defendant Florence Schenke C.N.R.A. (“Defendant Schenke”), and SSC. (UMF No. 3.)

Defendant SSC states “None of the above-mentioned Defendants, including Defendant Duncan, Defendant Athwal, and Defendant Schenke, are employees of SSC” citing to Exhibit F entitled “Consent to Operations and Other Medical Services.” (UMF No. 4.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, arguing this information is unknown to Plaintiff and is not memorialized in Exhibit F. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 4.)

Further, that “SSC supplies a surgical facility and hires physicians to perform surgeries as independent contractors,” again citing to Exhibit F. (UMF No. 5.) Plaintiff disputes this fact arguing this information is unknown to Plaintiff and is not memorialized in Exhibit F. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 5.)

SSC provided the surgical facility for Plaintiff’s right hip arthroplasty (the “subject procedure”), which was performed by Defendant Duncan, as memorialized in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (UMF No. 6.) Throughout Plaintiff’s treatment at SSC, registered nurses provided care to her, including Kimberley Shahan, R.N. (“Nurse Shahan”), Monica Guzman, R.N. (“Nurse Guzman”), B.S.N., and Marinda Martinez, R.N. (“Nurse Martinez”). (UMF No. 7.)

Particularly, in accordance with the California Nurse Practice Act, Nurse Shahan independently performed direct and indirect patient care within her scope, including: 1) conducting patient assessments, obtaining and interpreting vital signs, and documenting in the medical record; 2) reviewing medical history, confirming allergies, and verifying procedure details; 3) performing point-of-care testing (Hemocue) and reporting results as required; and 4) administering medications as ordered by authorized providers and per standardized procedures. (UMF No. 8.)

Nurse Shahan conducted the pre-operative admission of Plaintiff. (UMF No. 9.) Nurse Shahan followed all criteria and guidelines as outlined in the Sequoia Surgery Center Policy Procedure. (UMF No. 10.) After the procedure, Plaintiff was evaluated and deemed stable for discharge from SSC following surgical intervention. (UMF No. 11.)

Per Sequoia Surgery Center’s Post-Operative Care Policy and the California Nursing Practice Act (Section 2725), all discharge procedures were conducted in alignment with established standards and scope of nursing practice. (UMF No. 12.) Discharge instructions, both verbal and written, were provided to Plaintiff and her responsible party. (UMF No. 13.) The discharge instructions included physician-specific instructions, general anesthesia guidelines, and signs/symptoms of complications to monitor. (UMF No. 15; the Court notes here there is no UMF No. 14.) A handoff report was prepared to ensure safe, high-quality, and continuous patient care during transitions. (UMF No. 16.) A handoff report is essential for communicating critical patient information, care plans, recent changes in condition, and outstanding tasks, thereby reducing the risk of medical errors and promoting patient safety. (UMF No. 17.)

Separately, prior to the subject procedure, Nurse Shahan reviewed the consent form with Plaintiff which indicated that Defendant Duncan was an independent contractor. (UMF No. 18.) Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating “There was no indication that Nurse Shahan reviewed the consent form “with Plaintiff,” or that she explained to Plaintiff that Dr. Duncan was an independent contractor” citing to Shahan’s declaration at paragraph 6. (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 18.)

Further, Defendant SSC states “Plaintiff signed this consent form” citing to Exhibit F. (UMF No. 19.) Plaintiff disputes this fact stating, “This information is not known to Plaintiff and not memorialized in Exhibit F.” (Plaintiff’s Dispute to UMF No. 19.)

The Court notes here that the references above to Exhibit F appear to improperly reference Exhibit E entitled “Consent to Operation and Other Medical Services.”

Defendant SSC seeks summary adjudication as to the following issues:

Issue No. 1: Defendant met the applicable standard of care in the treatment of Plaintiff, Tracy King (“Plaintiff”).

Issue No. 2: Defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for any acts performed by its independent contractors.

Further, the Court notes here that the opposition to this motion focuses on alleged breaches of the standard of care and causation as to the acts of Defendant Dr. Duncan and that Defendant SSC is vicariously liable for the acts (or failures to act) of Defendant Dr. Duncan.

As such, the Court views the issue of Defendant Dr. Duncan’s status as an independent contractor a threshold issue and will take Issue No. 2 first.

Authority and Analysis

“[T]he initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.”  (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only “that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence” but also that “the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)  It is insufficient for the defendant to merely point out the absence of evidence.  (Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891.)  The defendant “must also produce evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”  (Ibid.)  The supporting evidence can be in the form of affidavits, declarations, admissions, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)  The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, “shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action.”  (Ibid.)  “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

Issue No. 2: Defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for any acts performed by its independent contractors.

Vicarious Liability, Ostensible Agency and Independent Contractor Status

The theory of ostensible agency is a legal doctrine that would create vicarious liability as to Defendant SSC because it did not expressly provide notice that Defendant Dr. Duncan, amongst others, were not agents or employees of the SSC.

“It is well established in California that a hospital may be liable for the negligence of physicians on the staff, unless the hospital has clearly notified the patient that the treating physicians are not hospital employees and there is no reason to believe the patient was unable to understand or act on the information. This rule is founded on the theory of ostensible agency.” (Wicks v. Antelope Valley Healthcare Dist. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 866, 882.)

"Ostensible agency is when 'the principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him.'" (Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc. (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 748, 781 (quoting Civ. Code, § 2300).) It is a theory of vicarious liability that has developed because, as stated by the court in Mejia v. Community Hospital of San Bernardino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1453, and quoting a New York court:

“‘The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes, as well as administrative and manual workers,  and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of “hospital facilities” expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.’ (Bing v. Thunig (N.Y. 1957) 2 N.Y.2d 656)”

The Meija court continued: “In light of this modern reality, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions employed ostensible or apparent agency to impose liability on hospitals for the negligence of independent contractor physicians.” The imposition of liability vicariously due to the modern relationship between hospitals, doctors, nurses and other health care professionals, however does not promote the use of ostensible agency as sought by Plaintiffs.

In Meija, the plaintiff presented to the emergency department where an ER physician, based on an x-ray report by the radiologist, discharged the plaintiff. (Id. at 1451.) It was later determined the plaintiff’s neck was broken and the plaintiff was paralyzed. (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter sued the hospital, who successfully moved for nonsuit. (Id.) The court, after examining ostensible agency in California and elsewhere, concluded that ostensible agency can be inferred “from the mere fact that the plaintiff sought treatment at the hospital without being informed that the doctors were independent contractors.” (Id. at 1457)

The Mejia court further explained that hospitals are generally deemed to have held themselves out as the provider of services unless they gave the patient contrary notice, and the patient is generally presumed to have looked to the hospital for care unless he or she was treated by his or her personal physician. (Id. at 1453.) The court held that the elements required for the doctrine of ostensible are: “(1) conduct by the hospital that would cause a reasonable person to believe that the physician was an agent of the hospital, and (2) reliance on that apparent agency relationship by the plaintiff.” (Id.)

The first element is satisfied when a hospital holds itself out as a provider of care, which it is deemed to do unless it gives the patient contrary notice. (Id. at 1454.) The second element of reliance is satisfied when the plaintiff looks to the hospital for services, rather than to the individual physician and reliance is generally presumed absent evidence that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the physician was not the hospital's agent. (Id.) 

Additionally, the Court notes question of ostensible agency is a question for the trier of fact unless the evidence conclusively establishes that the patient knew or should have known that the treating physician was not an agent of the hospital. (Id. at 1457.)

In Meija, the appellate court concluded that the plaintiff demonstrated she sought treatment at the hospital and the evidence did not conclusively indicate “that the patient should have known that the treating physician was not the hospital's agent” and therefore the issue of ostensible agency must be left to the trier of fact. (Id. at 1458.)

The issue of a conditions of admissions form in the context of ostensible agency was examined Wicks, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 882.

In Wicks, the plaintiff had been in the emergency room for a little over an hour, signed and initialed an admission form stating “All physicians and surgeons providing services to me, including the radiologist, pathologist, emergency physician, anesthesiologist, and others, are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. … [T]hey have been granted the privilege of using the hospital for the care and treatment of their patients, but they are not employees, representatives or agents of the hospital. They are independent practitioners.” (Id. at 883.) The court, in finding no ostensible agency, concluded that “Mr. Wicks signed a straightforward notice, with no obtuse legalese, telling him the staff physicians were independent contractors and not employees or agents.” (Id.)

Wicks distinguished Meija, noting there that “ the hospital did not give the patient any notice that its staff physicians were independent contractors, and the patient had no reason to know they were not agents of the hospital.” (Id.)

The Wicks court also examined Whitlow v. Rideout Memorial Hospital (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 631. As summarized by Wicks, in Whitlow, “the patient was in no condition to understand the admission form she signed in the emergency room stating that all physicians furnishing services to her were independent contractors and not employees or agents of the hospital. Her son declared his mother was ‘crying in horrible pain’ when the hospital's registration processor told her to sign and initial the form, she was nauseous and unable to read it, and the processor did not explain the contents of the form or read it to her. (Whitlow, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 633–634.)” (Id. at 884)

The decedent in Whitlow was incapable of understanding what was contained in the form. (Whitlow, supra, 237 Cal.App.4^th at 634.) Therefore, finding that the decedent in had been forced to signed the admissions form including the disclaimer, concluded that “when a woman, writhing in pain and vomiting as a result of the worst headache she had had in her life, signed a boilerplate admissions form disclaiming the agency of the emergency room physician who treated her” the hospital was not absolved of liability. (Id. at 637, 640.) “[A] signature on an admissions form conclusively constitutes notice to a patient seeking care in an emergency room that the treating physician, whom she did not choose and did not know, is not an agent of the hospital” (Id. at 641.)

Here, SSC notes it supplies a surgical facility, hires physicians to perform surgeries as independent contracts, provided the facility at issue in this case, and that Nurse Shahan, prior to the subject procedure, reviewed the Exhibit E consent form with Plaintiff, which indicated Defendant Dr. Duncan was an intendent contractor, and thereafter, Plaintiff signed the form. (UMF Nos. 5, 6, 18, 19.) Specifically, the declaration of Nurse Shahan states, “I conducted a timely patient admission” and at “All pre-operative admission tasks, patient education and documentation were completed in compliance with both Sequioa  Surgery Center’s policies and California state nursing regulations.” (Exhibit B – Declaration of Shahan ¶¶2, 8.)

Further, there is no indication this was an emergency procedure, that Plaintiff was in distress that would preclude Plaintiff from reviewing Exhibit E or other facts similar to Whitlow.

Rather, Markow v. Rosner (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1027 appears more similar to the present case. In Markow, the allegedly negligent physician was the patient’s personal, chosen doctor for over four years, the patient did not seek emergency care and the patient signed 25 conditions of admissions forms previously, including one upon admission as to allegedly negligent procedure. (Id. at 1041-1042.) Although there is no history of prior conditions of admissions forms, this matter more closely resembles Markow. Plaintiff does not dispute the signature on Exhibit E, or the contents of Exhibit E, which states “…physicians, surgeons, and practitioners are not agents, servants, or employees of the facility, but independent contractors.”

As such, the Court finds the doctrine of ostensible agency does not apply here and finds Exhibit E establishes that Defendant Dr. Duncan was an independent contractor of Defendant SSC, thereby precluding vicarious liability against Defendant SSC. Therefore, the Court grants summary adjudication as to Issue No. 2.

Issue No. 1: Defendant met the applicable standard of care in the treatment of Plaintiff, Tracy King (“Plaintiff”)

As the Court notes above and as analyzed below, Plaintiff does not challenge that Defendant SSC’s employed nurses breached the standard of care or otherwise caused Plaintiff’s injuries. However, on summary adjudication, the initial burden remains on the moving party Defendant SSC as to the standard of care and causation issues. 

Applicable Standard of Care

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a medical malpractice action must “present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that their treatment fell below the standard of care.”  (Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305.)  The standard of care against which the acts of health care providers are to be measured is a matter within the knowledge of experts.  (Elcome v. Chin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.)  Unless the conduct required by the particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman, the standard of care in a malpractice action can only be proved by an expert’s testimony.  (Id.) 

Defendant’s Expert – Standard of Care

Plaintiff, in opposing this motion, states “[SSC] only provided the declarations of SCC employees, and not experts. Therefore, because SCC did not present competent expert testimony establishing that its conduct met the applicable professional standard of care in all respects, as per Hansen, supra, and Kelly, supra, their Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied in this regard.” (Opposition 7:1-3.)

To start, the Court recognizes that a treating physician or nurse could testify as an expert as to "…opinions formed on the basis of facts independently acquired and informed by [their] training, skill and experience” (Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31, 39) and that the Court is readily familiar with non-retained expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases.

As such, the Court examines the contents of the declarations submitted in support of SSC’s motion. Defendant submits the declarations of its employed Nurses Shahan, Guzman and Martinez, who indicate they are registered nurses and who state they followed the protocols of SSC and the California Nursing Practice Act. The declarations detail the steps taken by these declarants as to the treatment of Plaintiff and that the California Nursing Practice Act was met at all times during treatment and prior to discharge.

The Court finds these declarations sufficient as to meet SSC’s burden on the standard of care.

Plaintiffs’ Expert – Standard of Care

“When a defendant moves for summary judgment and supports his motion with expert declarations that his conduct fell within the community standard of care, he is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff comes forward with conflicting expert evidence.”  (Munro v. Regents of University of California (1989) 215 Cal.3d 977, 984-985.)

Here, Plaintiff, as noted by SSC, fails to submit a declaration in opposition to this motion as to the standard of care by SSC’s nurses.

Causation

In order to establish that defendant's negligence was a “substantial factor” in causing injury, the plaintiff must prove the negligence was of itself sufficient to bring about that harm.  (Bromme v. Pavitt (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1498.)  “The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.  Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.  [Citations.]  That there is a distinction between a reasonable medical ‘probability’ and a medical 'possibility' needs little discussion.  There can be many possible ‘causes,’ indeed, an infinite number of circumstances which can produce an injury or disease. A possible cause only becomes ‘probable’ when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.  This is the outer limit of inference upon which an issue may be submitted to the jury.”  (Id.; citing Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402 403.)

Defendant’s Experts

As with the duty issue, “causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.)  

In Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 125-126, the court noted declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment should be strictly construed. Here, the declarations of SSC’s employees fail to address the issue of causation and do not express that the opinions that no act or failure to act caused the injuries sustained by Plaintiff to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Even accepting these employees as non-retained experts, the declarations lack sufficiency under the causation standard. Defendant SSC, therefore, has not shifted the burden of proof on causation.

The lack of such testimony precludes summary adjudication of Issue No. 1 as to causation.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Rodriguez, Candelaria vs. Morales, Estevan

Case No.:   VCU300997

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Require Debtor Examination

Tentative Ruling: This matter was previously continued to permit service on the Judgment Debtor Morales. On March 26, 2026, Judgment Creditor Rodriguez filed a proof of personal service of the motion, application, order and notice of hearing for examination on April 14, 2026. Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will order the examination.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Leyva, Silvia vs. Allstate Insurance Company

Case No.:   VCU328626

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes this hearing off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Gonzalez, Ricardo et al vs. White Mountain Ranch, LLC (DOE 1) et al

Case No.:   VCU277573

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:     Hettinga’s Motion to Compel Additional Deposition of Carl Brasil

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and permit a third deposition up to one hour of testimony; to impose sanctions in the amount $1,175 against Zenith and counsel of record, jointly and severally; to order the sanctions due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

Facts

On April 28, 2017, Hettinga delivered 45 bales of hay at the A&C Enterprises Dairy (“A&C”). The complaint alleges that on or about April 29, 2017, Plaintiff Ricardo Gonzalez was injured while unloading hay for his employer A&C when hay bales fell on his head and shoulders. (Complaint ¶6.)

Plaintiff’s wife, Hortencia, also maintains a cause of action for loss of consortium.

Plaintiff Ricardo’s employer’s workers compensation insurance carrier Zenith has intervened into the matter seeking recovery of benefits paid to Plaintiff Ricardo.

It is further alleged that an employee of Defendant Hettinga negligently stacked too many bales at AC Enterprise such as to constitute a dangerous condition. (Complaint ¶8.)

Central to this case is the manner in which the hay was stacked in transport and upon delivery, as Plaintiffs and Zenith allege that Hettinga negligently stacked or delivered the hay 4’ tall and 3’ wide (instead of 3’ tall and 4’ wide) and that the bales were stacked 4 hay bales high instead of 3 bales high, causing one stack to fall on Plaintiff Ricardo Gonzalez and injure him without any negligent act by Plaintiff Ricardo.

Hettinga, however, argues A&C gave it no advance instruction regarding stacking or arranging the bales, that no employee of A&C supervised Hettinga, that an employee of A&C signed off on the delivery as received in good condition and that A&C never requested restacking of bales or rearrangement.

Prior to the initial trial, Carl Brasil was deposed as an individual for approximately two- and one-half hours and was asked whether A&C expected Hettinga to reconfigure the hay bales so that they would be 4' tall instead of 3' tall. Both Plaintiffs’ attorneys objected as beyond the scope of Carl Brasil’s expertise.

During a jury trial in December 2021, this matter was dismissed pursuant to an order granting Defendant Hettinga’s motion for nonsuit. 

Plaintiffs appealed, obtained an appeal bond to stay enforcement, and in March 2024, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion and remittitur reversing the order granting nonsuit and ordering a new trial.

On remand, this matter was set for trial July 27, 2025. This trial date was vacated on June 25, 2025.

Thereafter, Zenith’s counsel indicated Carl Brasil was its non-retained hay expert. However, Zenith did not designate Carl Brasil as a non-retained expert on its disclosure on June 9, 2025.

Nevertheless, Hettinga served Carl Brasil with a deposition subpoena on July 14, 2025, in his capacity as a non-retained hay expert, a PMK of A&C, and as an individual. The deposition was initially set for August 18, 2025.

On November 4, 2025, the Court granted the motion to compel the second deposition of Carl Brasil as a non-retained expert and with respect to hay depicted in the recently produced photographs, and denied the motion to depose Brasil as a PMQ of A&C.

Pursuant to the ruling on the prior motion to compel, the deposition occurred of Brasil occurred on December 4, 2025 with Brasil producing 672 pages at the deposition.

On March 6, 2025, Hettinga filed this motion to compel a further deposition of Brasil and for sanctions in the amount of $6,680 on the basis that additional documents consisting of hay invoices for A&C were produced by Brasil less than 24 hours after the end of the December 4, 2025 deposition, that such documents were produced untimely and the invoices are “potentially very important in the case” because “ZENITH claims that this document unequivocally disproves HETTINGA’s claim that the hay bale that injured plaintiff RICARDO GONZALEZ was not its hay bale.” (Declaration of Bilotti ¶11 – Ex. 6.)

Therefore, Hettinga seeks to re-depose Brasil to the invoices produced after the deposition concluded.

The parties appear to have met and conferred, agreed to a further deposition of Brasil, but could not agree as to a limitation of further time for the deposition.

In opposition, Zenith argues that Brasil is a non-party who requires a subpoena to be deposed, that Brasil has complied with his obligations as a third party witness and that sanctions should be imposed on Hettinga.

Authority and Analysis

In general, absent a showing of good cause, "[o]nce any party has taken the deposition of any natural person, . . . neither the party who gave, nor any other party who has been served with a deposition notice pursuant to Section 2025.240 may take a subsequent deposition of that deponent." (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.610(a).) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), for good cause shown, the court may grant leave to take a subsequent deposition, and the parties, with the consent of any deponent who is not a party, may stipulate that a subsequent deposition be taken. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.610(b)

The burden is on the moving party to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1).) This burden "is met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance." (TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

The right to discovery is liberally construed, even when "good cause" is required to obtain particular discovery. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.) "In the absence of privilege, the right to discovery in this state is a broad one, to be construed liberally so that parties may ascertain the strength of their case and at trial the truth may be determined." (Id. at 538.)

Here, the Court finds good cause to depose Carl Brasil a third time as to the limited issue of the produced invoices. These invoices appear central to a defense of Zenith in this matter, were produced after the conclusion of Brasil’s recent deposition and appear within the scope of the Court’s prior order compelling the deposition of Brasil with respect to the hay depicted in the photograph.

As to the argument that deposition subpoena is required, the Court’s prior ruling determined Brasil as a non-retained expert of Zenith, which is sufficient in the Court’s view to require only a deposition notice in combination with this Court’s finding of good cause above.

Therefore, the Court grants the motion and will compel the deposition of Brasil a third time up to one hour of actual deposition testimony as to the invoices produced after the second deposition.

Sanctions

Hettinga seeks sanctions in the amount of $6,680 consisting of 26 incurred and anticipated hours as to this motion at rates ranging from $265 through $235.

Hetting notes Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 authorizes sanctions for abuse of discovery process with respect to producing the documents after the deposition.

Here, the Court will award 5 hours total at the rate of $235 per hour, for a total sanction of $1,175 against Zenith and counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Synchrony Bank vs. Mendoza, Daisy

Case No.:   PCL303766

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside Default and Dismiss Case

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and dismiss the case

Facts and Analysis

In this matter, after Plaintiff obtained default judgment, its review of the file indicated that confirmed fraud had occurred with respect to the account at issue and therefore requests the default and default judgment be set aside and that this case be dismissed with prejudice.

The Court, therefore, grants the motion, vacates default and default judgment and dismisses this matter.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION vs. DOMINGUEZ, JAYME

Case No.:   PCL313331

Date:           April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Motion to Enforce Settlement

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and enter judgment as requested in the amount of $9,369.83.

Facts

The complaint in this matter seeks recovery for subrogation in the amount of $10,375.17.

On or about May 1, 2025, the case resolved by way of stipulation for entry of judgment (“Stipulation”). Pursuant to the stipulation, Defendant was required to make the following payments, for a total of $10,375.17:

(a) The sum of $1,963.40 shall be paid Sentry Insurance on or before May 15, 2025;

(b) The sum of $100.00 shall be paid on or before the 15th of each month from May 15, 2025 to April 15, 2032,

(c) The sum of $11.77 shall be paid on or before May 15, 2032.

In the event of default, the Stipulation indicates that Plaintiff is entitled to entry of judgment for the judgment amount noted above plus interest starting from the date of the filing of the complaint and court costs, less any credits.

The Stipulation indicates that the Court shall retain jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. On July 23, 2025, this matter was dismissed by Plaintiff without prejudice and with the Court retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On February 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to enforce the settlement in this matter as a judgment, indicating that Defendant had made no payments pursuant to the Stipulation. Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $9,369.83.

Authority and Analysis

Section 664.6 (a) states: 

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.”

“The court’s retention of jurisdiction under section 664.6 includes jurisdiction over both the parties and the case itself, that is, both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2014) 230 Cal.App.4^th 1050, 1061.) “Section 664.6 permits the trial court judge to enter judgment on a settlement agreement without the need for a new lawsuit.” (Osumi v. Sutton (2007) 151 Cal.App.4^th 1355, 1360.)

As indicated above, the Court has retained jurisdiction over the parties and this matter and therefore is prepared to “enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.”

The Court, having no opposition, grants the motion and enters judgment in the amount requested of $9,369.83, consisting of the principal amount due of $10,375.17, less the $1,963.40 paid Sentry Insurance, plus $583.06 interest and $375.00 costs for service of process.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 FARIAS-GAITAN, JOSE vs. RICE, JANICE et al

Case No.:    PCU308085

Date:            April 14, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:       Defendant Jerry Walker’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint 

Tentative Ruling: (1) and (2) To find the demurrer and motion to strike moot by the dismissal filed on April 1, 2026.

Facts

The initial complaint in this matter was filed against “Defendant Jerry D Walker Trust,” amongst others.

On November 3, 2025, Defendant Jerry Walker, “presumably named as Jerry D Walker Trust” (hereinafter “Defendant Jerry Walker”) filed a demurrer and motion to strike.

On January 27, 2026, this Court sustained Defendant Jerry Walker’s demurrer without leave to amend as to the first and fourth causes of action and sustained Defendant’s demurrer with leave to amend as to the second and third causes of action. The ruling provided ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.

On February 9, 2026, Defendant Jerry Walker filed an ex parte application for dismissal based on the failure of Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 10 days after the demurrer hearing. On February 11, 2025, the Court granted the motion and dismissed Defendant Jerry Walker.

On February 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for relief from the dismissal and for leave to file a second amended complaint via this ex parte application. The Court granted the motion and permitted the filing of the second amended complaint. On February 27, 2026, the second amended complaint was filed.

On March 16, 2026, Defendant Jerry Walker filed a demurrer and motion to strike.

On April 1, 2026, Plaintiff dismissed “Defendant Jerry D. Walker Trust.”

The Court’s understanding, therefore, is that the dismissal of “Defendant Jerry D. Walker Trust” makes Defendant Jerry Walker’s demurrer and motion to strike the second amended complaint moot.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division