Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, September 3, 2026 (modified at 3:05 pm as to Dept. 19 only) are:

Re:               Asman, Bruce E. et al vs. Ponce, Cipriano et al

Case No.:  VCU313509

Date:          September 3, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate

Tentative Ruling: To continue this matter to September 10, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and to order compliance with the procedural requirements of consolidation prior to consolidation as indicated herein.

Facts and Analysis

Via this motion, Plaintiffs seek to consolidate this matter VCU313509 with VCU332655.

VCU313509, as it stands, involves causes of action for quiet title and easements involving 13930 Idaho Ave Orosi, CA 93647 (“Subject Property”). The Court notes a pending motion to amend the complaint to add causes of action for negligence, fraud and failure to disclose involving the Subject Property. Defendants Ciprano Ponce and Sylvia Ponce are alleged claim that the garage in dispute belongs to another parcel owned by Defendants.

VCU332655 involves causes of action for negligence and misrepresentation against Defendants Bloom Group, Inc. and Alma Rosa Jimenez (alleged to have represented Plaintiffs regarding the purchase of the Subject Property) and Defendants Melson Realty, Inc. and Maxim Leo Lisitsyn (alleged to have represented the sellers of the Subject Property.)

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subd. (a), “[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court…it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”

“A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights of the parties. The purpose of consolidation is merely to promote trial convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, particularly in the proof of issues common to both actions.” (Wouldridge v. Burns (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.) “Under the statute and the case law, there are thus two types of consolidation: a consolidation for purposes of trial only, where the two actions remain otherwise separate; and a complete consolidation or consolidation for all purposes, where the two actions are merged into a single proceeding under one case number and result in only one verdict or set of findings and one judgment.” (Hamilton v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1127, 1147.)  “Consolidation under Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 is permissive, and it is for the trial court to determine whether the consolidation is for all purposes or for trial only.” (Id. at 1149.) Consolidation “is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial [court].”  Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 509, 511.)

Here, the substantive elements of section 1048(a) appear to be met given the common issues between the matters.

However, the Court will require compliance with the procedural aspects of consolidation prior to ordering consolidation.

Under California Rule of Court 3.300, a notice of related case must be filed in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

No notice of related case has been filed in either VCU313509 or VCU332655.  The Court orders Plaintiffs to file the notice of related case in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

Under California Rules of Court Rule 3.350(a), the notice of motion to consolidate must be filed in each case sought to be designated.

While the notice was filed in VCU313509, no notice of this motion was filed in VCU332655. The Court orders Plaintiffs to file the notice of motion in VCU332655.

Finally, California Rule of Court, Rule 3.350(c) requires a proposed order to be filed in each case sought to be consolidated. No proposed order has been filed in either VCU313509 or VCU332655. The Court orders Plaintiffs to a proposed order in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

Upon compliance with the procedural requirements, the Court intends to grant consolidation of these matters for all purposes.

The Court, therefore, continues this matter to September 10, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and orders Plaintiffs to file:

• the notice of related cases in both VCU313509 and VCU332655;
• the notice of this motion in VCU332655; and
• the proposed order in both VCU313509 and VCU332655.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:   Lead: VCU3245716; consolidated with PCU325122 

Date:           September 3, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion. 

Here, the court takes up a “Motion of Prosperity Farms, LLC to Quash Records Subpoena to Bank of the Sierra.”  Receiver Focus Management Group (Focus), by the subject subpoena, seeks records from the bank where Prosperity Farms, LLC (Prosperity) maintains one or more accounts. 

This court’s order appointing Focus directs it “to take possession, custody, and control” of a receivership estate consisting of “all assets and property, tangible and intangible, real and personal, of any kind, of [Prosperity],” “whether in the current possession of [Prosperity] or any other person or entity,” and “to maintain, conserve, and liquidate” the receivership estate in accordance with the court’s order. 

Focus’s entitlement and duty to take possession of, and control, the estate under this court’s order is “exclusive.” “[T]o the exclusion of all others including Prosperity Farms’ current equity owners, managers, and financial manager,” Focus is given “all management powers, authorities, rights, and privileges (including the attorney-client privilege and work product protection) heretofore possessed by the officers, directors, managers, and/or members of Prosperity Farms … in addition to all powers and authority of a receiver at equity or under applicable law, including, without limitation, the power in the Receiver’s reasonable business judgment to resolve and take all corporate actions, to contract, to sue, to be sued, to commence any insolvency or bankruptcy proceeding, to liquidate, wind down, dissolve, or continue any business or business activities of the Receivership Estate, to make use of Receivership Estate assets, to investigate and prosecute claims of the Receivership Estate, and to settle, compromise, litigate, or contest any matter for and on behalf of the Receivership Estate.”

According to Focus, notwithstanding its granted powers, it has encountered resistance in its efforts to get Prosperity’s records from Bank of the Sierra.  Focus asserts it “has not been able to obtain [these records] from the parties” and/or that “[t]he Cooks” have refused to produce them.  Focus has, in either event, because of this resistance, issued a business records subpoena to Bank of the Sierra for (1) “All DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS regarding PROSPERITY”; and (2) “All bank records for PROSPERITY … from January 1, 2019 to present.”

It’s not clear why Focus needs to subpoena the records it seeks, its being expressly authorized to access such records under this court’s appointment order, but evidently it is necessary.  Perhaps it is because Bank of the Sierra will not provide the records, absent cooperation of individuals reflected in its records as having authority with respect to Prosperity’s accounts.  If Focus has encountered difficulty securing the cooperation of those formerly authorized with respect to Prosperity’s account(s), however, that would be a troubling development.  This court’s order specifically “directed” “[a]ll persons and entities having control, custody or possession of any [of the above identified] items … to turn them over to the Receiver within five business days of the entry of this Order, including information necessary for [the] Receiver to exercise full and exclusive control over all bank accounts in the name of or belonging to the Receivership Estate.” Specifically, the order provides: “The managers and members of Prosperity Farms, including the Grahams, shall fully cooperate with all actions taken by the Receiver in connection with this Order. Prosperity Farms and its officers, directors, members, managers, employees, and advisors shall immediately provide the Receiver with full access to all financial information, legal documents, employees, and other records regarding the Receivership Estate.”

Clearly, though, Focus has encountered difficulty, and all indications are that the difficulty arises from a lack of cooperation on the part of one or more people this court has ordered to cooperate with Focus.  The instant motion is a clear incidence of such resistance: The objective is to prevent or forestall production of Prosperity’s bank records to Focus, notwithstanding its court-ordered entitlement to them.  It’s a bit of a mystery who is behind it, though, since it’s obviously not Focus. It is only clear attorney Justin Campagne, who represents he is “an attorney with the law firm of Campagne & Campagne, a Prof. Corp., … counsel for Defendant PROSPERITY FARMS, LLC,” assisted with the motion.  Campagne, obviously, does not represent Focus. 

Needless to say, the court agrees with Focus that, given its appointment as receiver, whomever purports to direct Prosperity here—given that it’s not Focus—has no “independent authority” to bring this motion, and Mr. Campagne—not being counsel hired by Focus—“has no authority … to appear on behalf of Prosperity Farms.”

For this principal reason, the motion to quash is denied.

Additionally, though, the grounds presented to quash the subpoena are meritless; based entirely on perfunctorily stated arguments that the subpoena “is … overbroad as to scope and time,” is “not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence,” and violative of constitutional privacy interests of “Prosperity Farms and its members, some of whom are individuals, namely, Michael and Cynthia Graham [notably, the Grahams do not join in the motion or otherwise weigh in].” 

The powers and duties of the receiver with respect to Prosperity Farms’s assets, including its bank accounts, self-evidently undermine the contention that the subpoena is overbroad or that it does not seek admissible evidence, or documents reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. 

And, assuming, without here deciding, that Prosperity Farms has some cognizable constitutional privacy interest in the records sought (see Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley LLP v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 579, 595 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 446]), no effort is made, beyond stating that privacy interests are “implicate[d],” to explain why that interest should trump Focus’s interest in receiving records to which it is entitled under standing orders of this court. 

And so, even if this motion was initiated by those authorized to do so, it would be denied. 

Request for Campagne & Campagne to turn over file; sanctions

Focus additionally requests the Campagne & Campagne firm to turn over its “complete file” to Focus, and, additionally, that the court “find that Campagne & Campagne acted without substantial justification in connection with the instant Motion.”  Regarding the latter request, Focus states, “[i]f the Court makes this finding … , the Receiver intends to file a motion for the fees and costs incurred in connection with opposing the Motion.”

The court declines to order turnover of the file, given the procedural posture of the request (in an opposition brief); the court does find the motion was brought in bad faith.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

 Re:                Sierra Range Construction, a California corporation vs. Lower Tule River Irrigation District, a public entity

Case No.:   VCU335769

Date:           September 3, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend

Facts

The complaint in this matter alleges Defendant is a public entity. (Complaint ¶2.) Further that on or about March 27, 2024, the Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Contract Agreement Installation of Protective Fencing (“Agreement”). (Complaint ¶8.)

Plaintiff alleges “Under the Agreement, LTRID had a duty to act with good faith and fair dealing which obliged it to refrain from taking any action that would destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract.” (Complaint ¶12.)

Further that “On August 1, 2024, Plaintiff was informed via email from D. Vink at Six-33 Solutions LLC, an agent of LTRID, that “Legal had advised them they need to end the current contract...” and attached to that email was correspondence indicating LTRID was “reviewing the remaining items for potential modifications and terminating the current agreement.” The attached correspondence was undated.” (Complaint ¶14.)

Additionally, that “Under the terms of the Agreement, termination was proper only for: Failure to supply an adequate working force, or material of proper quality, or in any other respect to prosecute the work with the diligence and force specific by the contract, is grounds for termination of the Contractor’s control over the work and for taking over the work by the District.” (Complaint ¶16.)

The project was rebid, with sealed bids due on or before 12:00 p.m. on September 27, 2024, with bid opening on October 1, 2024 at 1:00 p.m. (Complaint ¶¶17, 18.)

On November 18, 2024, Plaintiff, through its counsel submitted a public records act request to Defendant and on November 26, 2024, Defendant responded to the records request and produced documents. (Complaint ¶¶19, 20.)

Plaintiff then alleges that “After Plaintiff obtained documents on November 26, 2024, Plaintiff learned LTRID had terminated the contract in bad faith.” (Complaint ¶21.)

Plaintiff alleges further “On November 25, 2025, Plaintiff submitted a Government Claim to LTRID which identified a claims accrual date of November 26, 2024 and described the claims as improper termination and improper post-bid bid security acceptance. This Government Claim was not responded to by LTRID and was rejected as a matter of law.” (Complaint ¶26.)

Based on the above, Plaintiff brings a single cause of action for breach of contract.

Defendant demurrers for failure to plead compliance with the tort claim presentation requirements, that the discovery rule does not apply to extend accrual of the cause of action and notes this Court’s ruling denying Plaintiff’s application for leave to file a late claim under Government Code section 946.6.

The Court’s ruling noted:

“As such, the late claim application process has no effect here, where the claims are related to “any other cause of action” and allow a one year presentation period from the date of accrual. In other words, there is no late claim application process for claims that do not arise from death or injury to person or personal property.

This finding is consistent with the statutory scheme. If a claim for “any other cause of action” must be presented within one year of accrual and a late claim application must be presented no later than one year from accrual, the deadlines for presentation and late claim application overlap entirely.

Under Government Code section 946.6(a), this petition for relief can only be made “[i]f an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant to Section 911.6…”

Here, there is no late claim application available under section 911.6 and therefore no relief from the denial of the late claim application available.”

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that its discovery of the “wrongful nature” of Defendant’s conduct on November 26, 2024 starts the accrual of the cause of action.

Authority and Analysis

California Government Code section 911.2 requires that “A claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.”

Presentation of such a claim is a condition precedent to filing a suit against the public entity. (Cal. Govt. Code, § 945.4.)

Additionally, compliance with the presentation requirement must be stated in the complaint. (Dilts v. Cantua Elementary School Dist. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 27, 31 [holding “In those circumstances in which a claim must be presented, the plaintiff must allege compliance or circumstances excusing compliance, or the complaint is subject to general demurrer.”].)

"The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: '(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.'" (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.)

“A cause of action for breach of contract does not accrue before the time of breach.” (Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 488

Here, the allegations of the complaint indicate the contract at issue was terminated (that is, breached) August 1, 2024. (Complaint ¶14.)

The subsequent public records request and discovery of alleged improper bidding procedures have no affect on the accrual of breach of contract. Plaintiff need not know why the contract was breached to bring a claim for breach of contract. All elements of breach were present August 1, 2024 when termination occurred.

As such, the last day to present the tort claim for breach of contract was August 1, 2025, one year from the date of the breach.

The complaint alleges the claim was presented November 25, 2025, which is beyond the August 1, 2025 date.

Therefore, the Court finds a failure to allege compliance with the tort claim presentation statute under the facts alleged in the complaint.

The Court, as such, sustains the demurer without leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Castillo, Destani vs. Kaweah Delta Health Care District

Case No.:   VCU335868

Date:           September 3, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.

Facts

Plaintiff sues Defendant Kaweah Delta Health Care District, alleged to be a California non-profit corporation, and Lucille Gibbs for the following:

1. Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation (Labor Code sections 203, 218.5, 512, 515.5, 558, 1194, and 1198)

2. Failure to Pay Minimum Wage  (Labor Code sections 218, 1194, 1194.2)

3. Failure to Provide Meal Periods (Labor Code sections 218.5, 226.7, 512; Wage Order 2001)

4. Failure to Provide Rest Breaks (Labor Code sections 218.5, 226.7; Wage Order 2001.)

5. Failure to Issue Accurate and Itemized Wage Statements (Labor Code section 226)

6. Failure to Indemnify (Labor Code section 2802.)

7. Unlawful Business Practices in Violation of B&P Code 17200

Defendants Kaweah and Gibbs demurrer to each cause of action. Kaweah seeks judicial notice of its status as a public entity. As such, Kaweah argues that the Labor Code violations alleged herein cannot be asserted against a public entity. Further, that Gibbs cannot be liable for such violations personally where the employer, Kaweah, is not liable.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Judicial Notice

Kaweah seeks judicial notice that it is a local healthcare district and political sub-division of the State of California via Resolution No. 61 729 recorded with the Tulare County Recorder's Office on March 31, 1961 and Statements of Facts filed with the Secretary of State of California.

Evidence Code sections 452(c) and (h), respectively, permit a court, in its discretion, to take judicial notice of the existence and recordation of a document. Further, “a court may take judicial notice of the fact of a document's recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document's legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document's authenticity. From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 755.)

Additionally, “A court may take judicial notice of documents in its own records and those reflecting the official acts of local and state agencies, including resolutions, minutes, and agendas. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), (h); see Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 375, fn. 4)” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 600.)

Under Elmore v. Oak Valley Hospital Dist. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 716, 721, the statement filed with the Secretary of State become a public record and a document of which the court may properly take judicial notice. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of this document, as well as the “facts that can be deduced, and/or clearly derived from, its legal effect, such as the names and dates contained in the document, and the legal consequences of the document.” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 600.)

Therefore, the Court finds Kaweah has established itself as a public entity via judicial notice.

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

Labor Code and Public Entity Status

The Labor Code applies only to private sector employees unless a Labor Code provision is “specifically made applicable to public employees.” (Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of California (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 311, 334;  “[U]nless Labor Code provisions are specifically made applicable to public employers, they only apply to employers in the private sector.” (Johnson v. Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 729, 733)

 First Cause of Action – Failure to Pay Overtime Wages under Labor Code sections 218.5, 512, 515.5, 558 and 1194

Labor Code section 220 provides in relevant part: "Sections 200 to 211, inclusive, and Section 215 to 219, inclusive, do not apply to the payment of wages of employees directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town, or other municipal corporation." (Lab. Code, § 220, subd. (b).)

Although Labor Code section 220 does not define a “other municipal corporation” the Court notes that this term has been defined as:

“ “ ‘A municipal corporation proper is created mainly for the interest, advantage, and convenience of the locality and of its people. The primary idea is an agency to regulate and administer the interior concerns of the locality in matters peculiar to the place incorporated, and not common to the state or people at large.’ ” ([In re Madera Irrigation District (1891) 92 Cal. 296,]  323.) The Legislature has the power to create such corporations to serve a specific  public purpose, and it need only grant them the limited powers necessary to serve that purpose. (Id. at p. 318.) Madera made clear that “[t]he municipal corporations which may be thus created are not limited to cities and towns.” (Id. at p. 319.) Rather,  they may be formed as “mere agencies of the state in local government, without any powers except such as the legislature may confer upon them, and … at all times subject to a revocation of such power.” (Id. at pp. 319–320.) Subsequently, Morrison v. Smith Bros. (1930) 211 Cal. 36, 39 [293 P. 53] distinguished between “two different species” of public corporations for tort law purposes. While incorporated cities or towns constitute “municipal corporation[s] proper” (id. at p. 40), quasi-municipal corporations encompass organizations created to assist state or local governments in providing a public service (id. at pp. 40–41). Generally, the term “municipal corporation” has been understood to include both categories. (See id. at p. 41.)” (Stone v. Alameda Health Sys. (2024) 16 Cal. 5th 1040, 1070.)

Therefore, this definition of municipal corporation appears to encompass Kaweah as a public healthcare district.

No claim, therefore, lies under section 218.5

The Court agrees that Labor Code sections 512 and 515.5 do not pertain to overtime compensation issues relevant here as section 512 discusses meal periods and section 515.5 discusses overtime compensation in the computer software filed. Further this cause of action’s allegations only relate to overtime compensation and that Plaintiff has not, therefore, set forth a basis for liability under sections 512 and 515.5. Moreover, under the same analysis as above, neither 512 nor 515.5 appear to be made specifically applicable to public entities.

Section 558 provides for the recovery of penalties for violations, does not provide a separate basis for liability and does not expressly make itself applicable to public entities.

Finally section 1194 of the Labor Code is not made expressly applicable to public entities. (Curcini v. County of Alameda (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 629, 643.)

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to the first cause of action as to Kaweah.

Second Cause of Action – Failure to Pay Minimum Wage under Labor Code section 218 and 1194.2

As noted above, Labor Code section 220 provides in relevant part: "Sections 200 to 211, inclusive, and Section 215 to 219, inclusive, do not apply to the payment of wages of employees directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town, or other municipal corporation." (Lab. Code, § 220, subd. (b).) As such, no cause of action against Kaweah lies under section 218.

Labor Code section 1194.2 as to recovery of liquidated damages does not appear to create liability and, in any event, is not made expressly applicable to public entities.

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to the second cause of action as to Kaweah.

Third Cause of Action – Failure to Provide Meal Periods under Labor Code section 512 and Fourth Cause of Action – Failure to Provide Rest Periods under Labor Code section 226.7

Public entities are not subject to the meal and rest break statutes of Labor Code sections 226.7 and 512. (California Correctional Peace Officers’ Association v. State (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 646, 652-654; see also Allen, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 597.)

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action without leave to amend as to Kaweah.

Fifth Cause of Action – Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements under Labor Code section 226(a)

Similarly, section 226 does not appear to make itself expressly applicable to public entities. (Johnson, supra, 174 Cal. App. 4^th at 733.) The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to the fifth cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action – Failure to Reimburse under Labor Code section 2802

Similarly, section 2802 does not appear to make itself expressly applicable to public entities. (Johnson, supra, 174 Cal. App. 4^th at 733; see also Allen, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 597.)

The Court, therefore, sustains the demurrer without leave to amend as to the eight cause of action as to Kaweah.

Seventh Cause of Action - Unlawful Business Practices in Violation of B&P Code 17200

The Court, having sustained the demurrer to the prior causes of action, finds the seventh cause of action derivative and sustains the demurrer on that basis.

Additionally, Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq, permits recovery against “persons” who engage in unfair competition in the form of damages and injunctive relief (See Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203-17205).

Kaweah has been established as a “public entity” above (Gov. Code, § 811.2) and “therefore, not a ‘person’ within the meaning of the Unfair Practices Act.” (California Med. Ass'n, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of California (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 542, 551, as applied to the Regents as a public entity)

Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prevail on claims of unfair competition under section 17200 against a public entity. The Court sustains the demurrer to the seventh cause of action without leave to amend as to Kaweah.

Application to Defendant Gibbs

As to Defendant Gibbs, the alleged employee of Defendant Kaweah, Plaintiff seeks to establish liability under Labor Code section 558.1, which states:

(a) Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term “other person acting on behalf of an employer” is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer, and the term “managing agent” has the same meaning as in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the definition of employer under existing law.

Here, the Court has found no liability under the causes of action above and therefore finds no liability as to Gibbs as an “other person acting on behalf of an employer.”

Therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer as to Gibbs.

No Leave to Amend

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226)

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of curing these defects, as no opposition has been filed, and the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                Reyes, Roque vs. Saleh, Faiz H. et al

Case No.:   VCU322445

Date:           September 3, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

Tentative Ruling: To deny the motion. CMC and OSC re: dismissal are set for October 14, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.  The Court’s OSC re: Sanctions against each side are likewise continued to October 14, 2026.

Facts

This matter, initially filed June 13, 2025 by Plaintiff Roque Reyes against Defendants Faiz Saleh and Rasha Saleh for violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code section 51. The complaint seeks declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief.

The complaint alleges Plaintiff visited Farmer’s Food Market, located at 14542 RD 192, Porterville, CA 93257, on May 3, 2025, purchased items on that date, obtained a receipt and “also evaluated the Business and the Property for compliance with the ADA and the UCRA.” Plaintiff identifies lack of accessible parking, no accessible route, a business entrance door lacking adequate width and that Plaintiff’s right and entitlement to full and equal access was denied.

On July 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice that Plaintiff died June 17, 2025.

On July 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion “to add Julia Soto as a plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E).”

The proposed complaint seeks to add the following:

“Plaintiff SOTO assisted and accompanied Plaintiff REYES when he visited the Subject Property. Plaintiff SOTO seeks relief based on her association with her former spouse, long-term partner, and companion REYES. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E), Plaintiff SOTO has been discriminated against and has suffered an injury within the meaning of the ADA that is separate, direct, and independent from that suffered by Plaintiff REYES as a result of the barriers that exist at the Subject Property. As the care provider of Plaintiff REYES, Plaintiff SOTO would necessarily accompany Plaintiff REYES to the Subject Property. Plaintiff SOTO experienced frustration and discrimination when she encountered the barriers at the Subject Property. These injuries are specific to her independent right to access the Subject Property with her partner. Plaintiff SOTO has been denied full and equal access to the Subject Property because of her association with a person with a mobility disability.”

Counsel provides a declaration stating “Proposed Plaintiff Ms. Soto has been approved as an administrator of Mr. Reyes’ estate and has obtained a bond” and that:

“5. The amendment is necessary because Plaintiff ROQUE REYES is deceased and Ms. Soto has a cognizable claim under the ADA and the UCRA pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(1)(E). The amendment is proper because Defendants will not be prejudiced by the amendment.

6. The facts that gave rise to the proposed allegations rely on and relate back to the same set of facts as Mr. Reyes’ original allegations.

7. The proposed amendment is requested now due the death of Mr. Reyes, the appointment of Ms. Soto as representative of Mr. Reyes estate, and Defendants’ failure to respond to our contact attempts.” (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶¶4-7.)

Plaintiff attaches a copy of the proposed amended complaint as well as a redlined version thereof. (Declaration of Fitzgerald ¶8 – Ex. B.)

No opposition appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

The proposed amended complaint seeks to add Soto as a separate plaintiff based on association with Plaintiff and arising out of the same event as pled in the complaint.

The Court may, in the furtherance of justice, and upon any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 473, 576.)  In general, California courts liberally exercise discretion to permit amendment of pleadings in light of a strong policy favoring resolution of all disputes between parties in the same action.  (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939; Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296 [“[T]here is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.”].)  Pursuant to this policy, requests for leave to amend generally will be granted unless the party seeking to amend has been dilatory in bringing the proposed amendment before the Court, and the delay in seeking leave to amend will cause prejudice to the opposing party if leave to amend is granted.  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490; Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 564-565.)  The decision on a motion for leave is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Rule 3.1324 regulates the content of the motion and supporting declaration as follows:

“(a) Contents of motion

A motion to amend a pleading before trial must:

(1)  Include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments;

(2)  State what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and

(3)  State what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located.

(b) Supporting declaration

A separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify:

(1)  The effect of the amendment;

(2)  Why the amendment is necessary and proper;

(3)  When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and

(4)  The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Here, subsection (a) is complied with via Exhibit B.

The Court cannot find compliance with subsection (b) of Rule 3.1354, as the amended complaint alleges that Soto suffered independent and unique harm at the same time as Plaintiff on the date of the visit, but failed to bring this claim at the time of the filing of the initial complaint. The facts giving rise to the amended allegations appear known at the time of the filing of the complaint. There is no explanation as to why Soto was not added as a Plaintiff from the inception of this case. It is within the court’s discretion to require compliance with Rule 3.1324 before granting leave to amend. (Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

Plaintiff has not provided a substantive excuse or explanation for not seeking leave to amend earlier. (See Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 926, 939–940 [“The law is also clear that even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial. The cases indicate that the denial may rest upon the element of lack of diligence in offering the amendment after knowledge of the facts, or the effect of the delay on the adverse party.”]; See also Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 746 [“he failed to offer any explanation for his delay in seeking leave to amend.”]; See also Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136 [“The law is well settled that a long deferred presentation of the proposed amendment without a showing of excuse for the delay is itself a significant factor to uphold the trial court's denial of the amendment.”]

Here, Soto fails to explain the year delay in seeking amendment. Soto, at all times, has been aware of this independent harm and basis for the claims now asserted in the proposed amended complaint, as well as the association with Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court denies the motion.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Re:                In the Matter of Micaela Gomez Living Trust

Case No.:   PPR053973

Date:           September 3, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Maria Gomez Sanchez’s Motion for Order Voiding Judgment and Confirming Existence of Trust and Directing Conveyance of Real Property to Trust

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and void the judgment in this matter; to set a hearing and briefing schedule as to Sonia Lozano’s petition to invalidate the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds and Maria Gomez Sanchez’s request for damages, fees and costs pursuant to Probate Code section 859.

Facts re: Petition for Non-Existence of Trust

On March 2, 2026, Petitioner Sonia Lozano filed a verified petition for order approving termination of trust, to reallocate trust property and for non-existence of trust under Probate Code sections 15403 and 17200(b).

The petition states Micaela Gomez, Trustee of the Micaela Gomez Living Trust, (“Decendent”) passed away on October 03, 2025. (Petition ¶1.)

Further, that on May 24, 2022, Quitclaim Deed, Document 2022 0033487 was recorded transferring decedents primary residence, real property commonly known as: 16554 Dillon Ave, Visalia, California 93292, APN 111-202-029-000 (“Subject Property”) to the “Micaela Gomez Living Trust, dated April 12, 2022” (“Trust”). (Petition ¶2.)

The petition further alleged that there was no known record of the Trust and no known will for Decedent, despite a search of Decedent’s personal property. (Petition ¶¶3-5.)

The Petition indicates personal service pursuant to Probate Code section 851 “on all parties” as to the following:

• Sonia Lozano, Petitioner 373 E. Worth Ave. Porterville, CA 93257
• Guadalupe Gomez 8781 Emerald Rd. Sunnyside, WA 98944
• Maria Elva Gomez 4021 NE 65'" Ave. Vancouver, WA 98661
• Maria Elena Gomez Navarro 12707 SE Bobby Bruce Ln. Boring, OR 97009
• Maria De Jesus Gomez 523 N. Angelino Ave Azusa, CA 91702
• Jose Gomez Navarro 100 Tuttle Rd. Grandview, WA 98930
• Aurelio Gomez Navarro 6978 Hannegan Rd. Lynden, WA 98264
• Ricardo Gomez 1035 W 15th Pl Kennewick, WA 99337
• Griselda Gomez 1035 W. 15th Pl Kennewick, WA 99337

On April 24, 2026, this Court entered an order terminating the trust and relocating the Subject Property from the Trust, and for the non-existence of the Trust.

Facts re: Intestate Sucesssion Petition by Lozano - PPR054058

On April 23, 2026, Sonia Lozano filed a separate action in PPR054058 to determine succession to the Subject Property as a primary residence.

The PPR054058 matter noted nine (9) heirs the estate:

1. Sonia Lozano 373 E. Worth Ave. Porterville, CA 93257

2. Guadalupe Gomez 8781 Emerald Rd. Sunnyside, WA 98944

3. Maria Elva Gomez 4021 NE 65'" Ave. Vancouver, WA 98661

4. Maria Elena Gomez Navarro 25120 145th PI SE Monroe, WA 98272

5. Maria De Jesus Gomez 523 N. Angelino Ave. Azusa, CA 91702

6. Jose Gomez Navarro 100 Tuttle Rd. Grandview, WA 98930

7. Aurelio Gomez Navarro 6978 Hannegan Rd. Lynden, WA 98264

8. Ricardo Gomez 1035 W. 158 Pl. Kennewick, WA 99337

9. Griselda Gomez 1035 W. 15M Pl. Kennewick, WA 99337

Further, the PPR054058 petition attached assignment of entire interest in the estate documents for 2. Guadalupe Gomez, 3. Maria Elva Gomez, 4. Maria Elena Gomez Navarro, 5. Maria De Jesus Gomez, 6. Jose Gomez Navarro 7. Aurelio Gomez Navarro, 8. Ricardo Gomez and 9.Griselda Gomez.

Likewise, notice of the hearing on the petition in PPR054058 was provided to those nine (9) persons, including Sonia Lozano, listed above at the same addresses provided.

On May 28, 2026, this Court entered an order determining succession to the Subject Property in PPR054058 in favor of Sonia Lozano.

Facts re: Motion to Void Judgment by Maria Gomez Sanchez

On July 27, 2026, Maria Gomez Sanchez filed this motion to void judgment entered in this matter as to the determination no trust existed and to direct conveyance of the Subject Property to the Trust.

The facts stated in the motion are verified by Maria Gomez Sanchez and state that Maria Gomez Sanchez is the duly appointed and currently serving trustee of the Trust created by Decedent via written declaration. (Motion ¶¶1, 2 – Ex. A.) Maria Gomez Sanchez indicates she was appointed as primary successor trustee upon the death of the Decedent and that the Trust became irrevocable upon Decedent’s passing. (Motion ¶¶4, 5.)

The motion further states Decedent acquired title the Subject Property in 1996 via a grant deed and that on May 22, 2022, Decedent recorded  a quitclaim deed transferring the Property to the Trust. (Motion ¶¶8-10 – Exs. C and D.)

The motion further notes that Maria Gomez Sanchez, sister of Sonia Lozano and daughter of Decedent, is not on the list of persons provided notice of the Petition in this matter. (Motion ¶¶14, 16, 17.)

The motion notes that Maria Gomez Sanchez was not on the list of persons provided notice in PPR054058 and that no assignment of interest was executed by Maria Gomez Sanchez or attached to the petition in PPR054058. (Motion ¶19-24.)

Therefore, the motion seeks to void the judgment and orders in this matter pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d)

The response and petition in opposition by Sonia Lozano does not appear to address the service and notice issues, but instead seeks to invalidate the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds.

Authority and Analysis

Voiding the Judgment and Orders

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d) provides:

The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.

In Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020 the appellate court described the process for a Section 473(d) determination as follows:

“In determining whether an order is void for purposes of section 473, subdivision (d), courts distinguish between orders that are void on the face of the record and orders that appear valid on the face of the record but are shown to be invalid through consideration of extrinsic evidence. This distinction may be important in a particular case because it impacts the procedural mechanism available to attack the judgment [or order], when the judgment [or order] may be attacked, and how the party challenging the judgment [or order] proves that the judgment [or order] is void. [Citation.] An order is considered void on its face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment roll or court record without consideration of extrinsic evidence. [Citation] ["[t]o prove that the judgment is void [on its face], the party challenging the judgment is limited to the judgment roll, i.e., no extrinsic evidence is allowed"]; [Citation.] There is no time limit to attack a judgment void on its face. [Citations.] If the invalidity can be shown only through consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the order is not void on its face. Such an order must be challenged within the six-month time limit prescribed by section 473, subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity. [Citation.]”

In Estate of Buckley (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 434, 450, fn. 4, the court noted:

The items comprising the judgment roll in a probate action are defined in Probate Code section 1242 in pertinent part as follows: "The following papers, without being attached together, shall constitute the judgment roll in the proceedings mentioned in this code:

"1. The petition or application or contest or report or account which initiates a particular proceeding; any order directing notice to be given of the hearing thereof; any notice of the hearing thereof, or any order to show cause made thereon, with the affidavits showing such publication, posting or mailing of the notice or order as may be required by law or the order of the court; the citation, in case no answer or written opposition is filed by a party entitled, by law or order of court, to notice of the proceeding by citation, with the affidavit or proof of service thereof, and if service of such citation is made by publication, the affidavit for such publication and the order directing publication; any finding of the court or referee therein; the order or judgment made or rendered therein; and the letters testamentary or of administration, if any." (Italics in original.)

The court in Brown v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 182, 186 noted that a judgment may be void “…because the judgment or order violated a party's due process rights to notice and opportunity to be heard. (§ 473, subd. (d) ....)”

Here, a review of the judgment roll, including the Petition itself indicates to the Court that moving party Maria Gomez Sanchez did not receive notice of the Petition in this matter. The response appears to concede no such service or notice was provided, arguing instead that the Trust should be invalidated due to capacity and undue influence, which necessarily recognizes the existence of the Trust.

As such, the judgment is void.

The Court further finds the existence of the Trust has been sufficiently demonstrated and that the Subject Property could not become subject to the administration of Decedent’s estate after her passing. This finding necessarily voids the order in PPR054058 with respect to administration of the estate.

It is the Court’s understanding that the Subject Property should be placed back into the Trust either by conveyance by Sonia Lozano or via voiding of the May 28, 2026 order in PPR054058.

Probate Code section 859 and the Petition by Sonia Lozano to Invalidate Trust

Probate Code section 859 states:

“If a court finds that a person has in bad faith wrongfully taken, concealed, or disposed of property belonging to a conservatee, a minor, an elder, a dependent adult, a trust, or the estate of a decedent, or has taken, concealed, or disposed of the property by the use of undue influence in bad faith or through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the person shall be liable for twice the value of the property recovered by an action under this part. In addition, except as otherwise required by law, including Section 15657.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the person may, in the court’s discretion, be liable for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The remedies provided in this section shall be in addition to any other remedies available in law to a person authorized to bring an action pursuant to this part.”

“The language of Probate Code section 859 is not ambiguous in specifying when a bad faith finding is necessary for double damages." (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1128.) "The statutory language contains three different . . . categories of conduct that can support double damages, each of which is separated by the conjunction 'or.' The first two categories require a separate finding of bad faith but the third one . . . does not." (Id. at 1128-1129.) Under the third category, therefore, double damages may be awarded without a finding of bad faith if the property was taken, concealed, or disposed of through the commission of elder or dependent adult financial abuse as defined in section 15610.30 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Id. at 1128-1130.)

“Section 859 also applies to real property…Suppose a petitioner seeks to recover title to residential real estate valued at $100,000. If he prevails, the trial court will order the necessary reconveyance of title. If the opposing party acted in bad faith when transferring title to herself, she will be liable for $200,000.”
(Estate of Ashlock (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1074.)

Here, Maria Gomez Sanchez appears to proceed under the wrongfully taken or disposed of categories, which require a separate finding of bad faith.

Here, the Court first considers that the only heir who failed to receive notice of the petitions in this matter and in PPR054058 was Maria Gomez Sanchez, the successor trustee. Moreover, the Court notes that Sonia Lozano indicates contacting Maria Gomez Sanchez a single time with reference to the Trust, but thereafter failing to provide notice. It is apparently not in dispute that notice was not provided to Maria Gomez Sanchez, nor was the assignment of interest so obtained.

However, the Court finds that the section 859 damages rely upon the existence of the Trust, which though established in this motion above, has been challenged via the response and petition on grounds of capacity and undue influence. As such, the Court believes these issues should be adjudicated together.

As such, the Court intends to set a hearing as to the petition by Sonia Lozano challenging the Trust on capacity and undue influence grounds and, thereafter, adjudicate, if necessary, the issue of bad faith, damages and reasonable fees and costs. The parties may appear in any manner as to the setting of the hearing and briefing schedule.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order. Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2

Examiner notes for probate matters calendared August 26, 2026, that allow for posting:

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
VPR054190	In the Matter of Medina, Jose Luis	Letters of Administration	Appearance Required	Petition Item 2d(2):  amount of bond omitted
VPR053497	In the Matter of Chavez, Lily Mendez	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR053305	In the Matter of Prine, Audrey R.	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	1. Petition paragraph 12; 14 Statutory Computation:  loss on sale of $165,000 does not reflect loss on sale of $168,000 in Schedule A. 2. Extraordinary Fees Request:  must be accompanied by a statement of the facts specifying the amount and hourly rate for each category as required in CRC, rule 7.702 and 7.703
VPR053501	In the Matter of Martinez, Raymond Carl	Final Distribution Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR048986	In the Matter of Hurtado, Samuel Martinez	Petition Hearing	Appearance Required	Documents in order
VPR054128	In the Matter of Cardona, Olivia M.	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order. Court investigation not completed
VPR054125	In the Matter of White, Kristophor Gary	Appoint Conservator	Appearance Required	Documents in order

Honorable Russell Burke Presiding- Department 19

Examiner notes for probate matters:

                                         Probate calendar for September 3, 2026

Status:  Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc.

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302 or 1430

Case Number	Case Name	Type	Status	Comments
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR054091	In the Matter of Gilmer, Carol	Appoint Conservator	Matter appears to be in order
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR054092	In the Matter of Gilmer, Allen	Appoint Conservator	Matter appears to be in order
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR054214	In the Matter of Dennis Jr., William Harrison	Determine Succession to Primary Residence	Not filed- Notice of Hearing & Heirs’ assignment of interest Amended Order lodged
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR054235	In the Matter of Smothers, Barbara	Letters of Administration	Children of decedent are not all included in #8
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR054236	In the Matter of Everhart, Joann	Letters of Administration	6(a-h) NO SELECTION MADE, but relatives are listed in #8. – (f) NEXT OF KIN
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR053809	In the Matter of Miller, Judy K.	Petition Hearing - FINAL DISTRIBUTION	Matter appears to be in order
9/3/2026 8:30	PPR053973	In the Matter of Micaela Gomez Living Trust	Motion Hearing- SET ASIDE ORDER	No issues to address with filings

South County Justice Center & County Civic Center- Visalia

GUARDIANSHIP CASES

         SCJC- Honorable Russell Burke Presiding

         Visalia- Honorable Bret D. Hillman; Honorable Nathan D. Ide; Honorable David C. Mathias

Examiner notes for probate GUARDIANSHIP matters calendared September 2, 2026 & September 3, 2026  that allow for posting:

PLEASE NOTE:  All attempts possible are made to have the information on this page entered by 3:00 p.m. the day prior to hearing in order to allow for any needed continuances or travel if an appearance should be required.  For further information regarding a probate matter listed below you may contact the Probate Document Examiner at (559) 730-5000 x 1302.

Hearing Date & Time	Department Number	Case Number	Case Name	Comments
9/2/26 8:30 AM	Department 01	VPR053085	In the Matter of Camacho, Mia	Petition Hearing- Declaration of Good Cause to waive notice has NOT been filed with the court, pursuant to Probate Code §1460(e); No request made to shorten the time for giving a notice of hearing, Probate Code §1203 NEED Notice of Hearing GC-020 form to be filed indicating parties to this case were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing pursuant to Prob Code §1460, service to be given 15 days before hearing
9/3/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR053168	In the Matter of L.M.	NEED Notice of Hearing to be filed indicating the Notice of Hearing was served pursuant to Probate Code §1460
9/3/26 8:30 AM	Department 19	PPR050803	In the Matter of I.A.A.	Terminate Guardianship Hearing- Moving party to contact court investigator NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed indicating relatives were served with a copy of the Notice of Hearing, 15 calendar days, as required by PROB Code §1511
9/3/26 8:30 AM	Department 09	VPR050772	In the Matter of J.S.C.Z.	Petition Hearing- Petition is incomplete at #3, #5, and no supporting facts attachment. No Order lodged NEED Notice of Hearing (GC-020) to be filed indicating service of the Notice of Hearing, 15 calendar days, as required by PROB Code §1511, §2352, CRC 7.1013
9/3/26 10:00 AM	Department 01	VPR050006	In the Matter of S.A.S.	CO-GUARDIANS have not filed the Confidential Guardianship Status Review Report for 2025/2026