Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, February 5, 2026, are:

Re:                Carranza, Susan vs. The City of Dinuba

Case No.:   VCU283128

Date:           February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs

Tentative Ruling: To award $215,353.15 in costs.

Facts

This matter involves a collision between a vehicle driven by Defendant Wymenga, and Decedent Raymond Millard while Decedent operated an electric scooter in a marked cross-walk at East El Monte Way and Palm Drive in the City of Dinuba. Plaintiff Carranza’s only cause of action against the City is for dangerous condition of public property.

In this matter, a section 998 offer was served on June 18, 2025 by Defendant City.

On August 6, 2025, during the trial, Plaintiff and Defendant Wymenga reached a settlement, and the City agreed to a mutual waiver of costs as to Defendant Wymenga.

On September 24, 2025, the City filed a notice of judgment after trial reflecting that on August 12, 2025, the jury returned a verdict that the property at issue was not in a dangerous condition at the time of injury and awarded Plaintiff nothing from the City.

On September 30, 2025, Defendant filed its memorandum of costs seeking recovery of the following:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Plaintiff?
2. Jury Fees	$1,184.31	No
4. Deposition costs	$21,304.77	Yes
5. Service of Process	$996.00	Yes
8. Witness Fees	$168,562.95	Yes
12. Models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits	$22,337.41	Yes
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$1,336.00	Yes
16. Other	$6,060.16	Yes
Total	$221,782.42

Defendant filed a number of documents in support of this request.

On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion to tax costs, challenging the costs noted above, arguing that the memorandum improperly includes charges that are “(a) unrelated to the litigation between Plaintiff and the City, (b) unreasonable in amount, or (c) expressly prohibited by statute including costs expressly excluded under § 998 or not “reasonably necessary” under § 1033.5.” Plaintiff seeks a total award of costs in the amount of $12,179.31.

The Court notes here that one of the main arguments as to taxing or striking costs is that a portion of the costs claimed were incurred prior to the expiration of the section 998 offer. Pursuant to section 998, the offer must be accepted prior to trial or within thirty (30) days.

Subsection (c)(1) states “If an offer made by a defendant is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover their postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant's costs from the time of the offer.” (emphasis added.)

The plain language of subsection (c)(1) states that Defendant is entitled to recover costs “…from the time of the offer” which, in this matter, is September 13, 2023. The Court notes a second section 998 offer June 18, 2025 that is irrelevant to this issue.

In opposition, Defendant seeks to recover all costs, that no waiver occurred regarding settlement with Defendant Wymenga, and that all costs were reasonable and necessary.

4. Deposition costs

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all but $3,853.31 of the $21,304.77 sought by Defendant. Plaintiff argues that a number of depositions were unrelated to Plaintiff’s claims and the City’s defense thereof, and instead were incurred with respect to Defendant Wymenga, who settled with the City during trial.

The Court does not agree with this position. Defendant Wymenga was the party who struck the decedent in the case and remained a defendant through the start of trial. Depositions taken related to those claims were necessarily incurred by the co-Defendant City. The costs sought here are to transcripts of those depositions incurred by Defendant. Additionally, the Court does not find the deposition costs associated with other persons identified in discovery or associated with the decedent unnecessary to prepare the matter for trial.

As a result, the Court will not tax this category.

5. Service of Process

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all of the $996 sought by Defendant.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(a)(4) permits recovery of such costs as follows:

(4) Service of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means, as follows:

(A) When service is by a public officer, the recoverable cost is the fee authorized by law at the time of service.

(B) If service is by a process server registered pursuant to Chapter 16 (commencing with Section 22350) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code, the recoverable cost is the amount actually incurred in effecting service, including, but not limited to, a stakeout or other means employed in locating the person to be served, unless those charges are successfully challenged by a party to the action.

(C) When service is by publication, the recoverable cost is the sum actually incurred in effecting service.

(D) When service is by a means other than that set forth in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C), the recoverable cost is the lesser of the sum actually incurred, or the amount allowed to a public officer in this state for that service, except that the court may allow the sum actually incurred in effecting service upon application pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (c).

Here, while Defendant has provided invoices regarding the service used “ACE” the Court is unable to determine if service was complete by a registered process server under subsection (B).

Therefore, the Court awards the cost under (D), which it understands to be $50 per person, resulting in $250 in costs permitted.

8. Witness Fees

Ordinary Fees

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all of the $1,100.82 sought by Defendant as to Ismael Hernandez. Plaintiff claims Hernandez was an employee of the City and therefore no cost should have been incurred.

However, the City notes Hernandez was not an employee at the time of the deposition and therefore the ordinary fee incurred is recoverable.

The Court will not strike any cost in this category.

Expert Fees

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all but $8,325 of the $167,462.95 sought by Defendant as to expert fees.

“In the absence of an order of the trial court appointing an expert witness, the fees of an expert witness are not recoverable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032.” (Sanchez v. Bay Shores Medical Group (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 946, 950.) However, Defendant is seeking to recover fees paid to Plaintiffs’ experts under the fee shifting provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 998(c)(1).

If a plaintiff rejects a defendant’s settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment, the plaintiff may not recover his post-offer costs and must pay the defendant’s costs from the time of the offer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 998, subd. (c)(1).)  The court may also award the defendant his reasonable costs for expert witnesses.  (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff recovered nothing from Defendant at trial. Plaintiff is therefore liable for Defendant’s allowable costs under 1033.5(a), as discussed herein, as well as post section 998 offer costs, which would not otherwise be available but for the rejection of the section 998 offer and Defendant’s status as prevailing party. Per “the explicit statutory language of section 998, subdivision (a): ‘The costs allowed under Sections 1031 and 1032 shall be withheld or augmented as provided in this section.’ (Italics added.) Section 998 allows a prevailing party to recover fees paid to experts under the specific circumstances outlined in the statute in addition to the costs allowable under sections 1032 and 1033.5, such as court-ordered experts.” (Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 55.)

To start, the dates stated under 8b on the attachment reference dates after the first section 998 offer dated September 13, 2023.

As to Englemann and Braun, Defendant indicates Englemann served as a traffic and safety engineering expert and Braun was retained as an accident reconstruction expert. Therefore, these experts were not duplicative. Further,  the Court may award fees associated with Englemann even though he did not testify at trial. “The court in Evers went on to further hold that section 998 also covers the cost of experts who aid in the preparation of the case for trial, even if they do not actually testify. [citation omitted.] The court observed: ‘Since the statute does not specify precisely the services for which costs are recoverable, the determination of allowable costs is largely within the trial court's discretion.’ [citation omitted.]” (Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 124.) Therefore, the Court will not strike or tax the costs as to Englemann and Braun.

Again, the Court does not agree that the settlement with Defendant Wymenga at trial by Plaintiff precludes costs incurred in preparation for trial that, at the time the costs were incurred, included Defendant Wymenga.

As such, the Court is not inclined to tax or strike any expert costs stated in the memorandum.

12. Models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all of the $22,337.41 sought by Defendant.

These costs are stated as digital exhibit display, PowerPoint display, transcription of police interviews and production of traffic signs.

The Court considers the trial technology services “other costs” that are not expressly allowed under 1033.5(a) and thus the Court utilizes its discretion to determine if the costs were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation instead of merely convenient and, if necessary, that they are reasonable in amount under section 1033.5(c). 

Courts have examined the use of technology in the courtroom with respect to whether it was reasonably necessarily to the conduct of the litigation or merely convenient or beneficial. (Green v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1363.) Whether these costs are reasonably necessary is a question of fact for the trial court. (Id. at 1374.) In Green, the court held that preparation and presentation of electronic evidence, including videos of deposition testimony, exhibits and excerpts from audio recordings technology, and the use of a technician to monitor the equipment and quickly resolve any glitches, has become commonplace, and expected by jurors, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing these costs. (Id. at 1374.)

In Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 217 Cal. App. 4th 968, 989-990, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to tax $24,103.75 for courtroom presentations, including trial video computer, power point presentation and videotape deposition synchronizing and the cost of a court technician for nine days of trial.

Here, therefore, the Court will not tax the $20,030 as to Trial Presentation Specialists and Cogent Legal Services.

As to the traffic signs, these appear to be proper costs permitted expressly under 1033.5(a)(13) where reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. (See Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 651, 667 [noting these costs are recoverable “…under section 1033.5(c)(4) to award costs incurred in preparing demonstratives and photocopies of trial exhibits, even though they were not ultimately used at trial, when such materials are reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation and reasonable in amount… Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeal that costs for such items are allowable in the trial court's discretion under section 1033.5(c)(4).” (Id. at 667.)

As to the transcription of audio, this appears expressly permitted under “electronic formatting” and where reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact.

The Court, therefore, will not tax or strike any costs in this category.

14. Fees for electronic filing or service

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all of the $1,336 sought by Defendant.

Plaintiff argues that “While it is true that public entities are exempt from the filing fees, the City, nonetheless, is required to electronically file documents.” The Court knows of no requirement to electronically file documents.

Section 1033.5(a)(14) permits recovery of such costs “ if a court requires or orders electronic filing or service of documents.”

Therefore, the Court will strike all costs as requested.

16. Other

Here, Plaintiff seeks to strike all of the $6,016 sought by Defendant.

These costs are subpoenaed medical records and investigation services to locate unnamed trial witnesses

As to the $1,713.71 in subpoena records costs, the Court will not strike these given that they relate to the records of Wymenga.

However, the City makes no argument with respect to the investigative services in the amount of $4,346.45. Plaintiff has challenged this cost sufficiently and Defendant has not met its burden demonstrating this was reasonably necessary. Additionally, such costs appear expressly not allowable under section 1033.5(b)(2).

Therefore, the Court will strike $4,346.45 and award $1,713.71.

Miscellaneous

The Court notes here that the majority of these costs are expert fees awarded pursuant to section 998. LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1124 notes that:

 “…‘section 998 gives the trial court discretion to consider  a party's ability to pay costs, when considering costs recoverable under that section.” [citations omitted] However, the appellate court disagreed that a court had the same discretion under section 1032: ‘There is no language in section 998 which would transfer the discretion of that section to a motion to tax costs recoverable by the prevailing party under sections 1032 and 1033.5, and unrelated to section 998.’ [citation omitted].”

Here, however, Plaintiff has not made any argument or provided evidence through declaration of an inability to pay.

Summary

Cost	Amount Sought	Amount Awarded
2. Jury Fees	$1,184.31	$1,184.31
4. Deposition costs	$21,304.77	$21,304.77
5. Service of Process	$996.00	$250.00
8. Witness Fees	$168,562.95	$168,562.95
12. Models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits	$22,337.41	$22,337.41
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$1,336.00	$0.00
16. Other	$6,060.16	$1,713.71
Total	$221,782.42	$215,353.15

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Boelter, Celina vs. Ochoa, Carlos Jose

Case No.:   VCU305474

Date:            February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling:  Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

Celina Boelter alleges Carlos Ochoa, a Porterville police officer, negligently “ran over [her] with his patrol car,” which he was operating in the course of his employment.  Boelter sues Ochoa and the Porterville Police Department, asserting a single cause of action for motor vehicle negligence. 

The following is not in dispute:

In the hours preceding the accident, near midnight on March 28, 2024, Boelter and her husband got together with friends, during which Boelter consumed approximately four shots of Southern Comfort alcohol and methamphetamine (after the accident, she also tested positive for fentanyl).  Boelter, her husband, and a friend decided to go to a nearby casino.  Boelter’s husband drove.  During the drive, Boelter began to act erratically, was yelling at her husband, and ended up instructing him to pull over a let her out of the car, which he did, and Boelter got out.  

Near 3:30 AM (March 29, 2024), Ochoa was driving towards the Porterville Police Department to attend a mandatory training.  He was driving southbound on Westwood Street, north of Scranton Avenue, in Porterville. 

On the way, Ochoa observed two vehicles stopped on the northbound side of the road.  The bright headlights were shining towards Ochoa’s direction.  As Ochoa drove closer, his attention was momentarily directed towards the northbound lanes because he observed people standing outside of the vehicles.  At least one person was waiving with their hands in the air to get his attention as he drove by. 

Ochoa wanted to assess the situation and he slowed to make a U-turn in order to contact the individuals attempting to gain his attention.  When Ochoa redirected his attention to the road ahead of him, he momentarily observed a dark object on the ground just in front of his vehicle’s push bar, but it was too late to swerve or stop in time to avoid it.

After striking the object, Ochoa completed the U-turn and parked his vehicle on the east side shoulder of Westwood Street, facing the northerly direction, north of Scranton Avenue.  Ochoa got out of his vehicle and walked towards the object, and learned that he struck a pedestrian, later identified as Boelter. 

Boelter was lying completely supine on the roadway, dressed in a black top, dark jeans, and black boots.

Defendants move for summary judgment on the complaint.  Defendants assert Ochoa owed no duty of care to Boelter; that even if he did, he did not breach a duty of care owed to Boelter; and that even if he owed a duty to Boelter and breached it, that his breach was not the cause of Boelter’s injury.

The court finds Ochoa owed Boelter a duty of care, but that defendants make an unrefuted prima facie showing that Ochoa did not breach that duty and that his driving conduct was not the cause of Boelter’s injuries. 

ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standards

“A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if ‘there is no triable issue as to any material fact and …the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must present evidence that either ‘conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff's cause of action’ or ‘show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’ evidence necessary to establish an element of the claim. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853–856 [107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].) If the defendant meets this burden, ‘the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)” (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 832 [236 Cal.Rptr.3d 236] (Staats).)

B. Negligence

“ ‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are well established. They are “(a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty; [and] (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”’ ” (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, 911 P.2d 496].

C. Duty

“[T]he existence and scope of a duty are questions of law.” (Staats, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 832, citations omitted.) 

Because defendants are a public entity and an employee thereof, their “exposure to tort liability is nominally defined by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815, subd. (a); C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 868 [138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 270 P.3d 699] (William S. Hart). However, the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) provides that public employees are liable for their acts and omissions ‘to the same extent as a private person’ (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a)), and public entity employers are vicariously liable for employees' negligent acts within the scope of their employment to the same extent as private employers (Gov. Code, § 815.2, subd. (a); William S. Hart, at p. 868).”  (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 [230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656].)

Defendants do not dispute Ochoa was acting within the scope of his employment when the subject incident occurred, and, therefore, defendants’ “potential liability … ‘turns on ordinary and general principles of tort law.’ ” (Ibid., citation omitted.)

“The general rule in California is that ‘[e]veryone is responsible … for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person … .’ (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) In other words, ‘each person has a duty to use ordinary care and “is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances … .” ’ (Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 771 [122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313, 248 P.3d 1170] (Cabral), citations omitted.)

Defendants argue Ochoa owed Boelter no duty of care because the risk of harm from Ochoa’s conduct was not foreseeable.  Defendants characterize the risk of harm in this case as having been created exclusively by Boelter’s “decisions lead[ing] her to lying completely supine, at three in the morning, dressed in dark clothing, in the middle of a highway, where unsuspecting motorists are traveling” and essentially argue that these factual circumstances were unforeseeable to Ochoa. 

“To base a duty ruling on the detailed facts of a case,” however, as defendants invite the court to do here, “risks usurping the jury's proper function of deciding what reasonable prudence dictates under those particular circumstances.”  Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 774.)  Foreseeability, in the context of assessing the legal question of the existence of a duty, is, instead, “evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality. … [T]he court’s task in determining duty ‘is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed … .’ ” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 772.)  “In other words, [the court’s] foreseeability analysis in the duty context is not case specific.”  (Coyle v. Historic Mission Inn Corp. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 627, 635 [234 Cal.Rptr.3d 330], citing Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

Approaching the duty question at this more general level, the court finds Ochoa owed a duty of care.  “[T]he general duty to take ordinary care in the conduct of one's activities (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a)) indisputably applies to the operation of a motor vehicle.” (Cabral, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 774.)  More specifically, higher courts have specifically determined that a person lying in the middle of the road, solely by virtue of that conduct, does not assume the risk of being run over.  (See Eramdjian v. Interstate Bakery Corp. (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 590, passim [315 P.2d 19] (Eramdjian); Cooke v. Stevens (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 457, 463 [describing Eramdjian as “quite properly” holding “that a person who is lying unconscious in the middle of a highway, as a result of one accident, does not assume the risk of being run over in another.”)

The court, accordingly, finds that Ochoa owed Boelter a duty of care. 

The court notes that defendants raise, in their reply, an argument addressed to a selective quotation of a comment in plaintiff’s opposition that Ochoa had “a duty to immediately stop and investigate.”  Defendants point to Posey v. State of California (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 835 [219 Cal.Rptr. 534] and Von Batsch v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1111 [222 Cal.Rptr. 239]—cases in which plaintiffs attempted, unsuccessfully, to assert liability based on a law enforcement officer’s duty to investigate, in asserting that Ochoa, here, had no duty to investigate. 

The court will not spend much time on this point because it responds to a contention that is not made by plaintiff in her lawsuit.  Plaintiff’s operative point in the quoted portion of her brief is that a person being in the road was foreseeable to Ochoa “considering that there was a bystander in the road … warning Ochoa of a potential danger ahead”; that “Ochoa failed to heed warning, running over Plaintiff”; and that her injuries could have been avoided because Ochoa “had the option and duty to stop immediately and investigate upon seeing the witnesses waiving at him to stop.”  Plaintiff is not asserting the type of duties in question in Posey v. State of California (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 835 [219 Cal.Rptr. 534] or Von Batsch v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1111 [222 Cal.Rptr. 239]; rather, as defendants clearly recognize, plaintiff is asserting that Ochoa was required, in conformity with the standard of ordinary care to avoiding running over her, “to stop immediately” once he observed the “bystander in the road … warning Ochoa of a potential danger ahead.”  Defendants’ arguments regarding Ochoa not having a duty to investigate are, accordingly, irrelevant to the duty question presented in this case. 

B. Breach & Causation

“[B]reach of duty is usually a fact issue for the jury.  If the circumstances permit a reasonable doubt whether the defendant's conduct violates the standard of due care, the doubt must be resolved by the jury as an issue of fact rather than of law by the court. Like breach of duty, causation also is ordinarily a question of fact which cannot be resolved by summary judgment. The issue of causation may be decided as a question of law only if, under undisputed facts, there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion.” (Nichols v. Keller (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1672, 1687 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 601], citation omitted.)

“Breach is the failure to meet the standard of care.”  (Coyle, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 643, citing Johnson v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 297, 305 [49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52] (Johnson).)  “Therefore, a breach in this case would mean [Ochoa] failed to exercise reasonable care [in the driving of his patrol car when he ran over Boelter].” (Ibid.)  “ ‘To be entitled to summary judgment in [its] favor, [defendants are] required to present evidence that would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding it was more likely than not that [Ochoa’s driving conduct] fell below the standard of care. Only if [defendants are] successful in meeting this burden does the burden shift to [Boelter] to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. [Citation.]” (Ibid., citing Johnson, at p. 305.)

The court finds this is a case where, based on defendants’ showing, a reasonable trier of fact would be precluded from finding it more likely than not that Ochoa’s driving conduct fell below the standard of care and that his driving conduct was the legal cause of Boelter’s injuries. 

As noted above, the undisputed facts establish that as Ochoa drove closer to the area where he ultimately ran over Boelter, his attention was momentarily directed towards the northbound lanes because he observed people standing outside of the vehicles, at least one of whom was waiving their hands to get his attention; and that, when Ochoa redirected his attention to the road ahead of him and observed “a dark object” that turned out to be Boelter, it was too late to swerve or stop in time to avoid hitting her. 

These undisputed factual contentions were supported by expert declarations submitted by defendants of (a) Tate Kubose, Ph.D, a human factors scientist with an engineering and scientific firm specializing in the investigation and analysis of accidents and equipment failures; and (b) Thomas Braun, P.E., who was retained as an accident reconstruction expert.

Kubose determined, based on a visibility study of conditions present at the time of the subject incident, that Ochoa likely would not have been able to detect and recognize Boelter as a hazard in the roadway until his vehicle was 50-75 feet away from her, and it would have taken him approximately 1.2 seconds to (1) detect and determine that Boelter’s presence in the road was a hazard, (2) determine an avoidance response, and (3) initiate that response.  Kubose opined, further, given nighttime conditions and the competing demand for Ochoa’s attention from the individual in the roadway waiving, the assessed 1.2 seconds avoidance respond time would typically be increased. 

Braun determined that, at 500-600 feet from impact, Ochoa was traveling at approximately 44 MPH (below the 55 MPH speed limit), and, as he reached and passed the two vehicles parked facing northbound on Westwood, he was traveling at 41-42 MPH.  Braun further determined Ochoa was approximately 155 feet from impact when he was parallel to and traveling past the second parked car, which was approximately 2.9 seconds before impact.

Braun concluded, based on the results from a collision and trajectory simulation program, which incorporated the visibility distance and required avoidance response time determined by Kubose, that Ochoa could not have reasonably perceived, reacted, and braked or steered in time to avoid impact with Boelter. 

The court finds, based on this showing, defendants make a prima facie showing sufficient to establish that a reasonable trier of fact is precluded from finding it more likely than not that Ochoa’s driving fell below the standard of care arising from his duty to avoid running over a person lying in the road.  Defendants uncontradicted showing establishes that Ochoa simply did not have enough time to initiate avoidance measures by the time he was able to see “a dark object” that turned out to be Boelter, in his path of travel. 

Boelter’s response to this is that Ochoa breached his duty of care by not stopping immediately upon seeing the witness waiving at him to stop.  Boelter asserts “[i]t was clear that there was some sort of emergency, and it was foreseeable that this could include, as it did, a pedestrian in the roadway.”  It was not foreseeable, however, merely by the presence of a person waiving at Ochoa to stop, that a person wearing at black shirt, dark jeans and black boots, was lying, at approximately 3:00 AM under cover of dark, supine in the middle of the road.  The court does not find, as a necessary incident to the duty to drive with reasonable care in the avoidance of persons lying in the roadway, that all officers must treat all attempts by a person signaling their attention as indicative of the presence of a person lying in the roadway concealed in the dark. 

Although this fact-specific foreseeability inquiry in the context of breach of the established duty of care is generally a question reserved for the jury, the issue may be determined as a matter of law if the circumstances do not permit a reasonable doubt as whether the defendant’s conduct violates the boundaries of ordinary care.  (Nichols, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1687.)  No reasonable jury could conclude, more probably than not, that striking a person whose presence is not visible to a driver is a foreseeable injury resulting from the act of driving merely because a bystander is standing in the road waiving at the driver. 

As Ochoa testified at deposition (which evidence is submitted by Boelter), when Ochoa approached the scene and saw the person waiving, it may have been “an option for sure to stop,” but he was, at that point, “still trying to process the situation” as he didn’t know “what’s going on there … it could have been a car broken down or something way worse.”

At the time Ochoa was being flagged down by the bystander/witness in the road, he did not know what risk, harm, or other situation was presented—“it could have been a car broken down or something way worse.”  Nothing about the information presented to Ochoa at that point indicated a foreseeable risk of a concealed person lying in the roadway, and ordinary care did not require him to conduct his driving as though precisely and only that risk was presented to him. 

Relatedly, no reasonable jury could conclude Boelter’s injuries were caused by Ochoa’s driving conduct.  “ ‘ “Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question of fact which cannot be decided as a matter of law from the allegations of a complaint. … Nevertheless, where the facts are such that the only reasonable conclusion is an absence of causation, the question is one of law, not of fact.” ’ ” (Modisette v. Apple Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 136, 152 [241 Cal.Rptr.3d 209], citing State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353 [188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 349 P.3d 1013].)

Because defendants’ undisputed prima facie showing establishes that Boelter was undetectable to Ochoa until it was too late to avoid hitting her, the court finds no reasonable jury could conclude Boelter’s injuries were caused by Ochoa’s driving conduct.  The cause of Boelter’s injuries was her lying, at approximately 3:00 AM under cover of dark, supine in the middle of the road in dark clothing, such that she was not detectable by Ochoa until it was too late to swerve or stop in time to avoid hitting her.  

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. 

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Banks, William Jr. vs. Martin AG,

Case No.:  VCU320973

Date:          February 5, 2026

Time:          8:30 A.M. 

Dept.          1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel Initial Responses to (1) Form Interrogatories – General, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (2) Form Interrogatories – Employment, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (3) Special Interrogatories, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (4) Requests for Production, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag and to Deem Admissions Admitted as to (5) Requests for Admission, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag; and for sanctions

Tentative Ruling: (1) through (4): To grant the motion and order responses no later than thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Plaintiff shall give notice; (5) to deem the admissions admitted; to order a total of $1550.00 in sanctions against Defendant Martin Ag and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, due no later than thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Plaintiff shall give notice.

Facts Common to (1) through (5)

In this discrimination, failure to prevent, harassment, retaliation and wrongful termination matter, Plaintiff sues Defendants Martin Ag and Seth Martin.

On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff served (1) Form Interrogatories – General, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (2) Form Interrogatories – Employment, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (3) Special Interrogatories, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag, (4) Requests for Production, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag and (5) Requests for Admission, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag.

Responses to the said written discovery requests were due on July 29, 2025.

Despite meet and confer efforts by Plaintiff in September and October 2025, Plaintiff indicates Defendant Martin Ag, as of the filing of these motions on November 24, 2025, has failed to serve verified answers.

As such, Plaintiff seeks to compel initial response to (1) through (4) and deem admissions Nos. 1-25 admitted as to (5)

Further, Plaintiff seeks sanctions a follows:

(1) Form Interrogatories – General, Set One  - $1,760

(2) Form Interrogatories – Employment, Set One - $1,760

(3) Special Interrogatories, Set One - $2,610

(4) Requests for Production, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag - $1,760

(5) Requests for Admission, Set One, as to Defendant Martin Ag. - $1,760

No opposition to these motions appears to have been filed.

Authority and Analysis

(1), (2) and (3) - Form Interrogatories – General, Set One, Form Interrogatories – Employment, Set One, Special Interrogatories, Set One

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the both sets of form interrogatories, and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first sets of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(4) Requests for Production, Set One

Based on Defendant’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Defendant provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Plaintiff’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

(5) Requests for Admission, Set One

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 states that if a party to whom requests for admissions have been directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order that the truth of any facts specified in the requests for admissions be deemed admitted. Here, Defendant has failed to serve a timely response and Plaintiff has moved for an order to deem the admission admitted.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. The facts and allegations alleged in Requests for Admissions 1 through 25 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Admission shall be deemed admitted.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280(c) (Admissions), 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), sanctions are available against the party that unsuccessfully opposes the motion.

However, the Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

The Court finds the both the hourly rate of $850 and number of hours unreasonable as requested as to each motion. The Court will sanctions Defendant Martin Ag, and its counsel of record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $1250.00 as to all five motions, providing 1 hour for each motion at the reasonable local rate of $250 per hour, plus $300 as to the $60 filing fee for each motion, for a total of $1550.00. Sanctions are due within thirty (30) days after service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Plaintiff shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Scott, Natasha vs. General Motors

Case No.:   VCU309749

Date:           February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion and award $32,186 in fees and $839.45 in costs.

Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff purchased a new 2022 Chevrolet Tahoe K1500 (“Vehicle”) which allegedly experienced suspension, transmission, electrical and other defects during the warranty period, which caused abnormal and excessive tire wear, improper alignment and steering issues, electrical malfunctions, and transmission slipping, hesitation, delayed engagement, and loud clunking noises during operation. Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to an authorized dealer on seven separate occasions.

On July 17, 2025, the parties entered into a formal Settlement Agreement which permitted the recovery of reasonable fees and costs.

On January 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion for recovery of fees and costs. Plaintiff seeks $66,878.25 in fees, a .1 multiplier and $1,560.20 in costs.

Here, no judgment appears to have been entered and therefore this motion appears timely under California Rule of Court 3.1702 stating that a fee motion “must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under Rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case . . . .” (Rule 3.1702(b)(1).)

Further, under Rule 8.104(1):

(1) Unless a statute or rules 8.108, 8.702, or 8.712 provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:

(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served;

(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or

(C) 180 days after entry of judgment.”

On January 27, 2026, Defendant GM filed a late opposition to this motion. GM argues that no multiplier should be awarded, that counsel has not demonstrated support for the rates in Tulare County, argues specific reductions and that the costs were not actually or reasonably incurred.

Authority and Analysis

Lodestar Calculation

“A trial court assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.”  (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.) “The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. The court may also consider whether the amount requested is based upon unnecessary or duplicative work.” (Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 448.)

“Under that [lodestar]method, the court ‘tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.)

Here, Plaintiffs seek to recover 116.31 hours at the rate of $575 per hour and to add an additional .1 multiplier.

No Multiplier

As to the 0.1 enhancement sought by Plaintiffs on the following factors:

1. The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
2. The skill displayed in presenting them;
3. The extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorney; and
4. The contingent nature of the fee award. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

The Court finds Plaintiffs’ justification for the multiplier is conclusory and does not set forth an adequate basis to award an enhancement. The Court does not find that the work cited demonstrates such extraordinary skill to justify an enhancement to the award sought. This case settled before trial, and the Court finds that this appears to be a standard Song-Beverly case, with no additional novelty or difficulty of issues evidenced from the supporting papers filed by Plaintiff.

As to the third factor, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s counsel was precluded from accepting other work.

As to the fourth factor, The Court further agree that the “contingent risk” here was minimal given the mandated fee-shifting of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Ketchum v. Jones (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141-42 [Where attorney fees are mandatory, the “contingent” risk of “establishing eligibility for the award” is not actually contingent and does not warrant an enhancement.].)

The Court will not award an enhancement in this case.

Reasonable Local Rate

“The lodestar calculation begins with a determination of the ‘reasonable hourly rate,’ i.e., the rate ‘prevailing in the community for similar work.’ (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The general rule is ‘[t]he relevant “community” is that where the court is located.’ (Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Systems Laboratory, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 26, 71.)” (Marshall, supra, 54 Cal.App.5^th at 285.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”  (PLCM Group Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court.” (Id.)  Additionally, the determination of the value of the legal services is committed to the discretion of the trial court without necessity of expert testimony. (Cordero-Sacks, v. Housing Authority (2011) 200 Cal App 4th 1267, 1286.)

There is no evidence provided that the $575 rate is the prevailing rate in Tulare County, where this Court resides. This Court, based upon its experience as to the prevailing rates in Tulare County, sets the hourly rate at $350 per hour.

Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

Plaintiff’s counsel’s records indicate 116.31 hours incurred on this matter.

Although detailed time records are not required, courts have expressed a preference for contemporaneous billing and an explanation of work. (Raining Data Corp. v. Barrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) “Of course, the attorney's testimony must be based on the attorney's personal knowledge of the time spent and fees incurred. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a) [‘the testimony of a witness concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter’].) Still, precise calculations are not required; fair approximations based on personal knowledge will suffice.” (Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 269.) 

The starting point for the determination as to hours is the attorney’s submitted time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395-397—verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous.)

 Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the fees were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation and were reasonable in amount. (Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), rev. denied (Jan. 2, 2020) [internal quotations and citations omitted].) If the party seeking fees fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [citing Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104]; see also Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [where prevailing party fails to meet that burden, the court “has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether”].)  

Here, Defendant specifically challenges the following entries:

• Client Intake and Case Initiation—May 16-17, 19, & 28, 2024 – 4.8 hours: The Court agrees that some reduction is necessary based on the content of the billing entries and will award 3 hours (-1.8 hours)
• Plaintiff’s Discovery Responses & Document Production—October 13 & 29, 2024; April 9, 2025; May 8 & 21, 2025 – 4.3 hours: The Court agrees some reduction is necessary based on the templated nature of discovery in these cases and will reduce these entries to 3.3 hours (-1 hour)
• Review of GM’s Discovery Responses & Preparation of Meet & Confer Letter—October 14, 23, & 30, 2024 – 4.0 hours: The Court agrees that some reduction is necessary based on the templated nature of the discovery and will reduce these entries to 3 hours (-1 hour)
• Preparing for & Drafting Motions to Compel RFPs & SROGs -November 6-7, 2024; January 13, 15, 22-23, & 27, 2025; April 23, 2025; May 19, 2025 – 16.45 hours: The Court agrees that some reduction is necessary based on the templated nature of the discovery and will reduce these entries to 10 hours (-6.45 hours)
• Travel Time for MTC “Hearing”—April 24, 2024: 12.0 hours: Here, although the Court requires personal appearances for discovery disputes, the Court does not require personal appearances when the parties have stipulated or otherwise resolved the discovery dispute. The minute order from this hearing indicates the parties reached a resolution on the discovery at issue, rendering travel unnecessary. Therefore, the Court will reduce this entry to 0 (-12 hours)
• Drafting Mandatory Settlement Conference Statement, Reviewing Settlement Release & Check, & Preparing Notice of Settlement—May 21-22, 2025; July 14, 2024; September 26, 2025 – 4.1 hours: The Court does not finds some of these entries related to clerical or administrative tasks and will reduce this entry to 3.6 hours (-0.5 hours).
• Fee Motion—July 11, 2025; December 9-10, 16, & 18, 2025; January 8, 26, 29, 2026; February 4-5, 2026 – 7.3 hours: The Court does not agree that the hours stated as to this fee motion are unreasonable and will not reduce this entry. However, the Court will not award “anticipated hours”
• Case Review & Preparing Memos to File—July 15, 2024; August 26, 2024; October 8-9, 2024; January 23, 2025; March 12, 2025; May 8, 2025 – 8.1 hours: The Court notes some file review and internal memorandum work are necessary and will reduce this entry to 6.5 hours (-1.6 hours)
• Administrative & Clerical Tasks Billed at Attorney Rates—Throughout – 5.9 hours: The Court agrees that the administrative and clerical tasks described in the opposition are not billable at the attorney rate, but notes that Defendant has failed to state precisely which entries are at issue. Additionally, Defendant argues for a reduction on this basis in specific entries above, creating an issue of a double reduction. As such, the Court cannot reduce these entries.
• Redundant & Excessive Communications—Throughout: - 20.52 hours: GM seeks reduction by half of these entries, but again, does not specifically identify each one. In any event, the Court does not find that this amount of hours, over the course of this case from filing to this motion is excessive. Therefore, the Court will not reduce this entry.

As a result, the Court calculates the fees as follows: 91.96 hours at $350 per hour for a total of $32,186.

Costs

Plaintiff seeks to recover $1,560.20. Plaintiff has filed a memorandum of costs and an amended memorandum on January 13, 2026. As such, Defendant’s opposition to the amended memorandum appears timely as filed January 27, 2026, and the Court will accept it as a motion to tax or strike costs.

Here, Plaintiffs seek the following:

Cost	Amount	Challenge by Defendant?
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$649.45	Yes
2. Jury Fees	$153.50	Yes
5. Service of Process	$40.00	No
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$181.45	Yes
16. Other	$243.29	Yes
Total	$1,560.20

Taxing Costs

“Any notice of motion to strike or to tax costs must be served and filed 15 days after service of the cost memorandum. If the cost memorandum was served by mail, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1013. If the cost memorandum was served electronically, the period is extended as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(a)(4).” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(1). Here, the motion is timely.

“Unless objection is made to the entire cost memorandum, the motion to strike or tax costs must refer to each item objected to by the same number and appear in the same order as the corresponding cost item claimed on the memorandum of costs and must state why the item is objectionable.” Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(b)(2).

Here, Defendant’s motion follows Rule 3.1700(b)(2).

The starting point is the verified Memorandum of Costs and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. “[T]he verified Memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred” and the burden rests with the party seeking to tax costs to show they were improper, unreasonable or unnecessary. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 855-856.)

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount.  An item not specifically allowable under Section 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). 

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.)  On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.  (Id.)  Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.  (Id.)   

“[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a ‘proper objection’ to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.] However, ‘[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting party].’ [Citations.]”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

A party contesting costs must state why the contested item is objectionable. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1700(b)(2)). Factual recitals rather than mere conclusions are required. Conclusory allegations that the item was “neither necessary nor reasonable” do not satisfy the objecting party’s burden. (County of Ker v. Ginn (1983) 146 Cal_App.3d 1107, 1113-1114; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.)

However, as noted by Plaintiffs, Jensen, supra, 35 Cal. App. at 137 indicates additional expenses may be recoverable that extends beyond the definition of costs set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure.

(1) Filing and Motion Fees

Defendant seeks to strike $134.00 in filing fees related to the motions to compel, characterizing them as unnecessarily filed. The Court does not agree that the parties resolution of the issues as to those motions makes them unnecessary. The Court will not strike this costs.

Defendant also seeks to strike $63.50 in anticipated filing fees that were related to the fee motion. However, the Court’s file indicates a $60 filing fee was paid on January 12, 2026 as to this motion and therefore the Court will strike only $3.50 from this category.

(2) Jury Fees

GM seeks to strike the $150 in jury fees because the case did not proceed to trial. However, this cost was reasonably incurred to preserve the jury trial. The Court will not tax the cost.

(14) Fees for electronic filing or service    

Electronic filing and service fees are statutorily authorized if the Court orders electronic filings or service. Here, there is no court order or requirement for electronic filing or service. The Court will strike the $181.45 in fees.

(16) Other

The other costs, totaling $535.80, consist of mileage expenses for travel on April 24, 2025 (which the Court has noted above was rendered unnecessary by the resolution of the discovery issues prior to the hearing) and anticipated mileage expenses. The Court will strike these entries in total.

Cost	Amount Sought	Amount Awarded
1. Filing and Motion Fees	$649.45	$645.95
2. Jury Fees	$153.50	$153.50
5. Service of Process	$40.00	$40.00
14. Fees for electronic filing or service	$181.45	$0.00
16. Other	$243.29	$0.00
Total	$1,560.20	$839.45

Therefore, the Court awards $839.45 in costs.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Graham, Michael vs. CA Farms, LLC

Case No.:  VCU324716

Date:           February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     CA Farms’s Demurrer to Grahams’ Answer to Cross-Complaint

Tentative Ruling: On January 23, 2026, the Graham Cross-Defendants filed a timely amended answer in lieu of opposing the demurrer. Therefore, this motion is moot.  

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Central Business Bureau, Inc. vs. Cabrera, Rosario

Case No.:  PCU330781

Date:           February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Ex Parte Application for TRO and OSC re: Preliminary Injunction

Tentative Ruling: To deny the application

Facts

On January 30, 2026, Plaintiff, Central Business Bureau, Inc. filed this complaint for judicial foreclosure and accounting of rents and profits (in rem – no deficiency sought) against Defendants Rosario Cabrera and Hector Cabrera.

Plaintiff states that on May 9, 2011, it obtained a money judgment against Defendant Rosario Cabrera, that the judgment a renewed on April 20, 2021 in the amount of $6,474.15, exclusive of post judgment interest, fees and costs. (Declaration of Chambers ¶1, 2.)

On May 13, 2011, Plaintiff recorded an abstract of judgment, creating a judgment lien attached to real property located at 221 E. Chase Ave., Porterville, CA 93257. (Declaration of Chambers ¶3,4.)

The lien remains unsatisfied.

A public auction sale of the property at issue has been scheduled for March 3, 2026, 10:00 am, with a stated minimum bid, based on a notice of default and election to sell recorded by the County of Tulare. (Declaration of Chambers ¶5,6.)

Via this ex parte application for temporary restraining order and order to show cause re: preliminary injunction, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the sale in order to effectuate its own judicial foreclosure action via this complaint.

Plaintiff seeks the TRO “solely to preserve the status quo pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction…” (Declaration of Chambers ¶8.)

No proof of service or notice of the ex parte has been indicated in the application.

Defendants have not appeared in this matter.

Authority and Analysis

Here, Plaintiff seeks a TRO and an OSC re: preliminary injunction by ex parte.

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, entitled “Preliminary injunctions and bonds” subdivision (g) states:

“(g) Ex parte temporary restraining orders Applications for ex parte temporary restraining orders are governed by the ex parte rules in chapter 4 of this division.”

As such, California Rule of Court, rule 3.1206 entitled “Service of papers” states:

“Parties appearing at the ex parte hearing must serve the ex parte application or any written opposition on all other appearing parties at the first reasonable opportunity. Absent exceptional circumstances, no hearing may be conducted unless such service has been made.”

No proof of service has been filed. No exceptional circumstances are demonstrated in the application or declaration of Counsel.

Further, the application lacks compliance with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1204 subdivisions (b) and (c) entitled “Contents of notice and declaration regarding notice” states:

(b) Declaration regarding notice An ex parte application must be accompanied by a declaration regarding notice stating:

(1) The notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any response, and whether opposition is expected and that, within the applicable time under rule 3.1203, the applicant informed the opposing party where and when the application would be made;

(2) That the applicant in good faith attempted to inform the opposing party but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made to inform the opposing party; or

(3) That, for reasons specified, the applicant should not be required to inform the opposing party.

(c) Explanation for shorter notice If notice was provided later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, the declaration regarding notice must explain:

(1) The exceptional circumstances that justify the shorter notice; or

(2) In unlawful detainer proceedings, why the notice given is reasonable.

Further, California Rule of Court, rule 3.1202, entitled “Contents of application” which, under subdivision (a), requires the following:

(a) Identification of attorney or party An ex parte application must state the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of any attorney known to the applicant to be an attorney for any party or, if no such attorney is known, the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the party if known to the applicant.

Additionally, California Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, entitled “Preliminary injunctions and bonds” notes, in subsection (a), that:

“A party requesting a preliminary injunction may give notice of the request to the opposing or responding party either by serving a noticed motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 or by obtaining and serving an order to show cause (OSC). An OSC must be used when a temporary restraining order (TRO) is sought, or if the party against whom the preliminary injunction is sought has not appeared in the action. If the responding party has not appeared, the OSC must be served in the same manner as a summons and complaint.” (California Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(a).) (emphasis added.)

Here, an OSC appears properly sought by Plaintiff as Plaintiff seeks a TRO and Defendants have not appeared in the action.

However,  Rule of Court, rule 3.1150, subdivision (c) states:

(c) Form of OSC and TRO The OSC and TRO must be stated separately, with the OSC stated first. The restraining language sought in an OSC and a TRO must be separately stated in the OSC and the TRO and may not be incorporated by reference. The OSC must describe the injunction to be sought at the hearing. The TRO must describe the activities to be enjoined pending the hearing. A proposed OSC must contain blank spaces for the time and manner of service on responding parties, the date on which the proof of service must be delivered to the court hearing the OSC, a briefing schedule, and, if applicable, the expiration date of the TRO.”

Here, the OSC is not stated first, the restraining language sought in the OSC is not stated separately in the OSC, the OSC does not describe the injunction, and the proposed OSC does not contain appropriate blank spaces as to service, proof of service, or a briefing schedule.

Finally, the declaration indicates the foreclosure sale is set for March 3, 2026, which would otherwise appear sufficient time to bring this matter by noticed motion.

Therefore, the Court denies the application.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Thompson, Jimmy Jr vs. Thompson, Lisa

Case No.:   PCU315874

Date:           February 5, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Judgment re: Signature

Tentative Ruling: To inquire as to service and notice of the motion; to inquire as to the status of a pending sale; if service and notice were made, and a sale is pending, to consider the appointment an elisor.

Facts

On December 12, 2025, this Court issued a statement of decision after court trial ordering the listing of 57 N. Westwood Street, Porterville, CA for sale and that if the property is not sold within that period, that a realtor shall be selected to sell the property.

This decision formed the basis of the judgment entered January 14, 2026. It is unclear if the judgment was served.

On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed this ex parte motion indicating that Defendant has failed to comply with the judgment, that the property is “at imminent risk, including loss of sale, escrow failure, continued delay, and financial harm” but provides no further details.

The request seeks the setting of an immediate hearing, that the Court “enforce the Judgment” that the Court authorize execution of “all necessary documents without further cooperation from Defendant” and grant other such relief.

No proof of service is provided as to this motion.

No indication of notice of the motion has been providing in the moving papers.

Authority and Analysis

California Rule of Court, rule 3.1206 entitled “Service of papers” states:

“Parties appearing at the ex parte hearing must serve the ex parte application or any written opposition on all other appearing parties at the first reasonable opportunity. Absent exceptional circumstances, no hearing may be conducted unless such service has been made.”

No proof of service has been filed. No exceptional circumstances are demonstrated in the application or declaration.

Further, the application lacks compliance with California Rule of Court, rule 3.1204 subdivisions (b) and (c) entitled “Contents of notice and declaration regarding notice” states:

(b) Declaration regarding notice An ex parte application must be accompanied by a declaration regarding notice stating:

(1) The notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any response, and whether opposition is expected and that, within the applicable time under rule 3.1203, the applicant informed the opposing party where and when the application would be made;

(2) That the applicant in good faith attempted to inform the opposing party but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made to inform the opposing party; or

(3) That, for reasons specified, the applicant should not be required to inform the opposing party.

(c) Explanation for shorter notice If notice was provided later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the ex parte appearance, the declaration regarding notice must explain:

(1) The exceptional circumstances that justify the shorter notice; or

(2) In unlawful detainer proceedings, why the notice given is reasonable.

Further, California Rule of Court, rule 3.1202, entitled “Contents of application” which, under subdivision (a), requires the following:

(a) Identification of attorney or party An ex parte application must state the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of any attorney known to the applicant to be an attorney for any party or, if no such attorney is known, the name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number of the party if known to the applicant.

The Court cannot either force a signature by Defendant nor order that documents regarding the sale of real property may be executed only by Plaintiff. However, Code of Civil Procedure section 128 permits the Court to appoint the Clerk of the Court as an elisor to execute documents necessary to effectuate the Court’s orders. Code Civ. Proc. section 128(a) provides in relevant part:

“Every court shall have the power to . . . compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding pending therein.” (See Blueberry Properties, LLC v. Chow (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1027 [“A court typically appoints an elisor to sign documents on behalf of a recalcitrant party in order to effectuate its judgments or orders, where the party refuses to execute such documents”]

Here, this appears the appropriate remedy. However, the Court requires the ex parte procedures be followed, including service and notice of this motion, before considering appointment of an elisor. Additionally, no details as to the sale, escrow period or attempts to obtain a signature have been provided to this Court.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division