Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Thursday, March 26, 2026, are:

Re:                Vidal, Jose Ruiz vs. Faria Land and Cattle Company LLC

Case No.:   VCU310614

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion for Final Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the Final Compliance Hearing for November 19, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts and Analysis

Plaintiff’s motion for final approval of class action and PAGA settlement, attorneys’ fees, costs, enhancement award, LWDA payment and class certification for settlement purposes came on for hearing on March 26, 2026.  The Court finds and rules as follows:

On February 27, 2026, the settlement administrator Apex Class Action, LLC, through its Case Manager, filed a declaration detailing the following events.

On October 8, 2025, the administrator  received a mailing list of 121 individuals  On October 22, 2025, after the administrator processed the names through the National Change of Address Database and updated the list with any updated addresses located, the administrator sent class notice by mail. A total of 24 notices were returned, 13 updated addresses were obtained and therefore 11 notices are deemed undeliverable.

The settlement administrator indicates Class members had 60 days, until December 22, 2025 to submit objections, disputes and/or requests for exclusions. However, as of February 27, 2026, the date of this declaration, zero (0) requests for exclusion and zero (0) objections were received from class members. Therefore, all 121 Class Members or 100% of the Class will participate in the settlement.

The court presumes the settlement is fair and reasonable given (a) that it was reached through arms-length bargaining at mediation, (b) that there was sufficient time for investigation and discovery since commencement of litigation (c) class counsel have particularized experience with the claims at issue in the case, and (d) there appear to be no disputes or objections.  (Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4^th 1794, 1802.) 

A net settlement amount of $144,321.34 is available to pay to the class members in accordance with the terms of settlement. The highest estimated individual payment is $3,145.02, the average estimated individual payment is $1,192.74, and the lowest estimated individual payment is $7.03

The Court believes basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise under the circumstances, in accordance with Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4^th 116, 133.  This case involved extensive informal discovery and investigation of disputed claims, including review and analysis by Plaintiff’s expert.  The settlement avoids significant risks and delay that would result from further litigation of the case, which would include, amongst other matters, certification proceedings, trial, and the possibility of further delay and cost resulting from appeals.

Class counsel has provided an updated declaration in support of the recovery of attorneys fees in the amount of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $319,500 or $106,500 and costs of $16,928.66

Counsel indicates spending 143.5 hours at rates ranging from $950 to $575, creating an updated total lodestar figure of $105,837.50. (Declaration of Hyun ¶22.)

Counsel has additionally provided sufficient cost information indicating actual costs incurred in the amount of $16,928.66. (Declaration of Hyun ¶25.)

The Court believes the requested attorney fees and costs appear reasonable under the circumstances. Additionally, counsel has provided a sufficient declaration to demonstrate adequate previous experience with class actions to further support the reasonableness of the award.

The settlement administrator has provided, in the declaration describing the work it has performed on the case, a value of services totaling $6,750. The Court believes the amount requested as compensation for the administrator appears reasonable. 

The settlement agreement designates California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

The Court previously approved representative payments of $5,000 as to Plaintiffs Vidal, Estrada and Torres and finds that the class representative payment is appropriate under the circumstances.

Finally, the Court confirms its conditional certification of the settlement class. The Court finds no significant events have occurred that would cause it to change its prior determination that the settlement class met all requirements under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 for certification for settlement purposes at the time it granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval.

On review of the declarations and pleadings submitted, the Court finds, given the established presumption that the settlement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case, and, particularly, given the absence of any objection or opposition following the class notice, that the settlement is fair and reasonable and that the motion for final approval should be, and is hereby, granted.

Therefore, the following deductions from the gross settlement of $319,500 are approved as follows:

Approved Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$106,500.00
Approved Attorney Costs (expended):	$16,928.66
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Vidal:	$5,000.00
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Estrada:	$5,000.00
Approved Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Torres:	$5,000.00
Approved Settlement Administrator Costs	$6,750.00
Approved PAGA Payments (Total)	$30,000.00
Approved Net Settlement Amount	$144,321.34

The Court shall enter its order of final approval and judgment in this case on the proposed form submitted by Plaintiff on February 27, 2026.

Final Compliance Hearing is set for November 19, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Centeno, Rene vs. Escobar, Sulema

Case No.:   VCU322457

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Compel Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion upon Defendant’s payment of the additional $120 in filing fees; to order further responses within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; to impose sanctions in the amount of $880 due within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion; Defendant shall give notice.

Facts

In this partition matter, Defendant served Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents on Plaintiff on October 1, 2025.

Responses were due November 5, 2025.

Defendant’s counsel contacted Plaintiff’s counsel, who indicated responses would be forthcoming by December 12, 2025.

No responses to the discovery were received.

Thereafter, Defendant filed this single motion to compel initial responses to Form Interrogatories, Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.

Further, Defendant seeks sanctions in the amount of $2,000 representing 5 hours at $400 per hour.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

As an initial matter, the Court notes one motion fee has been submitted to this Court, but that three motions are made here. The Court will condition the order as to initial responses upon payment of the remaining filing fees of $120.

Form and Special Interrogatories

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set of form and special interrogatories, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.290(a), that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of form interrogatories and first set of special interrogatories, within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

Requests for Production

Based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first set requests for production of documents, the Court orders under, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(a) that Plaintiff provide full and complete verified responses without objection to Defendant’s first set of requests for production of documents, within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

Sanctions

Under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) (Interrogatories) and 2031.300(c) (Requests for Production), the Court imposes sanctions as follows: $880 total, including $700 representing two hours for this motion at the rate of $350 per hour and the $180 in filing fees. The Court notes there is no meet and confer requirement and all that is necessary to obtain the relief requested on this motion to compel initial responses is that the other party failed to respond within the designated time.

Sanctions are imposed jointly and severally against Plaintiff and counsel of record and are due within thirty days after payment of the additional $120 filing fee and service of the notice of this ruling for this motion. Defendant shall give notice.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Jackson, Robert vs. State of California

Case No.:   VCU292972

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Defendant Visalia Landscape’s Demurrer

Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer without leave to amend

Facts

On August 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed this complaint as follows:

• Against Defendant State of California, Caltrans and Does 1-20 for Dangerous Condition of Public Property under Government Code section 835, defining Does 1-20 as "currently unknown governmental or quasi-governmental entities which owned, maintained, or otherwise controlled the premises."
• Against Does 21 – 40 for general negligence;
• Against Does 41-80 for general negligence; 
• Against Does 41-80 for premises liability;
• Against Does 21-40, 81-100 for negligent hiring, training and supervision;

Plaintiff alleges the incident occurred October 15, 2021.

On or about July 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amendment to complaint, naming Defendant Visalia Landscape & Tree Company, Inc. as Doe 6.

Defendant Visalia Landscape demurrers to the only cause of action pled against it for dangerous condition of public property and seeks judicial notice of the Secretary of State’s directory of business entities indicating that Defendant Visalia Landscape is a corporation and that this is not reasonably subject to dispute.

No opposition appears filed.

Authority and Analysis

Judicial Notice

The request for judicial notice provides a copy of a certificate of filing with the Secretary of State for California. “A court may take judicial notice of documents in its own records and those reflecting the official acts of local and state agencies, including resolutions, minutes, and agendas. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (d), (h); see Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 375, fn. 4)” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn. v. Julian-Cuyamaca Fire Protection Dist. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 583, 600.)

Under Elmore v. Oak Valley Hospital Dist. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 716, 721, the statement filed with the Secretary of State become a public record and a document of which the court may properly take judicial notice. The Court therefore takes judicial notice of this document, as well as the “facts that can be deduced, and/or clearly derived from, its legal effect, such as the names and dates contained in the document, and the legal consequences of the document.” (Julian Volunteer Fire Co. Assn, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at 600.)

As such, the Court judicially notices that demurring Defendant is not a public entity.

Demurrer

The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint “states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based.” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4^th 209, 220.  To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.) The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if “the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4^th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer.  (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062) But “doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4^th 1219, 1226.)

Public Entity Liability

The starting point is that, except as otherwise provided by statute, “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”  (Gov. Code § 815(a).)  “[T]his section ‘abolished all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for public entities, except for such liability as may be required by the federal or state Constitution. Thus, in the absence of some constitutional requirement, public entities may be liable only if a statute declares them to be liable’ [Citation.]”  (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.)  It has been recognized that it is impermissible to sue a public entity for common law negligence. (Torres v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 844, 850.) 

The statutory basis for imposing liability on public entities as property owners is Gov. Code §835. (Metcalf v. County of San Joaquin (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1121, 1129.) The elements of such a claim are found in Government Code section 835, which states:

Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either:

(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or

(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

Here, demurring Defendant is not a public entity and therefore the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Sanchez, Pedro vs. Beneventos Cleaning & Restoration Service, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU310618

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:      Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion; to set the motion for final approval for November 19, 2026; 8:30 am; D1. CMC is off calendar.

1. Sufficiency of Amount of Settlement (Net Estimated: $65,843.34)

The gross settlement amount is $162,500. Plaintiff estimates approximately 116 proposed Class Members, providing an estimated average payout of $597.79 per member.

The Class Members consist of:

“All current or former hourly paid or non-exempt employees employed by Defendant within the state of California at any time during the period from July 1, 2023 through October 18, 2025.”

Plaintiff primarily alleged the following violations: 1) Violation of Labor Code§§ 204, 1194, 1194.2, 1197 (Failure to Pay Minimum Wages); (2) Violation of Labor Code§§ 1194, 1198 (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation); (3) Violation of Labor Code§§ 226.7, 512 (Failure to Provide Meal Periods); (4) Violation of Labor Code§ 226.7, (Failure to Authorize and Permit Rest Breaks); (5) Violation of Labor Code§ 2802 (Failure to Indemnify Necessary Business Expenses); (6) Violation of Labor Code§§ 201-203 (Failure to Timely Pay Final Wages at Termination); and (7) Violation of Labor Code§ 226 (Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (8) Violation of Bus. & Prof. Code§§ 17200 et seq. (Unfair Business Practices); and (9) Civil Penalties Under PAGA [Cal. Lab. Code § 2699, et seq.].

Plaintiff provides estimates of the maximum recovery for each of the asserted wage and hour claims and penalties with information showing how the estimates were calculated including the damages models utilized. (Declaration of Hyun ¶¶ 13 – 24.) The total estimated recovery in the event of an outright victory is $1,137,727.96

Plaintiff has provided a detailed discussion of the value of each claim, applied various discount rates regarding the chance of success as to each claim which corresponds to the final gross settlement amount. (Declaration of Hyun ¶¶ 13 – 24.).)

After agreeing to participate in early mediation, Defendants informally produced time and pay records for Settlement Class members, key class data points, and other documents and information relevant to the claims alleged in advance of mediation. The parties reached the settlement after a full day mediation. 

The Court finds the information provided in support of the gross settlement amount sufficient for the Court to preliminarily approve the gross settlement amount, as the settlement amount appears to be within the recognized range of reasonableness given the claims and defenses asserted in this case.

Plaintiff’s deductions from the gross settlement of $162,500 are proposed as follows:

Proposed Attorney Fees (33.3%):	$54,166.66
Proposed Attorney Costs (up to):	$16,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Sanchez:	$5,000.00
Proposed Enhancement Payment to Plaintiff Meza:	$5,000.00
Proposed Settlement Administrator Costs:	$6,490.00
Proposed Total PAGA Penalty:	$10,000.00
Proposed Net Settlement Amount	$65,843.34

2.  Class Notice

The settlement agreement provides no claim form will be required of class members to participate in distributions.  Only those wishing to object or opt out must file notice with the settlement administrator.  Objections or opt out notices are to be made within 60 days. The Court regularly approves notice periods of 60 days or longer. The class notice period is approved.

With respect to the content of the Notice, the Court finds the Class Notice to be reasonable.  It clearly provides to the class member an estimate of the settlement share the employee is to receive and provides adequate instructions for any class member to opt out of the settlement or to submit an objection.

3.  Enhancement Award to Class Representative

The court preliminarily approves Plaintiffs Sanchez and Meza as Class Representatives for settlement purposes. The proposed enhancement award to Plaintiffs is $5,000.00 each. The Court has, in past cases, approved enhancement awards of $5,000.00 routinely. The enhancement payment is approved.

4. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3% of the gross settlement fund of $162,500 or $54,166.66 and costs not to exceed $26,000 are sought by Plaintiff’s counsel. Counsel has utilized the percentage of common fund methodology as well as provided adequate lodestar information to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee request.

Here, Counsel Hyun indicates that the firm has spent 133.7 hours on this case, at a rates ranging from $950 to $600 per hour, creating a total lodestar of $67,262.50. (Declaration of Hyun ¶37.) Therefore, the fees requested are approved.

Counsel has also provided the current costs expended in amounts of  $14,931.80 (Declaration of Hyun ¶39)The Court preliminarily approves costs not to exceed $16,000.

The Court further finds that Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced class action attorneys through the declarations of counsel.

5.  Claims Administrator

The court preliminary approves Apex Class Action, LLC Inc. as the claims administrator for this class action based both on prior experience with this settlement administrator in other class actions litigated in this court and on the Declaration of Sean Hartranft, Chief Executive Officer. The Court preliminarily approves administration costs not to exceed $6,490 based upon the Declaration of Hartranft and the itemized estimate. (Declaration of Hartranft ¶7– Exhibit B.)

6. Unclaimed Settlement Proceeds

The court preliminarily approves the distribution of unclaimed settlement proceeds to California Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Division, with an identification of the Participating Class Member to whom the funds belong, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 384.

7. Release

The Court finds the proposed release of claims reasonable under the circumstances.

8. LWDA Notice

Counsel’s declaration indicates confirmation from the LWDA of receipt of proof of submission of the proposed settlement agreement. (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (l)(2).) (Declaration of Hyun ¶ 27 – Exhibit 4.)

9. Class Certification

Code of Civil Procedure section 382 permits certification “when the question is of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 382.)  The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification under section 382 is proper.  (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 460.)  To do so, “[t]he party advocating class treatment must demonstrate the existence of an ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class, a well-defined community of interest, and substantial benefits from certification that render proceeding as a class superior to the alternatives.”  (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021.) 

Here, the Motion and accompanying declaration of Counsel sufficiently sets forth the basis for finding the class is numerous and ascertainable as 116 employees have been identified through Defendants’ employment records. Additionally, common questions of law and fact predominate within the individual causes of action based on class wide policies and procedures of Defendant. Further, the class representatives, through their declarations, indicates they will adequately and fairly represent the Class Members and will not place their interests above any Class Member. The Class Representatives were employed by Defendant during the relevant time period and thus worked under the same policies and procedures as the Class Members.

Accordingly, the motion to preliminarily approve the Class Action and PAGA settlement is granted. Motion for final approval is set for November 19, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Avila, Joanne Porras vs. Adequate Care Hospice, Inc., a California Corporation, dba American Care et al

Case No.:   VCU318473

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Vacate Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To find the motion moot by the stipulation of the parties; to set the Case Management Conference on April 9, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Facts

In this matter, on June 5, 2025, this Court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed this motion to set aside the Court’s order compelling arbitration on the basis that Defendants failed to timely pay the requisite arbitration fees.

Plaintiff indicates that on August 13, 2025, Plaintiff paid their portion of the filing fee.

On August 13, 2025, the arbitrator sent a letter to Defendant regarding Defendant’s portion of the fees.

On December 2, 2025, the arbitrator sent a further request for fee to all parties.

On January 8, 2026, the parties received notice from the arbitrator that it had not received Defendant’s filing fee.

On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff informed the arbitrator that Plaintiff sought to proceed in this Court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98.

On January 14, 2026, the arbitrator sent a confirmation letter that the matter has been closed.

Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $3,700.

In opposition, Defendants submits a stipulation whereby the parties agree to resolve the pending claims outside of arbitration and within this Court, that Defendant pay $1,679.10 to Plaintiff, that the motion filed by Plaintiff is withdrawn, that the order compelling arbitration is vacated, and that the stay imposed is lifted.

Therefore, the Court will sign the proposed order and sets a Case Management Conference for April 9, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Barajas, Raul vs. Agriland Farming Company, Inc.

Case No.:  VCU325257

Date:           March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion in part and compel arbitration of the individual Labor Code, Wage Orders, and Business and Professions Code claims as between Plaintiff and Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc.; to dismiss the class claims; to deny the motion as to the entire PAGA claim; to stay this matter as to the PAGA claim pending arbitration; to deny the motion as to Defendant Brar Family Farms.  CMC is continued to June 25, 2026; 8:30 am; D1.

Background Facts

In this matter, Plaintiff’s operative amended complaint alleges a number of causes of action under the Labor Code, Wage Orders, and Business and Professions Code on a classwide basis. Plaintiff, as an individual, further alleges discrimination, retaliation, wrongful termination. Finally, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA.

Plaintiff names Defendants Agriland Farming Company, Inc., Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc., and Brar Family Farms, as Defendants.

Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc. in response, filed this motion to dismiss the class claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement, and compel arbitration of the remaining claims on the basis it is a third party beneficiary to the arbitration agreement.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides the declaration of Johnnie Pena, an employee of Consolidated Compliance Management, Inc, an agent of Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc. who provides human resource and related services support. (Declaration of Pena ¶1.) Pena indicates maintenance and modification of Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc.’s policies, including arbitration agreements. (Declaration of Pena ¶2.)

Pena then states “This Arbitration Agreement identifies the employer as "Prime Ag Labor Solutions, Inc." instead of "Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc." This is simply a typographical error made in adapting the Arbitration Agreement for use by Prime Ag” (Declaration of Pena ¶4.)

However, Pena indicates that other onboarding documentation is provided simultaneously with the Arbitration Agreement and states the employer is “Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc.” (Declaration of Pena ¶¶5, 6.)

Additionally, Defendant submits the declaration of Hector Rodriguez, who states employment by Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc. and who indicates responsibility for the onboarding process, including the process regarding Plaintiff’s onboarding. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶¶1-2.) Rodriguez indicates meeting with Plaintiff November 3, 2020 to review the onboarding packet, that it was presented to Plaintiff that same day, that Plaintiff was advised the Arbitration Agreement was voluntary, that Plaintiff did not seek extra time to review it or ask any questions thereon, and that Plaintiff executed all documents that same day, including the Arbitration Agreement. (Declaration of Rodriguez ¶¶3-4.)

Finally, Defendant submits the declaration of the general manager of Consolidated who indicates that Plaintiff has named Brar Family Farms as a Defendant in this matter, but that Defendant Prime Ag, on information and belief, as to this Plaintiff, contracted with The Harbinder S. Brar Family Limited Partnership LP; The Harbinder S. Brar Family Limited Partnership 11 LP; Harbinder S. Bmr Family Limite Partnership III; The Harbinder S. Brar Family Limited Partnership IV L.P.; The Harbinder S. B FLP V LP; The Harbinder S. Brar FLP VI LP; The Harbinder S. Brar FLP VII LP; KSB LP; Bos LP; and SBSB LP (collectively, the "Brar Entities"), which are separate entities from named Defendant Brar Family Farms. (Declaration of Thompson ¶2.)

In opposition, Plaintiff declares a limited education level, that his primary language is Spanish, that he cannot read or write in English, that he can barely read the Spanish language that “I was not provided with any arbitration agreement as part of my employment onboarding on November 3, 2020, or anytime afterwards,” that “I was never provided with an opportunity to review, understand, or consider any arbitration agreement before allegedly being asked to sign documents during onboarding” and that the onboarding documents were presented in a hurried, informal manner. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶1-9.)

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.) The motion to compel arbitration requires the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., §1290.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413–414.) The motion must set forth the provisions of the written agreement and the arbitration clause verbatim, or such provisions must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; see Condee v. Longwood Mgmt. Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 164-165.)

"However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at. 165.)

"First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]" (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) "The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]" (Id.) "For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.' [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, Defendant has provided the Agreement it submits was signed by Plaintiff when employment commenced. (Declaration of Pena ¶4 – Ex. A; Declaration of Rodriguez ¶¶3-7 – Ex. A.)

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

In Gamboa, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiff “met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been aware of it: ‘I do not remember these documents at all .... Had I been made aware of the existence of an arbitration agreement, and been explained its provisions, I would not have signed any such documents.’” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 167.)

However, under Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (May 15, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, Plaintiff’s declaration is insufficient, as he fails to deny the signature is his own:

“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to arbitration. (Compare Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 757–758, review den. Apr. 26, 2023, S278817 with Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165) We join Iyere in concluding that an individual is capable of recognizing his or her handwritten signature and if that individual does not deny a handwritten signature is his or her own, that person's failure to remember signing the document does not create a factual dispute about the signature's authenticity. (Iyere, supra, at p. 757.)” (Id. at 825.)

In Ramirez, the appellate court found that the employer had met the initial burden via a declaration that asserted the employee was employed, that the declarant was the custodian of records, that the personnel file containing employee documents was kept in the regular course and scope, that a personnel file was maintained for the employee, that the employee signed the agreement and that true and correct copies were attached to the declaration. (Id. at 831.) As noted above, and in line with Ramirez (as well as with Gamboa and other cases), the Court has found Defendant has carried its initial burden.

Further, under Ramirez and in a handwritten signature case like this one, Plaintiff’s failure to deny she signed the Agreement is fatal the challenge to the authenticity. The Ramirez court noted that “Ramirez's declaration stated (1) he did “not recall ever being presented with an arbitration agreement,” (2) he did “not recall ever signing an arbitration agreement,” (3) no one informed him about an arbitration agreement, informed him of a desire that he sign an arbitration agreement, or explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, and (4) if someone had explained to him what an arbitration agreement was, he would not sign it.” (Id. at 836.)

The court, therefore, found the declaration insufficient to challenge the authenticity, stating “His declaration does not assert the signature on that document is not his and, furthermore, does not even state that he cannot recall signing that particular document.  Consequently, we conclude Ramirez, like the plaintiffs in Iyere, has offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of the handwritten signature on the acknowledgement.” (Id. at 836-837.)

The Court here agrees that mere “the inability to recall signing a document does not ‘afford[] an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed’” and therefore, the burden has not shifted back to Defendant. Plaintiff provides no testimony that the signature appearing on Exhibit A is not his own.

As such, the Court finds Defendant has provided a authenticated arbitration agreement.

Authority and Analysis – Mutual Assent / Fraud in Execution

As to the argument regarding mutual assent, Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518 notes:

“ ‘Mutual assent is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings.’ [citation omitted] ‘A party's acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.’ [citation omitted].) ‘[O]ne who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.’ [citation omitted]”

Therefore, the Court finds sufficient mutual assent.

As to the argument regarding fraud in the execution of the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff cites to Najarro v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 871, 885-886  which states:

“California law distinguishes between fraud in the ‘execution’ or ‘inception’ of a contract and fraud in the ‘inducement’ of a contract … in the former case ‘“the fraud goes to the inception or execution of the agreement, so that the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract at all, mutual assent is lacking, and [the contract] is void. In such a case it may be disregarded without the necessity of rescission.”’”

However, in Najarro, the Plaintiff after stating she did not know how to read and had trouble completing the paperwork, was asked: “‘do you want to work or not?’” to which she replied “ ‘[W]hat do these documents say? I don't know how to read,’ to which she was told, ‘It's okay, if you don‘t know how to read, then just sign them,’ adding that it was ‘nothing important.’ She signed a Spanish version of Version One.” (Id. at 887.)

There are no facts before this Court as to affirmative representations minimizing the importance of the documents or simply encouraging Plaintiff to sign if he wanted to work. As such, the Court will not find the Arbitration Agreement void based on the theory of fraud in the execution.

Authority and Analysis – Prime Ag Labor Solutions, Inc and Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc.

Given that the Court must find that an agreement to arbitrate exists by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds that the reference to Prime Ag Labor Solutions Inc. in the Agreement is sufficient to find an agreement to arbitrate exists with Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc. The remainder of the onboarding documents properly reference Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source, Inc., including the checklist which references to Arbitration Agreement. As such, the Court finds a sufficient agreement between Defendant Prime Ag Labor Source Inc. and Plaintiff.

Authority and Analysis – Execution Date and Lack of Signature by Defendant Prime Ag

Plaintiff argues that the lack of execution date on the Arbitration Agreement precludes enforcement of the Agreement. However, Plaintiff’s declaration states “Whatever I signed, I signed on top of the hood of Hector’s truck” and the Court has a declaration from Hector Rodriguez that this event took place on or about November 3, 2020. Further, as noted above, Plaintiff does not dispute that he signed the Agreement.

As to the lack of signature by Prime Ag, the Court notes that “Just as with any written agreement signed by one party, an arbitration agreement can be specifically enforced against the signing party regardless of whether the party seeking enforcement has also signed, provided that the party seeking enforcement has performed or offered to do so.” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 177.) Here, Defendant Prime Ag seeks enforcement and has otherwise performed duties required by it as to the employment of Plaintiff and under the Arbitration Agreement.

Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the Court finds execution of the Agreement occurred on or about November 3, 2020.

Authority and Analysis – Brar Entities

As to the naming of Defendant Brar Family Farms and Defendant Prime Ag’s contracting with the “Brar Entities” the Court recognizes that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement may be bound under a number of theories.

However, the Brar Entities, as set forth above and in the declaration of Thompson are not only non-parties to the arbitration agreement, but non-parties to the lawsuit. No law has been presented to this Court that would permit the compelling of a non-party to the lawsuit to arbitration. The Court recognizes the Brar Entities may be necessary to arbitration in this matter as Defendant Prime Ag’s client, but the Court is unaware of authority permitting it to bind a non-party in this case.

No other party to this lawsuit has joined this motion to compel or otherwise consented thereto.

Further, Defendant Prime Ag, in making this motion, expressly does not seek to compel Defendant Brar Family Farms on the basis that Defendant Prime Ag has not contracted with Defendant Brar Family Farms.

As such, the Court cannot enforce the Agreement against non-party Brar Entities.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement states:

“arbitrable disputes by an employee are those claims that are made within the applicable statute of limitations and that arise out of, or are related to:

…

4. Claims for wages or other compensation, Including, but not limited to alleged wage and hour violations;

          …

Claims that are related in any manner to claims described in paragraphs 1 through 5 above, whether based on statute, public policy, or otherwise.”

Further, that “claims under PAGA… are not arbitrable under this Procedure.”

Rather, PAGA claims are subject to a separate “PAGA Arbitration Procedure” noted later in the Agreement.

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement expressly includes the wage and hour claims brought on a class basis and the PAGA Arbitration Procedure applies to the PAGA claims.

As such, the Court finds the claims within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement.

Facts – FAA Application

The Agreement states:

“As the Company is engaged in interstate commerce, this Arbitration Procedure and the rights of the parties shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the Arbitration Act of the state in which the Company Is located.”

Authority and Analysis – FAA Application

The party asserting the FAA applies to an agreement has “the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence.” (Hoover v. American Income Life Ins.Co. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207; see Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101)

“The FAA applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if it is so stated in the agreement.” (Davis v. Shiekh Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 963.)

Here, the Agreement expressly states the rights of the parties shall be governed by the FAA, which is sufficient to apply it under the above.

Facts – Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

As to procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff’s declaration states a limited education level, that his primary language is Spanish, that he cannot read or write in English, that he can barely read the Spanish language that “I was not provided with any arbitration agreement as part of my employment onboarding on November 3, 2020, or anytime afterwards,” that “I was never provided with an opportunity to review, understand, or consider any arbitration agreement before allegedly being asked to sign documents during onboarding” and that the onboarding documents were presented in a hurried, informal manner. (Declaration of Plaintiff ¶¶1-9.)

Further, that no person explained the arbitration process, that no indication of a waiver of jury trial was provided, that no explanation of the elimination of the right to bring a class action, that Plaintiff was instructed to complete the onboarding documents quickly, that Plaintiff was not provided with a copy of the Agreement, that Plaintiff was not informed the he could decline to sign the Agreement and that Plaintiff was not permitted to take any documents home, review them later or consult with counsel.

As to substantive unconscionability, Plaintiff notes contradictory provisions as to PAGA claims and lack bilaterality due to this provision.

Authority and Analysis – Defenses to Enforcement – Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Service, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 82, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

“An adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Arbitration contracts imposed as a condition of employment are typically adhesive. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 114-115; Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.)

But the fact that an agreement is adhesive is not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Malone v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1551, 1561.) “[A] compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.)

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

Here, Agreement is a preprinted form, presented to Plaintiff at the time of hiring, with a number of other onboarding documents, was instructed to sign the Agreement and other documents, was not given an explanation thereof, could not negotiate the terms and did not obtain a signed copy of the Agreement in order to review it later or with an attorney. Additionally, the Agreement is relatively dense, contains five pages, and contains a separate PAGA arbitration procedure and opt out form. Plaintiff indicates the documents were signed on the hood of a truck surrounded by fencing and equipment. 

The Court agrees there exists a high degree of procedural unconscionability under these facts.

Substantive Unconscionability

“Substantive unconscionability occurs when a contract, particularly, contracts of adhesion, impose terms “that have been variously described as overly harsh, unduly oppressive, so one-sided as to shock the conscience, or unfairly one-sided. All of these formulations point to the central idea that the unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with a simple old-fashioned bad bargain, but with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party. Unconscionable terms impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy or attempt to impermissibly alter fundamental legal duties.” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at 129–30, internal quotations and citations omitted.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Armendariz, supra. 24 Cal 4th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement fails to provide a modicum of bilaterality between employer and employee with respect to the PAGA Arbitration Procedure and otherwise unfairly advantage the Defendant.

PAGA Arbitration Procedure

To start, the Court notes Plaintiff’s operative amended complaint alleges a PAGA claim.

Defendant’s motion, however, expressly states “This is not a PAGA action. Thus, there is no issue with respect to staying this action for continued PAGA matters.”

The Arbitration Agreement states that “claims under PAGA” are not arbitrable “under the Procedure” referencing the portion of the Agreement prior to the PAGA Arbitration Procedure section.

As such, “claims under PAGA” are carved out of the “Procedure” set forth in the first portion of the Arbitration Agreement.

Turning then to the PAGA Arbitration Procedure, it states “If an employee has a PAGA claim and has voluntarily agreed to use the PAGA Arbitration Procedure by not timely opting out of It, the employee must submit the claim to the PAGA Arbitration Procedure.” Here, as noted above, Plaintiff has alleged a PAGA claim and no completed opt out form has been presented.

Thereafter, the PAGA Arbitration Procedure expressly incorporates some, but not all of the prior Procedure sections, stating:

“Procedure. The procedure regarding the Initiation of Arbitrator, Selecting the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator's Fees, Scape of Arbitrator's Authority, Conducting Discovery, Representation by Legal Counsel, Hearing, and the Arbitrator's Decision contained In the Arbitration Procedure shall be sued in connection with claims under this Procedure in the absence of a different specific provision.”

Notably, the first three paragraphs of second page of the Agreement are not expressly incorporated as to the “PAGA Arbitration Procedure.” Those first three paragraphs contain various language as to waiver of “class, collective, or representative proceedings.” As such, the Court examines the PAGA Arbitration Procedure language and the expressly incorporated sections from the Procedure in evaluating the argued substantive unconscionability of the PAGA procedure.

Type A and Type O PAGA Claims

The Court notes here, “[t]here is no individual component to a PAGA action because '"every PAGA action . . . is a representative action on behalf of the state."' [Citation.]" (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 87.) The term "individual" refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by the plaintiff. (See Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 648 [referring to these claims as "Type A" claims].) The term “non-individual” refers to those claims brought by a plaintiff as a representative of the State and which seek to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations experienced by employees other than the plaintiff. (Galarsa, at 649 [referring to these claims as "Type O" claims].)

Carving Out of PAGA Claims

In Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 59, the agreement to arbitrate stated:

“In the event there is any dispute between [Duran] and the Company relating to or arising out of the employment or the termination of [Duran] … [Duran] and the Company agree to submit all such claims or disputes to be resolved by final and binding arbitration, instead of going to court, in accordance with the procedural rules of the Federal Arbitration Act” and encompassed wage and hour disputes. (Id. at 62)

The agreement in Duran then carved out the following claims from arbitration:

“Claims for unemployment compensation, claims under the National Labor Relations Act, claims under PAGA, claims for workers' compensation benefits, and any claim that is non-arbitrable under applicable state or federal law are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” (emphasis in original) (Id. at 63)

The court noted “This is the agreement's only reference to PAGA.” (Id.)

The appellate court affirmed the decision to deny the motion to compel arbitration as to all PAGA claims (that is, Type A and Type O) under the agreement. (Id. at 62.)

The Duran appellate court examined first, the “antiwaiver rule” from Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 360, that “an arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy.” (Duran, supra, 92 Cal. App. 5^th at 64.)

The Duran court noted that this rule was left intact by the United States Supreme Court Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639.

In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court held that a PAGA cause of action may be divided into individual and representative claims and that the individual claims may be ordered to arbitration: "PAGA authorizes any 'aggrieved employee' to initiate an action against a former employer 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current and former employees' to obtain civil penalties that previously could have been recovered only by the State in an [Labor Workforce and Development Agency] enforcement action." (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 645.) The "individual PAGA claim" is the claim for the violations suffered by the aggrieved employee and the "representative PAGA claim" is the PAGA claim arising out of events involving other employees. (Id. at 648.)

The Viking River decision “left undisturbed” and “intact” both of the rules from Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348 that (1) prohibited categorical waivers of the right to bring a PAGA action in any forum and (2) prohibited waivers of PAGA claims on behalf of other employees, i.e., non-individual or representative claims. (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1117-1118.)

However, the United States Supreme Court held that the third rule, which prohibited the "'division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate'" was preempted by the FAA. (Id. at 1118.)

Specifically, the Viking River Court stated:

"The agreement between Viking and Moriana purported to waive 'representative PAGA claims. Under Iskanian, this provision was invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims. And under our holding, that aspect of Iskanian is not preempted by the FAA, so the agreement remains invalid insofar as it is interpreted in that manner. But the severability clause in the agreement provides that if the waiver provision is invalid in some respect, any portion that remains valid must still be 'enforced in arbitration.' Based on this clause, Viking was entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana's individual PAGA claim." (Id. at 1924-1925.)

As summarized by Adolph: "The high court explained that an anti-splitting rule 'unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine "the issues subject to arbitration" and "the rules by which they will arbitrate," [citation], and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that "arbitration is a matter of consent."' (Viking River, at p. 659.) Requiring parties to adjudicate a PAGA action entirely in one proceeding, the high court said, 'compels parties to either go along with an arbitration in which the range of issues under consideration is determined by coercion rather than consent, or else forgo arbitration altogether. Either way, the parties are coerced into giving up a right they enjoy under the FAA.' (Viking River, at p. 661.) Thus, Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff's individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA." (Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at 1118-1119.)

Application to the Procedure and PAGA Arbitration Procedure in this Agreement

Here, the Agreement lacks an intent to split the claims under the FAA and instead provides a wholesale waiver as to adjudicating PAGA claims in Court. The Agreement at issue here states “…disputes between the Company and its employees shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator and not to any court ("Procedure" or "Arbitration Procedure")” before carving out “claims under PAGA” without any designation or express desire to split Type A and Type O PAGA claims.

Turning to the “PAGA Arbitration Procedure” it too fails to differentiate between Type A and Type O PAGA claims, stating that “If an employee has a PAGA claim and has voluntarily agreed to use the PAGA Arbitration Procedure by not timely opting out of it, the employee must submit the claim to the PAGA Arbitration Procedure.”

This is a wholesale waiver of the PAGA claim that is not permitted under Iskanian and left intact by Viking River.

The Duran court then noted that, although a severance clause existed, there was nothing illegal or unenforceable to sever in this case, because the “antiwaiver rule” above prohibits waiver of PAGA claims and “Consequently, the PAGA claims fall within the exception to the agreement's waiver provision. Because the exception applies, there is no invalid provision to sever from the remainder of the agreement.” (Duran, supra, 92 Cal. App. 5^th at 65.)

The Duran court then moved to analysis of the contractual language as to the carve out of “claims under PAGA” as non-arbitrable. In finding that the carve out applied to all PAGA claims without qualification, the court noted: “As drafted, the carve-out provision contains no qualifying language. It simply says that ‘claims under PAGA … are not arbitrable under this Agreement.’” (Id. at 66.)

Therefore, all PAGA claims (the only claims at issue in the complaint filed by the plaintiff in Duran) were beyond arbitration. The court concluded:

“It cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean the parties agreed to arbitrate the category of PAGA claims seeking to recover civil penalties that will be split 75 percent to the state and 25 percent to plaintiff—that is, the claims seeking to recover penalties for Labor Code violations suffered by plaintiff…In other words, Type A claims and Type O claims are both ‘claims under PAGA’ for purposes of the carve-out provisions.” (Id. at 66-67.)

The Duran court noted “If Select Staffing intended the clause to be a truism—that is, only nonarbitrable PAGA claims would not be arbitrable under the agreement—it should have drafted the clause to say so.” (Id. at 67.)

Here, the language stating claims under PAGA are excluded from the “Procedure” and then that all PAGA claims must be arbitrated without language indicative of an intent to split the PAGA claim. Therefore, this renders the entirety of the PAGA Arbitration Procedure unenforceable under Duran and Iskanian above.

However, the Court will sever the PAGA Arbitration Procedure and strike it.

As such, the PAGA claims are not subject to arbitrable, but the Agreement now contains no substantive unconscionability.

Facts and Authority and Analysis - Class Action Waiver

As the FAA applies, the class action waiver is enforceable. (Viking River Cruises v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 651 ["'a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so'"]; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 352 [holding class action waivers are enforceable under FAA and California rule to contrary preempted].)

Therefore, the Court dismisses the class claims.

Conclusion

The Court finds an agreement to arbitrate the individual Labor Code, Wage Orders, and Business and Professions Code claims, having dismissed the class claims pursuant to the enforceable waiver.

The Court has severed and struck the PAGA Arbitration Procedure, thereby avoiding finding the Agreement to be unconscionable.

However, because the PAGA Arbitration Procedure has been struck, the cause of action for PAGA, all of it, is not subject to arbitration, as the “Procedure” expressly carves out, entirely, “claims under PAGA.”

As such, the Court grants the motion, compels arbitration of the individual Labor Code, Wage Orders, and Business and Professions Code claims and stays this matter as to the PAGA cause of action.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 In the Matter of State of California, Agricultural Labor Relations Board

Case No.:   VCU326221

Date:            March 26, 2026

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           1-The Honorable David C. Mathias

Motion:     (1) Motion for Authorization to Serve via Secretary of State (2) Petition to Enforce Administrative Subpoena

Tentative Ruling: (1) To grant the motion; (2) To continue the petition to April 23, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and order the filing of a proof of service as to the service authorized above.

Facts Common to (1) and (2)

In this matter, Petitioner seeks, via an amended petition filed February 13, 2026, for an order enforcing an administrative subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to California Labor Code section 1151, subdivision (b), California Code of Regulations, title 8, sections 20217(g) and 20250(k) as against Respondent RFL, Inc.

However, Petitioner has been unable to serve Respondent and seeks an order authorizing service via the Secretary of State.

On September 5, 2024, ALRB office staff sent the Subpoena via certified U.S. mail, return receipt requested, to the RFL’s agent for service at the address registered with the Secretary of State. However, no response to the subpoena was provided.

In support of the motion, Petitioner provides the declaration of Xavier Sanchez who indicates that upon filing this Petition, he directed Petitioner’s administrative staff to contact legal service provider One Legal so it could serve Elia Rodriguez, the registered agent for service of process for Respondent, at the sole address listed with the Secretary of State. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶6.)

Four attempts were made over four days in September 2025 to serve Elia Rodriguez at the sole address on file with the Secretary of State, which is also a residential address. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶6 – Ex. B.)

On October 6, 2025, Petitioner sent via first-class mail the Petition, two copies of the Notice and Acknowledgement of Receipt, and a return envelope with prepaid postage to Elia Rodriguez at the sole address on file with the Secretary of State, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.30, but the Petitioner never received the returned Acknowledgement of Receipt. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶8.)

On November 26, 2026, the ALRB employed the Tulare County Sheriff’s Department to serve the Petition with the hearing date of January 29, 2026. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶11.) The Sheriff’s authorized agents made three attempts in December 2025 to serve Elia Rodriguez at the sole address on file with the Secretary of State, none of which were successful. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶12 – Ex. D.)

On December 30, 2025, the ALRB employed One Legal to conduct a stakeout and service of process on Elia Rodriguez at the sole address on file with the Secretary of State. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶13.) However, during the service attempts, on the evening of January 1, 2026, a resident of the address on file with the Secretary of State told Camarillo that Elia Rodriguez did not live there. (Declaration of Sanchez ¶14.)

No opposition appears to be filed in response to the motion.

(1) Motion for Authorization to Serve via Secretary of State  - Authority and Analysis

Corporations may be served by delivery of summons and the complaint to the person designated as agent for service of process or to an officer, a general manager, or a person authorized by the corporation to receive such service of process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10.) If, despite reasonable diligence, summons cannot be served on such persons, service may be made on the Secretary of State pursuant to Corporations Code section 1702(a). (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10(d).)

Corporations Code section 1702, subdivision (a) provides as follows:

"If an agent for the purpose of service of process has resigned and has not been replaced or if the agent designated cannot with reasonable diligence be found at the address designated for personally delivering the process, or if no agent has been designated, and it is shown by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that process against a domestic corporation cannot be served with reasonable diligence upon the designated agent by hand in the manner provided in Section 415.10, subdivision (a) of Section 415.20 or subdivision (a) of Section 415.30 of the Code of Civil Procedure or upon the corporation in the manner provided in subdivision (a), (b) or (c) of Section 416.10 or subdivision (a) of Section 416.20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may make an order that the service be made upon the corporation by delivering by hand to the Secretary of State, or to any person employed in the Secretary of State's office in the capacity of assistant or deputy, one copy of the process for each defendant to be served, together with a copy of the order authorizing such service. Service in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after delivery of the process to the Secretary of State."

As a condition precedent to issuance of an order for substituted service on the Secretary of State, a party must show by affidavit that the corporation could not be served with the exercise of due diligence in any other means provided by law. (Batte v. Bandy (1958) 165 Cal.App.3d 527, 534-535.) "Respect for the principles of fair play and due process also support the conclusion that, where authorization is sought to effect service other than by personal service, a showing should be required that personal service cannot otherwise be made with the exercise of due diligence, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of a construction requiring such a showing in construing particular statutory provisions." (Id. at 535.)

Here, the Court finds a sufficient showing of due diligence that the designated agent cannot be served at the address designated under Corporations Code section 1702 and therefore the Court grants the motion as requested.

(2) Petition to Enforce Administrative Subpoena – Authority and Analysis

As service authorized by the ruling above is deemed complete on the 10th day after delivery of the process to the Secretary of State under Corporations Code section 1702(a), the Court will continue this matter to April 23, 2026; 8:30 am; D1 and order the filing of a proof of service as to the service authorized above.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division