Tentative Rulings

The Tentative Rulings for Tuesday, July 8, 2025, are:

Re:                Discover Bank vs. Raney, Elizenda

Case No.:   VCL201884

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside / Vacate Default

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Kevin C. Duncan and Sally J. Duncan vs. Olson-Kirsch, Luann

Case No.:   VCU318533

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Moton to Determine Value

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Dodson, Jennifer vs. Automobile Club of Southern California

Case No.:   VCU308283

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Approve PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                Kurts, Aileen vs. Sierra Lifestar

Case No.:  VCU311118

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                GSFC, LLC vs. Polyset Company, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU314068

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Cross-Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Cross-Complaint based on Personal Jurisdiction

Tentative Ruling: To permit jurisdictional discovery to take place and to continue this hearing to October 21, 2025; to set a briefing schedule as follows:

All jurisdictional discovery complete by September 9, 2025;

Polyset’s supplemental opposition and evidence filed no later than September 23, 2025; and

Indmar’s supplemental reply and evidence filed no later than October 7, 2025.

Facts

The complaint in this matter alleges that Defendant Polyset sold Plaintiff GSFC a flooring product that was defective as to initial issues of bubbling and separation of color and further failed by peeling up in areas, exposing the multiple layers of product and bare concrete, allowing water to seep in and spread throughout the floors, causing mold. (Complaint ¶¶9-12.) The installer of the product, Advanced Floors-Polished Concrete, LLC, attempted to repair the issues but was unable to do so. (Complaint ¶14.)

The complaint further alleges that the coloring product supplied by Defendant’s third-party supplier appeared to be part of the problem with the flooring failures, in addition to the product supplied by Defendant. (Complaint ¶15.)

On February 21, 2025, Polyset filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants Advanced Floors-Polished Concrete, LLC and Indmar Coatings Corporation for indemnity, contribution and declaratory relief.

Polyset filed a proof of service on Indmar indicating that the agent for service of process was served in Virginia on March 19, 2025.

On May 7, 2025, Indmar specially appeared in this action via this motion to quash service based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. Indmar’s director and president indicates Indmar is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Virginia, has its principal place of business in Virgina, does not own lease or maintain any offices, facilities, or real property in the State of California, and does not have any employees, officers, directors, agents for service of process or bank accounts located in California. (Declaration of Rowe ¶¶1-5.) Additionally, Rowe states that Indmar has not entered into any contracts in California, and it has not negotiated, executed, or performed any contracts in California relating to the matters alleged in the Cross-Complaint and is not a party to the contract between GSFC and Polyset. (Declaration of Rowe ¶¶7-8.)

In opposition, Polyset provides the declaration of its Chief Financial Officer who states “Polyset purchased materials from Indmar for application at GSFC, LLC's facility in Woodlake, California,” that “on November 30, 2018, Polyset Company purchased products from Indmar that were shipped directly by Indmar to Polyset's customer in Vernon, California. Polyset's customer in this instance was an entity called ‘Jungle Boys’  and “On information and belief, Indmar also supplied product for a Polyset project in California for an entity "Sanden Construction."” (Declaration of Blackman ¶¶5, 10, 13.) Additionally, that Indmar’s website utilizes a photo of the Golden Gate Bridge to advertise that coatings are preapproved in most states for bridges. (Declaration of ¶ - Ex. G)

Polyset argues this is sufficient for the Court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Indmar.

Alternatively, Polyset seeks an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.

Authority and Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10 states: “A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion … (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” ((Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (a).)

“When a defendant challenges jurisdiction through a motion to quash, the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate facts, as to each nonresident defendant, justifying the exercise of jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence. [Citation.] The plaintiff must provide specific evidentiary facts, through affidavits and other authenticated documents, sufficient to allow the court to independently conclude whether jurisdiction is appropriate. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot rely on allegations in an unverified complaint or vague and conclusory assertions of ultimate facts. [Citation.]” (Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair and Logistics, LP (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 215, 221-222.) “Once facts showing minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” (Vons Companies, Inc, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 449.)

Jurisdictional facts must be proved by competent evidence - that is, declarations by competent witnesses. If the parties' declarations conflict on the jurisdictional fact, the court decides whom to believe. (Evangelize China Fellowship, Inc. v. Evangelize China Fellowship (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 440, 444.) Unverified pleadings have no evidentiary value in determining personal jurisdiction but can be relevant to determination of the cause of action and whether it arises out of the defendant's alleged local activities. (Mihlon v. Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710.) If there is no conflict in the evidence, "the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law." (Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062.)

“California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is not inconsistent with the state and federal Constitutions. Thus, the inquiry in California is whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the limits imposed by federal due process.” (Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 855, 865 [internal quotations and citations omitted])  “Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.” Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445.

General Jurisdiction

“A defendant that has substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the forum state is subject to general jurisdiction in the state, meaning jurisdiction on any cause of action.” (HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1167.) Under a "general" jurisdiction analysis, nonresident defendants may be sued on causes of action unrelated to their activities within the state. (Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147.) "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home" (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 US 117, 137.)

Here, the Court finds Polyset has not met its burden demonstrating that California is fairly regarded as Indmar’s “home” given that Indmar’s principal place of business appears to be located in Virginia. The Court does not find Indmar under general jurisdiction of California.

Specific Jurisdiction

A nonresident may be subject to specific jurisdiction if a three-prong test is met. “First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the state's benefits. Second, the controversy must be related to or arise out of the defendant's contacts with the state. Third, considering the defendant's contacts with the state and other factors, California's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must comport with fair play and substantial justice.” (Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1568.)

For specific jurisdiction, a defendant's contacts with the forum state must have a substantial connection to the plaintiff's claim, though the contacts need not be the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury or even directed at the plaintiff. (Vons Companies Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 452, 455, 460-462.)

The Court grants Polyset’s request to conduct jurisdictional discovery and continue this hearing. (See HealthMarkets, Inc. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173 [holding “[a] trial court has the discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues”].)

Polyset should be permitted to conduct discovery regarding Indmar’s alleged contacts with California. The Court finds a sufficient showing via Polyset’s declaration as to a basis in fact for jurisdictional discovery, such that the Court concludes discovery is likely to produce evidence of California contacts sufficient for personal jurisdiction. (See In re Automobile Antitrust Cases (2005) 136 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 ["In order to prevail on a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction"].)

Therefore, the Court continues this hearing to October 21, 2025 and sets a briefing schedule as follows:

All jurisdictional discovery completed by September 9, 2025;

Polyset’s supplemental opposition and evidence filed no later than September 23, 2025; and

Indmar’s supplemental reply and evidence filed no later than October 7, 2025.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Garcia, Juan vs. Tetra Propery [sic] Management [sic]

Case No.:   VCU306822

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion to Lift Stay

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar. The Court notes that Plaintiff’s ex parte application to lift the stay was denied May 22, 2025.

At the hearing on July 1, 2025 in this matter, the Court lifted the stay by agreement of counsel.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Julius, Desmond Anthony vs. Amdal Transport Services, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU309520

Date:           July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Motion for Preliminary Approval

Tentative Ruling: No documents appear filed in connection with this motion. The Court takes the motion off calendar. The parties to this matter continued the hearing until August 12, 2025. As the court has continued this hearing more than once, counsel is admonished to file the documents as stipulated this time. It is unlikely the court will be receptive to another request to continue.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Donaghy, Stephen vs. World Wide Sires Ltd, LLC

Case No.:   VCU320336

Date:            July 8, 2025

Time:            8:30 A.M. 

Dept.            2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:      Motion to Compel Arbitration

Tentative Ruling: To grant the motion.

Background Facts

The complaint in this matter alleges a single cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 against Defendant World Wide Sires, LTD, LLC.

Defendant moves to compel arbitration based upon an alleged agreement to arbitrate all employment-related claims (“Agreement”) entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant.

Facts – Agreement to Arbitrate

In support, Defendant provides a declaration from its Director of Administration, who states they are familiar with Defendant’s practices for implementing and reviewing company policies and procedures for employees, including the process of presenting documents to employees, including the Agreement. (Declaration of Elliot ¶¶1-3.)

The Director notes that the documents and policies for employees, including the Agreement, are presented using a digital platform “SinglePoint—Worklio.” (Declaration of Elliot ¶4.) The Director notes the Defendant initially registers the employee for Worklio using the employee provided email address, after which the employee creates a unique password that only they know to finish setting up their digital profile. (Declaration of Elliot ¶4.)

The Director further states:

“After the employee sets up their unique digital profile, the employees have the ability to access relevant documents for their employment, including their payroll records, company policies, and the arbitration agreement. To fill out documents, employees will create their own digital signatures. Employees have the ability to select a font from a pre-written signature, or to use their cursor to manually pen a signature. The employees then use their unique digital signature to fill out documents as needed. The employees use the digital signature to fill out all of the orientation and hiring documents, including company policies, tax withholding information, direct deposit information, acknowledgement of receipt of company policies, the arbitration agreement, and other relevant personnel documents. Only the employee has the ability to access documents or use the employees digital signature.” (Declaration of Elliot ¶5.)

Additionally, there is no time limit and the employees are free to review the documents for as long as needed, including away from work and at all times, the employees are made aware that the document they are executing is an arbitration agreement. (Declaration of Elliot ¶6.) The employees sign the arbitration agreement using their unique digital signature that the employee creates, as described above. (Declaration of Elliot ¶6.)

Here,  Plaintiff began his employment in 2018, and at that time, was presented with a physical copy of an arbitration agreement, which he executed. (Declaration of Elliot ¶7.)

However, starting in 2021 when Defendant switched to the Worklio system, Plaintiff was presented revised company policies and documents, including the Agreement. (Declaration of Elliot ¶8.) The updated Agreement was intended to take the place of the existing arbitration agreement. (Declaration of Elliot ¶8.)

Further, the Director notes that, on or about September 20, 2021, Plaintiff signed up for the Worklio system, filling out several company documents and choosing the option of creating a signature using his own hand to handwrite in the digital signature. (Declaration of Elliot ¶8.) The Director notes that while this created a digital signature, Plaintiff was required to physically write out his signature for digital use. (Declaration of Elliot ¶8.) Thereafter, Plaintiff used the same digital signature to fill out several employment documents, including the acknowledgment and confirmation of receipt of the Company general policies, rules of safe practices, and the updated Agreement. (Declaration of Elliot ¶8.) Plaintiff additionally used the Worklio system to fill out tax withholding information, access his payroll documents, and Company training documents. (Declaration of Elliot ¶9.)

The Director indicates copies of the executed documents, including the Agreement. are stored digitally and that the Director has access to employee files, including Plaintiff’s file. (Declaration of Elliot ¶11.) The Director indicates that upon searching the digital file of Plaintiff, they located the Agreement containing Plaintiff’s signature. (Declaration of Elliot ¶11.) The Director indicates she is personally familiar with Plaintiff and his signature. (Declaration of Elliot ¶¶10, 11.) The Director attaches a true and correct copy of the Agreement to the declaration. (Declaration of Elliot ¶11 – Ex. A.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute executing the Agreement, but argues it is unconscionable and cannot be enforced.

Authority and Analysis – Agreement to Arbitrate

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.”  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1281.2(a), (b).) (emphasis added.)

Absent a challenge by the nonmoving party, this burden is met by simply providing a copy of the arbitration agreement.  (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC, 13 Cal. App. 5th 1152, 1160 (2017); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330.)  “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001), 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218; Sprunk v. Prisma LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 785, 793.)  

However, when the opposing party disputes the agreement, then the opposing party must provide evidence to challenge its authenticity.  (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165.) 

Under California law, "[t]he burden of persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the evidence …." (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164-165.)“However, the burden of production may shift in a three-step process." (Id. at 165.)

“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing 'prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.' [Citation.]” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “The moving party 'can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party's] signature.' [Citation.]” (Id..) “For this step, 'it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.’ [Citation.]” (Id.)

Here, this initial step is met through the attachment of the Agreement.  

"If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement." (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at 165.) “The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff has not made such a declaration and the Court, under the modified rules applicable to authentication and burden shifting above, finds Defendant has demonstrated an agreement to arbitrate.

Lack of Signature of Defendant

Defendant argues the Agreement unenforceable because Defendant did not execute the Agreement and there is no signature line for Defendant.

However, “the writing memorializing an arbitration agreement need not be signed by both parties in order to be upheld as a binding arbitration agreement. In Banner Entertainment, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, the court explained, “it is not the presence or absence of a signature [on an agreement] which is dispositive; it is the presence or absence of evidence of an agreement to arbitrate which matters.” (Id. at p. 361, original italics.) Evidence confirming the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, despite an unsigned agreement, can be based, for example, on “conduct from which one could imply either ratification or implied acceptance of such a provision.” (Ibid.; see Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420–423 [100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818] [despite absence of a signed writing acknowledging receipt of the memorandum and brochure containing the arbitration provision, the employee's continued employment constituted implied acceptance of the agreement].)” (Serafin v. Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 176 [emphasis in original].) Here, the Agreement contemplates an employment relationship between the parties that is the subject of the Agreement and its arbitration of disputes arising out of such a relationship. The Agreement identifies the employer. In construing the meaning of the  Agreement, the primary focus is to give effect to the intent of the parties at the time of its making. (Civ. Code, § 1636.) "A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates." (Civ. Code, § 1647.)

The Court does not find the Agreement unenforceable due to the lack of Defendant’s signature thereon.

2021 Agreement

Defendant argues a lack of consideration supports Agreement executed in 2021, as Plaintiff already executed an agreement to arbitrate in 2018.

The Agreement states “This is the entire agreement between the Company, on the one hand, and Employee, on the other hand, regarding dispute resolution, and this Agreement supersedes any and all prior agreements regarding these issues.”

Because the employment between Plaintiff and Defendant was at will, Defendant could unilaterally change the terms of Plaintiff’s employment with notice of the change. “[I]t is settled that an employer may unilaterally alter the terms of an employment agreement, provided such alteration does not run afoul of the Labor Code. [Citations.]” (Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 619.) “The at-will presumption authorizing an employer to discharge or demote an employee similarly and necessarily authorizes an employer to unilaterally alter the terms of employment, provided that the alteration does not violate a statute or breach an implied or express contractual agreement.” (Id. at p. 620; see also DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 629, 637 [in adopting the majority view of at-will contracts, the court stated “the majority line of cases supports the proposition that as a matter of law, an at-will employee who continues in the employ of the employer after the employer has given notice of changed terms or conditions of employment has accepted the changed terms and conditions.])”
(Diaz v. Sohnen Enterprises (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 126, 131.)

Additionally, "[A]ny prejudice suffered, or agreed to be suffered, by [a promisee], other than such as he is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the promisor, is a good consideration for a promise." (Cal. Civ. Code § 1605.)  The parties' mutual "promise to be bound by the arbitration process itself serves as adequate consideration." (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Garner v. Inter-State Oil Co., (2020) 52 Cal. App. 5th 619, 265 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384, 389 (rejecting "lack of consideration" argument when "mutual, obligating promises to arbitrate" had been made "in the formation of the contract").

Therefore, the Court does not invalidate that Agreement for lack of consideration.

Facts – Scope of Agreement

The Agreement indicates it applies to all disputes, whether based on tort, contract, statute, including, expressly, the California Labor Code.

As noted above, Plaintiff sues Defendant for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The Agreement further states “This is the entire agreement between the Company, on the one hand, and Employee, on the other hand, regarding dispute resolution, and this Agreement supersedes any and all prior agreements regarding these issues.”

Authority and Analysis – Scope of Agreement

Here, the Agreement expressly includes claims under the Labor Code as arbitrable and therefore the Court finds Plaintiff’s claim within the scope of the Agreement.

Defenses to Enforcement  - Unconscionability

The inquiry into unconscionability consists of two prongs: A contract will be revoked if it is both procedurally unconscionable and substantively unconscionable. (See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th 83, 102.) Procedural and substantive unconscionability need not be present to the same degree. “[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Id. at 114.)

Procedural Unconscionability

“‘Procedural unconscionability’ concerns the manner in which the contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties at that time.  It focuses on the factors of oppression and surprise. The oppression component arises from an inequality of bargaining power of the parties to the contract and an absence of real negotiation or a meaningful choice on the part of the weaker party. The component of surprise arises when the challenged terms are ‘hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.’” (Nyulassy v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1281.)

Here, in support of procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff argues the Agreement was presented on a take it or leave it basis as a condition of employment, that Plaintiff had no opportunity to review or seek modification of the Agreement due to its electronic presentation, there was lack of meaningful choice.

Where a contract of adhesion includes the unequal bargaining power of contracting parties, with the weaker party’s inability to negotiate, this may indicate procedural unconscionability in the form of oppression. (See Thompson v. Toll Dublin, LLC (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1372.) “The term ‘adhesion contract’ refers to standardized contract forms offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or services except by acquiescing in the form contract. [Citations.] The distinctive feature of a contract of adhesion is that the weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms. [Citations.]” (Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 345, 356.) 

However, “a compulsory pre-dispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” (Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1127.) The fact that an arbitration agreement is mandatory for employment may be a factor in determining that it is procedurally unconscionable. (See, e.g., Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387, 393; Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 114-115.) Where a contract of adhesion includes the unequal bargaining power of contracting parties, with the weaker party's inability to negotiate, this may indicate procedural unconscionability in the form of oppression. (See Thompson v. Toll Dublin, LLC (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1372.) 

The Court also considers whether circumstances of the contract’s formation created such oppression or surprise that closer scrutiny of its overall fairness is required. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 126-127.) “The circumstances relevant to establishing oppression include, but are not limited to (1) the amount of time the party is given to consider the proposed contract; (2) the amount and type of pressure exerted on the party to sign the proposed contract; (3) the length of the proposed contract and the length and complexity of the challenged provision; (4) the education and experience of the party; and (5) whether the party's review of the proposed contract was aided by an attorney.” (Id.) As OTO recognizes, the pressure exerted on a standard employee to accept an adhesive arbitration agreement as a condition of employment is “particularly acute,” which indicates oppression.  (Id. at 127.)

These considerations, however, are mitigated by the Agreement’s text that states:

“Employee confirms that they have had time to read this Agreement and ask the Company’s representative any questions that Employee had about the Agreement prior to signing this Agreement.

MY SIGNATURE BELOW ATTESTS TO THE FACT THAT I HAVE READ, UNDERSTAND, AND AGREE TO BE LEGALLY BOUND TO ALL OF THE ABOVE TERMS. DO NOT SIGN UNTIL YOU HAVE READ THE ABOVE AGREEMENT.

By using the online Employment Form Center I have agreed to use an electronic signature in lieu of a paper-based signature to demonstrate that | have received access to the CALIFORNIA MUTUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ARBITRATION) AGREEMENT and understand that it is my responsibility to read and comply with the policies contained in this CALIFORNIA MUTUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ARBITRATION) AGREEMENT and any revisions made to it. if I would like a paper copy of the CALIFORNIA MUTUAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ARBITRATION) AGREEMENT, I will contact my HR Specialist.”

Here, the Court finds a degree of procedural unconscionability exists given the preprinted form, the circumstances around presentation thereof, the take it or leave it basis.

Substantive Unconscionability

“ ‘Substantive unconscionability’ focuses on the terms of the agreement and whether those terms are so one-sided as to ‘shock the conscience.’ ” (Kinney v. United HealthCare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330 (citations omitted).) The paramount consideration in assessing [substantive] conscionability is mutuality. (Ibid.) Substantive unconscionability looks to overly harsh or one-sided results. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 99.)

Armendariz sets forth elements of essential substantive fairness as follows:

(1) provide for a neutral arbitrator:

(2) provide for adequate discovery;

(3) require the arbitrator to issue a written decision that permits limited judicial review;

(4) provide for the same remedies that would otherwise be available to the employee in court;

(5) not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration; and

(6) provide a “modicum of bilaterality” between the employer and employee. (Arnendariz, supra. 24 Cal 4th at 102-113, 117-118.)

Plaintiff argues there is an permissive limitation on statutory rights and contains an ambiguous cost shifting provision.

Plaintiff argues the term “Resolution of all disputes shall be based solely upon the law governing the claims and defenses pleaded, and the arbitrator may not invoke any basis (including but not limited to, notions of “just cause’) other than such controlling law” improperly limits the arbitrator’s authority to base an award on statutory remedies, citing to Armendariz at 103. 

The Court’s interpretation of this term is that the arbitrator must follow the law, including any statutory authority or remedies available based upon the causes of action pled. Moreover, the term discussed in Armendariz is wholly distinguishable:

“the arbitration agreement in this case provides in part: "I  and  Employer further expressly agree that in any such arbitration, my exclusive remedies for violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of employment shall be limited to a sum equal to the wages I would have earned from the date of any discharge until the date of the arbitration award. I understand that I shall not be entitled to any other remedy, at law or in equity, including but not limited to reinstatement and/or injunctive relief." (See ante, at p. 92.) The employees claim that the agreement compels them to arbitrate statutory claims without affording the full range of statutory remedies, including punitive damages and attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff, available under  the FEHA.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 at 103-104; emphasis added.)

The Court does not find the term in the Agreement substantively unconscionable.

As to the fees, the Agreement states “Arbitration Fees and Costs. The Company will pay the arbitrator's fees and other costs relating to the arbitration forum. However, Employee and the Company will each be responsible for their own costs and for their attorneys’ fees should any of them choose to be represented by counsel, unless the arbitrator shifts one party’s costs and attorneys’ fees to the other party in accordance with applicable law.”

This term does not require the employee to bear costs unique to arbitration and limits any shifting of fees or costs in accordance with applicable law. Therefore, this term is not substantively unconscionable.

The Court, having found no substantive unconscionability, grants the motion and compels arbitration.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Re:                 Requejo, Christine Leanne vs. Valley Health Team, Inc.

Case No.:   VCU291366

Date:            July 8, 2025

Time:           8:30 A.M. 

Dept.           2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman

Motion:     Continued Motion for Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement

Tentative Ruling: At the prior hearing, the Court continued this motion as to the 60 day notice period. The Court notes no supplemental documents appear filed. Therefore, the Court continues the motion to July 29, 2025, 8:30 am, Dept. 2.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Examiner Notes for Probate Matters Calendared

• Visalia Division 
• South County Justice Center Division